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this book was born out of the need for greater scrutiny of Fiji’s elections. not 
since 1963 had a Fiji election been subjected to any book-length scrutiny.  in 
comparison, for example, neighbouring papua new Guinea had earned itself a 
book for each election since independence. We were determined to redress that 
literary imbalance. there had been a significant number of substantial, and often 
excellent, event-specific documentary accounts of post-independence elections, 
but no broader exploration of the social context of electoral politics. owing to 
the odd mix of communal representation and the new-fangled post-1997 voting 
system, Fiji elections had became a focus of considerable international commentary 
amongst political scientists and international electoral systems specialists.  From 
within the country, also, elections posed repeatedly awkward challenges. indeed, 
that was what had sparked the international debate. A constitutional crisis had 
dislodged Fiji indian-backed elected governments in 1977, and coups had done 
the same in 1987 and 2000. elections had, in each case, sparked the controversy. 
could Fiji’s 2006 election find some way out of that starkly polarized history? 
Would the power-sharing, or the multiparty cabinet that ensued from the 2006 
election, prove the master-key to ethnic accommodation, and enable Fiji to re-
orient itself away from the debilitating politics of ethnic polarization?
that much was the theme of our originally intended book; its relevance has 
been modified but not obliterated by subsequent events. We knew that the 
passage of time would change the significance of the may 2006 election. We 
also knew that the military commander believed the government corrupt and 
preface
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xx
wanted it defeated. But when the election came and went, and the government 
was re-elected, and the commander fell silent, we hoped that Fiji had averted the 
threat of military intervention. the formation of a power-sharing cabinet, for 
the first time bringing together representatives from the two starkly polarized 
political parties, backed respectively by the bulk of ethnic Fijians and Fiji 
indians, seemed to offer a unique solution to Fiji’s perpetual political impasse. 
that was the perspective offered by then Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi, 
included in this volume, and rightly so. And it was a viewpoint embraced, 
for a time, also by the commander of Fiji’s military forces. popular optimism 
abounded, and Fiji – for the first time – seemed to have found a home-grown 
strategy for the supersession of ethnic fractionalization.
under these circumstances, the important task was to gather together a 
diverse group of people to comment upon and analyse the election from a 
wide variety of perspectives. in a workshop held at the university of the South 
pacific in june 2006, we gave an opportunity for prospective contributors to 
share thoughts and tackle various election-related themes, and the proceedings 
of that event form the backbone of this book. Few anticipated at that time that, 
less than seven months after the election, yet another coup, on 5 December, 
would breach the banks of Fiji’s democracy, transforming the 18 may election 
into a last gasp before the country lurched once more into military government. 
Yet, coups do not easily obliterate the significance of their preceding election. 
that was true of the 1987 and 1999 polls which, albeit annulled by subsequent 
coups, commanded an enduring historical interest. the difference, as regards 
the 2006 poll, was oddly that the boot was on the other foot. this time, unlike 
1987 or 1999, it was a coup that dislodged a government elected on the basis 
of majority ethnic-Fijian support. 
Fiji has established two methods of changing government since 1987: 
elections and coups. neither is fully accepted as settling the matter. in the 
last two decades, the democratic result has determined the formation of 
governments on three occasions (1992, 1994 and 2001) but it has not done 
so, or done so for only a short time, on another three occasions (1987, 1999 
and 2006). the army did not accept the outcome in 1987, and staged a coup. 
When the 1999 election brought to power the country’s first prime minister 
of indian origin, many indigenous Fijians refused to accept the result and 
welcomed his overthrow by George Speight a year later. the army then took 
xx
over, and installed an interim administration. And when an election returned 
the Qarase government to office in 2006, the army seized power once again, 
claiming that the election result was not in the national interest and dismissing 
democracy as a mere ‘numbers game’. none of Fiji’s previous coups has resulted 
in a lasting military government: Fiji is not Burma. instead, both domestic and 
international pressures have encouraged a return to constitutional democracy 
as each wave of rulers seeks to consolidate its legitimacy.
therein lies the crux of Fiji politics; each social force that claims unilateral 
power for itself almost visibly struggles for a broader public consent, and cringes 
in the face of its unacceptability to one or other section of the community. that 
perpetual legitimacy crisis owes its origins to the 1987 coup; no subsequent 
elected government commanded a broad popular consensus. rabuka’s 
governments in the 1990s failed to do so. So did the short-lived chaudhry 
administration of 1999–2001. And so it was also for Qarase, first after the 2000 
coup, as the courts found his interim regime unconstitutional, and then, again, 
after 2001 when, despite election victory, the courts found his government 
unconstitutional because it failed to follow the power-sharing rules in the 
constitution. in the dying days of the 2001–2006 Qarase administration, that 
search for legitimacy remained visible, as the re-elected government – under 
the threat of impending military overthrow – sought to bolster and sanctify its 
legitimacy by vain appeals to the Great council of chiefs, and, although the 
response was disappointing, to the office of the president. 
neither elections nor coups, then, enjoy enduring legitimacy in the Fijian 
political system. nor do constitutions. Fiji has had three constitutions since 
independence (those of 1970, 1990 and 1997), and, owing to the legally 
precarious position of the post-january 2007 interim administration, there 
is now talk of a fourth. the extraordinary constitutional justifications of the 
commander, as relayed to the nation on 5 December and again on 5 january, 
the appeal to the ‘doctrine of necessity’ or various supposed ‘reserve powers’, 
seem destined to fall on deaf judicial ears, at least if these retain any semblance 
of independent authority. Yet, leaving aside the supposedly pristine legal debates, 
the political realities are clear enough. Fundamental rules and institutions in Fiji 
are accepted up to a point, but not if they threaten vested interests too directly or 
they deliver the ‘wrong’ outcome. under these circumstances, principle counts 
for less than power. mahendra chaudhry, the prime minister overthrown in 
xx
the 2000 coup, is a minister in the military-backed interim government. the 
victim of one coup, chaudhry is the beneficiary of another, back in power but 
through the agency of armed force rather than the popular vote. 
commitment to democracy and constitutionalism seem, then, to sit more 
lightly with Fiji’s political leaders than the desire to reclaim a place at the top of 
Fiji’s public life. that much was true also of the host of politicians who hoped to 
gain from Speight’s coup in may 2000 or, perhaps more pragmatically, from the 
military takeover that superseded it. And the switch to serving the 2007 military 
government – for such it is in all but name – is all the easier for those who chose 
to participate in the Bainimarama-led cabinet because the December 2006 coup 
was undertaken in the name of anti-corruption. they claim to be a part of a 
clean-up campaign, sweeping away corruption, nepotism and inefficiency and 
to be acting in the national interest. But then all Fiji’s coups have been justified 
by appeals to the greater good – the protection of ‘indigenous rights’ in the 
case of the 1987 and Speight coups, ‘national security’ in the case of the army’s 
intervention on 29 may 2000, and, in December 2006, ‘anti-corruption’. the 
labels may change but beneath lie the ambitions of individuals and groups who 
want political power and are not willing to wait for the cumbersome, and often 
messy and difficult, process of electoral democracy to get it. 
Books about elections are habitually, and necessarily, about political parties, 
political deal-making, campaigns, candidates, platforms, policies, issues, the 
media, the role of women, voting systems, electoral boundaries, and regional 
political peculiarities. this book covers all these issues, but it also does more 
than that. it includes chapters by the major protagonists at the polls: laisenia 
Qarase, the prime minister who won the election, and former opposition leader 
mahendra chaudhry, who lost and claimed it was tainted by ballot-rigging. 
that argument subsequently became a major part of the case of the republic 
of Fiji military Forces and, bizarre though that was, of the Fiji Human rights 
commission, which sought to justify the coup of December 2006. this book 
also addresses many of the unique nuances of Fiji politics: how christian, 
Hindu and muslim religious organizations responded to the election, the 
role of traditional chiefs, the regional peculiarities in electoral politics (in 
rewa, tailevu, rotuma and Ba province), the backwash of earlier events in 
Fiji’s political history, especially the 2000 coup, and, most importantly, the 
campaign against the sitting government by the military commander, which 
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proved ultimately decisive in reversing the course seemingly set in stone by the 
2006 election result. 
We offer this book, then, as a study of a moment in time in the jagged 
course of Fiji’s modern history. the contributors wrote their chapters before 
they could have known that the military would annul the election result. 
their perspective, and no reproach is due to them for this, is inevitably from 
within the pre-coup democratic and constitutional order. We have not sought 
to revise those contributions. if those chapters turn out to be primarily of 
historical interest, so be it. they are no less important for that. But this book 
is also much more than an interpretation of past events, forgotten players or 
defeated social forces. elections will return, and – at the time of writing – the 
political players examined in this book are already climbing back onto the 
stage, assuming positions in the interim order or staking out their claims and 
perspectives for the anticipated contests of the future, whether these be legal, 
political or ideological. the supposedly cathartic intervention of the military in 
government rests inherently on force, even if buttressed by the persuasive sirens 
of a ‘clean-up campaign’. legitimacy crises, which figure as such a perpetual 
accompaniment to the orchestra of Fiji politics, will not easily be discharged by 
gunpoint. And, as the absence of consensus makes its presence felt, the social 
forces, ideals and political players investigated in this book will resume their 
roles, no doubt in transfigured but still recognisable forms.  
Fortunately, we had not gone to press when the commander of Fiji’s military 
forces seized control in December 2006. So we were able to include several 
contributions to the interpretation of that enigmatic event, and the odd 
reconfiguration of Fiji politics that followed it. robert norton, in a postscript 
to his concluding chapter, asks whether the coup might prove a means of 
transcending ethnic divisions, although emphasising also the inherently coercive 
nature of military intervention. jon Fraenkel has sought, in an addendum, to 
weigh and balance the initial conflicting interpretations of the December 2006 
coup. ours will not be the last word on Fiji’s latest coup, and nor should it 
be. Here was a sufficiently perplexing event to warrant a host of analyses and 
investigations. We offer our own as a contribution to that ongoing debate, one 
buttressed and backgrounded by a far-reaching and detailed survey of that era 
when constitutional power-sharing was attempted as a productive way forward 
in the ever-turbulent history of post-independence Fiji. 
February 2007
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A note on the Fiji electoral  
system
Jon Fraenkel
Fiji adopted the alternative vote (AV) system as part of the 1997 constitution, 
and its finer details are set out in the 1998 electoral Act.1 previously, the 
country had used an Anglo-American style first-past-the-post (or plurality) 
system. the new AV system, like its predecessors, reserves a substantial number 
of seats for members of specific ethnic groups, although now accompanied 
by ‘open’ or common roll seats. there are 46 reserved constituencies – 23 are 
for the ethnic Fijians, 19 for Fiji indians, 3 for ‘General’ electors and one for 
those from the island of rotuma.2 in these communal constituencies, eligible 
citizens from Fiji’s distinct groups vote for candidates from their own ethnic 
community. in addition, there are 25 open constituencies, where all eligible 
citizens vote together. every eligible citizen may complete two ballot papers 
– one for a communal seat and one for an open seat. the boundaries of 
the various communal and open constituencies are not coterminous. every 
geographical area in Fiji will be, in some way, covered by all five different 
types of constituency. All constituencies return only a single member to the 
71-member Bose Lawa (parliament).
the alternative vote system is a preferential voting system. Voters are required 
to rank candidates. if no candidate gets a majority (50 per cent+1) at the first 
count, the lowest polling candidate is eliminated and his or her ballots are 
recounted to ascertain voter second preferences. if there is still no candidate 
with an outright majority, the next lowest polling candidate is eliminated and 
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Table 1 Outcome in the 2006 North Eastern General Communal 
constituency
 number of counts
candidate party 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Harry robinson upp 528 545 561 941 excl.
nawaia touakin independent 357 361 excl.  
rebo terubea Flp 383 391 423 excl. 
David christopher SDl 1,467 1,478 1,511 1,547 1,639
rocky Billings nApF 289 excl.   
robin irwin independent 629 873 1,158 1,165 2,014
informal votes  389    
total votes  4,042    
total valid votes  3,653    
Votes required for a majority 1,827 
notes: upp = united peoples party; Flp= Fiji labour party; SDl = Soqosoqo Duavata n lewenivanua; 
nApF = national Alliance party of Fiji; excl. = excluded.
his or her votes are again redistributed in accordance with preferences to the 
remaining contestants. this process of elimination and redistribution continues, 
if necessary, until there are only two candidates remaining. 
table 1 shows the outcome in one of the three General electors’ communal 
constituencies in 2006, where the outcome was ultimately decided at the fifth 
count. the total number of valid votes was 3,653, so the required majority 
threshold was 1,827 (50 per cent+1). no candidate achieved this at the 
first count, so the lowest polling candidate, the nApF’s rocky Billings, was 
eliminated. redistribution of his preference votes failed to yield a winner, and 
it required the elimination of three further candidates until, in a two-horse 
race, robin irwin passed the threshold by obtaining 2,014 votes, although he 
had received only 629 first preference votes. 
Fiji’s voting system uses a split format ballot paper, with an ‘above-the-line’ 
and a ‘below-the-line’ section. Voters are required to choose which section of 
the ballot paper they complete, but they may not complete both. the ‘above-
the-line’ section of the ballot paper requires the voter to place a single tick next 
to a favoured party or candidate. Such ticks are taken to endorse the preferences 
lodged by political parties or candidates with the Fiji elections office shortly 
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Table 2 Preferences lodged by political parties for the 2006 North Eastern 
General Communal constituency
 party/candidate lodging preferences
 upp touakin Flp SDl nApF irwin nVtlp nFp jFp coin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
robinson (upp) 1 4 2 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 
touakin (ind) 4 1 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 
terubea (Flp) 2 6 1 6 4 6 6 6 5 5 
christopher (SDl) 6 5 6 1 6 5 1 4 6 6 
Billings (nApF) 3 3 3 4 1 3 5 1 2 2 
irwin (ind) 5 2 5 2 2 1 3 2 1 1
notes: upp = united peoples party; Flp= Fiji labour party; SDl = Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua; 
nApF = national Alliance party of Fiji. 
before the polls. the ‘below-the-line’ section of the ballot paper requires the 
voter to rank candidates him or herself. parties may lodge preferences with the 
elections office even in constituencies where they do not stand candidates. in 
such cases, they must list another party as first preference. Around 95 per cent 
of ballots at the elections of 1999, 2001 and 2006 were cast ‘above-the-line’.3 
the consequence of this was that in constituencies where there was no winner 
at the first count, political parties had substantial control over outcomes.
in the case of the north eastern General communal constituency, robin 
irwin’s victory owed much to party preferences, which controlled the 
redistribution of ballot papers that had been cast ‘above-the-line’. When the 
first candidate (rocky Billings – nApF) was excluded, most of his votes were 
transferred to irwin because, as shown in table 2 (column 5), nApF had 
listed irwin as second preference. the residual Billings votes that went to 
other candidates were ‘below-the-line’ ballots. Similarly, the second eliminated 
candidate, nawaia touakin (independent) gave second preference to irwin. 
When the final two candidates were eliminated (Flp and upp), irwin 
benefited from having been placed as penultimate preference (5th) ahead of 
his major rival, the SDl’s David christopher (6th), as shown in the first and 
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third columns. As a result, irwin leapfrogged ahead of David christopher at 
the 5th count and took the seat. Four parties (shown in columns 7–10) lodged 
preferences for this constituency even though they did not stand a candidate, 
hoping to use these to trade for better preferences from other parties in other 
constituencies. 
Fiji’s AV system is a compulsory system in two senses. First, eligible citizens 
are required to register and cast a ballot, and may face fines if they do not 
do so. Second, they are required to rank at least 75 per cent of candidates in 
order to cast a valid (formal) ballot (either by inserting numbers themselves 
or by voting ‘above-the-line’ and thereby endorsing party preferences). Ballots 
completed by a tick below the line are invalid. research by the Fiji elections 
office has shown this to be the commonest reason for casting an invalid ballot. 
in total, 8.7 per cent of ballots were invalid in 1999, 12.1 per cent in 2001 
and 9 per cent in 2006. 
Notes
1 the full 1998 electoral Act is available online at http://www.undp.org.fj/elections/elections/
law/electoral_act_1998.htm
2 General electors are all those who do not fall into the Fijian, the indo-Fijian or the rotuman 
categories. the rotuman constituency covers all of Fiji.
3 the exact share of ‘above-the-line’ votes is uncertain because the elections office has never 
been able to release the full set of forms which show the detailed records of all votes. 
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Editors’ note
throughout this book, in accordance with common usage, the term ‘the 
promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill’ has been abbreviated 
to ‘the rtu Bill’.
note also that, throughout this book, different authors use different terms 
to describe those descended from the indian subcontinent. no attempt has 




Changing calculus and  
shifting visions
Stewart Firth and Jon Fraenkel
the mood in Fiji following the 2006 election was positive. not only had the two 
major parties performed strongly and confirmed themselves as the unequivocal 
representatives of their respective communities, but Fijian and indian ministers 
were working together at last. if those who drew up the 1997 constitution were 
right, such cooperation could be expected to bring stability and harmony to the 
country. unexpectedly, the constitutional provisions for power-sharing were 
implemented with the entry into government of a group of ministers from the 
largest losing party. Given the worsening state of the country’s foreign reserves 
and the decline of the sugar and garment industries, the election outcome and 
its aftermath seemed to be another of those good strokes of fortune that the 
people of Fiji have come to expect. the 1987 coup, after all, could have ended 
in brutal dictatorship, but it did not. the 2000 coup could have split the army 
down the middle, but instead it isolated a small group of military rebels, leaving 
the commander in control and making possible a return to constitutional 
government. twice on the edge of disaster, Fiji twice avoided it. 
Fiji had seemed doomed to increasingly frequent instability when George 
Speight and his followers seized control of parliament in may 2000. each of 
Fiji’s three constitutions had lasted a shorter time – the 1970 constitution for 17 
years, the 1990 constitution for eight years and the 1997 constitution (which 
came into effect in 1998) for fewer than two years until it was abrogated by 
the republic of Fiji military Forces in the wake of Speight’s so-called civilian 
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coup. But a series of court judgements set Fiji back on the path to constitutional 
democracy. in the chandrika prasad case of march 2001, Fiji’s court of Appeal 
declared that the 1997 constitution remained the supreme law of the land and 
had not been abrogated. A High court ruling later approved the president’s 
dissolution of parliament, opening the way for elections in August 2001, when 
the prime minister, laisenia Qarase, led his newly formed Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni lewenivanua (SDl) party to its first victory. remarkably, the judicial system 
retained its integrity and continued to command the respect of political leaders. 
on the heels of his arrest by the military, George Speight was convicted of 
high treason and sentenced to death, although this was commuted to life 
imprisonment by the prerogative of mercy commission. ironically, the forces 
responsible for saving Fiji democracy – the military and the law courts – were 
both un-elected institutions. 
But where did that leave democracy in Fiji? the 2001 election established 
majority rule – of a sort. the SDl won, although the Fiji labour party (Flp) 
gained the larger share of first preference votes. majority rule had never sat 
easily on Fiji’s communal soil. three times, mainly indian-backed parties had 
won elections; the first time the consequence was a constitutional crisis and, 
after that, the result was in both cases a coup. the outcome was always the 
same – a reversion to Fijian-controlled government. indian leaders seemed 
perpetually relegated to sit on the opposition benches. the 2001 election put 
the politicians back in charge, opening yet another era of fraught top-level inter-
communal rivalry. not for the first – or the last – time there was a successful 
bid for indigenous Fijian unity in the face of the ‘indian threat’, echoing the 
experiences at elections in the 1970s and 1980s. 
So too at the 2006 election. Democracy seemed to work, but not many 
people wanted to ask whether or not democracy had in fact been put to the test. 
Would the mood have been so positive if the Flp had won, and labour leader 
mahendra chaudhry become prime minister for a second time, even supposing 
he had invited members of the defeated Fijian party into his cabinet? Had that 
happened, labour would have risen to power without anything resembling the 
coalition with Fijian allied parties that it had built at the time of its previous 
victory in 1999. if so, would people have expected stability, or would they have 
feared another 2000, when chaudhry’s labour government was overthrown in 
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the name of the rights of indigenous Fijians? in other words, does democracy 
work in Fiji only so long as the indigenous Fijians win the elections? 
the answer to that question has historically been yes, although whether 
that was inevitably so is more difficult to judge. the historical reason for the 
affirmative answer lies in Fiji’s colonial past as well as in its political experience 
since independence. the British transformed Fiji politically, economically and 
demographically, but they did not obliterate all that was distinctively Fijian. 
they created a modern state with a modern bureaucracy, the most effective 
in the South pacific, but they also enshrined within it an indigenous Fijian 
state-within-the-state that resonated with the echoes of an older order. they 
created a modern economy, underpinned by the sugar industry; and they 
brought so many plantation labourers from india that, by the time the union 
jack was lowered for the last time in 1970, the descendants of those labourers 
were in the majority. in the Fijian villages, life was much changed compared 
with the pre-cession years, but ancient affiliations and practices survived in 
a manner interlaced with superimposed British versions of Fijian tradition: 
the provincial council, the roko tui and the Buli.1 As the certainties of the 
old order began to crumble, the church also played an increasingly powerful 
cohesive role for Fijians. 
protecting Fijians had been the leitmotif of British colonial rule. the number 
of Fijians fell continuously for the first 45 years after cession in 1874, and 
the early colonists feared the indigenous peoples would disappear completely 
unless cushioned from the harsh impact of market forces. protecting Fijians 
meant keeping them in their villages under the authority of traditional chiefs 
until well after World War ii. British rule had not always been so benign, 
only periodically so. in the first 20 or so years of the 20th century, an alliance 
between the colonists and the indians seemed distinctly possible, and likely 
to lead to ever-increasing encroachments onto Fijian lands.2 But when, under 
pressure from colonial india, continued bonded labour migration from the 
subcontinent became clearly impossible, the calculus changed. When the no-
longer indentured indian labourers went on strike in Suva, and when their 
leaders began to demand greater political rights, the temporary rift between the 
colonists and the Fijians was gradually mended. World War ii cemented that 
marriage, at least for Fiji’s towering 20th century chief, ratu Sir lala Sukuna. 
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For Fijian commoners, life in the colony was less hospitable. But Fijian soldiers 
fought hard for the British cause during the pacific War. For their services, 
ratu Sukuna was entrusted with reinventing the Fijian administration, or a 
bowdlerized version of it. the tikinas were amalgamated and villagers were 
pressed into new towns. the late 1940s and 1950s was an era of restraint for 
the indigenous community, and frustrations grew. By the 1960s, educated 
Fijians were earnestly demanding change, and the dismantling of ratu Sukuna’s 
Fijian order hastened indigenous movement into the towns and into the formal 
sectors of the economy. 
For the indian community, the 1920s and 1930s had been years of 
advancement. the era of indenture had ended, and advancement in the 
schools and a flowering of religion proceeded apace, along with a continuing 
movement of indians towards the towns. Defeat of political demands, as for 
minority communities elsewhere in the world, served to invigorate social and 
economic advancement. Yet, by the mid-1940s, the indians were no longer a 
minority. And with the coming twilight of the colonial order, as debates began 
to rage about suitable post-colonial institutions in the mid 1960s, the calculus 
of demography played a central role. With a common roll, the indians might 
take control of government. With a communal roll, embellished with the old 
rhetoric of Fijian protectionism, the indigenous community might feel safe. the 
British colonists were not wholly insensitive to these sensibilities, but they had 
no workable answer. land leasing by indian farmers from Fijian landowners, 
for example, was made subject to statutory renewals, generating a periodically 
inevitable conflict in the legislature that echoed down to the 2006 election.3 
At the london conference of 1965, a highly elaborate ‘cross-voting’ system 
was introduced, in the hope of elevating politicians of national standing, able 
to draw on support from both the major communities.4 it did not work. And, 
as with land leasing, the debates about Fiji’s electoral system proved to be 
perpetual sources of contention. 
By the 1960s, the stage was set for Fijian politicians to adopt a highly 
defensive posture in their approach to national politics. A minority in their own 
country, and only recently acquainted with the concepts of elections and voting, 
the Fijians were determined to ensure that democracy, if that were unavoidable, 
should work in favour of the indigenous community. more than that, it should 
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work in favour of the high chiefs, who had, since 1904, nominated Fijian 
representatives to the legislative council. they lost that monopoly in 1963, 
when commoners for the first time were allowed to vote. But in the finally agreed 
constitutional arrangements left behind by the British in 1970, the council of 
chiefs remained recognized and powerful by being able to appoint eight of the 
22 members of the Senate and veto any legislation affecting Fijian interests. 
in sympathy with Fijian sensitivities, communal representation remained the 
bedrock of the post-colonial constitutional arrangements, lest the indians 
take control by virtue of superior numbers.5 Fiji’s three post-independence 
constitutions all left a substantial space for communal representation, gently 
moulding the conduct of elections into a basically race-based experience for 
which, as paul Geraghty notes in this volume, one wears one’s Sunday best. 
Fijian chiefs did not easily settle back into a ceremonial role, a mere decoration 
on the new order, but dominated post-colonial national politics through the 
governing Alliance party, under the leadership of tui nayau, ratu Sir Kamisese 
mara. 
the vision of a multiracial Fiji espoused by ratu mara rested on the Alliance 
party bringing together its Fijian, General Voter and indian associations in a 
multi-ethnic government rather than a multiparty government. the first post-
independence election, held in the context of a search for unanimity in the 
new and difficult post-colonial circumstances, gave that party its strongest ever 
showing. none of the later Fijian mainstream parties was ever able to repeat 
the Alliance’s 1972 achievement of obtaining 25 per cent of the indian vote. 
Yet ratu mara, like laisenia Qarase in 2006, was constantly disappointed that 
indians would never vote in sufficient numbers for his party. He felt betrayed. 
the Alliance never picked up a single indian communal seat, and its great rival, 
the Federation party, never picked up a single Fijian communal seat. 
Still worse, ratu mara’s shift to the political centre in search of indian votes 
gave birth to a threat on his other flank. in the mid-1970s, the Fijian nationalist 
party emerged, demanding a ‘Fiji for the Fijians’ and condemning Britain for 
saddling the country with a multiracial constitution instead of reciprocating 
the honourable generosity of the high chiefs in giving Fiji to the Queen in 
1874. At the April 1977 election, Sakeasi Butadroka’s Fijian nationalist party 
split the Fijian vote, with the unexpected and unwanted consequence that 
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the national Federation party narrowly won the election, with 26 seats to the 
Alliance’s 24. cold feet, indecision among party members over who should 
be prime minister, and the reaction of indigenous Governor General ratu Sir 
George cakobau ensured that the largely indian-backed party was never to 
govern. ratu mara was returned at the head of a minority government. When 
minority government proved unworkable, the Governor General called for fresh 
elections, which were held in September 1977. the Alliance won. 
this was an experience repeated, without the constitutional niceties, a decade 
later, when lieutenant colonel Sitiveni rabuka seized control in a bloodless 
coup to depose the government of Dr timoci Bavadra. in power for only a 
month, Bavadra’s labour government had won the 1987 election in coalition 
with the national Federation party, inauspiciously bringing together the two 
major indian parties and, probably forever, undermining labour’s claims that 
it could or would supersede the politics of race.
the 1987 coup shattered the country’s second vision of a multiracial future, 
centred on the coming together of Fijians and indians in the towns and in the 
cane belts of western Viti levu and the ‘friendly north’, the macuata region 
around labasa on Vanua levu. the ‘facade of democracy’, as Asesela ravuvu 
put it, had been cracked.6 the idea that Fijians would ever accept an indian 
prime minister, or a government in which the largely indian-backed parties 
had a majority, had been exposed as an illusion, or so it was said around the 
yaqona bowls. What would have happened if the indian population had kept 
climbing? Would the loss of illusions have entailed dictatorship, spearheaded 
by the overwhelmingly indigenous republic of Fiji military Forces? that we 
shall never know, for, by the mid-1980s, the Fiji indians started leaving in large 
numbers to live in new Zealand, Australia, the uSA or canada, where their 
race counts for little and where talent is amply rewarded. 
mahendra chaudhry’s rise to power in 1999 was on the back of a third 
vision of a multiracial future, but it was not his own. the 1997 constitution 
had been principally the dream of Fijian coup leader Sitiveni rabuka and 
opposition leader jai ram reddy, although labour’s Krishna Datt played an 
insufficiently acknowledged role. in jai ram reddy’s speeches, the new vision 
was quite explicitly counterpoised to the class-based party-building approach 
espoused by the labour party: 
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You can have multiracialism in two ways. You can ... have multiracial parties ... that 
kind of multiracialism is, maybe, a bit premature for Fiji, perhaps we are not ready for it 
... the communal pulls are extremely strong ... we are locked into a situation where we 
will continue to look into the indefinite future in terms of race ... there is another kind 
of multiracialism ... let us each be in our separate racial compartment ... let communal 
solidarity prevail ... let everyone be united, but from our respective positions of unity, 
let us accept that we must co-exist and work together ... it may be ... that that is a more 
realistic approach.7   
communal seats were thus retained in the 1997 constitution. indeed, there 
were now 46 of them as opposed to the 27 under the 1970 constitution.8 
other tensions emerged between the political leaders’ views and those of 
the constitutional review commission (crc) entrusted with preparing the 
proposal for Fiji’s fundamental laws. the crc wanted fewer communal seats, 
and looked not so much to the emergence of multi-ethnic political parties, but 
rather to sophisticated electoral mechanisms to deliver inter-ethnic compromise 
and a multiracial government. the politicians were, perhaps rightly as it turned 
out, not convinced that this would necessarily happen. they superimposed the 
power-sharing provisions on top of a basically Westminster-based constitution, 
in ways that jarred and creaked at times under the heavy weight of controlling 
government formation. more than once, the courts were to be transformed, 
effectively, into law-makers. Disquiet about those various provisions was 
still notable in the aftermath of the 2006 general election, when mahendra 
chaudhry found he could not assume the position of leader of the opposition 
because his party was in government, and when prime minister Qarase, as he 
explains in this volume, found that backbenchers from the now allied Fiji labour 
party could not legally function as a check and balance in the legislature.
During 1997–1999, the labour leader had been transformed from critic to 
strong advocate of the 1997 constitution, but he never quite mastered the style 
of leadership it required. rising on the crest of a wave of dissatisfaction with 
the government of Sitiveni rabuka, his party obtained an absolute majority 
at the election in 1999, aided in no small way by the new electoral provisions. 
the overthrow of chaudhry’s government a year later seemed to confirm, yet 
again, the notion that democracy works only as long as the indigenous Fijians 
win. But there is room for reasonable doubt. in 1987, the Bavadra government 
had lasted just a month before it was overthrown. the 1999 people’s coalition 
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government faced down the initial challenge within days of the announcement 
that mr chaudhry was to become the country’s first-ever indian prime minister, 
and lasted a full year in office. president ratu mara came to the labour 
government’s assistance in the early days, and calmed the disquiet of the leaders 
of the small and fractious Fijian parties that had so helped labour to win. 
labour had an unshakeable mandate, chaudhry would continually say during 
that turbulent year, but Fijian allies were indispensable if one recognized the 
security threat. When the dam finally burst on 19 may 2000, it was called a 
‘civilian coup’. But civilian coups are never quite possible in a country with as large 
an army as Fiji’s. A small squad of crack soldiers from the élite meridian Squadron 
supported the coup, and its ultimate fate rested critically on provoking wider 
military support. Given the role the military played in ultimately defeating George 
Speight, perhaps a more solid alliance between the commander of the military 
forces and the government might have seen off the threat in may 2000, or put 
labour back in office in its aftermath. the refusal of ratu epeli Ganilau, himself a 
former military commander, to take the position of Home Affairs minister in the 
chaudhry government, weakened the link with the military and left that crucial 
ministry unable to respond effectively to the gathering storm clouds of Fijian 
discontent. As the 2006 campaign commenced, military commander Voreqe 
Bainimarama gave a lot more than just the impression that he would back the 
re-election of a labour government, and made it clear he would defend such a 
government to the hilt. Back in 2000, the military’s position was less clear. 
the multiparty cabinet forged in 2006 differed in three critical respects from 
that formed in 1999, all of which undoubtedly improved the former’s prospects 
(even if the arrangement, despite those advantages, was still to prove highly 
precarious). First, it was the Fijian party that had the premiership and that was 
in the ascendancy. Given the Fijian majority in the population, a multi-ethnic 
government led by a mainstream indigenous party was always more likely 
to succeed. Second, the other participating party, the labour party, was the 
undisputed majority party of the indian community. By contrast, the 1999 
elections had not met jai ram reddy’s expectation of two triumphant robust 
communal parties, each retaining solidarity in their own racial compartments. 
labour had obtained strong indian support, but the Fijian vote had splintered. 
rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) had obtained the largest 
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share of the Fijian vote (38 per cent), but the new preferential voting system had 
worked against it. the SVt won only eight seats, well below the 18 it might 
have had if the election had been conducted under the former first-past-the-post 
system. With those eight seats, it only just qualified for inclusion in cabinet 
in accordance with the multiparty cabinet rules. But this inclusion was not to 
happen. the former governing party was deeply disappointed by its electoral 
defeat, and put up conditions for participating in the labour cabinet. chaudhry 
did not negotiate, and the courts later found the prime minister’s exclusion of the 
SVt from government to be in accordance with the constitution. looking back 
later, other judges – as they struggled with the complexities of the multiparty 
cabinet provisions after the 2001 elections – were less certain.9
the third critical difference distinguishing the 2006 post-election setting 
from that of 1999 affected the fundamental calculus of Fiji’s electoral politics. 
changing proportions of the major ethnic groups in the population had secured 
the position of the indigenous Fijians, and perhaps moved Fiji away from those 
troubled years when minor variations in the turnout or vote-splintering could 
make a major difference to electoral outcomes. in a system in which most Fijians 
vote for one party and most Fiji indians for another, demographic shifts in ethnic 
populations assume great importance, as a number of contributors to this volume 
point out. And as more Fiji indians than Fijians are emigrating, the arithmetic 
of demography is working relentlessly against the Fiji labour party, especially in 
the open constituencies where everyone can vote together, and where outcomes 
are often determined by which group has the slight majority. the ironic effect 
may be to enhance inter-ethnic cooperation in government as the Fiji indians, 
losing numbers all the time, recognize that power-sharing offers the best chance 
of a place at the table. By a demographic route, has Fiji reached the destination 
envisaged by the architects of the 1997 constitution? more doubtful is whether or 
not communal solidarity can and will prevail, in the way the constitution-framers 
envisaged, as the forces that bound both communities into a bipolar two-party 
system dissipate. if communal solidarity fades and the people of Fiji begin to divide 
along different lines, the mechanics and campaign strategies at future elections 
will be very different from those of 1999, 2001 and 2006. that will complicate 
matters, and may, by that odd, long and painful route, make the victors in future 
elections those who are less steeped in the communal politics of the past.
10 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
Notes
1 the roko tui were chiefs installed as salaried governors of the provinces. Within the provinces, 
local government was organized through the tikinas, districts made up of several connected 
social groups (the vanua). those who took charge of these groups, often also chiefs, were called 
‘Buli’, and were responsible for levying taxes, maintaining the order of villages, implementing 
provincial council resolutions and ensuring provision of services (lala) for higher chiefs 
(macnaught, j. 1982. The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neotraditional Order 
under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II, Anu, canberra, 1982, pp.4–5.)
2 colonial controls over the Fijian administration were strengthened; restrictions on Fijians 
entering contracts were eased; and the former taxation-in-kind scheme was replaced by a 
more flexible system allowing cash payments. crucially, however, full-scale land privatization 
was halted by Sir Arthur Gordon in the British House of lords. Had the edwardian boom 
and the accompanying heyday for pacific plantations continued, pressures for opening up 
Fijian lands might have been much greater.
3 one of the key issues in the election was the SDl/Flp conflict over whether the native 
land trust Act or the Agricultural landlord and tenants Act was the appropriate legislation 
covering land leasing.
4 All voters had four votes – one in their own communal constituency (either Fijian, indian 
or General) and another three in ‘cross-voting’ or ‘national’ constituencies, where eligible 
citizens of all races voted together but for candidates whose ethnicity was specified as Fijian, 
indian or General. 
5 norton, r. 2004. ‘Seldom a transition with such aplomb: from confrontation to conciliation 
on Fiji’s path to independence’, Journal of Pacific History, 39(2): 163–84. 
6 ravuvu, A. 1991. The Facade of Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control, 1830–1987, 
institute of pacific Studies, uSp, Suva. See also, Scarr, D. 1988. Fiji: The Politics of Illusion, 
new South Wales university press, Sydney.
7 Hansard (Suva: Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Fiji, 24 july 1992), pp.730–
731.
8 parliaments under the 1970 constitution had 52 seats, whereas under the 1997 constitution 
they had 71 seats, but the percentage of communal seats under the 1997 constitution was 
larger (65 per cent compared with 52 per cent).
9 the Supreme court later reviewed these issues emphasizing greater scope for different 
interpretations depending on circumstances: ‘ …even an invitation or acceptance expressed to 
be subject to conditions may not represent a failure to invite or an act of declining. Allowance 
must be made for the possibility that, in political negotiations, the forceful assertion of a 
requirement may not represent a final position. this court construed the letter of purported 
acceptance under consideration in the 1999 Supreme court opinion as a final non-negotiable 
position. that was a finding of fact ‘in the circumstances’ of the case. in other circumstances, 
even a similarly expressed “acceptance”, or “invitation”, may lead to a different conclusion. 
We should add that rigid stances are not readily reconciled with the compact and the spirit of 
the constitution as a whole’. (Qarase v. chaudhry, Supreme court, 18 july 2003, paragraph 





Chance hai: from the  
campaign trail
Brij V. Lal
Balata, Dabota, tagi tagi, Garampani: these are distant, even vaguely exotic, 
names to this labasa-born lad. they are, in fact, names of hauntingly beautiful 
places, evoking the sight, sound and smell of growing up in a rural settlement 
more than half a century ago. the same sprawling, rippling sea of cane fields, 
people going about their business on horseback or bicycle, weather-beaten faces 
of sons of the soil, their leathery skin cracked by excessive kava drinking. people 
show the hospitality and humanity that rural folk everywhere will recognize 
instantly. A hot cup of tea materializes quickly even in the poorest of homes, 
along with the invitation to stay over for a meal. these touching gestures remain 
with you long after you are gone.
i am travelling through western Viti levu, trying to get some sense of what 
rural folk think about the election, the stories they might have to tell of what 
they have seen or heard. everywhere, i am greeted with respect and affection, 
even, or especially, by those who think i am with the enemy, meaning the 
national Federation party (nFp). At least you haven’t become independent, 
one man says with a chuckle, a not too subtle reference to those who, unable to 
secure a party ticket and for one excuse or another, are standing as independents. 
Astoundingly, in this election there are more than 60 independents. What 
impact they will have on the final outcome is causing concern to party strategists. 
(none, as it turned out in the end). 
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in rural areas, the normal rhythm of life continues largely undisturbed by 
what is happening in the country at large. A few pocket meetings1 here and 
there, the occasional talk by a visiting politician or the local candidate, but 
little more than that. in urban areas, it is a different story. there, the campaign 
in its early stages is full of talk of betrayal and treacherous preferencing, about 
intimidation and fear and vote-rigging. Both the SDl (Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni lewenivanua) and labour (the Fiji labour party or Flp) accuse nFp of 
reneging on preference deals, which the nFp vehemently denies – but not 
to any great effect. the party recognizes its minority status, a far cry from 
its glory days when it was the major party of the indo-Fijian community. it 
gives its first preferences to labour in predominantly indo-Fijian areas and 
to the SDl in several winnable open seats in southeastern Viti levu. labour 
accuses nFp sarcastically of not knowing whether it is ‘Arthur or martha’, 
that is, whether it is a party of and for the indo-Fijians first and foremost or 
whether it has multi-ethnic identity and aspirations, while the SDl uses nFp’s 
preference distribution to rally the Fijians behind it, telling them that both 
nFp and Flp are secretly consolidating indo-Fijian support between them 
and that Fijians should do the same under the SDl’s broad umbrella. Divide 
and rule is the name of the game, and all the parties know it: unite your own 
ethnic constituency and divide enough of your opponents to win. i find the 
charge of betrayal hollow.
i listen to the radio, religiously watch the evening news on television, 
buy and read all the newspapers. there are so many issues lurking in the 
background that desperately need to be discussed, but they aren’t. it’s as if 
everyone is avoiding hard, controversial topics in the campaign. the promotion 
of reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill (rtu Bill) is one of them. the 
government says it wants to use the rtu Bill to bring closure to the painful 
events of 2000, but its opponents see it as a barely veiled attempt to grant 
amnesty to the coup-plotters whose support the SDl needs, especially among 
the nationalist sections of the Fijian community. the fact that some (notably 
former vice president ratu jope Seniloli) have been released from prison on 
compulsory supervision orders raises doubts and nurtures suspicion about 
the government’s true motives. there is massive objection to the Bill from 
community and non-government organizations. petitions are sent in the 
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hundreds and protest marches are organized, reminding me of the ‘Back to may’ 
movement against the may coup in 1987. the Fiji military forces commander, 
Frank Bainimarama, thunders ominously that the rtu Bill will simply ‘not 
happen’. to emphasize his point and to remind the country of his authority, he 
joins 500 of his fully armed men on a march through Suva the day parliament 
is dissolved. Bainimarama is angry, he says privately, because the government 
is not really in charge and the country is being run by two unelected men: 
jioji Kotabalavu, the chief executive officer of the prime minister’s office, and 
Senator Qoriniasi Bale, the Attorney General. 
the country is deeply divided over the rift between the military and the 
government. there are some who applaud Bainimarama’s tough, no-nonsense 
approach. Flp president jokapeci Koroi, asked on television about her views 
on the army’s confrontational attitude to the government, says that she would 
have no qualms about the army overthrowing the Qarase government and 
putting labour back in power to continue its ‘unfinished business’. i am 
astounded by the utter brazenness of the statement from the head of a party 
which itself had been a victim of the army’s intervention in 1987. later, seeking 
to deflect the issue, she says she was quoted out of context, but i have seen the 
interview with my own eyes, and she was not misquoted. the government calls 
for her resignation, but the matter is not followed through. As the campaign 
progresses, the issue quietly slips away. in many places, i hear indo-Fijians 
actually supporting the army’s stance. As one person tells me, in Hindi, ‘We 
will take aim at them [meaning the SDl] by placing the gun on the shoulders 
of the soldiers’. ‘You need steel to cut steel’, another says to me in a tone that 
i find somewhat disturbing. ‘the army is with us’, labour tells the electorate. 
‘there will be no coup. Don’t be afraid. Vote for us without fear.’ the message 
is repeated in pocket meeting after pocket meeting. it is effective in rallying 
wavering supporters to the party in the dying days of the campaign.
on the Fijian side, there is genuine discomfort about the army’s 
increasingly confrontational statements. many feel the army is overstepping 
its constitutionally defined role. in newspaper advertisements and on radio 
and television, laisenia Qarase makes this point repeatedly. He wants the 
Supreme court to rule on the proper constitutional position of the army 
in a Westminster-type democracy. there are some who are calling for the 
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government to discipline the commander and cannot fathom the government’s 
reluctance to move. But there is confusion about the proper procedure to use 
for this. on the eve of the elections, the widely admired Vice president ratu 
joni madraiwiwi, a high chief in his own right, convenes a meeting between 
Qarase and Bainimarama to cool the temperature of the public spat between 
them. A vaguely worded accord is negotiated, and there is a palpable sigh of 
relief in the country, accompanied by a foreboding sense that things could go 
wrong at any time. As the campaign concludes, the army’s strident intervention 
in the public arena has pushed many Fijians to the SDl side. ironically, the 
army has achieved a result it wanted to prevent in the first place: SDl’s increased 
popularity among Fijians.
in a radio interview, i am asked about the army’s antics. my view is clear, 
and directly opposite to the military’s, which sees an increased role for itself in 
the public life of Fiji. ‘it is better to prevent the mess at the outset’ one officer 
tells me, ‘than to be called in to clean it up after the event.’ pakistan is cited 
as a model. i don’t think it is the army’s role to interpret the public’s will, i 
say. its role should be to enforce the public will, not to interpret or pre-empt 
it. my words are published in the papers and, for a brief moment, i wonder 
whether i should be so incautious in my public statements. ‘Watch out, Doc’, 
a Fijian nationalist candidate says to me at the Dolphins Foodcourt in Suva, 
slapping me playfully on the shoulder. He was the same person who had staged 
a public confrontation with me at a reeves commission hearing in Suva and 
had called on television for my resignation. He made the headlines. But when 
i met him in Korovou a few weeks later, he said politely that he hoped i did 
not mind what he had said about me. He was standing for a by-election, and 
wanted some free media attention, which the episode had given him. But i am 
troubled for a brief moment only: i have to be true to my convictions.
Another issue burning in the background is the expiry of agricultural leases 
under the Agricultural landlord and tenant Act (AltA). the leases began 
expiring in the late 1990s. now, there are thousands of farmers whose leases 
have not been renewed, who are uprooted and beginning new careers as casual 
labourers, small vegetable growers and domestic hands, crowding the already 
clotted Suva–nausori corridor. i am told that in the nasinu constituency 
contested by labour’s labasa-born Krishna Datt, fully 40 per cent of the voters 
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are displaced labasans. there is quiet resentment against them – resentment 
about their industry and enterprising spirit, their preparedness to work for 
any wage. ‘this place stinks of labasa’; ‘labasa, labasa gandhaye’, a taxi driver 
tells me as we drive from  Kinoya to tacirua via the Khalsa road,  not knowing 
that i too am from the ‘friendly north’. there is intense competition for the 
squatter vote. But about a major cause of that problem, the expiry of leases, 
nothing much is said. SDl wants to renew the leases under the native land 
trust Act (nltA), which gives the landowner more say and greater flexibility on 
the renewal of leases, while labour prefers the AltA, whose tenant-favouring 
‘hardship clause’ places greater onus on the landowner to prove that his need 
to reoccupy his land is greater than the tenant’s.
the nFp proposes the concept of a ‘master lease’ under which the 
government would lease land from the landlords under the provisions of the 
nltA and then lease it to the tenants under the terms of the AltA. the idea 
was first proposed by jai ram reddy and Wadan narsey in the late 1990s, but 
it goes nowhere in this campaign. people are reluctant to engage seriously with 
ideas and alternatives, i begin to realize, preferring instead the comfort of the 
simple slogans. As i travel through the countryside, i see displaced tenants by the 
roadside selling root crops, vegetables and fish. the look on their sun-bathed, 
anguished, furrowed faces touches the heart. through no fault of their own, 
they have become refugees in their own homeland. i see formerly productive 
cane fields slowly reverting to bush. A Fijian farmer, deep in the heartland of 
Viti levu, tells me about the situation in his area. many leases were not renewed 
and tenants had to move to the town. ‘nltA or calcutta’, some village wit 
had remarked. But after a few years, the landowners realized their error in the 
absence of the income that the lease rents brought, and pleaded with the former 
tenants to return. most refused.
the land issue is closely tied to the uncertain fortunes of the country’s ailing 
sugar industry. the preferential access to the european union markets will 
soon expire, forcing Fiji to sell sugar on an internationally competitive market. 
the sugar mills function on ancient machines habitually prone to repeated 
breakdowns. the increasing cost of transporting cane to the mills and of hiring 
labourers is being felt by the growers. the uncertainty of renewal of leases creates 
its own problems. the government has talked about re-structuring the sugar 
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industry, following the advice of an indian team of experts, but the precise 
details are not spelled out. Strangely, it is not an issue in this campaign. just 
as certain as night will follow day, labour will oppose any solution proposed 
by the SDl. the reason? politics. Keep politics out of the industry, people 
say, but that is naïve. politics drives the sugar industry, always has. mahendra 
chaudhry’s power base is in the cane belt; and he is the general secretary of the 
national Farmers union. Farmers are slowly, visibly descending into poverty, 
while their leaders play politics and manoeuvre for political advantage, like 
vultures hovering eagerly over a mortally wounded animal. 
every major party has prepared a manifesto, a grab-bag of ideas and proposals 
about how they will address the social and economic problems facing Fiji. 
these are attractive documents, professionally produced, accessibly written 
and widely distributed. though there are vernacular versions, the main one is 
in english. But these are for show really. many candidates with poor english 
wave a copy furiously before their audiences, with all the pretended passion 
they can muster, urging them to read it when they themselves are innocent of 
its contents! prepared speeches, rehearsed several times over, are the standard 
campaign fare. politicians glibly tell people what they want, not what they 
ought, to hear. But manifestos have to be launched, a politician tells me, because 
without them, people would not take the party seriously. the ones loudest in 
their demands for manifestos are those who don’t read, a candidate says to me 
slightly cynically. complex ideas are reduced to laughter-inducing slogans. 
Voters want entertainment as well as (some) enlightenment.
the method of campaigning in Fiji has changed dramatically over the years. 
When i first began writing about elections in the early 1980s, large rallies were 
the order of the day. people travelled miles to listen to speeches. there was no 
television in Fiji then, and the video revolution was just beginning. So people 
turned up for rallies because these were a major item in their limited social 
calendar. By the late 1980s, cassettes began to be mass produced, carrying the 
party’s ideas into distant rural areas, where people could listen to their leaders 
while sitting around the tanoa. Sakeasi Butadroka, the fiery Fijian nationalist, 
was among the first to use this medium. By the 1990s, pocket meetings had 
come to prominence and were used very effectively by the Flp. And with good 
reason too. labour’s organizational machinery, well-oiled and functioning 
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efficiently, reached out to the grassroots. A handful of diehard supporters in 
each constituency was briefed –  brainwashed may be a better word – to carry on 
the party propaganda while the candidate moved elsewhere. in the late 1990s, 
video cassettes were used, especially by the nFp to carry party leader jai ram 
reddy’s message on the constitution, but that trend did not catch on. 
more recently, radio and television debates, phone-in programs, live 
interviews and, especially, advertising on television, have come to dominate 
election campaigns. SDl led the way in 2006 with slick advertisements – the 
white dove, the party’s symbol, flying majestically against a light blue background 
– reminding the people of all it had achieved in the past five years and asking 
them not to jeopardize their future by voting for other parties. labour focused 
on the real and alleged failures of the SDl government, highlighting the 
problems of poor water supply, unemployment and increased cost of living. 
its advertisements, featuring despairing down-and-out people needing food, 
shelter and clean water, were pointed and hard-hitting in the characteristically 
labour style. the nFp, strapped for funds, dusted up its 2001 campaign video 
for the 2006 election, screening exactly the same images but with a changed 
voice-over. no one noticed, which caused some bemused puzzlement among 
party leaders! the national Alliance launched a surprisingly well-funded media 
campaign, highlighting its connection to the legendary lights of the Fijian 
establishment: ratu Sukuna, ratu edward cakobau, ratu George cakobau 
and ratu mara, with a gently smiling party leader ratu epeli Ganilau holding 
up a lighted torch, marching towards a rising dawn. Slickly packaged television 
campaigns will be the order of the day in the future.
campaign styles vary. Among Fijians, especially in rural areas, there is an 
acute awareness of cultural protocols governing public discourse. Voice is not 
raised and insulting language avoided. un-chiefly conduct is frowned upon. i 
vividly recall a national Alliance meeting at Syria park in nausori. i was invited 
to the meeting. ratu epeli arrives in a new, rented four-wheel drive. making a 
good impression is important. About two dozen people, mostly Fijian women 
from the neighbouring hinterland, are seated in a temporary corrugated iron 
shelter. At the appointed time, ratu epeli enters the speaker’s shelter with his 
chiefly wife. they are seated on two elegant chairs facing the audience. ratu 
epeli is introduced. He reads a prepared speech, some of it in english. He is 
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a dignified man, chiefly, well-spoken but wooden. He is critical of the SDl’s 
policies, but never once does he directly attack the party or its leader. He talks 
about the need for the various ethnic groups to work together. He eschews 
racial politics. He talks about Fiji as a multiracial family. He is against racial 
discrimination in any form, including race-based affirmative action programs for 
Fijians. people clap politely when he finishes. Yaqona is served in the traditional 
Fijian way. He mingles with the crowd rather awkwardly. Style and status count 
as much as the substance of the speech. Snippets appear on the evening news 
and in the following day’s papers.
After ratu epeli finishes, he asks me whether i might like to say a word or 
two. this catches me completely by surprise; i am unprepared. i realize quickly 
that ratu epeli is not inviting me, he is actually asking me to speak, in the 
traditional chiefly way. What to say? i begin with something i had read in 
the papers recently, some politician saying that racially polarized politics were 
inevitable, necessary even, because Fijians and indo-Fijians could not, could 
never, work together. History was proof enough of that. i said in response that 
our history showed the contrary to be the case. Fiji had encountered seemingly 
intractable problems in its recent history, but our leaders had been able to resolve 
deep-seated difficulties through discussion and dialogue. independence was a 
contested issue, but it was eventually achieved amicably. our leaders were able 
to work together to devise AltA, which had brought decades of prosperity 
to the country. Again, after the coups of 1987, they were able to retrieve the 
country from the brink of a precipice and conflagration. in the 1990s, jai ram 
reddy and Sitiveni rabuka, once bitter foes – reddy was, after all, the chief 
target of the taukei movement in 1987: ‘reddy the Gun, Bavadra the Bullet’, 
the placards had proclaimed – had been able to join hands to give the country 
the best constitution it ever had. We can work together, i said.
meanwhile, the prime minister was telling his campaign audiences that 
Fijians were are not ready for a non-indigenous prime minister. And some SDl 
politicians were suggesting that the constitution should be changed to reflect the 
Fijian wish for the country to be led by Fijians. i said that i myself did not have 
a problem with a Fijian leader of government, provided that arrangement was 
the outcome of a political negotiation rather than a constitutional requirement. 
if race were further entrenched in the constitution, specifically the requirement 
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that the prime minister should be a Fijian, we will once again court international 
sanctions. We will be expelled from the commonwealth and strain our relations 
with our neighbours. With the population trend favouring Fijians – they would 
be about two thirds of the population in a decade or so – it was likely that a 
Fijian would always head government. repeating my oft-spoken words, i said 
that this preoccupation with race was a prescription for political paralysis.
my words, echoing the sentiment ratu epeli had aired a few minutes earlier, 
received a warm response. He shook my hands in appreciation, and the women 
sitting in the shed clapped gently. i was moved, but wondered how much of 
what i had said was understood by the audience, for i had spoken in english. 
How i wished then that i could speak fluent Fijian, rather than communicating 
with my fellow countrymen in a language that none of us own or are truly 
comfortable with.
A week or so after the nausori meeting, i attended an nFp rally in Suva. i 
had gone there to observe the proceedings and to catch up with old friends. i was 
a bit late and sat at the back of the room. much to my surprise, the chairman 
announced my arrival to the audience and said, without my permission, that i 
would be speaking towards the end of the meeting! the speakers were full of fire 
and with a bagful of ideas about how to resolve the problems facing the country. 
labour’s strategies of ‘boycott and high court’ (someone mischievously added 
paraquat) were derided to quiet applause. in other meetings, as the campaign 
heated up, the rhetoric got hotter and more personal. indo-Fijian audiences 
love chest-thumping, masala, talk.
After the last speaker had finished, i was invited to the front, still unclear in 
my mind about what to say. then, all of a sudden, i remembered something i 
had read – or was told. in one of the meetings a year or two back, mahendra 
chaudhry had said that nFp stood for ‘not Fit for parliament.’ i began by 
reminding the audience that nFp had, in fact, played a very large role in 
Fiji’s recent history. i asked the audience to name four of the most important 
achievements of Fiji in the last half-century. people look blankly. they are not 
used to this kind of interactive meeting. Achievement of independence, i suggest, 
is one. people nod in agreement. the Denning Award of 1969, which led to the 
departure of the colonial Sugar refining company and brought prosperity to 
the sugar industry, is another. people are listening intently now. the successful 
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negotiation of the Agricultural landlord and tenant Bill after independence 
– also a milestone achievement. And finally, i ask people not to forget the 
promulgation of the 1997 constitution, a momentous achievement considering 
the circumstances prevailing in the 1990s. i then make two concluding points. 
in all these four achievements of national importance, the nFp had played a key 
role: that was a matter of historical record and no trimming of the truth could 
alter that fact. And second, i say these achievements came about as a result of 
dialogue and discussion, patient negotiation and sensitive appreciation of the 
fears and aspirations of Fiji’s different communities. people clap warmly as i 
sit down. i hadn’t said anything terribly profound, but i realize as i ponder the 
event later that our people, even political leaders, have a poor understanding 
of history, even the recent history of their own party.
the nFp puts on a brave face, but even the most optimistic assessment by 
party insiders gives them just a handful of seats, anywhere between three and 
eight. they can’t be kings, its leaders realize, but they could be king-makers 
by distributing their preferences wisely and perhaps, as a bonus, get a Senate 
seat or two. its most critical handicap in this election is that there is no clear, 
and in the public’s mind clearly identifiable, leader; no one face of the party. 
Attar Singh, pramod rae and raman Singh take turns to represent the party 
in various fora, but that only serves to compound the problem. on this front, 
labour has a considerable advantage. mahendra chaudhry is the public face 
of the party, its brand name. For many, chaudhry is the labour party.
in the Fijian electorate, laisenia Qarase enjoys a similar advantage. He 
is no longer the shy, awkward campaigner of 2001, unsure of himself and 
dependent on others for advice. in 2006, he is relaxed, confident, skilled at 
public speaking, engaging. He is the undisputed leader of the SDl, which 
he has, over the course of five years, built into a cohesive, well-oiled fighting 
machine. His most prominent Fijian challenger, ratu epeli Ganilau, is also a 
well-known name from a distinguished family, but his base is limited and his 
platform of multiracialism drowned out by the politics of racial polarization. 
Qarase’s advocacy of race-based affirmative action policy and his frequently aired 
view that Fijians must continue to lead the country fall on receptive ears. the 
fear of chaudhry returning to lead pushes many Fijians into the SDl camp. 
‘Do you want mr chaudhry to lead this country?’ Qarase asks his audiences 
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repeatedly, and the response always is a thunderous ‘no’. A Fijian taxi driver 
tells me that he admires chaudhry for his courage, but he does not trust him. 
to him, the labour leader is politically too smart for his opponents; he always 
has something up his sleeve. He was not alone in thinking that.
personalities certainly matter, but both SDl and labour have done their 
homework. Qarase has made sure that in his policies and programs no province 
is left out. the provincial link is assiduously cultivated, and the party’s network 
reaches deep into the Fijian hinterland. the SDl is not officially endorsed by the 
Great council of chiefs, as the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) was 
in the 1990s, but people know that its blessing is with it. Any opportunity to 
‘explain’ the government’s policies – the rtu Bill, for example – to the provinces 
is seized to strengthen the party’s connection with the grassroots, reminding 
them of what the government has accomplished. With the disestablishment of 
the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua party, SDl became the umbrella 
party of the Fijian community. the SVt is a ghost of its former self, fielding 
only one candidate, that too an indo-Fijian! like the SDl, labour’s machinery 
is strong. the national Farmers union, the Fiji public Service Association and 
the Fiji teachers union are all identified with labour. parliamentarians are 
regularly required to keep in close touch with their constituents. chaudhry 
himself sets the example that others can ignore only at their peril. 
Voters have become more sophisticated over the years. now, they are keenly 
aware of the power they have in their hands. they know that they own the vote. 
they expect the candidates to come to them, to sit down with them, serve them 
kava and cigarettes, attend their marriage and funeral functions. they expect 
to be picked up from their homes and  transported to the polling booth – at a 
time convenient to themselves. candidates from all political parties complain 
about the expense incurred in entertaining voters. many say that they have spent 
more than $10,000 of their own money during the campaign, most of it on 
providing kava. i am amazed at how much kava is drunk these days. Any excuse 
to mix a bowl. A party worker tells me that in his constituency, meetings go well 
into the night. ‘that’s good’, i say, thinking that people are really engaged with 
the campaign. ‘no, Doc, nothing like that. they want long meetings so that 
they can drink more free grog.’ in Fijian meetings i observe, yaqona is drunk, 
but protocol and rank are recognized. the spirit of the vanua is honoured and 
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outsiders are formally welcomed. But among indo-Fijians, yaqona is consumed 
in copious amounts, without decorum or dignity. excessive yaqona drinking 
among indo-Fijian men is a major cause of domestic problems and extramarital 
affairs, which sometimes end in tragedy. the sad thing is that yaqona drinking 
is becoming increasingly popular among younger people.
politicians try hard to meet their public obligations, but sometimes things 
go wrong. A  man tells me that when his wife died in a tragic fire accident, the 
politician representing his constituency felt obliged to make an appearance. 
He walked up to the bereaved husband, and asked him if he knew who 
the dead woman was! the man decided there and then not to vote for that 
parliamentarian ever again. Another candidate told me that when she visited 
one particular household, an elderly lady told her that she would vote for her 
provided she increased her monthly allowance. She was honest enough to say 
that she would try but could not promise. the old woman abruptly shut the door 
on her. the changing voter behaviour, at least in the indo-Fijian community, 
is producing a new kind of politician, one who is attentive to the needs of the 
constituency almost to the exclusion of any other consideration, who spends 
most available time and energy mixing with constituents, ministering to their 
personal needs. Whether the candidate would make a good parliamentarian 
and legislator capable of handling complex national policy issues is, sadly, a 
secondary matter.
i encounter a range of opinion as i travel the countryside. most talks are 
depressing: non-renewal of leases, unemployment, discrimination in the public 
sector, people waiting hopefully for their children to emigrate so that they, too, 
could go. But there are light moments as well. Without humour, it would be 
difficult to cope, i realize. A middle-aged man in tavua town assures me over a 
bowl of grog that there has been real progress in Fiji since 1987. progress? How? 
‘look, Doc’, the man says, ‘in 1987, our government lasted one month, in 2000 
it lasted one year. next time, it will last two years, no?’ A thigh-slapping laugh 
follows. ‘let’s hope it lasts much longer’, i reply, joining in the laughter. A man 
in rakiraki tells me he will vote labour. Before i am able to say anything, he 
says, ‘if labour wins, there will be trouble. We will then have a better chance 
to migrate’. this reminds me of an incident in Sydney when some protestors 
hoisted a banner saying ‘Speight ke Maro Goli’. this could read as ‘to hell with 
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Speight’ or ‘Shoot Speight’. the protestors had the latter in mind. A man tells 
me, ‘We will get ourselves photographed in front of parliament house and will 
use the photograph to claim political asylum in Australia!’ 
other stories. A man says he will never vote for nFp because it is a rich 
man’s party. Another replies: ‘Arre, you should vote for a rich man’s party: what 
can a poor man’s party do for you?!’ At another place, a man relates a story 
which has been around for a while. Someone says he will never vote for nFp 
because nFp is not known outside Fiji. there is a labour party in the uK, 
and in Australia and new Zealand, but there is no nFp there. ‘How can you 
expect help for a party no one knows about overseas?’ A candidate in tavua 
says they should vote for mahendra chaudhry because he is a man of courage. 
‘i was a hostage for nearly two months. i saw with my own eyes the terrible 
beating the soldiers gave to my leader. i saw blood on his face. His ribs were 
broken. But he did not flinch.’ people are impressed. But a week later the local 
headmaster visits the area and is told the story. He is puzzled. How could the 
candidate have seen chaudhry being beaten ‘with his own eyes’ when he was 
not in parliament and never incarcerated? trimming the truth: everyone seems 
to be doing it.
people devise ingenious ways of getting their message across to the people. 
At one meeting, a candidate asks people to vote for the vara, the germinating 
coconut tree which is the Flp symbol. Why? Because coconut is offered to 
the gods in Hindu religious ceremonies. ‘coconut water is the purest form of 
water, untouched by human hands’, he says. What that has to do with politics 
is beyond me. But at another meeting, an nFp candidate responds to this by 
saying that, yes, coconut water is the purest form of water, but we offer it to 
the gods using the mango leaf. the mango tree is the symbol of the nFp!
there is much talk about the poor calibre of candidates standing in this 
election. How can candidates with limited education be entrusted with making 
decisions about the country’s future, people ask. many are barely able to put 
two sentences in english together: how will they be able to digest complex bills 
in parliament? the point is taken, though it is easy to say this while sitting 
on the sidelines. the calibre of Fijian candidates is better than the calibre of 
indo-Fijian candidates. Fijians see a future in politics for themselves. indo-
Fijians don’t. Some of them are standing because they are retired, have nothing 
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useful to do, and are looking for a bit of fame and fortune before the flame is 
finally extinguished. Some are standing because they believe passionately in 
some cause or because their party has asked them to. their sense of loyalty and 
perseverance commands respect. 
At the beginning of the campaign, almost every candidate i speak with is 
hopeful about his or her prospect. ‘chance hai.’ We have a chance. But hope 
begins to vanish as the campaign proceeds. it is a sad spectacle. the saddest 
though is the fate of those who, having done their arithmetic, know from the 
very beginning that they have no hope of winning at all. But they put on a 
brave face, go through the motions and campaign house-to-house. How they 
can muster the energy and enthusiasm to go on the campaign trail in humid 
heat and dust, day in, day out, over several weeks defies easy comprehension. i 
suppose hope springs eternal in the heart of every prospective politician. Some 
hope to make enough acquaintances to help their business. For others, this is 
a trial run, an apprenticeship for the next time around. At least one candidate 
tells me that the exposure he has gained in this campaign will help his chances 
for selection in the municipal elections. 
As i travel around the countryside, usually by myself, i often think how 
things have changed over the years. i published my first Fiji election analysis in 
1983. there was no internet then, no websites, no email, no googling, just the 
radio and the newspapers. Gathering data – about the demographic and ethnic 
composition of a constituency, for example, or getting hold of party manifestos 
or profiles of candidates – was tedious and time consuming. luck played a 
large part in acquiring the election marginalia so essential to understanding the 
mood of the campaign. But all that has changed. All the data you need are now 
posted on the official election website. Both SDl and labour have their own 
websites, displaying their manifestos and speeches by their leaders. All the major 
newspapers have their own websites, carrying analysis as well as information. 
expert commentary is copied and carried far and wide. it is possible now to 
‘know’ what is happening on the hustings without leaving your computer desk. 
the kind of detailed analyses i wrote earlier seems inappropriate now because 
everyone who wants to can have access to the same data set. i have become a 
remnant in my own lifetime!
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As the day of reckoning draws near and all the campaign propaganda have 
been distributed, attention turns to the logistics of manning the polling booths: 
sheds will have to be erected, transport arranged, food and grog organized, 
trusted party workers found to look after the booth. And the waiting, the 
endless waiting for the D-Day. As i say goodbye to the campaign trail, with 
some sadness i have to admit, i know in my heart that the friendships i have 
made with people in once exotic and unknown places, such as Balata, Dabota, 
tagi tagi and Garampani, will remain with me for a very long time, reminding 
me of the world i once knew so intimately, but of which i am no longer a 
part. Fate has dealt these folk a cruel hand. often they suffer through no fault 
of their own, victims of other people’s envy and avarice. i hope and pray that, 
whatever the final outcome, the verdict of the ballot box will be respected and 
that citizens of this most beautiful of lands on earth will be given an opportunity 
to fashion the future of unity and prosperity that they so richly deserve and 
which is within their reach. 
Notes
1 Small meetings with a handful of supporters in the constituency, largely away from the media 
and usually around a yaqona bowl. 
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The pre-election ‘cold war’: 
the role of the Fiji military 
during the 2006 election
Steven Ratuva
the military’s role during the may 2006 election was largely in the form of 
participation in political campaigns against the incumbent Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
lewenivanua (SDl) government for the purpose of protecting ‘national security 
interests’. While the 1987 and 2000 military interventions involved deployment 
of armed troops, the 2006 deployment largely involved public relations – and 
at times psychological pressure – to attempt to influence the election results. 
this was the first time in Fiji’s history that the military was openly involved in 
electioneering and associated activity. the issue of contention then is: by such 
involvement, to what extent did the military exceed its constitutional limits? Are 
the limits clearly defined – as the ruling government argued – or are they meant 
to be interpreted in a utilitarian way, depending on the security circumstances 
– as the military contended? Another pertinent question is whether or not the 
military’s campaign influenced the election result. indications are that it may 
have – but in an unexpected way; rather than diminishing Fijian support for 
the SDl, it strengthened it. 
the military’s election campaign was linked to its attempt to affirm its post-
2000 coup ambitions to ‘cleanse’ Fiji of trouble-making ethno-nationalists. 
Had the SDl lost the election, it would have vindicated the military’s stance 
and given it the moral high ground that it wanted to occupy. there was some 
general public fear that if the SDl won there would be a reprise of the pre-
election ‘cold war’ between the SDl and the military; yet, in fact, the post-
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election formation of the multiparty cabinet quickly eased the tension, enabling 
the two sides to re-engage in a peaceful way. in fact the military commander 
pledged his support for the prime minister and the multi-party government. 
However, the post-election honeymoon period between the SDl government 
and the military did not last long. in September, the military commander 
went back on his words, started denouncing the government and demanded 
that two controversial bills, the Qoliqoli Bill (which was for the purpose of 
returning ownership of the traditional fishing grounds from the state to the 
indigenous landowners) and the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and 
unity Bill (rtu Bill) be withdrawn. this created a new phase of hostility and 
tension, leading to speculations of another military coup in Fiji. this chapter 
examines the extent and possible impact of the pre-election ‘cold war’ between 
the military and the government. the battle for moral and political supremacy 
between the two institutions provided the backdrop to an otherwise peaceful 
and reasonably fair election. 
Fiji’s military plays a pivotal role in shaping the culture, configuration 
and dynamics of Fiji’s politics. the primary role of the Fiji military since its 
inception in the 1870s has been that of ‘internal security’, although there were 
overseas deployments during the Boer War, World War i, World War ii, the 
malayan campaign and during various international peacekeeping operations 
since 1978.1 nevertheless, apart from its involvement in the 1870’s colonial 
pacification process of coercing rebellious Fijian tribes to submit to British rule, 
the most direct interventions of the military in political affairs in recent times 
were the two coups in 1987 and when it moved to remove the coup makers 
and impose martial law in may 2000. Since 2000, the relationship between 
the civil state and the military has gone through a turbulent phase; this had a 
significant impact on the role of the military during the 2006 election. 
The evolution of a fighting force 
the genesis of the Fiji military is to be found in the years prior to cession to 
Britain in 1874. cakobau, a warlord from the powerful chiefdom of Bau, had 
an army, dubbed the ‘royal Army’, that was part of his pre-cession government. 
the royal Army, together with servicemen from the royal navy (Australian 
Squadron), formed part of the ceremonial guard during the deed of cession 
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ceremony in levuka, the old capital of Fiji, on 10 october 1874. After cession, 
the royal Army was converted into the Armed native constabulary (Anc). 
the Anc consisted largely of local Fijians under the command of British 
officers.2 it was used extensively to suppress the anti-colonial and anti-christian 
rebellion of tribal groups in the interior of Viti levu, the main island of the 
Fiji archipelago, and in Seaqaqa on Vanua levu, the second largest island, 
until it was abolished in 1906. A paradoxical characteristic of the Anc was 
the technique of using indigenous troops to suppress indigenous uprisings. 
this was an effective method of ‘divide and rule’ deployed by the British to 
maintain its hegemony.3 
in 1897, as a result of rumours of new Zealand’s intention to annex Fiji, 
the Governor, Sir George t.m. o’Brien, signed an ordinance providing for the 
establishment of an all-european Volunteer Force ‘whose task would be to repel 
invasion [and] quell local disturbances’.4 the ordinance was repealed in 1906 
and was replaced by the Fiji rifle Association ordinance, which required that 
all the rifle clubs be mobilized under the Fiji rifles Association in the event of 
an invasion. During the Boer War (1899–1902), a number of local european 
residents of British descent volunteered to join the British forces. 
it was not until World War i that Fijian troops were sent overseas as a coherent 
force. they were mostly involved in the labour corps because they were not 
allowed full infantry status by the British. World War ii provided the opportunity 
for Fijians to prove their fighting prowess. two battalions were sent to the Solomon 
islands when the japanese invaded the pacific, and fought with distinction under 
uS and new Zealand commanders. it was during the Solomons campaign that 
Fijians won high praise as ‘the best jungle fighters in the world’. During the 
communist uprising in malaya (now malaysia) in 1950, Fijian commandos were 
mobilized with other commonwealth troops to crush the anti-colonial rebellion. 
Again, a significant paradox in this case was the use of colonial troops by the 
British to quell an anti-colonial movement by other colonized people. inspired 
by the exceptional Fijian soldiers’ performance in malaya, the British government 
recruited 200 Fijians into the British Army in 1960, many of whom joined élite 
regiments, such as the British Special Air Service (SAS). 
Since 1978, Fijian soldiers have been active in peacekeeping operations 
overseas. these have included the uniFil mission to lebanon as part of 
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the united nations-sponsored buffer between israeli and lebanese-based 
anti-israeli groups, and to the Sinai peninsula as part of the united States-
sponsored multinational force to keep peace between egypt and israel over 
the disputed peninsula. Fijian soldiers were also sent to rhodesia to be part of 
an international observer group during the first election after independence. 
After the end of the cold War, Fiji participated in un peacekeeping missions 
in croatia, Somalia, cambodia, Afghanistan and pakistan, Kuwait, iraq and 
east timor, and sent troops to Bougainville as part of a regional peacekeeping 
force following the end of hostilities there in 1997. Fijians have served in the 
regional Assistance mission to the Solomon islands (rAmSi) since 2003, 
under the overall command of the Australian military. 
in recent years, a number of Fijian officers have joined the new Zealand and 
Australian armies, but the largest number have joined the British Army. Since 
1997, about 2000 Fijians have been recruited by the British. many were already 
trained soldiers in the Fiji military. private security companies operating in iraq 
since the uS-led occupation of that country, such as Global risk Strategies, 
Homeland Security limited and triple canopy, have recruited close to 1000 
former soldiers, serving soldiers (who had to resign) and non-soldiers to perform 
a variety of security tasks. 
the Fiji navy, an important component of the military, was set up in 1978. 
the first ships were purchased from the united States and subsequent ones 
were provided by Australia and israel, as military aid. the navy has been used 
mainly for policing the 200-mile exclusive economic Zone, and in emergency 
operations relating to rescues and national disasters. the military’s Air Wing 
was formed after the 1987 coup, when the French provided two helicopters 
as part of its military aid package to the Fiji military. it was disbanded after 
both helicopters crashed and after subsequent revelations of huge debts 
incurred as a result of the aircraft. the profile of the navy was raised as a result 
of the appointment of its commander, commodore Frank Bainimarama, as 
commander of the Fiji military.5 
Institutional and ideological transformation 
the military coups of 1987 brought to the surface a whole series of 
contradictions that characterized Fiji’s post-colonial state. By and large, the 
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contradictions centered on the tension between national identity and civic 
nationalism on one hand, and communal identity and ethno-nationalism on 
the other. theoretically, at the professional level, the military was an institution 
representing civic and national spirit – but at the ideological and political 
levels, it was a guardian of indigenous communal interests. the institutional 
and ideological shift from the former to the latter became the basis for 
transformation from the 1990s to the post-2000 coup period. By 2006, the 
military, led by Bainimarama, had aligned itself firmly on the side of national 
identity and civic nationalism. 
the coup in may 2000 was engineered by civilian ethno-nationalist 
politicians using a small group of élite soldiers from the counter revolutionary 
Warfare unit (crWu). Although some soldiers were involved in taking the 
government politicians (including the prime minister) hostage, the military, as 
an institution, was not. the military intervened to thwart the takeover, firstly 
through negotiations and then, when negotiations fell through, by way of 
force. the situation in Fiji was precarious, to say the least, with executive and 
legislative authority neutralized, the judiciary and police rendered ineffective 
and the president as head of state powerless to take control of the situation. 
the military, as the last bastion of state power, intervened to salvage the 
situation by firstly asking the president to ‘stand aside’ and then suspending 
the constitution. these were the two major barriers to the military’s intention 
of dealing with the coup perpetrators directly. the actions by the military were 
contentious and were seen by some as tantamount to staging a coup. However, 
to the army, these were the only means to deal with the coup perpetrators in a 
direct and effective way and to maintain order and rebuild security in a new, 
chaotic situation. 
upon the removal of the president and the suspension of the constitution 
under the ‘doctrine of necessity’, the military proceeded to put in place a re-
democratization process, starting with the setting up of a ruling military council, 
followed by a caretaker government and an election a year later. meanwhile, 
the coup perpetrators – consisting of nationalist politicians, former military 
officers, members of the crWu and other civilian ethno-nationalist agitators, 
and including some chiefs – were rounded up and imprisoned. A final attempt 
by the nationalists to complete their unfinished business and reclaim lost glory, 
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by removing the military commander in a mutiny on 2 november 2000, failed. 
the plan was to remove the commander and take over the military, release 
George Speight and the coup perpetrators, and establish an exclusivist ethno-
nationalist state called the Matanitu Vanua, outlined in a document called the 
Deed of Sovereignty.6 the military had vowed to put an end to any attempt by 
indigenous ethno-nationalists to implement their political agenda and, since 
2000, has been campaigning hard against ethno-nationalist ideology. this was 
a sudden change in the ideological and political orientation of the military 
– from its role as guardian of indigenous nationalism to one which advocated 
multi-ethnic statehood. the military made use of nation-wide public relations 
programs to articulate these changes. 
The military public relations machine in motion 
While the military had been involved in public relations exercises – such as the 
use of its band and sports (especially rugby) teams – for many years, it was really 
only after the 1987 coup that there was large-scale concerted effort to mobilize 
public opinion and re-create an acceptable public image of the military. Since 
then, public relations has grown into a professional priority for the military – a 
priority that has seen it deploying its troops around the country to carry out a 
variety of integrated tasks. Since the 1987 coups, three phases of image-making 
can be discerned. the first was the post-1987 coups extensive image re-creation 
process, the second was the post-2000 coup public relations exercise, and the 
third was the 2006 election campaign. each had its own specific objectives, 
characteristics and methods, although there were basic similarities in terms of 
the ultimate motive: to win the hearts and minds of the citizens. 
The post-1987 coups image reconstruction 
the coups in 1987 undermined the Fiji military’s international and local image 
in a significant way. internationally, the Fiji military was highly respected 
as a fighting and peacekeeping force and this image took a battering as the 
international and local media vilified the Fiji military in ways that were 
unprecedented. From a heroic outfit the military became a demonized mob. 
While the military was hero-worshipped by indigenous nationalists, it was 
vilified by other ethnic groups, especially indo-Fijians, who felt that the coup 
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had victimized them and relegated them to the status of second-class citizens. 
there were also many Fijian supporters of the Fiji labour party (Flp) who 
were openly critical of the military. 
the response of the military then was twofold. the first response was to 
use force, torture, imprisonment and psychological coercion to intimidate 
opponents of the coups. the second was to engage in an extensive public 
relations exercise to convince people of their goals in uniting the country. 
there were two audiences for the public relations exercise. the first was 
the local indo-Fijian community, which had to be convinced that indo-Fijian 
political rule had led to instability and that the coup was to provide the political 
environment for ‘political stability’. the second audience was made up of 
Fijians who were opposed to the coups and who were seen by the military as 
probably the biggest barrier to their attempt to unify Fijians under the military’s 
ideological spell. After the coups, a large number of Fijians, especially from the 
western side of Fiji, had mobilized behind Dr timoci Bavadra, the deposed 
prime minister (also from the western side), and the ensuing tension led to 
various violent incidents.7 to the military, the Fijians were seen as a greater 
threat to their designs than the indo-Fijians because Fijians could easily ‘melt’ 
into the Fijian community without being identified, unlike indo-Fijians who 
were more ‘visible’ as a group. 
in these circumstances, a number of varied but complementary approaches 
were used by the military to change its public image and provide legitimacy to 
its post-coup political consolidation. these included direct community public 
relations use of sports, entertainment by the military band, introduction of the 
school cadet scheme, expanded recruitment, establishment of the auxiliary unit, 
use of symbolism, ‘civilianization’ of military personnel, and extensive use of 
the church and of the vanua. the details are shown in table 3.1. 
Post-2000 coup public relations
the public relations approach after the 2000 coup was different because of the 
different circumstances of the coup. the coups in 1987 were direct interventions 
in which all branches of the military were involved. in 2000, although the 
élite crWu of the military was involved in the coup, the entire operation was 
largely supervised by civilian politicians and nationalist activists. As in the 1987 
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Public relations activity Purpose and approach
Participatory approaches 
 Sports organization and involvement in rugby as a public 
  relations tool.
 School cadet scheme  Setting up of military cadet schemes in schools as part   
  of the curriculum in order to inculcate military values  
  into young minds.
 Auxiliary unit Setting up of a maritime unit involved in marketing  
  village produce. this was a way of projecting a good  
  image of the military in the rural areas.
 ‘civilianization’ of military and militarization  
 of civilian life Senior officers were recruited into senior civil service  
  positions and many civilians were absorbed into the  
  military, where they held military rank. they could  
  operate both as civilians and military officers
 expanded recruitment  expansion of the army under the justification of  
  ‘security’ and ‘employment’, and facilitation of  
  rabuka’s promotion to major general.
 rural infrastructure projects 	 use of the engineering unit for infrastructure  
  development in rural areas.
Ideological/sentimental approaches  
 Brass and rock band Bands used in concerts and on public occasions to  
  whip up pro-army sentiments.
 use of church use of methodist church to mobilize Fijian support  
  for the military.
 use of vanua use of traditional sociocultural links to consolidate  
  military support amongst Fijians.
 media  use of newspaper and radio (both english and  
  vernacular) to propagate military values and ideas
 Symbolism  use of military, political and cultural symbols (e.g.  
  wide use of military uniform, songs, dances, promotion 
  of warrior mythology etc.) to promote military  
  discourses.
 public show of force  use of parades and public shows of force to keep the  
  public reminded of who has the power.
Table 3.1 The nature of the military’s public relations exercises after the 1987 
coups
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coups, the public justification was political paramountcy for indigenous Fijians, 
although there were complex economic and political factors associated with 
the coup. the military as an institution intervened to thwart the coup and free 
the members of parliament who were held hostage. the military succeeded in 
doing this after weeks of cat-and-mouse negotiations with the hostage-takers, 
culminating in the use of force by the military to neutralize the coup makers. 
At the height of the hostage drama, the military and the coup makers were 
engaged in an intensive propaganda and counter-propaganda warfare never 
before seen in Fiji. the coup makers produced dozens of leaflets making 
allegations – ranging from deposed prime minister mahendra chaudhry’s 
conspiracy to get india to take over Fiji, to president ratu mara’s blood-drinking 
antics. the coup makers deliberately planted rumours to keep the public in a 
state of fear and panic, hoping that this would work in their favour, especially 
in terms of the military bowing down to their demands. George Speight, the 
self-styled coup leader and international public image of the coup, was the 
major official mouthpiece through which the ‘aspirations’ and ‘cause’ of the 
coup were articulated. the military responded by attempting to nullify the 
coup-makers’ claims and vilifying their leaders. 
meanwhile, the military engaged in active public relations throughout the 
country (discussed in further detail later in this chapter). the exercise continued 
even after the coup rebels were overpowered. there was an increase in the media 
blitz, with the military frequently making public statements, and a special Fijian 
program on Sundays for the commander, commodore Frank Bainimarama. 
the military bands (both the brass and rock bands) were used extensively for 
public entertainment to provide a ‘feel-good’ factor during the depressing times 
after the coup, and also to project an image of the military as defender of public 
interests. However, political developments after the coup saw the relationship 
between the government and the military deteriorate and the military’s public 
relations stance took a different twist, both in style and intensity. 
The post-coup/pre-election military–government power struggle 
unprecedented tension between the government and the military preceded 
the 2006 election and provided the backdrop to the military’s pre-election 
campaign. From 2003 onwards, Frank Bainimarama directed sustained criticism 
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against the government on a range of issues, including his own reappointment 
as military commander, reconciliation policy, the size of the military budget 
and the performance of politicians and public servants. But he reserved his 
greatest censure for the government’s attitude towards those involved in the 
2000 coup. that attitude, in his view, was revealed by the rtu Bill introduced 
into parliament in 2005. He thought the government too lax, and demanded 
that the rule of law be upheld so as to ensure that no more coups took place. 
military objections to government policy first appeared following attempts 
by Qarase’s government to reduce the sentences imposed on soldiers convicted 
of mutiny at the Sukunaivalu Barracks in labasa during the 2000 coup. Some 
government members also called for the release of George Speight and his 
accomplices. the military resisted this move, arguing that the rule of law should 
take precedence over political emotions and that those who had been found 
guilty must serve their full sentences. the war of words caused some public 
anxiety, compelling Bainimarama to publicly state on 15 April 2003 that there 
was not going to be a coup.8 
things came to a head some months later when Bainimarama’s contract 
expired and the government threatened not to renew it. Bainimarama called 
for the removal of jeremaia Waqanisau from his post as ceo of the ministry 
of Home Affairs, and was alleged to have threatened him personally. Bending 
to the pressure, the government appointed Waqanisau as ambassador to china 
soon afterwards. to mobilize support within the military, Bainimarama asked 
his senior officers to pledge allegiance to him. Five senior officers refused, 
saying that their loyalty was to the military not to the commander. the 
officers, colonels ratu George Kadavulevu, Alfred tuatoko, Samuela raduva, 
and Akuila Buadromo, and commander timoci Koroi, a naval officer, were 
asked to resign as a consequence. the five alleged that, during the stand-off 
with the government, Bainimarama had asked the senior officers to organize 
a coup. the government requested president josefa iloilo to establish a 
commission of inquiry into the case, but he refused on the grounds that 
Bainimarama had given assurances that the military had no intention of 
overthrowing the government. Because Bainimarama was the biggest obstacle 
in the government’s attempt to free the 2000 coup rebels, the government 
– from 2001 to 2004 – had been pursuing indirect methods to replace him. 
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Bainimarama was offered diplomatic positions in the uK, malaysia and new 
Zealand, all of which he turned down. the government even promoted him 
to vice admiral and backed his unsuccessful application for the post of un 
field commander in Kuwait. At the end of the day, Bainimarama opted for a 
contract renewal to enable him to see through the conviction and punishment 
of the coup rebels. With considerable reservation, at the end of january 2004, 
the government eventually extended Bainimarama’s contract for another five 
years.9 
the government soon discovered it had reappointed one of its greatest 
critics. From october 2004 onwards, Bainimarama engaged in repeated public 
criticism of government policy; it continued until the election was held in may 
2006. He criticized the government for organizing Fiji Week for the purpose 
of inter-ethnic and inter-religious national reconciliation. the ceremonies 
included public apologies by some chiefs – some of whom were involved in 
the 2000 coup – to the indo-Fijian community for the suffering they had 
endured during the crisis. the military refused to take part in the ceremonies, 
saying that the apologies were meaningless without justice taking its course.10 
the military again condemned the government for the early release of the 
former vice president, ratu jope Seniloli (who was convicted of coup-related 
crimes), and argued that it made a mockery of the judicial process and was a 
threat to national security. this drew criticism from a number of government 
politicians, who accused the military of meddling in political affairs. moreover, 
after the resignation of Seniloli, Bainimarama publicly supported the idea of 
having a non-Fijian take over Seniloli’s position, saying he favoured someone 
with excellent leadership skills for the post, regardless of race. the government 
saw his statement as unjustified interference with the affairs of the state. the 
tension reached a level of seriousness that raised widespread public concern 
in late 2004 and early 2005. Bainimarama sent out a series of warnings to the 
government that the rFmF ‘would put pressure on anyone’ who dared tamper 
with national security, saying that ‘if we don’t act, this country is going to go 
to the dogs and no investor will want to come here’. He likened the military 
to a tiger sitting in a corner. ‘You have to give it [the tiger] room’, he warned. 
‘if you don’t give it room, it will bite you.’11
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in April 2005, two convicted coup plotters – ratu naiqama lalabalavu (now 
minister for Fijian Affairs) and ratu josefa Dimuri (now minister of State for 
Agriculture, Alternative livelihood and outer islands Development) – were 
given early release after serving just eleven days of their eight-month prison 
sentences. Bainimarama delivered a salvo of criticism against the government, 
provoking an equally fiery reply from Home Affairs minister josefa Vosanibola, 
who warned the commodore that he would be ‘disciplined’ if he spoke to the 
media without consultation with him. A public argument between the two 
followed. And more conflict came with the non-renewal of the contract of 
Australian lawyer peter ridgeway, the Deputy Director of public prosecutions, 
who, on 20 june, was ordered by the government to leave Fiji. Bainimarama 
saw this as an attempt to undermine the coup investigations, especially because 
ridgeway had made significant inroads into the coup investigations and 
prosecutions. 
the most important source of military–government tension, however, was 
the controversial rtu Bill, which the government hoped would settle the post-
coup matters once and for all. Amongst other provisions, the Bill proposed to set 
up a reconciliation and unity commission with powers to grant compensation 
to the coup victims as well as provide amnesty for the coup perpetrators as part 
of the process of national reconciliation. the military argued that providing 
amnesty would undermine the rule of law and would encourage future coups. 
the military was adamant that all convicted coup perpetrators were to serve 
their full sentences. When the earlier draft of the Bill was being discussed in 
parliament, the military sent a number of officers to watch and listen to the 
proceedings and at the same time provide a show of force to tell the government 
and parliament that they were serious. 
other issues also soured the relationship between the government and the 
military. Amongst them were allegations by the military in August 2005 of 
plots to remove the president, with some alleged plotters having links with 
the government.12 in october of the same year, the military spokesperson, 
lieutenant colonel orisi rabukawaqa, made scathing allegations regarding 
corruption in the registrar General’s office involving illegal chinese immigrants. 
in the same month, the military publicly opposed its budgetary allocation, 
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stating that it wanted more autonomy over its finances rather than having 
to go through the ceo for Home Affairs. the military saw the bureaucratic 
control of their budget as tantamount to ‘political control’ of the military by 
the ministry for Home Affairs. Bainimarama was further infuriated by the 
fact that, although the military budget announced on 4 november had been 
increased from F$67 million in 2000 to F$76.4 million for 2006, it was still 
short of the F$84 million the military wanted. Due to the shortfall, the military 
was forced to apply cost-cutting measures. earlier, in october, the commander 
had been fined for overspending the military budget, but this was later over-
turned by the Supreme court. 
the situation grew tense in December 2005 as the military demanded the 
resignation of the ceo for Home Affairs, lesi Korovavala, because of the 
delay in the re-trial of the 20 soldiers charged with mutiny during the 2000 
coup, resulting from difficulties in sorting out the contract for the judge 
advocate, Graham leung. Bainimarama threatened to ‘send his boys’ down to 
the ceo’s office to ‘secure it’ if nothing was done quickly. the stand-off led 
to the intervention of Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi, who stepped in 
to cool down the situation. on 31 December 2005, Bainimarama stated that 
the military no longer recognized josefa Vosanibola as the minister responsible 
for the military, stating ‘the military now is on its own and is not answerable 
to anyone’.13 He further stated that legislation being proposed by the Qarase 
government was ‘racist’ and based on self-interest, not on the interest of the 
nation. in a related pronouncement he reassured the nation that, ‘i am the one 
who is standing for democracy and the rule of law because the Government 
and its officials only want the laws to be made to suit them’. 
the 2005 tensions spilled over into 2006 and intensified. towards the 
end of january, the Auditor General, eroni Vatuvoka, accused the military of 
contempt of court for refusing to follow the Supreme court order to open up 
the military welfare fund, about which the military has been protective, arguing 
that the fund is a private one not a public one. 
in addition to the rtu Bill, the other Bill which attracted the wrath of the 
military was the Qoliqoli Bill, which was meant to legally enforce indigenous 
ownership and control of traditional fishing grounds currently under state 
jurisdiction. the military commander saw the Bill as a threat to security, on the 
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grounds that it has the potential to cause dispute and conflict within the Fijian 
community. He assured the country that there was not going to be any coup, 
in response to widespread rumours of a possible takeover of the government. 
in early january 2006, Bainimarama called on the government to resign 
because of its inability to resolve the 2000 events and also because of its ‘racist’ 
legislation. He claimed: 
they have let people out of jail on one excuse or the other. How can they [the Government] 
sleep at night – do they have a clear conscience?...this government is incompetent…it’s 
better that they resign so that better people can do the things that [are] supposed to bring 
us good.14
the tension was worsened a few days later when the military learned that 
the government had approved a shipment of arms for the police. the military 
stated that they were not consulted and it appeared that the government was 
deliberately arming the police against the military. this was denied by the 
government as well as by the police and the matter was laid to rest after the 
commissioner of police visited the military headquarters to explain that the 
arms were standard police equipment, were only for use in confined places, 
and were needed to replace dilapidated old police weapons. 
one of the most high profile incidents was when the military issued a media 
release in which it threatened to take control of the country if the government 
failed to ‘continue the good fight’.15 this was in response to a newspaper-
reported comment by pita nacuva, the acting Foreign minister and now Speaker 
of the House of representatives, that the attitude of the military was based on 
‘sour grapes’.16 When the president of the Flp, jokapeci Koroi, appeared on Fiji 
television supporting a ‘government take-over’, the incident created a political 
crisis that saw the intervention – and resolution of the conflict – by the Vice 
president, ratu joni madraiwiwi, on 16 january. nevertheless, the impact of 
Bainimarama’s outburst had consequences within the military itself. the land 
forces commander and deputy to Bainimarama, colonel jone Baledrokadroka, 
confronted his boss about his outburst. this led to a stand-off between the two 
that culminated in the dismissal of Baledrokadroka from the army. 
in responding to criticism regarding his anti-government stance, commodore 
Bainimarama stated, ‘i really don’t have any business in the political running 
of government. my outbursts are not political. it’s about national security…
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Security to me and the rFmF means a clean and corrupt-free country’.17 in a 
meeting between the prime minister and the commodore convened by the Vice 
president, it was agreed that both Bainimarama and the commissioner of police 
be invited as observers in the Security council and also that there be more direct 
communication between the prime minister and the commodore through 
regular meetings to discuss issues of common concern. the prime minister also 
assured Bainimarama that the next election would be conducted fairly, without 
government interference. the Vice president urged the two parties to be more 
responsible in their dealing with each other, saying, ‘it is critical that elements 
in the Government and the military exercise circumspection and discretion in 
their dealings with each other at all times’.18 
However, that was not the end of the matter. the minister for Home 
Affairs lodged an official complaint with the commissioner of police against 
Bainimarama for his threat to overthrow the government and asked him to 
determine whether or not the commodore’s words were seditious or treasonous.19 
the minister for Home Affairs told Bainimarama that he would withdraw the 
complaint to the police on the condition that Bainimarama apologize for his 
threat of 8 january to depose the government. As expected, Bainimarama refused 
to apologize, saying, ‘Asking me to apologize for making that statement is an 
insult to the working people of this nation because, simply, it is my job...no one 
is going to attack the military without any retaliation from the military – not 
even under any agreement’.20 on the advice of his senior officers, he retaliated 
by withdrawing commitment to the agreement made with the Vice president 
on 16 january; in particular, any further talks with the prime minister were 
to be put on hold. 
Pre-election psychological warfare: The ‘truth and justice’ 
exercise
As the tension between the government and the military increased in tempo, and 
as the election approached, the military embarked on a nation-wide program 
to combat what they saw as ‘lies’ perpetrated by ‘opportunists’ in government. 
the announcement for the commencement of the campaign was made by 
Bainimarama on 10 march: 
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We will go into villages and tell them the real truth of what happened and what is being 
done...i will advise the people because they cannot continue to advise a government that 
continues to make it okay for those that went to jail to get back into society. By not educating 
the people about doing what is right, it is willfully lying and misleading them.21 
the proposed campaign was supported by the Flp, which by that time 
had aligned itself with the military. the leaders of the conservative Alliance 
and the new nationalist party called for Bainimarama’s arrest for fomenting 
instability. the SDl saw the proposed campaign as an attempt to undermine 
its power base while some, like former prime minister Sitiveni rabuka, saw it 
as a perfectly constitutional process. 
in response to accusations of interfering in elections, the military stated that 
what they were involved in was an ‘exercise’ not a ‘campaign’. the military’s 
confrontation with the government even extended to the Supervisor of elections, 
Semesa Karavaki. the military commander attacked the election preparation 
as being disorganized; Karavaki, himself a territorial soldier, reciprocated by 
saying that Bainimarama should not interfere in the election process. in fact, 
Bainimarama had initially opposed the election date, saying that it was too 
early given that the registration process had a lot of anomalies. 
the military’s strategy in the election campaign was twofold. the first 
element, the ‘truth and justice’ exercise, was focused largely on re-educating 
the public about the 2000 coup; the second element of the strategy was direct 
campaigning against the SDl party. the two were closely linked because the 
SDl was seen as supportive of the 2000 coup, both its ideological justification 
and its political execution.
Bainimarama openly spoke of his campaign to discourage his soldiers and 
friends from voting for political parties and candidates he deemed ‘racists’ and 
‘discriminatory’. this attracted flak from SDl campaign manager jale Baba, 
who urged Bainimarama to stand for the election to prove his worth, as well as 
from Alexander Downer, Australian minister for Foreign Affairs, who warned 
Bainimarama about interfering in politics.22
Bainimarama’s campaign was very direct. He urged voters not to listen to 
fearmongers and ‘opportunists’ who claimed that a victory for the Flp would 
spell instability for Fiji. He then asked voters to keep an open mind, saying, 
‘Don’t choose a party just because it’s a Fijian party. choose an indian or chinese 
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if his policies are for your benefit’.23 the military defended its campaign saying 
that it was not against any particular party or politician; it was primarily for 
the purpose of asking the voters to vote with their conscience. 
A case which further infuriated Bainimarama was the sacking of Sitiveni 
raturala, a popular Fijian radio host who, on 9 march, hosted a show with 
Bainimarama. in response to allegations by the military that the government had 
a hand in the sacking, the ceo of the Fiji Broadcasting corporation limited 
(FBcl), Francis Herman, said that mr raturala had breached his contract. it 
later emerged that the issue had to do with raturala giving the whole air time 
to Bainimarama without allowing time for the public to ask questions live on 
air. the military warned the FBcl against muzzling its voice and, in a surprise 
move, raturala was quickly drafted into the military’s public relations team. 
The military public relations team 
the military public relations team consisted of 30 to 40 soldiers – in teams of 
three to four – who visited various provinces in Fiji. to make sure that they 
were welcomed, men from the provinces were deployed to carry out the public 
relations tasks. the normal approach was for the soldiers to ask, traditionally, 
for permission to enter the village to carry out their exercise. often, the 
presentation was accepted, although in some cases the soldiers’ requests were 
ignored. Fijian protocol usually demands that visitors are welcomed, no matter 
how disliked they are. 
After the sevusevu ceremony (welcoming ceremony), a request would be 
made for veitalanoa (discussion) to take place. the soldiers would explain the 
purpose of their visit and would then proceed to make their verbal presentation. 
Questions and answers would follow. the whole process would take place in 
the presence of the chiefs and other leading members of the village and often 
involved kava-drinking. upon completion of the task, the soldiers would head 
for another village. 
Although the military said that their campaign was successful, it is not easy 
to provide evidence for this. the fact that they were readily accepted into the 
villages and given the chance to make their presentation did not mean that 
people were convinced by their message. Furthermore, even if the messages 
were convincing there was still doubt about whether or not the impact was 
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sufficient to sway the people’s votes away from the SDl. the landslide victory 
of the SDl could mean that the military’s campaign had very little impact on 
Fijian voters’ behaviour. 
Conclusion: implications of the military’s public relations 
activities 
the direct participation of the military in the 2006 election shows that the 
aftermath of the coup of 2000 still shaped, to a great extent, the political 
and ideological climate in Fiji. the post-coup public relations effort by the 
military sought to undo the ‘lies’ which justified the 2000 coup, and the effort 
intensified as election fever heated up. the military was bent on ensuring that 
the political trajectory before and after the election was based on the principles 
of multiracialism and transparency – although the approach used was highly 
questionable in the context of modern liberal democratic norms; in particular, 
the line of demarcation between the civil state and the ‘non-political’ military 
was blurred. 
normally, in a parliamentary democracy, the military operates under civilian 
authorities so that its coercive power is manageable and accountable. A military 
with special interventionist powers may not be good for stability and democracy. 
the role of the military is one of the dilemmas of post-colonial militaries, in 
which there have been difficulties in making it align with and accountable to 
civilian rule. this dilemma is partly historical because, since the colonial and 
post-colonial period, many post-colonial militaries have been used as active 
components of political governance by colonial and post-colonial élites. During 
the colonial days, as we have seen in the case of Fiji, the role of the military 
was to help maintain internal security. the Fiji military was groomed as part 
of the Fijian élite power structure, and its intervention in 1987 on behalf of 
Fijian nationalism was a violent manifestation of this. 
the 2000 coup was not strictly military, but a civilian intervention 
undertaken by civilian nationalists with the help of some soldiers. moreover, 
the military intervened to smash the coup, imposed martial law and helped 
put Fiji back on the road to democratic governance. the military was of the 
conviction that the coups of 1987 and 2000 were not to be repeated, and that 
all possible steps should be taken to ensure this. the military saw their public 
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relations exercises as ways of educating the people about the ‘evils’ of coups. 
the SDl was seen as an institutionalized supporter of the 2000 indigenous 
nationalist ideals. 
While the government and various foreign governments, such as those of 
Australia and new Zealand, denounced the public relations exercise as ‘political 
interference’, many people in Fiji, especially the indo-Fijians and other ethnic 
groups, saw the military as a saviour, as the only institution that would protect 
their rights and well-being from extremist Fijian hegemony. the country 
was divided into two groups of citizens; those who felt that the military had 
overstepped its authority, and those who believed that, despite the extra-legality 
of its actions, the military was right in terms of ensuring political stability. 
the military’s public relations effort may have driven indo-Fijians into the 
Flp camp – as they felt confident that the military would provide them with 
the sought-after security if the Flp won – and driven Fijians towards the SDl 
– as they felt alienated and threatened by the military’s perceived alignment 
with the Flp. 
the tension between the military and the government took an unexpected 
turn. After the SDl party won the election, it offered the Flp nine cabinet seats 
and, consequently, a multiparty cabinet was set up. this had an immediate effect 
on the political perceptions and behaviour of the citizens, as well as those of the 
military. people of all ethnic groups welcomed the move and the military made 
a commitment to support the multiparty government. the political tension that 
had characterized the pre-election and election period suddenly disappeared. 
most of the issues of contention between the military and the government 
suddenly became obsolete. And, as a result, the military disbanded its public 
relations group and, in its place, created a small but professional public relations 
team of six people, and shifted its effort from direct propagation of views to 
the public towards community service by its service arms, such as engineering, 
and naval search and rescue. 
the question then is, will the new political climate be sufficiently sustainable 
to see the blossoming of a new civil state–military relationship in which 
the professional lines of demarcation are respected? or will future political 
developments re-create the conditions that led to the pre-2006 election ‘cold 
war’? 
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this all-important question, however, became somewhat superfluous when, 
in September, the ‘cold war’ between the military and the government reared 
its ugly head again. the military demanded that the government withdraw 
the Qoliqoli and the rtu Bills, spawning further tension between the two 
institutions; by november this had developed into a national crisis leading to 
speculations about a possible military coup. 
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Songs in sheds:  
some thoughts on the  
sociology of Fiji elections
Paul Geraghty1
the way elections are conducted in Fiji differs in many ways from the way 
they are conducted ovasis (a Fiji english term that usually means Australia 
and new Zealand, but can also include the united Kingdom and other places 
where kaivalagi – people of european origin or ‘white’ people – reside). these 
differences are, at least in part, due to indigenous Fijian customs. in this 
chapter, i attempt to answer such questions as why, in elections in Fiji, there 
is little or no heckling but lots of prayers and hymns, why people turn up for 
elections in their Sunday best, and the origin and function of that peculiarly 
Fijian institution, the electoral shed and the songs sung therein.
History
the first general election in Fiji was in 1963.2 this was the first time that 
Fijians had universal suffrage and participated in a secret ballot. on the other 
hand, indians in Fiji had been voting for representatives to the legislative 
council since 1929, and europeans since 1904.3 Fijians had taken little 
interest in national affairs, being more concerned with Fijian society and 
local Fijian politics, in particular the Bose levu Vakaturaga (Great council 
of chiefs). However, they were not total strangers to the concept of elections. 
As with many aspects of the westernization of Fijian society, it was probably 
the methodist church that introduced the Fijians to electoral voting, with the 
Fijian administration not far behind. Some form of voting had existed in the 
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methodist church since 1866,4 and the practice of electing office holders, such 
as turaganikoro (village headmen) and mata ni tikina (district representatives), 
by laveliga (show of hands) or by vakaio (acclamation) seems to go back a long 
way, probably to the 19th century.5
the Fijian word currently used for ‘election’ or ‘ballot’ is veidigidigi,6 which 
is recorded as early as 1941.7 etymologically, it means ‘many people choosing 
someone’ – so is a very apt neologism, and whoever its coiner was deserves 
credit. the same word was used in the Bible – the current translation of which 
dates from 1900 – but there it seems to have a different meaning, translating 
as ‘partiality’ (1 timoci 5:21) and ‘make distinctions’ (jemesa 2:4). there is at 
least one alternative form, veidigitaki (literally ‘one person choosing another’), 
which appeared in the Fijian language newspaper Volagauna in 1963,8 but i 
have been unable to determine whether or not it had any general currency at 
that time. certainly, it is not used today.
it is commonly believed that ‘consensus’ is the traditional pacific way of making 
decisions, but this notion appears to be relatively modern. Before the arrival of 
christianity and western government, decision-making was fairly exclusively by 
way of lewa vakaturaga (chiefly decision) – though if the people for whatever 
reason did not like the lewa of a particular turaga, they often found ways of 
getting rid of him or her and appointing another. With the westernization of 
political institutions, at least at a certain level, decisions were made by the will 
of the majority, and determined by voting. A now retired member of a certain 
provincial council told me that voting was only recently, within the last 10 or 20 
years, replaced by ‘consensus’ – usually a steamrolling by the chair.
Politics is religion, campaigning is preaching
in the Fijian worldview, politics is, if not exactly religion, something very close 
to it. one indication – though i am always wary of reading too much hidden 
meaning into homonyms, as many anthropologists do – is that vunau, the word 
for ‘preach’, is also used for political campaigning. indeed, political speeches are 
usually listened to with the silence and respect afforded a sermon, even when 
the ‘congregation’ patently has no intention of voting for the speaker.
Heckling is a sine qua non of campaigning in places like Britain9 – but is 
very rare in the Fijian context, although it does occur to some extent among 
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the indian community. in nearly 30 years of living in Fiji and reading The Fiji 
Times daily (and other newspapers occasionally), i have, to my recollection, only 
come across the word ‘heckle’ once – and even then it was spelled ‘hackle’.
The shed
to most native speakers of english, a shed is a small building for storing 
gardening tools or coal for the fire to tide you over the long winters. in Fiji, 
however, the word has a unique meaning. essentially, it is a temporary open-
sided structure, usually with bamboo posts and a corrugated iron roof, erected 
for many kinds of gatherings. in colonial times, there was a roaring trade in 
bamboo from the bilibili (bamboo rafts) that brought bananas down to nausori 
by way of the Wainimala and Wainibuka rivers, precisely for this purpose; but 
this has all but ceased today.
the best-known Fijian word for the shed is vakatunuloa (sometimes shortened 
to tunuloa), on the origins of which there has been much speculation. it may 
have some connection with tunuloa, on the natewa peninsula in cakaudrove, 
but the exact nature of the connection is obscure. the earliest reference is in 
cargill’s dictionary of lakeba Fijian,10 where vakatuniloa is defined as ‘a porch 
or shade’, and its rewa equivalent is given as vakatunuloa. the 1839 definition 
suggests that it may have had a rather different meaning at that time. the word 
is not found in the first-published dictionary of Fijian,11 but does appear in 
the most recent Fijian dictionary, in which both tunuloa and vakatunuloa are 
defined as ‘shed’.12 there are also a number of regional names for the same 
structure, such as bolabola and covacova.
in Fiji Hindi, the word for shed is remarkable in that it has at least four 
different forms. in most of Vanualevu it is jhaap, in most of Vitilevu it is 
mad’haa (the apostrophe after the ‘d’ indicates that it is retroflex), in some 
parts of rural nadi and Bua it is pandaal, and the Fiji-english shed is used in 
Suva and lautoka. it would be interesting to find out the original meaning or 
meanings of these terms. Given that none of them is a borrowing from Fijian, 
it would seem that this artefact was also present in traditional indian culture, 
though some of its functions may well have been adapted from the use of the 
vakatunuloa in Fijian society.
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the function of the shed is to shelter, fodder and ply with grog, visitors at a 
gathering, most frequently a funeral, but also weddings and, in Fijian society, 
vakataraisulu (the lifting of mourning for a chief ) and, particularly in the 
islands, vakatawase – new year celebrations – when swarms of urbanites return 
to their villages for a week or two of celebration and feasting on fish and lairo 
(land crabs). the function of sheds at elections is similar, but they are erected 
by political parties or independent candidates, and function like the exclusive 
lounges run by airlines at airports, except that the customers are provided with 
the kinds of food and drink that are more popular in Fiji. the expectation is 
the same: that in return, the customers will continue to ‘fly with that particular 
airline’ – or vote for a particular party. no modern election is complete without 
some party complaining about the agepije or liumuri13 of voters who go through 
their sheds and enjoy their palau and yaqona and then go and tick the name of 
some other party on the ballot form14 – and complaining that the sheds are an 
inordinate drain on resources. But next election there they will be again, because 
voters have come to expect them. it could also be argued that they are symbols 
of the political power of the party or of the individual erecting and financing 
them. i believe that they are a relatively modern institution – certainly they 
seem not to have been present during the 1963 general election.
in Fijian custom, large gatherings – such as tevutevu (exchange of wedding 
gifts) and vakataraisulu – are subsumed under the name solevu, and i would 
like to suggest that, for Fijians, the election is a kind of solevu. Hazlewood15 
defines a solevu as ‘a large number of people gathered together to present 
property to a chief, or to a town, on which occasion they generally meke 
(dance) and make magiti (large quantities of food); a kind of Fijian ball; feast, 
or fair’. the presence of the vakatunuloa or shed is one of the indications of 
this functional equivalence, but there are others. clothing is one. Fijian dress 
codes are relatively strict (at least from the perspective of most westerners); 
when a Fijian goes out to a public occasion, he or she will dress appropriately. 
they will dress vakavavalagi (in the western fashion, e.g. trousers or jeans for 
men, skirts or jeans for women) if they are going to the cinema, or a concert 
of western music, or a western-type gathering, such as Suva’s annual Hibiscus 
Festival. But if it is a vakaviti (traditional Fijian) occasion, such as most religious 
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gatherings and vanua-based fund-raising events called adi (which are in many 
respects similar to the Hibiscus Festival), then ‘traditional’ Fijian dress is ‘de 
rigeur’ – sulu vakataga (pocket sulu) for men, and usually suluira (ankle-length 
under-skirt) and jaba (knee-length dress) for women.16 For elections, Fijians 
typically dress in this traditional fashion. in many parts of Fiji, various groups 
of participants in the recent elections, including even groups of officials, chose 
to buy and wear specially tailored uniforms – kalavata or puleta – in much the 
same way as happens with solevu.
The songs
the songs that are sung in election sheds by Fijians, particularly when victory 
has been announced but often before that too, are taken from a very limited 
repertoire of songs that are associated with solevu. they could almost be 
numbered on the fingers of two hands: Da mai laveta, Lomaloma, O Bau na 
yanuyanu, Liwavi au na tokalau, Noqu vanua, and not many more. they are 
songs of cibi – triumph.17 they are not songs that would normally be played 
on the radio, not songs that anyone would request on any of Fiji’s numerous 
phone-in radio programs. they are patriotic songs, expressing pride in the 
nation or a particular region. maybe not coincidentally, they all appear to have 
been composed in the 1950s or 1960s, so would have been popular at the time 
of the first general election in which Fijians participated. they belong to a very 
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5
Election observation missions 
to the 2006 Fiji election
Graham Hassall and Jeannette Bolenga1
never believe what you read in the papers and particularly from observers  
who are paid a lot of money for a tropical holiday (internet chatter)
the general feeling of unease in Fijian society in the lead-up to the 2006 general 
election made the presence of election observers of more than academic interest. 
in his statement of 1 march 2006, announcing that the election would be held 
over the period 6–13 may, prime minister Qarase extended invitations to seven 
potential observer groups. A media release from the ministry of information, 
communications and media relations stated:
the prime minister…announced that on behalf of Government, he would be extending 
invitations to the commonwealth, the united nations, the european union, the pacific 
islands Forum, and, bilaterally, to Australia and nZ, to send observers to monitor the 
elections in Fiji. the pm will also write to the Vice chancellor of the uSp [the university of 
the South pacific] to invite its School of Governance to monitor the elections in close liaison 
and co-ordination with the office of the Supervisor of elections. mr Qarase explained that 
Government was doing this because it has full confidence in the electoral commission 
and the office of the Supervisor of elections in independently conducting the General 
elections in a free, open, fair and impartial manner, and with full transparency. 2
the invited organizations undertook observer missions of differing scale 
and emphasis, although each in its own way in accord with the electoral Act 
1998 and a set of ‘Guidelines for international electoral observers’ supplied 
by the Fiji elections office. From the government’s point of view, the presence 
of observers no doubt added to the transparency of the democratic exercise it 
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was about to undertake. the invitation was both a sign to the international 
community that the government was confident of the ability of the elections 
office to implement the election, and an acknowledgement that some of Fiji’s 
multilateral and bilateral partners had concerns about the election on the basis 
of Fiji’s turbulent recent past (not to mention that Australia, new Zealand and 
the european community had each donated substantial sums to help cover 
the costs of the exercise). 
others apart from the government called for observer presence at the 
2006 election. For example, in September 2005, while the commonwealth 
parliamentary Association was meeting in Fiji, opposition leader mahendra 
chaudhry asked the commonwealth Secretary General to send a monitoring 
group, citing election abuses of 2001 as a reason.3 
Earlier Fiji elections
international observer groups had attended Fiji’s general election in August 2001 
following a request from the Fiji government to the united nations (un) – in 
response to which a un electoral observer mission was approved by resolution 
of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly ‘…as part of the effort to promote and 
consolidate new or restored democracies’.4 japan announced grant assistance 
of uS$370,000 and ten support staff. At least 55 international observers were 
accredited for the 2001 poll – 40 represented the united nations, 12 represented 
the commonwealth Secretariat, and three represented the european union (eu).5 
the un report found the elections to be credible while expressing concern about 
technical problems ‘…including serious issues related to the electoral rolls’; about 
the ‘unnecessarily complex’ preferential voting system; and about the requirement 
of section 99 of the constitution for a multiparty cabinet to be established.6
The origin and purpose of observer missions
the practice of election observation has evolved rapidly in recent years, with 
standards emerging for long-, medium- and short-term observations. Among 
the lead agencies that have established guidelines are iFeS7 in north America, 
international iDeA8 in europe, and the un elections office. in october 
2005, 21 lead agencies gathered in new York to endorse the ‘Declaration of 
principles for international election observation’.
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Within the Asia pacific region, the practice of observation emerged in such 
divergent circumstances as the post-marcos years in the philippines and the 
relatively more staid political environments of Australia and new Zealand. 
the Australian electoral commission regularly invites electoral experts and 
practitioners to participate in observation of Australian general elections. the 
piAnZeA (pacific islands, Australia and new Zealand electoral Administrators) 
network, which links the electoral commissions of Australia, new Zealand and 
the pacific islands, has also coordinated a number of election observation 
missions in the region. 
the inclusion of a non-government international observer group, based in 
the Governance program at uSp, reflected the government’s awareness of that 
program’s interest in the development of electoral practices in pacific island 
countries. the uSp had formally applied for status on 15 February, and this was 
granted by Supervisor of elections Semesa Karavaki on 10 march, pursuant to 
the announcement made nine days earlier by the prime minister. in granting 
observer status the Supervisor commented:
i am pleased to provide observer accreditation to you and your team from the electoral 
Studies unit at the pacific institute of Advanced Studies in Development and Governance, 
uSp …i fully support your Goal and objectives. independent observers have a vital role 
to play in any election and as outlined in objective 7 of your terms of reference i am 
looking forward to your report and any recommendations you may have which might 
improve the relevant legislation and the procedures we use in the elections office.9
By the time of polling, 6–13 may, several additional observer groups had 
been given accreditation, and yet others came to Fiji to observe in an unofficial 
capacity. the piAnZeA network gathered a team of eight observers, from 
four regional countries – although there was no formal reporting process or 
coordination. officials from the papua new Guinea electoral commission 
came to learn any lessons in advance of their general election, scheduled for 
2007. transparency international sponsored a delegate from its Vanuatu branch. 
Due to the short time frame, the united nations was unable to organize a 
mission. 
in broad terms, each observer mission was interested in whether or not 
the elections were conducted in a ‘free and fair’ manner. no doubt the eu, 
following through with its interest in Fiji since 2000, had one eye on post-
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conflict restoration of democracy and the rule of law, and the other on Acp 
relations10 and the future of the sugar industry. the commonwealth, which 
has been monitoring the restoration of the rule of law in Fiji over a period of 
time, fielded a six-member team led by Keith Knight and including one pacific 
islander (paul Bengo, registrar of political parties in papua new Guinea) and 
five additional experienced election-watchers.11 
the 39-member eu observer mission was the best funded (with 
approximately Fj$2.4 million), most organized, and most visible (not least 
due to its accommodation at the Holiday inn of its international observers and 
support staff ). An advance team visited Fiji in march to gauge the viability of 
mounting an observation exercise and to determine its scope. Having decided 
to proceed, twelve ‘long-term’ observers arrived in Fiji on 10 April, and were 
despatched in pairs to six regions around the country. A further twelve short-
term observers arrived prior to polling; they were also dispersed across the 
islands after an intensive period of induction and orientation. nine members 
of the group were eu staff resident in Fiji. Additional staff were sourced 
locally to monitor media and provide logistical support. local academics and 
specialists were engaged to provide background briefings at a pre-poll retreat. 
chief observer istvan Szent-ivanyi, a Hungarian representative to the european 
parliament, arrived on 3 may, shortly before polling commenced on the sixth. 
the mission announced that its report would be issued at the end of August.
the 23-person pacific islands Forum team was led by Forum Secretary-
General Greg urwin. rather than organizing an independent program, the 
new Zealand government contributed nine observers to the Forum team. 
Although the Australian Government did not send an observer group, five 
diplomats from the Australian High commission in Suva were registered as 
‘independent observers’. Fiji resident and new Zealand citizen Father David 
Arms was the single independent observer not attached to a diplomatic mission 
or university team. the united States embassy accredited 15 observers and the 
new Zealand High commission, three. 
the Governance program at uSp organized a 16-member observer team, 
comprising faculty members, students and administrative staff.12 Smaller teams 
of two or three persons had previously observed general elections in cook islands 
(2004), Vanuatu (2004), Solomon islands (2006) and Samoa (2006), under 
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a three-year eu-funded program, ‘transforming our communities through 
Good Governance’, run at piAS–DG.13 the much larger exercise in Fiji was 
made possible by the fact that all participants were living in the country, as 
well as by a general expectation that the electoral Studies project at piAS-DG 
would take on this civic role, particularly as no domestic observation teams 
were permitted. A budget of approximately $20,000 was established. teams 
volunteered to observe in each of Fiji’s four districts (although an effort to have 
an observer travel to rotuma was thwarted – reportedly by excess rain on the 
island’s airstrip). 
Observer accreditation, orientation and coordination
the Supervisor of elections commissioned a consultant to take responsibility 
for accreditation and coordination of observer missions. only ‘international’ 
missions were allowed, and members of these missions were required to obtain 
formal accreditation.14 this required their agreement to comply with guidelines 
for observers provided by the elections office.15 no applications were denied 
by the elections office, and 121 observers were accredited.
observation was defined to include observation and evaluation of the 
impartiality and functioning of the office of the Supervisor of elections and its 
team of electoral officials; the voter registration process and the establishment 
of the electoral roll; the voter education campaign; the election campaign; the 
voting process; the vote count; the determination of electoral results and their 
dissemination; and access to and use of the media.16
international observation was defined as commencing ‘when international 
electoral observers have arrived in Fiji and have received their identity 
documents confirming their accreditation by the office of the Supervisor of 
elections’ and ending ‘with the departure of the observer Group from Fiji’.	17 
no Fiji citizens could participate in international observer missions.18 once 
accredited, observers had the right to obtain a visa, to move freely throughout 
the country, and to communicate freely with all parties involved in the elections 
in some way, including political parties, other social and political organizations, 
and officials involved in electoral processes. they were to communicate their 
findings to the office of the Supervisor of elections and seek his response before 
making these views public.19
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in return for this access to all facets of the election process, international 
observers accepted a number of obligations: they agreed to respect the 
constitution and the laws of Fiji, to exercise their role with ‘impartiality, 
independence and objectivity’, and to wear their identity cards at all times.20 
While they could not ‘interfere in, or impede, the normal course of the 
electoral process’ and were to ‘…refrain from issuing individual statements 
about the electoral process to the media’, they had an obligation to ‘… notify 
electoral officials of any action or conduct which they believe to be serious 
infringements of the electoral process’.21 Diplomats accredited in Fiji and who 
were ‘designated as international observers’, were free to ‘… exercise their 
functions without prejudice to the provisions of the Vienna convention on 
Diplomatic relations’.	22
upon accreditation, observers were provided with copies of all relevant legal 
and constitutional provisions, and with the elections office’s policy manuals. 
the Fiji government’s information, technology and computing Department 
provided it support to the elections office website (http://www.elections.gov.
fj), at which information on constituencies, candidates, parties and electoral 
provisions was regularly updated. immediately prior to polling, the elections 
office provided a one-day induction for international observers and, during 
the polling and count periods, observers benefited from the Supervisor of 
elections’ daily press briefings. 
Shortly before polling commenced, observer missions met with each other 
and with major players in the electoral process, partly to share thoughts on how 
each group felt the process was proceeding, but also in an effort to collaborate 
and avoid duplication in fieldwork. However, while these meetings brought 
familiarity with each group’s composition and strategies, they did not result in 
significant cooperation in practical terms. 
Determining observer mission effectiveness
radio new Zealand international reported that more than 100 observers ‘from 
the eu, the commonwealth, the pacific Forum and the uSp’ had assembled 
to monitor the elections.23 Given that one assessment put the cost of observer 
missions to the Fiji 2006 election at Fj$4.7 million (and the cost of the election 
exercise as a whole at Fj$48 million),24 questions concerning the value of 
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observer missions are clearly worth asking. At the same time, one may ask 
whether or not international observers had any particular training or expertise 
that would allow them to make pronouncements as to whether the elections 
were ‘free and fair’. A related question concerns whether or not electoral actors 
have taken any lessons whatsoever from previous observation reports.
The impact of fieldwork
Although observer missions were not to interfere or intervene in any way in 
electoral processes and were to remain as neutral as possible, there can be no 
doubt that the presence of so many observers had an impact on political actors, 
if not on the election outcome itself. the major parties expressed their support 
for the presence of observer teams, each pointing to issues that required careful 
watching.25 the national Federation party, for instance, called on international 
election observers to ‘observe the deliberate breaches of section 134 of the 
electoral Act’; it was concerned about parties continuing to use the media to 
conduct campaigns, and at advertisements that included the Fiji labour party 
banner appearing in papers during election week.26 Some parties and nGos 
shared their concerns about aspects of the campaign by faxing letters to observer 
missions. experience in the field suggests that some polling officials were more 
welcoming of election observers at polling stations than they were of the media, 
even though the media carried identity cards that gave them equal status. Does 
this point to the need for more civics education for officials on the role of the 
media during elections? 
Observer missions and media 
the observer missions were interested in how various media outlets reported the 
election, and in freedom of speech in general. the eu mission, in particular, 
undertook extensive media content analysis. on 19 may the Fiji Daily Post 
printed a small item in which the eu mission described the newspaper’s election 
coverage as having ‘a general tendency to report in neutral tone’ – with 34.7 
per cent of coverage going to the Fiji labour party and 28.5 per cent to the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua.27
For its part, the media reported the activities of observers and were keen to 
solicit opinions on ‘the topic of the day’. Because voting proceeded over ten 
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days and because observers were required to withhold judgemental commentary 
until completion of their observation period (and to avoid statements made 
as individuals, as opposed to the joint statement issued by the group as a 
whole), the observer presence was reported widely, but without substantial 
commentary. this did not stop the media from associating ‘neutral’ observers 
with political issues of the period. Fiji Daily Post, for instance, addressed the 
military commander with such headlines as “pSSSt! WAtcH it FrAnK!”,28 
and used editorial space to urge observer groups to take note of attitudes 
expressed by the military.29 
The impact of statements
the official and informal statements of observer missions had unavoidable 
impacts on public opinion. Virtually all groups observed a common set of 
problems (errors and omissions on the roll; inadequate supply of ballot papers; 
last-minute changes to polling-booth locations, etc), but no group reported 
evidence of intentional manipulation of rolls, ballots, or counts. Whereas 
some defeated candidates and parties offered their alleged evidence of (or at 
least hinted at motivations behind) intentional foul-play, such claims failed to 
gain support in the public mind, or in the views of the observer teams. the 
results that were announced, no matter how polarized they appeared in terms 
of ethnically defined voting patterns, were consequently accepted by the voters 
in general. the presence of so many observers in the field, paying particular 
attention to the manner of the opening and closing of polling stations, the 
security of ballot boxes during transportation to the count centres, and the 
integrity of the counting process, made it difficult for claims of ballot fraud to 
be sustained. the presence of observers seemed to have a similar effect on claims 
that ballots printed in excess of officially required quantities were somehow 
moved from the government printer and used in one or other constituency. 
observers had full access to the premises of the government printer at Vatuwaqa 
and their presence, together with that of numerous other agents, including 
police personnel, made the prospect of ballot-smuggling highly improbable. 
it is not clear which observer missions first directed their findings to the 
Supervisor of elections, as required by Article 7 of the international code. 
the Head of the eu’s electoral observation mission, istvan Szent-ivanyi, 
60 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
tabled a report on the election in the european parliament’s ‘committee on 
Development’ on 30 may,30 well ahead of the mission’s return visit to Fiji to 
make its final report at the end of August.
the commonwealth mission’s ‘Statement on Voting’ of 14 may suggested 
that while there were some shortcomings, the process was ‘reasonably well 
managed’. the full statement, together with a picture of the team, appeared 
on page five of the Fiji Daily Post.31 the commonwealth mission’s ‘Statement 
on the counting and on the electoral process as a Whole’ of 19 may called 
the election ‘credible’ and, while expressing concern about shortfalls in 
electoral administration (notably problems with voter registration and with 
late distribution of ballot papers), focused on the ‘challenge of representation 
based on ethnicity’.32 on 20 may the head of the commonwealth mission, 
mr K.D. Knight, publicly requested the commander of the republic of Fiji 
military Forces to accept the results and to refrain from interfering in politics 
– mentioning at the same time his preference that the electoral system move 
away from its ethnic basis.
on 2 june, the final report of the commonwealth mission was submitted 
to the commonwealth Secretary-General, who forwarded it the following 
week to the prime minister of Fiji, the chairman of the electoral commission, 
the Supervisor of elections, the leaders of the main political parties and 
commonwealth governments. it was released to the media on 12 june 2006. 
At the outset of its mission the Forum Secretariat team announced it would 
issue a statement to the elections office, to the government, and then to forum 
member countries.33 it declared the results ‘free and fair’ on 15 may.34 
the uSp team issued a statement on 15 may that was reproduced in the 
Fiji Daily Post on 16 may.35 Although small deviations from proper procedures 
were observed, the group commended the untiring efforts of election officials 
and the police who worked alongside them, especially given the short time 
frame between the date the elections were called, 1 march, and the date polling 
began, 6 may. 
the eu mission issued a preliminary statement on 18 may that appeared 
in the press the following day.36 in it, the eu commented on electoral 
administration, voter registration, electoral campaigns, media coverage, 
complaints and appeals, participation of women, postal voting, voting and 
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counting. Amongst other things, the report noted that the elections office 
had received a total of 65 written complaints, but noted that the procedure for 
the hearing of these complaints was not clear, and the results of the hearings 
were not to be made public.
the broad outlines of each observer mission report contained similar themes 
and concerns: inadequacies in registration, ballot printing and distribution, 
and identification of polling stations; the high number of invalid votes; and 
the handling of postal and overseas votes.
After the election observation exercise, questions will continue to be asked 
about its utility and effectiveness. Did the presence of such a large collection of 
international observers influence the behaviour of any of the most significant 
actors? Did the army become more restrained after an informal information 
session between the commander of the armed forces and eu representative 
Szent-ivanyi? Did losing candidates and parties limit their post-ballot protests 
on account of the ‘second opinion’ that observers were able to offer the public? 
Did individual scrutineers, returning officers and polling agencies alter their 
activities by reason of the fact that an observer might suddenly appear at the 
door? Answering such questions is not at all easy, but the reporting of some 
100 observers, who had nothing invested in the outcome of the poll apart 
from concern for the condition of democracy in Fiji and for the integrity of 
the country’s system of government, appears to have given the public a sense 
of ease about the outcome that made it possible to move to the next difficult 
item – formation of government. 
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The cycles of party politics
Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth
Fiji politics runs through cycles of consolidation and fragmentation. For the 
Fijian parties, consolidation is the response to adversity, and fragmentation 
ensues whenever the heat of national politics cools down. the 2006 election, 
when Fijians united to back the main Fijian party, reflected such consolidation. 
But where was the adversity, and where the heat of politics? the truth was 
that the 2001 election campaign had never truly ended, but flowed almost 
seamlessly into that of 2006. meantime, the political temperature had been 
kept high enough to command the attention of the Fijian voter. otherwise, 
regional, provincial and vanua rivalries might have reasserted themselves more 
strongly, and more Fijians might have stopped to ask why they continued to 
live in villages and urban settlements where conditions were little better than 
decades before, and what the government had done about it. 
For years after 2001, the dominant political issue was who should be in the 
government and who should not. the restored constitution required power-
sharing, but the largely Fijian-backed Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua 
(SDl) had not formed a multiparty cabinet after winning in 2001. the Fiji 
labour party (Flp) had taken the matter to court, and, for the next three years, 
debate raged over the legitimacy of the 2001 process of government formation. 
it became the central issue in Fiji politics. not until november 2004 did 
labour finally abandon its legal quest for inclusion in cabinet, and party leader 
mahendra chaudhry take up the position of leader of the opposition. no sooner 
65the  cycles  of  party  politics
had he had done so than the government launched the controversial promotion 
of reconciliation, tolerance and unity (rtu) Bill, causing the republic of Fiji 
military Forces (rFmF) to challenge the government’s legitimacy and threaten 
a coup. As a result, the question ‘who rightfully rules’ – which elections are 
supposed in theory to settle – was never truly resolved by the 2001 poll, and 
Fijians were repeatedly reminded that the legitimacy of ‘their’ government and 
its legislation was in question. under such conditions, what united the Fijians 
continued to be more important than what divided them. 
Splintering of Fijian political parties occurs when the pressure is off, as 
in April 1977, in 1987 and again in 1999. each decade’s crisis triggers a 
countervailing rotation, in the latter years under the auspices of successive 
new political parties. the Alliance party healed Fijian divisions at the polls 
of September 1977 and 1982, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) 
obtained the unanimous backing of the Bose levu Vakaturaga (Great council 
of chiefs, or Gcc) in 1991, and the SDl rose on the crest of yet another bid 
for Fijian unity in the face of adversity in 2001 and 2006.
For the indian parties, by contrast, adversity often historically gave birth to 
internecine struggles. So it was in the 1930s, after the initial defeat of demands 
for a ‘common roll’, when a decade of struggles ensued between the Arya Samaj 
and orthodox Sanatanis, between those originating from south and north india 
and between Hindus and muslims.1 So it was in the wake of April 1977’s 
constitutional crisis, when the ‘dove’ and ‘flower’ factions tore the national 
Federation party (nFp) apart. And so it was in the wake of the 1987 coup, when 
the coalition between the Flp and the nFp broke down and was replaced by 
vigorous intra-communal competition. Yet this did not happen after the 2000 
coup. instead, the Flp went from strength to strength; it improved on its 66 
per cent of indian support in 1999 by obtaining 75 per cent in 2001 and 81 
per cent in 2006. Had the Flp fragmented, in line with the previous cyclical 
experience, the 2006 election might have been very different. As a result, the 
events of 2000–2001 remained the crucible of party politics at the 2006 polls, 
and the 2006 election represented a sharpening of the political alignments 
already witnessed at the 2001 poll. this chapter explores that story.
the February 2001 chandrika prasad case proved a watershed in Fiji party 
politics.2 judges found that the interim administration had no legal standing. 
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one possibility was to reconvene the former parliament and so potentially 
restore the pre-2000-coup government. in theory, judges pay no attention to 
political practicalities. the law is the law, and constitutional interpretation 
stretches only so far as allowed by discerning the intent of the framers of those 
fundamental laws. in practice, the separation of powers between judges and 
legislators is often hazy, and so it was in Fiji. the chandrika prasad judgement 
was viewed by some as ‘the case that stopped a coup’.3 Yet, instead of requiring 
the reinstatement of the labour-led government, the court of Appeal ruling 
left space for the Fijian interim administration to repeat the process of selection 
of a new head of state and, thereafter, to re-legitimize itself by calling fresh 
elections. not only had the military failed to issue the appropriate decrees 
abrogating the constitution, but president ratu Sir Kamisese mara had not, 
as everyone thought he had, resigned from office on 29 may 2000. instead, it 
was a letter from president mara enquiring about his pension entitlements on 
15 December 2000 that became formally accepted as entailing his resignation. 
that meant that there were three months before a new president had to be 
selected, in accordance with the constitution.4 And of those three months, only 
15 days were left when the judges delivered their telling verdict on 1 march 
2001. the no-longer-recognized interim president, ratu josefa iloilo, thus 
had 15 days to repeat the process of his own selection via the Gcc, which he 
successfully did. 
in the wake of the chandrika prasad case, Fiji’s political parties re-crystallized 
in new and unexpected ways. For the interim government, then Deputy 
prime minister ratu epeli nailatikau appeared before the court of Appeal 
to announce the government’s acceptance of the verdict, so the alternative of 
defiance was straightaway, and fortunately for Fiji, rejected. 
three legal possibilities arose in the wake of the judgement: (i) the return 
of the chaudhry government, (ii) the advent of a ‘national unity’ government 
or (iii) fresh elections. 
Few thought the first option politically practical, and no attempt was made 
to restore mahendra chaudhry as prime minister. A majority of Fijians, roused 
to the defence of indigenous paramountcy by the events of 2000, would not 
have tolerated it. in any case, the former people’s coalition led by chaudhry 
had splintered at the grass roots level even before the coup, and backbenchers 
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from the Fijian Association party and Veitokani lewenivanua ni Vakarisito had 
been deeply implicated in the events of 19 may 2000. one was imprisoned on 
nukulau with George Speight. 
the president’s initial choice, reportedly, was the second option – a 
‘Government of national unity’, based on the 1999–2000 parliament, and led 
by ethnic Fijian Deputy prime minister Dr tupeni Baba, rather than chaudhry 
– but that did not eventuate either.5 moves to dislodge the Flp leader and 
install Baba in his place commenced, spearheaded by veteran Flp members 
Krishna Datt and pratap chand. However, chaudhry supporters boycotted 
the meetings, leaving them without a quorum. meanwhile, the labour leader 
visited Fiji’s re-installed president, ratu josefa iloilo, and offered a dissolution.6 
it was a tactically deft manoeuvre. if what was on the agenda was the formation 
of a new unity government that would draw cross-party support, tupeni Baba 
appeared the most acceptable leader, particularly if he had the backing of the 
majority of the 37 Flp mps. if, instead, the outcome was to be a fresh election, 
chaudhry’s strengths in rallying the party faithful and pulling out the cane belt 
vote made him the likely choice for the leadership. 
While the Flp argued, the president chose the third option, the one most 
likely to calm ethnic Fijian passions. He dissolved parliament and swore in 
laisenia Qarase to lead the government until elections could be held. Having 
been an ‘interim’ prime minister, Qarase became a ‘caretaker’ one, with the 
advantage of incumbency to take into an election. 
chaudhry’s triumph in the Flp internal battle was not without costs. the 
defeated Dr tupeni Baba formed the breakaway new labour unity party 
(nlup), drawing with him a number of long-standing indigenous Fijian Flp 
members, and some support from civil society activists and Gujarati businessmen. 
critically, however, Baba failed to retain the support of key moderate indian 
leaders. Both Krishna Datt and pratap chand were subsequently disciplined by 
the party, although they remained within the fold and soon reappeared on the 
front benches. At the 2001 poll, chaudhry and Baba were fierce opponents: Baba 
claimed a vote for chaudhry would result in another coup; chaudhry replied 
that Baba was desperate to be prime minister. Baba’s nlup fought a spirited 
campaign but it won only 4.5 per cent of the national vote, and secured only 
two seats. By the 2006 election, it had vanished without trace.7    
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the chandrika prasad case also entailed a reconfiguration on the Fijian side 
of politics and the emergence of a new Fijian party, the SDl. to begin with, 
Fijian leaders were deeply divided. efforts to unite Fijian parties in a ‘Fijian 
Forum’ to fight the impending election were plagued by faction fighting, as was 
the Gcc itself. Verata chief ratu ilisoni Qio ravoka described deliberations 
at the chiefs’ council as marked by ‘personal differences, backstabbing, vanua 
rivalry, political rivalry, jealousy and traditional power struggle’.8 SVt leaders 
were reluctant to cede their position as the dominant Fijian party, despite strong 
indigenous criticism of their role in saddling Fiji with the 1997 constitution 
and precipitating the crisis of 1999–2000. the Gcc withdrew its support 
for the SVt and declared an intention not to favour any one political party. 
that proved the death blow for rabuka’s SVt party, an organization originally 
invented as the chiefs’ party. Schisms quickly became apparent in the SVt 
leadership9, and even before the polls the party machinery was ebbing away.10 
the SVt was able to pick up only 8.6 per cent of the Fijian vote at the 2001 
election, and vanished into oblivion in 2006.11 
the launch of the SDl in may 2001 signalled both continuity and change in 
Fiji politics. in a bid to remain prime minister, Qarase initiated a constitutional 
review process aimed at providing a ‘safety-valve’ for indigenous discontent, and 
announced that government funds were to be spent on a pro-Fijian blueprint, 
including plans for the construction of a tar-sealed road through the rebellious 
province of tailevu, near Speight’s home area of Wainibuka. Qarase, himself a 
lauan, received the backing of former president, ratu Sir Kamisese mara, and 
the lau provincial council, mending what had been, in the Fijian tradition, 
a gross insult to the former long-serving prime minister, the tui nayau ratu 
mara, perhaps the last of Fiji’s high chiefs with great political stature (mana) 
and a corresponding position in the legislature. lauan, as well as indian, 
shops and buildings had been destroyed in the unrest on 19 may 2000, lauan 
houses had been stoned, and the notion that lauans had for long captured 
and monopolized the resources of mainland Viti levu had gained currency 
even in government circles. At the height of the post-coup crisis, ratu inoke 
takiveikata, the Qaranivalu –  highest chief of lowland naitasiri12 – had gone 
so far as to say that outer islanders (meaning lauans) should not ‘talk because 
you are visitors to Viti levu’ at a meeting of the Gcc.13 Yet peace was made 
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among the Fijian leaders, at least temporarily. When the SDl was formed in 
tamavua village, naitasiri, its founding president was none other than the 
Qaranivalu (until he was later convicted and imprisoned for involvement in 
the mutiny of november 2000). the former president played his part in the 
new Fijian political reconciliation, despite animosities that festered beneath the 
lauan surface. now retired and at home on lakeba, ratu mara ensured that 
his daughter, Adi Koila mara, stood aside, giving Qarase a free run at the lau 
Fiji provincial communal seat.  
the SDl quickly became the new dominant mainstream indigenous Fijian 
party, despite scandals before the election. chief among these was an ‘agricultural 
scam’ associated with the distribution of pitchforks, outboard motors and other 
agricultural implements to Fijian villagers, particularly in coup-supporting 
areas of tailevu and naitasiri. the 2001 achievement of the SDl in capturing 
50 per cent of the Fijian vote, and winning 32 seats in the new parliament, 
was extraordinary, and saluted as such by defeated veteran SVt politicians, 
such as jim Ah Koy and Berenado Vunibobo. the SDl captured all the urban 
Fijian communal seats, as well as lau and most of mainland Viti levu. most 
remarkably, the antagonism between Fijian parties in western Viti levu, the 
party of national unity and the Bai Kei Viti, had allowed the SDl to triumph 
also in that part of the country. 
Another six seats were won by the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua 
(cAmV), a new political party formed by customary chiefs and politicians who 
were implicated in the 2000 coup. the leader of the cAmV, ratu naiqama 
lalabalavu, was the tui cakau, the leading chief from the cakaudrove area, and the 
highest-ranking chief in one of Fiji’s three confederacies. George Speight himself 
was elected for the cAmV from his prison cell, although he soon lost his seat 
owing to his failure to attend three consecutive parliamentary sittings. He would 
not have been able to obtain the tailevu north Fijian seat without the support of 
the cakobau chiefs from Bau island (see tuitoga, this volume). the president of 
the methodist church publicly blessed both parties, offering Fijians the cohesion 
of shared faith in place of factionalization among traditional rulers.   
the Flp also emerged triumphant in its communal heartlands, seeing off 
the potential threats from the nFp and the nlup. in the open constituencies, 
it was able to repeat the 1999 achievement of capturing common roll seats in 
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the cane belts. Beyond that, contests – as in 1999 – depended on the ordering 
of minor party preferences. Yet this time, the smaller parties’ preferences did 
not favour the Flp. prior to the polls, these parties had clubbed together in a 
‘moderates Forum’ – comprising the nlup, nFp, SVt, upp and FAp. these 
parties gave each other second, third and fourth preferences, but, critically, 
tended to place the Flp as last preference and the SDl in penultimate position. 
that decision gave the SDl nine of the open constituencies; cAmV preferences 
gave the SDl an additional three of these seats, and one was secured at the 
first count, without relying on preference votes. in addition, the SDl won the 
north eastern General communal seat, bringing the total to 31, compared 
with the Flp’s 27.14 the ‘moderates Forum’ parties were left with only four 
seats in parliament, and soon lost two of those after Kenneth Zinck crossed the 
floor to join the government and after the courts overturned the nadi open 
result, giving an additional seat to the Flp.  
the outcome left both large parties short of a majority, and there were 
brief rumours of a seemingly impossible coalition between the ousted prime 
minister, mahendra chaudhry, and his nemesis, the coup-supporting cAmV. 
the cAmV, however, wanted an amnesty for the coup convicts, including 
George Speight, a concession that presumably would have been a public 
relations disaster for the Flp. predictably, it was the SDl and cAmV that 
joined forces to form a government. this was to prove a government plagued 
by controversy from its inception, both domestically and overseas. As prime 
minister, Qarase issued the constitutionally required invitation for the Flp to 
join the cabinet, but in a way that welcomed refusal. When chaudhry accepted 
the offer, the prime minister responded that the conditions attached to the 
Flp’s acceptance were too onerous, and that the Flp had rejected the prime 
minister’s condition that cabinet be based on SDl policy. the court found 
otherwise, and a succession of high profile multiparty cabinet cases commenced 
that were used by mahendra chaudhry mainly as a method for de-legitimizing 
the government. Had the court been obeyed, Qarase potentially would have had 
to unwind his coalition with the cAmV, which was not entitled to participate 
in cabinet according to constitutional rules (except as part of the entitlement of 
the party of the prime minister). in addition, chaudhry claimed vote-rigging 
at the 2001 polls, also pressing this before the courts. 
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From the 2001 election onward, the question of ‘who rules?’ in Fiji was kept 
permanently at the centre of Fiji politics, with another court case perpetually 
around the corner that would decide, again and again unfavourably, on the 
constitutionality of the Qarase-led government. no sooner had mahendra 
chaudhry finally given up and accepted the position of leader of the opposition 
in late 2004, than another issue emerged that again threatened the legitimacy of 
the government, and rekindled the ‘who rules?’ issue, albeit from a less familiar 
direction. the rtu Bill threatened, among other provisions, to provide an 
amnesty for coup-related prisoners. it brought to a head the long-simmering 
antagonism between the republic of Fiji military Forces and the Home Affairs 
ministry (see ratuva, this volume). military commander Frank Bainimarama 
threatened to stage a coup if the Bill were passed. For the Flp, this seemed a 
blessing in an odd disguise. in the run-up to the 2006 poll, its party president, 
jokapeci Koroi, in an ill-advised tV interview, astonished the viewing public 
by backing the military’s threats to seize political power. chaudhry refused 
to condemn the statement, despite having been part of the Flp government 
overthrown by a military coup in 1987. that the aspiration for political power 
could encourage such short-term pragmatism seemed extraordinary to most.   
the perpetual centrality of struggles over the composition of government 
during the period 2001–2006, first due to the multiparty cabinet controversies 
and second due to the rtu Bill, gives some insight into the nature of 
communal party politics in Fiji. on both sides, parties mobilized around the 
race issue, even if the position of the Flp as the representative of the minority 
community and as the victim of the coups enabled it to couch its appeal in a 
more universalist doctrine. the SDl used race politics overtly. the 2001–04 
multiparty cabinet controversies kept the need for ‘Fijian unity’ perpetually 
to the forefront and checked the potential for provincial splintering. the 
military’s new threat to Fijian rule in the wake of the rtu Bill generated 
an unprecedented mobilization. SDl campaign manager jale Baba brought 
busloads of Fijian villagers to demonstrate in support of the Bill outside the 
makeshift parliament at the police hall at nasese in june 2005. Days earlier, 
uniformed military personnel had occupied the public gallery in parliament, 
and Flp mps had staged a walkout. For the SDl, the rtu Bill, replete with its 
messages of christian forgiveness and charity, proved a highly effective electoral 
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tool (see Bhim, this volume). When public consultation on the Bill went out to 
the provinces, it generated overwhelming endorsement for government policy.15 
Had the SDl instead sent out a more direct request for electoral support for 
the party itself, it is doubtful that backing would have been so wholehearted. 
the rtu Bill was also a concession to the cAmV, designed to subdue 
militant criticism over the continued incarceration of Fijians on coup-related 
charges. When cAmV president ratu naiqama lalabalavu was himself 
imprisoned for ‘unlawful’ assembly during the mutiny at the Sukanaivalu 
Barracks back in 2000, it threatened to break the governing coalition. Yet, 
ratu naiqama and several of the other prisoners were released on compulsory 
supervision orders. As former new Zealand prime minister Geoffrey palmer 
pointed out in a talk before the Fiji law Society on 22 june 2005, scope to 
pardon prisoners already existed through the prerogative of mercy commission 
under the 1997 constitution. What then was the intention of the Bill? the 
rtu Bill potentially achieved something that other possible responses did not, 
in the sense that an amnesty wipes out the damage to status in a way that a 
pardon or premature release do not. Was the Bill primarily a political device, 
rather than a practical measure? Was this a machiavellian tactic on the part of 
the government? the Bill, after all, also played an important political role in 
other respects. in the run-up to the 2006 poll, the cAmV liquidated itself, 
with prominent ministers joining the SDl and, in most cases, keeping their 
seats. that political objectives played their part is also suggested by the shelving 
of the rtu Bill before the election, although an amended version was due to 
be put before cabinet thereafter.           
Whichever way, the liquidation of the cAmV altered the calculus of Fijian 
politics. After the 2001 election, the presence in the governing coalition of 
a substantial ethnic extremist party helped to shape the basic direction of 
government policy. Government initiatives over the period 2001–2005 were 
nearly all aimed at placating the perceived threat from Fijian nationalists. 
prime minister Qarase’s speeches regularly revisited the experience of the SDl’s 
predecessor, rabuka’s SVt, emphasizing the danger of the mainstream Fijian 
party being outflanked by more militant nationalists. in reality, the most likely 
option was always that cAmV ministers would join the SDl. But could they 
carry the grass roots of the party with them in that transition? Would radicals 
73the  cycles  of  party  politics
who had been left out in the cold, like former Fiji intelligence Services boss 
metuisela mua or the coup-prisoners themselves, vigorously challenge the new 
orientation? What would be the reaction in those villages in the Wainibuka 
area of northern tailevu or in cakaudrove province on Vanua levu, where the 
military clampdown in 2000 had left lasting grievances? the rtu Bill not only 
offered to wash away the stain of conviction for cAmV ministers, but also 
promised to soothe that festering resentment in the coup-supporting regions. 
that the rFmF was so opposed to the Bill only strengthened the perception 
of villagers in northern tailevu and cakaudrove that the SDl was, in fact, 
their government.
the SDl was careful to avoid direct, and potentially damaging, competition 
with the cAmV. At the West cakaudrove by-election in june 2005, the party 
withdrew its candidate at the eleventh hour, giving a free run to cAmV lawyer 
and former native land trust Board official niko nawaikula, who later proved 
a key supporter of the cAmV liquidation. At the 2006 election itself, four of 
the previous six cAmV mps were returned from constituencies in the former 
rebel regions, although now as SDl candidates. those who rejected the new 
accommodation fared poorly.16 the older nationalist Vanua lavo tako party 
was also badly defeated, ending up with only 1 per cent of the Fijian vote. the 
former threat to the SDl on the extremist Fijian flank, which had proved so 
important in moulding party policy during 2001–2006, had all but vanished. 
nor was there any substantial new threat from the centrist parties, owing to 
the poor showing of ratu epeli Ganilau’s revamped Alliance party and the 
western Viti levu-based party of national unity. What then would define the 
orientation of the new government? 
With the election results announced, Qarase announced his intention 
to form a multiparty cabinet including members of the Flp.17 Harried by 
journalists from Fiji tV, the prime minister at first emphasized his principled 
opposition to any ‘government of national unity’. this was suitable only for 
war-time, he said, emphasizing the unbridgeable ideological gulf between the 
SDl and the Flp, and the absurdity of a constitution that left parliament with 
no substantial or effective opposition. nevertheless, the portfolios offered to 
the Flp were to be substantial, initially out of a hope to avoid a rerun of the 
cycle of endless litigation experienced in the wake of the 2001 election by 
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obeying the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Within days, Qarase had 
warmed to the new power-sharing arrangements, just as Flp leader mahendra 
chaudhry showed increasing discomfort at the thought of Flp ministers 
entering cabinet. the portfolios offered were those left in a ‘mess’ by the SDl, 
he said, and when Qarase refused to match the Flp list of nine ministers 
with the portfolios indicated, chaudhry threatened to reject participation. it 
was the Flp management Board that pushed for acceptance of the offer. the 
Flp leader chose to remain outside cabinet, even seeking to become leader 
of the opposition while his colleagues entered cabinet. Within days of the 
formation of the new multiparty cabinet, signs of a split emerged within the 
Flp, with the ‘gang of five’, including Flp ministers Krishna Datt and poseci 
Bune, denouncing chaudhry’s decision as regards nominees to the Senate and 
submitting an alternative list.
Was Qarase’s conversion to power-sharing a direct reflection of the difficulties 
this entailed for the rival Flp? there was an element of that, but there was also 
a more optimistic interpretation. multiparty cabinet has inevitable attractions in 
Fiji, particularly for governments like the SDl 2001–06 administration, which 
had become familiar with the day-to-day difficulties of ruling without consensus. 
the new arrangements offered government a hitherto lacking legitimacy; also, 
as the new Flp ministers set about their work, the advantages of drawing on 
the reservoirs of talent in the indian community became palpable. Above all, 
support among ordinary Fijians for the new accommodation was strong. the 
vast majority of indigenous Fijians might have voted for a party committed 
to upholding the interests of their ethnic group, but they liked the idea that, 
once so constituted, that party seek to collaborate with the big indian party, 
particularly given that this was occurring from a position of strength. Qarase 
came to define the objectives of his second government by a commitment to 
make the power-sharing arrangements work, despite indicating a preference 
for a multi-ethnic over a multiparty cabinet. 
the 2006 election campaign witnessed some convergence in policy, despite 
the vigorous opposition of the two large conflicting parties and an outcome 
that entailed the eradication of all the minority parties. the SDl’s manifesto 
focused on poverty reduction, and shortly before the election the government 
abolished value-added tax on essential food items – borrowing a key policy 
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from the 1999–2000 labour-led peoples’ coalition. the government also 
promised to double $30 family welfare allowances to $60 per week, a move 
that galvanized Fijian support both in rural and urban areas. nevertheless, in 
the wake of the 2006 election, the core policies of the new government – the 
Qoliqoli Bill, the rtu Bill, proposals for an indigenous claims court and 
the shift from the Agricultural landlord and tenant Act to the native land 
trust Act – all reflected that earlier incubus of the SDl as a party defined by 
the objective of placating indigenous discontent. most of those core policies 
also entail potentially costly distributive exercises, likely to prove burdensome 
at a time when the Fiji government is spending more than it is receiving, and 
when budget deficits are ballooning. economic growth is likely to slow from 
more than 3 per cent in 2006 to 2.2 per cent in 2007 as Fiji feels the impact 
of falling sugar prices and a contracting garment industry, and the outlook for 
2008 is not much better.18
Postscript
the military coup of 5 December 2006 offered the possibility of a major break 
in the cyclical pattern of Fiji party politics. the rFmF was transformed from 
the major instrument upholding indigenous paramountcy into its nemesis, or so 
it, at least temporarily, appeared. Flp leader mahendra chaudhry and General 
Secretary lekh ram Vayeshnoi entered the interim cabinet, and the purging 
of the Qarase order led to triumphs for Flp mps, members and supporters 
across the commanding heights of the state-run sectors of the economy. 
History appeared to have run full circle, with mahendra chaudhry taking 
the finance portfolio he had lost as a result of the military coup back in 1987. 
the new arrangement oddly mirrored the stillborn Qarase multiparty cabinet, 
except with the key Flp leaders now playing their part in an unconstitutional 
regime together with a group of Fijian leaders who had not secured substantial 
indigenous support at the time of the 2006 poll.
At the time of writing, the longer-run impact on party politics remains 
unclear, but the distinct historical communal responses to adversity surveyed 
in this chapter may, if given sufficient time, give way to a more complex 
pattern. ‘might is right’ may become an indigenous focal point for political 
loyalty, and Fijians may rally behind a strong military regime. Bainimarama 
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wants to delay elections for years – in part to allow time for a census and the 
redrawing of constituency boundaries, but mostly in order to entrench his 
revolution so that centrist politicians, with the multi-ethnic vision of those like 
ratu epeli Ganilau, can one day capture a substantial share of the Fijian vote. 
the interim prime minister wants to reconfigure Fiji politics in such a way 
that communal parties like the SDl no longer command the indigenous vote. 
Yet, international pressure is against him. the commonwealth, the european 
union, the pacific islands Forum and bilateral partners want a quick return to 
constitutional democracy. Fiji’s economic prospects are against Bainimarama 
as well, as budget stringencies curb Fijians’ access to the public sector and to a 
government that used to be ‘theirs’.  
if a party of the same hue and flavour as the SDl retains majority Fijian 
support, the survival of the new order will come to depend on mahendra 
chaudhry and the Fiji indian vote. Here too the future is uncertain. As the 
economy slumps and as the honeymoon for the ‘clean-up’ campaign wears thin, 
chaudhry may well lose indian support for the new accommodation. 
Whatever lies before Fiji following its most recent political upheaval, the coup 
of 5 December 2006 has finally laid to rest the exclusively ethnic interpretation 
of Fiji politics, not least because Fiji indians can no longer see themselves, in 
good faith, as the solitary victims of Fiji’s history. 
February 2007
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Defending the inheritance:  
the SDL and the 2006 election
Alumita Durutalo
only five years after its birth, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) won 
a second general election on the basis of a promise to unify indigenous Fijians. 
the SDl’s victory in Fiji’s 2006 election signified an extraordinary achievement. 
the party showed that it had successfully inherited the mantle of its mainstream 
Fijian precursors, in the process renewing and reviving an ideological orthodoxy 
inherited from the Alliance party and the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei 
(SVt). All three parties proved able to capture the majority of Fijians’ votes. in 
each case, ascendancy has been based on successfully upholding platforms based 
on the trinity of vanua, lotu and matanitu (defined and discussed below). this 
chapter explores the emergence of the SDl after the crisis of 2000, the party’s 
election strategies, its merger with the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua 
(cAmV), the role of the methodist church, and the way in which the party is 
influenced by the traditional politics of the vanua. it concludes that, in 2006, 
the ideology of vanua, lotu and matanitu once again unified indigenous Fijian 
support behind the party most Fijians identify as being on their side. 
The formation of the SDL
the SDl party was formed after a period of severe division amongst Fijian 
leaders occasioned by the coup of 19 may 2000. it was intended to fill a power 
vacuum within Fijian society and within mainstream Fijian politics. Although 
the newly emergent Fijian party differed in some respects from its predecessors, 
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in its core philosophy it continued a long journey that was started by the 
Fijian Association in 1956. the Alliance party had advanced an orthodoxy of 
vanua, lotu and matanitu between 1967 and 1987 and a similar fundamental 
ideological framework became the bedrock of the SVt from 1992 to 1999.1 
like its predecessors, the SDl emerged as an eastern Viti levu- and Vanua 
levu-based Fijian political party. As with its predecessors, the link with the 
all-Fijian provincial councils provided the critical organizational underpinning 
for the party, and the backing of the methodist church proved of fundamental 
importance to the party’s success. 
the formation of the SDl was inspired by the need to unify indigenous 
Fijians once again under a single political umbrella, after the decimation of the 
SVt at the 1999 poll. that fracturing of the Fijian vote had ensured victory for 
the Fiji labour party (Flp)-led coalition in 1999, although that government 
lasted only a year. in the wake of its overthrow in may 2000, the republic 
of Fiji military Forces installed an all-Fijian ‘interim’ administration. led by 
prime minister laisenia Qarase, that interim government reconstituted itself 
as the SDl in the run-up to fresh elections held in August 2001, in the process 
reviving the staple orthodoxies of Fijian rule. the 2001 organizational structure 
of the SDl is shown in Figure 6.1.
the SDl proved a well-organized and well-funded Fijian political party 
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Source: constitution of the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) united Fiji party: 3.2
Figure 7.1 Organizational structure of the SDL party
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whom current prime minister laisenia Qarase is an outstanding example. 
Qarase and other ministers in the 2000–2001 interim government might 
instead have joined or taken over one of the already existent Fijian parties, 
such as the SVt or the Fijian Association party or, most likely, the Veitokani 
ni lewenivanua Vakarisito party. But these were all parties in decline, and 
Qarase eventually chose instead to forge a new party. From the start, the party 
faced a new rival, the cAmV, which was formed before the SDl. perhaps the 
cAmV’s close association with supporters of the Speight coup was a reason 
that Qarase preferred to form a different and seemingly neutral Fijian party to 
unite indigenous Fijians. However, the cAmV became successful in its own 
right, especially in Vanua levu and in tailevu north, Speight’s power base. 
Due to the similarities in political vision between the SDl and cAmV, after 
the 2001 election, the two parties coalesced and formed government between 
2001 and 2006. Both parties stressed the need to address long-standing Fijian 
development problems, which they believed contributed to political instabilities 
in Fiji. the cAmV believed that rabuka, as SVt government leader between 
1992 and 1999, had not delivered on his 1987 coup promises to indigenous 
Fijians. initial support for the formation of the cAmV was concentrated in 
the various vanua of the provinces of cakaudrove, Bua and macuata on Vanua 
levu. later, an invitation to join the party was extended to George Speight’s 
supporters on Viti levu. the cAmV was formed: (i) to ensure that Fiji would 
always be controlled by indigenous Fijians, and to incorporate that requirement 
into the constitution; (ii) to strengthen affirmative action for indigenous Fijians; 
and (iii) to introduce legislation to enable indigenous Fijians to be in full control 
of the development of their resources.3 
the SDl had similar goals, but its early advantage was a more practical 
strategy for accomplishing these and a greater respectability (at least insofar 
as the link with the coup instigators was less clear). the SDl attempted to 
address Fijian issues through what it termed the ‘Blueprint for Affirmative 
Action for indigenous Fijians and rotumans’, which became a major plank of 
the party’s 2001 manifesto. the 2001 SDl party manifesto explains affirmative 
action as:
Special programmes of assistance to help remove the economic differences between 
the Fijians and other communities…these are…provided for in the constitution…At 
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the moment the Fijians are falling behind in education, the professions, business and 
income…the affirmative action blueprint is about our vision of a country where different 
ethnic communities live in peace, harmony and prosperity. it is about creating a foundation 
for a stable and prosperous Fiji. it affirms our commitment to securing basic economic 
rights and a fairer division of wealth…inequities and inequalities…pose a threat to our 
social stability. Failure to address these would put society at peril and deny social justice 
to a large section of the population.4
the point of convergence between the SDl and cAmV which led to their 
coalition between 2001 and 2006, and their merger prior to the election in 2006, 
was their common vision that addressing Fijian economic underdevelopment 
was a prerequisite for Fiji’s future political stability. the overall SDl vision of a 
Fiji of  ‘peace, harmony and prosperity’ could only be achieved by first finding 
solutions to critical Fijian under-development problems. 
Background
many Fijian political parties were formed between 1960 and 2006, reflecting 
regional cleavages and the sociopolitical diversity of Fijian society. However, 
the three most powerful ones, which emerged and were consolidated mostly in 
eastern and northern Fiji, but were usually weaker in western Viti levu, were: 
the Fijian-dominated but multi-ethnic Alliance party, formed in 1965; the SVt, 
formed in 1991; and the SDl, formed in 2001. After the two military coups 
in 1987, the SVt emerged to replace the Alliance and, subsequently, in 2001, 
the SDl emerged to replace the SVt. the parties have all given expression to 
a political ideology that proclaims the virtues of Fijian political paramountcy 
and unity.5
the three Fijian political parties sustained the dominance and ideological 
orthodoxy of the eastern and northern chiefdoms. the concepts of vanua, lotu 
and matanitu, upon which the orthodoxy was founded, have to be understood 
in terms of Fijian political evolution since the 19th century. Vanua identifies 
and demarcates a geopolitical boundary within which Fijian cultural practices 
and chiefly rule prevail. Lotu, meaning the new post-1835 christian religion, 
replaced various forms of traditional Fijian religion and became grounded in 
the vanua. Matanitu is a Fijian word that denotes traditional government, and 
is associated with the country’s three confederacies: Kubuna, Burebasaga and 
tovata. linkages between the vanua and paramount confederacy chiefs give 
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political parties traditional sources of authority for indigenous Fijians. legitimacy 
and recognition were enhanced by the employment of some eastern and northern 
chiefs in the colonial native administrative system of indirect rule. Matanitu 
became a symbol of the respect for authority and the new rule of law. 
the dominance of the eastern chiefs was evident in appointments to the 
legislative council between 1904 and 1960. these were also the leaders behind 
the formation of the Fijian Association in 1956. this organization, which 
obtained around 75 per cent of Fijian support in its 30 years of existence, was 
formed to counter indian demands for a common roll.6 in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the divergent political demands of Fiji’s three largest communities shaped the 
process of decolonization. on one hand, Fijians demanded the paramountcy 
of their interests. on the other, indians wanted political rights that emphasized 
equality and were non-discriminating. in the middle, europeans were adamant 
that their privileges be preserved and their special position be maintained.7 
While other Fijian parties have tried to embody these three pillars in their 
party identity in one way or another, the Alliance party, the SVt and the SDl 
have successfully maintained the orthodoxy as a common rallying point for 
their Fijian supporters. During the era of the Alliance (1967–1987) and in 
the first half of SVt leadership (1991–1994), political unity under the vanua, 
lotu and matanitu were accepted as givens within Fijian society. challenges by 
western-based political parties in the early 1960s were not extensive enough 
to pose a threat to chiefs in the Alliance party. 
the formation of the Flp in 1985 and then the defeat of the Alliance party 
in 1987 posed the first direct challenge to the orthodoxy. After the post-1987-
coup formation of the SVt – another party intended to unify all indigenous 
Fijians under one umbrella – other Fijian parties, like the Fijian Association 
(FA) and the Veitokani ni lewenivanua Vakarisito (VlV), emerged to pose 
a further challenge to the orthodoxy. the challenge intensified after George 
Speight’s attempted civilian coup in 2000, in the sense that the coup leader 
did not readily accept the pronouncements of the Great council of chiefs. 
rabuka’s SVt had ushered in a new era in Fijian politics. in the process, the 
ideology of vanua, lotu and matanitu was modified. 
Although the council of chiefs did not directly back the SDl party in the 
way that it had explicitly backed the Alliance party and the SVt, support for 
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the party emerged through the co-option of vanua chiefs as well as through 
the methodist church – as part of the lotu ni vanua – and through individual 
support. the party continued to express the collective political aspirations of 
the majority of indigenous Fijians as their representative in modern politics. 
SDL strategy for the 2006 election
the SDl’s principal objective of achieving ‘Fijian unity’ was, perhaps inevitably, 
not achieved. But the party’s biggest achievement in this direction was its ability 
to persuade its coalition partner, cAmV, to join the SDl. the merger occurred 
on 17 February 2006, although a number of cAmV members and supporters 
did not sanction the move. Some supporters on Viti levu complained that 
they were being marginalized by the lau islanders in the SDl party.8 Yet, the 
newly combined party proved successful in retaining under the new umbrella 
all six of the seats won by the cAmV in 2001. With 80 per cent of the overall 
Fijian votes, and 36 out of the 71 seats, the strategic readjustment of indigenous 
Fijian politics proved successful.
Strategic Methodist Church alliance
central to the structure of the SDl was the use of lotu as a powerful uniting 
force amongst indigenous Fijians. the SDl emphasized the lotu and christian 
morality as political virtues in its 2006 candidate line-up. candidates seeking 
SDl nominations were required to show evidence of adherence to family 
values. Additionally, as seen in the curriculum vitae of a number of candidates, 
a number were methodist lay preachers in their own churches.9 While direct 
chiefly leadership in Fijian party politics has declined since 1987, the emphasis 
on the lotu, uniting both chiefs and commoners, was a most important factor 
in SDl victory at the 2006 election. the same strategy was attempted by the 
VlV in 1999, but it was able to secure only around 20 per cent of the overall 
1999 Fijian vote. the key difference was that, in the intervening years, the SVt 
had collapsed, leaving space for a new Fijian party to emerge.
in the SDl primary elections for the 2006 election, methodist church 
membership was considered an important yardstick by which to measure a 
candidate’s sense of morality and commitment to societal development. in 
large urban centres like Suva, where Fijians from the rural areas have relocated 
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to work, and where the influence of the vanua is not as strong, the church was 
used to identify SDl candidates for the 2006 election. For example, within the 
Samabula tamavua open constituency, leaders of the local methodist churches 
in the area – including Vunivau, Samabula east, raiwai, and raiwaqa – were 
in charge of local applications for the primary elections. After the primary 
elections in each constituency, the winning candidate’s name was submitted 
to the management board, which had the final decision on SDl candidates 
for each constituency.10 
in some cases, those who had won the primary elections were not ultimately 
selected. instead, more prominent candidates were chosen by the management 
board. the party used customary methods of reconciliation to appease those 
who were eliminated. conflicts were, in some cases, resolved amicably.11 this 
political strategy by the SDl highlights the use of both modern and customary 
institutions of society to not only win elections, but also to maintain internal 
party peace in the process of electioneering. 
Strategic vanua alliance
in 2006, the SDl considered the support of chiefs as fundamental to the success 
of the party, even if they did not compete as candidates. chiefs, as traditional 
political leaders, are often nominated as office bearers in Fijian political parties. 
president of the SDl ratu Kalokalo loki, for example, is tamavua high chief, 
who, through his chiefly influence, is able to attract people from the vanua in 
naitasiri to the party.12 
Furthermore, an addition to the new cabinet, appointed through the Senate, 
was Bau and Kubuna high chief Adi Samanunu talakuli cakobau. She became 
minister without portfolio in the prime minister’s office. the absence in 
government of any high-ranking Kubuna chief from Bau made Adi Samanunu’s 
appointment a strategic one for maintaining the traditional balance of power 
and Kubuna support for the new SDl government. in addition, Adi Samanunu 
had been a strong rival to Qarase for the prime ministership back in july 2000, 
and one backed by the Speight group against the military’s chosen candidate. 
Bringing her into the prime minister’s office was designed to heal that rift, 
and to quash a potential source of ethno-nationalist opposition to the new 
multiparty cabinet arrangements. 
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the Burebasaga fort has been maintained by the minister for education, 
Youth and Sports, ro teimumu Kepa, roko tui Dreketi (the leading title of 
the Burebasaga confederacy). Her re-election, although hotly contested by 
her nephew, ro Filipe tuisawau, maintains some form of unity in rewa (see 
Saumaki, this volume). the tui cakau, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, head of the 
matanitu tovata or tovata confederacy, won in the cakaudrove West Fijian 
provincial communal constituency. His cousin and traditional competitor to 
the tui cakau title, leader of the new Alliance party of Fiji (nApF), ratu epeli 
Ganilau, lost in the Suva city open constituency. the tui cakau’s inclusion in 
cabinet is intended to ensure the support of the cakaudrove confederacy. 
on Viti levu, tui namosi ratu Suliano matanitobua’s re-election highlighted 
the support of the namosi people for the SDl government. the SDl’s hold 
on Fijians in western Viti levu was strengthened by the inclusion of chiefs like 
ratu meli Saukuru of nadi, who was formerly Vice president of the methodist 
church of Fiji, as well as nadroga chief ratu isikeli tasere and navosa chief 
ratu jone navakamocea. 
the SDl managed to win all of the 17 Fijian provincial communal seats 
and all six of the urban Fijian communal seats in the 2006 election. the party 
secured 80 per cent of indigenous Fijian votes. in some constituencies, chiefly 
leadership contests were exacerbated by modern leadership competition in party 
politics, as seen in the rewa provincial Fijian communal constituency. the 
SDl won a smaller proportion of Fijian votes (56 per cent) in this constituency 
than in any other Fijian constituency. ro Filipe tuisawau, who stood as an 
independent candidate after failing to secure the SDl nomination, obtained 
41 per cent of the rewa vote, perhaps also indicating continuing political 
dissent in rewa. Since 1974, when the Fijian nationalist party was formed by 
Sakeasi Butadroka, the province of rewa has been the power base of the Fijian 
nationalist party. Both ro teimumu Kepa and ro Filipe tuisawau were from 
the same chiefly household.13 Within Fijian society, political parties are more 
than institutions for democratic representation; they also serve as vehicles for 
continuing subtle yet powerful ancient rivalries.
the SDl faced sterner competition in the open constituencies, where eligible 
citizens from all communities vote together. ethnic voting was still observable 
in the open constituencies. For example, SDl won in the constituencies 
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where Fijians predominated, such as the lomaivuna-namosi-Kadavu open 
constituency. the Flp, on the other hand, won in constituencies like labasa 
open, where indians predominated. Where an indo-Fijian was fielded as an 
SDl candidate in a constituency with a strong SDl power base, the indo-
Fijian candidate won. the two indo-Fijian SDl candidates in the ra open 
constituency and the cunningham open constituency both won their seats. 
likewise, Fijians standing for the Flp in areas with a strong Flp power base 
also won their seats. this was the case for Fijian candidates in the macuata 
east open and the Yasawa nawaka open constituencies.
neither the SDl nor the Flp had the unchallenged ascendancy in the open 
constituencies that they enjoyed in the communal constituencies. the open 
constituencies were shared almost equally between the SDl and Flp parties. 
the SDl won 13 of the 25 seats, and the Flp won the rest. competition in 
some marginal constituencies was intense. For example, in the laucala open 
constituency, the SDl won with a margin of only 11 votes (7,856) over the 
Flp (7,845).14  
Conclusion
the SDl’s victory demonstrated the continuing political importance of the Fijian 
orthodoxy of vanua, lotu and matanitu as a unifying ideology for indigenous 
voters. in this context, any attempt by the party to concurrently promote 
Fijian political paramountcy with multiracial politics is a real challenge, unless 
non-Fijians readily accept the promotion of policies such as ‘50/50 by 2020: 
the blueprint for affirmative action for indigenous Fijians and rotumans’.15 As 
we have seen, the SDl attempted to present a multi-ethnic front in 2006 by 
including indo-Fijians in its election line-up, and is likely to do so in future 
elections.16 the SDl’s strategy of facilitating policies for Fijian development has 
been a reaction to the long-term demands by some Fijian resource owners for 
greater government support in the development of indigenous resources. 
the 2006 election reminds us that party politics for many indigenous 
Fijians is a means of expressing two sets of rights and demands – democratic 
and indigenous. indigenous demands are being expressed through the electoral 
system against non-Fijian groups and as a means of extending ancient internal 
Fijian rivalries. in the long term, however, these indigenous demands may 
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become problematic in a society of diverse sociopolitical and cultural realities, 
and the SDl’s policies may, in the long term, be seen as offering solutions to 
some groups of indigenous Fijians only.
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below-the-line, much to the frustration of SDl campaign manager, jale Baba. in the event, 
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neither candidate was able to take this highly marginal seat, but Dr Baba was given an SDl 
Senate position, while pita nacuva became Speaker of the House. 
12 tamavua is a vanua in the province of naitasiri. the vanua owns much of the land at the 
northern end of Suva city.
13 Durutalo, A. 2000. ‘elections and the dilemma of indigenous Fijian political unity’, in B.V. 
lal (ed.) Fiji Before the Storm: Elections and the Politics of Development. Asia pacific press, the 
Australian national university, canberra, pp.87–88.
14 See election results 2006 – Fiji islands, http://www.elections.gov.fj/results2006/
constituencies/47.html.
15 See 50/50 By Year 2020: 20 Year Development Plan (2001–2020) For the Enhancement of 
Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the Socio-Economic Development of Fiji, 
Government of Fiji. 
16 there were 19 indo-Fijian SDl candidates in the indian communal constituencies and six in 
the open constituencies. two of these candidates, rajesh Singh, who stood in the cunningham 
open constituency and George Shiu raj, who stood in the ra open constituency, were 
successful in the election. 
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The strategic impasse: 
Mahendra Chaudhry and the 
Fiji Labour Party
Samisoni Pareti and Jon Fraenkel
leading the Fiji labour party (Flp) into its sixth general election, mahendra 
pal chaudhry showed every sign of being a confident leader-in-waiting. 
Formed in 1985 on the crest of a wave of support from workers and the general 
public, resulting from a series of wage increases won from the stand-offish 
and aloof government of ratu mara, his Flp had, by the late 1990s, risen to 
a position of ascendancy in the Fiji indian community. chaudhry’s overthrow 
in the coup of may 2000 served to cement his reputation as a die-hard fighter 
against injustice and a standard-bearer for the cause of Fiji’s impoverished and 
oppressed citizens. He was a scourge to those who dared to cross him. Still 
vivid in the minds of those working in the toorak office of the Supervisor of 
elections during the run-up to the 2006 election was his verbal threat to the 
besieged incumbent, Semesa Karavaki, that Karavaki would be a ‘sorry man’ 
when the election was over. 
A series of tebbutt polls held in the lead-up to the 2006 general election 
confirmed that chaudhry was the undisputed leader of the indian community.1 
Harrying the government for ‘incompetence’ and ‘racism’,  and drawing on the 
old cane field bases of Flp support, chaudhry had won the backing of indian 
professionals in the towns – even some bankers and businessmen – as well as 
many urban trade unionists. the only other indian-led party, the national 
Federation party (nFp), seemed like a spent force, not helped by its inability 
to find a successor with the charisma and the stature of its former leader, justice 
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jai ram reddy. chaudhry thus had many reasons to feel that he would return 
as prime minister.
chaudhry’s Flp had also been buoyed by some significant successes in the 
battle with the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl)-led government, 
mainly the result of smart, strategic manoeuvres. court victories in the landmark 
chandrika prasad case in march 2001, and successive triumphs in the legal 
controversies over the multiparty cabinet during 2001–2004 had, the Flp hoped, 
thrown into question the legitimacy of the Fijian-dominated SDl government. 
labour had managed to block the Bill to transfer agricultural land leases from 
AltA (Agricultural landlord and tenant Act) to nltA (native land trust Act) 
by denying the government the two-thirds vote majority it required as a result 
of constitutional protections connected to land legislation. A solution to the 
problem of expiring land leases remained elusive, with SDl policy on the issue 
meeting the same fate as had befallen that of previous administrations. As a result, 
prime minister laisenia Qarase went to the poll smarting from the experience of 
parliamentary blockages, whilst chaudhry had succeeded in reconsolidating his 
support within his power base, the indian tenant farmer community.
there were other seeming triumphs in the propaganda war. the controversial 
promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity (rtu) Bill was introduced 
by Qarase in order to placate the SDl’s junior coalition partner, the conservative 
Alliance–matanitu Vanua (cAmV) party. the amnesty provisions in that 
Bill might have made it possible to release from prison several cAmV leaders 
convicted of offences committed during the coup/standoff of may–july 2000 
and the associated mutiny of november in that year. the SDl had wanted 
to bring the Bill into law before the 2006 polls, but labour boycotted the 
parliamentary discussions. many in the country were vehemently opposed to 
the proposed amnesty provisions, although the rtu Bill did have the backing, 
with some reservations, of the Great council of chiefs and the 14 provincial 
councils. in the end, time ran out, and the SDl went into the election with 
the political fallout of another unfulfilled promise tarnishing its reputation, 
while chaudhry and his Flp registered yet another public relations triumph. 
As with the land lease bill, chaudhry’s tactics were to make Qarase and his 
SDl party appear ineffective, continuing what the labour leader took to be a 
long legacy of failure of post-independence Fijian leadership.
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labour’s strong support from indian voters was not in doubt, as the 
December 2004 tavua open by-election result had shown.2 indian support 
alone, however, could give the Flp only around 23 or 24 seats, short of the 
36 required to form government. less certain was the extent of support from 
indigenous Fijian and general voters, which would be critical if the Flp were 
to win the additional 12 or 13 seats. the other alternative for the Flp was to 
build an effective coalition, but that depended on allied parties making strong 
showings in the open constituencies, or in the General, rotuman and Fijian 
communal constituencies. Above all, what were needed were political parties 
that took votes away from the SDl, the other major contender for office. 
chaudhry hoped that repeating previous strategies would work well again 
in 2006. that meant taking the moral high ground by steering clear of the 
racial debate and focusing on ‘bread and butter’ issues. labour’s television 
advertisements, as well as the party manifesto, concentrated on such issues as 
the state of the economy, job creation, better housing, alleviation of poverty, 
cheaper education, better health services, prudent financial management, more 
appropriate rural development, infrastructure and utilities and the strengthening 
of law and order. labour also campaigned on the supposedly great achievements 
of its 1999–2000 government – claiming credit, for example, for an increase 
in the GDp growth rate over those years – and contrasting this with alleged 
mishandling of the economy by the subsequent Qarase government. 
chaudhry repeatedly refused to discuss publicly the issue of leadership, in a 
manner reminiscent of his pre-1999 poll strategy. Back then, he had reportedly 
suggested to Dr tupeni Baba that he would be the first choice for prime minister 
in the event of a labour victory, while coalition ally Adi Kuini Speed had also 
entertained ambitions for the top position.3 However, when the party obtained 37 
seats in its own right, it seemed only fair, argued chaudhry, that the Flp leader 
become prime minister. Yet, chaudhry’s assumption of the prime ministership 
back in 1999, the first ever indian to assume the position, did not go down well 
with indigenous Fijians, many of whom felt hoodwinked by the move. it was then 
that president ratu Sir Kamisese mara came to chaudhry’s assistance, swearing 
him into office as well as seeking to placate labour’s unhappy people’s coalition 
allies. the initial storm blew over, but Fijian disquiet remained a source of both 
grievance and attempted political realignment during the period 1999–2000. 
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When George Speight seized control of parliament on 19 may 2000, chaudhry’s 
earlier assumption of the prime ministership and the associated affront to 
‘indigenous rights’ featured centrally in the coup instigator’s regular interviews 
on international radio and television.
Before the 2006 election, the issue of whether or not Fijians would accept 
chaudhry’s return as prime minister was as hot a topic as it had been at the 
2001 polls. the idea that race should not be an issue in the campaign might 
have struck a positive chord amongst non-Fijian Flp supporters, but the issue 
of race remained much more controversial among the Fijian voters that labour 
needed to win over. After all, even within Flp ranks, it had been indigenous 
Fijians who had been most likely to break away during chaudhry’s years as 
leader. Back in 2001, Dr tupeni Baba’s new labour unity party (nlup) had 
been a splinter party that drew support primarily from among the already small 
band of Fijian Flp candidates. After their departure, the Flp became even 
more solidly indian in complexion. prior to the 2006 election, some Fijian 
voters saw chaudhry’s efforts to steer clear of the leadership issue as evasive 
and suspicious, reflecting his inability to read accurately the mood of a section 
of the community that he desperately needed to win over.
the Flp strategy reflected the benefit of strategic partnerships under Fiji’s 
alternative vote system. on the other hand, the SDl tactic of seeking ‘Fijian 
unity’ seemed misguided because, with victories in marginal constituencies 
relying on transfers of preference votes from like-minded allies, the best tactic 
for big parties is usually not to seek to merge with smaller parties, but for the 
parties to field separate candidates and give each other strong preferences. this 
was the strategy that gave the Flp an absolute majority back in 1999, and it was 
the strategy attempted again in 2006. At the intervening election, in 2001, it 
had not worked. Back then, a group of ‘moderates Forum’ parties – including 
the nlup, led by Dr tupeni Baba, the former Deputy prime minister in the 
people’s coalition government – had emerged; this group was bitterly opposed 
to chaudhry’s leadership and blamed the Flp leader for exacerbating tensions 
in the run-up to the 2000 coup. moderates Forum preferences favoured the 
SDl above the Flp, leaving chaudhry’s party able to capture only the 19 indian 
communal seats and nine of the open seats in the Flp’s cane belt heartlands 
of western Viti levu and northern Vanua levu. 
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in 2006, the Flp was determined not to repeat the 2001 experience of 
being left without substantial coalition partners. these were required for two 
reasons. Victories in the more marginal open constituencies required the Flp 
either to (i) obtain sufficient preference votes to win in its own right, or (ii) 
assist like-minded allied parties to win and then enter into coalition with them. 
this was what drove the Flp to enter into a pre-election coalition with the 
western Viti levu-based party of national unity (pAnu) and mick Beddoes’ 
united peoples party (upp).4  
labour was unable to secure a similar arrangement with the new Alliance 
party (nAp) led by ratu epeli Ganilau. ratu epeli, a former army commander 
and chair of the Great council of chiefs, adopted a ‘multiracial’ platform for his 
newly formed nAp, which seemed, in many respects, more suited to a coalition 
with the Flp than with the SDl. Aimed at resurrecting the earlier Alliance 
party – which had been forged in the mid-1960s and been the dominant force 
in Fiji politics over the period 1966 to 1987 – ratu epeli’s advertising campaign 
paid homage to the stabilizing influence of Fiji’s key post-war traditional chiefs, 
ratu Sir lala Sukuna, ratu Sir penaia Ganilau and ratu Sir Kamisese mara. 
that the nAp remained formally neutral was indicative of their fear of the 
political consequences of too close an association with mahendra chaudhry 
– an association that would have limited the party’s chances of winning Fijian 
support. this was a setback for labour. nevertheless, with some exceptions, 
the nAp preferences favoured the Flp, and enabled the party to win several 
of the highly marginal seats in the Suva–nausori corridor. 
Amongst the 13 parties that registered with the office of the Supervisor of 
elections to contest the may 2006 general election was the rejuvenated pAnu. 
pAnu had been an important pillar of the Flp victory back in 1999, when its 
transferred preference votes gave the Flp four open seats. it had won another 
four Fijian communal seats in its own right. chaudhry’s close ally, Ba chief 
ratu Sairusi nagagavoka, was the party president, and two western pAnu 
mps, meli Bogileka and ponipate lesavua, had joined the 1999–2000 people’s 
coalition cabinet. this episode caused some internal consternation. After his 
defeat at the 1999 poll, pAnu General Secretary Apisai tora broke away to 
join a rejuvenated taukei movement. He was among those who on 19 may 
2000, aiming to create an atmosphere of destabilization, led the taukei march 
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through Suva’s streets while George Speight and his followers stormed Fiji’s 
parliament. pAnu had fared poorly in 2001, largely because Apisai tora had 
forged a rival western Viti levu party, the Bai Kei Viti, which split the Fijian 
vote and allowed the SDl to take the western Fijian communal seats. But, prior 
to the 2006 polls, Apisai tora retired and his Bai Kei Viti party vanished with 
him. on the other hand, under the auspices of ratu Sairusi, pAnu reformed 
and contested all western Fijian communal seats, giving the Flp its second 
preferences. together with the upp and pAnu, the Flp hoped to capture a 
larger number of the all-important 25 open constituencies. 
labour also hoped to translate the stand-off between the SDl government 
and the Fiji military forces into more votes for the party. over the years of 
Qarase’s 2001–2006 government, army commander Frank Bainimarama had 
skirmished repeatedly with the Home Affairs ministry, and even threatened to 
seize control of the government. in particular, the commander was vehemently 
opposed to the rtu Bill, the amnesty clause of which he saw as undermining 
the military’s work in stabilizing the security situation in the wake of the 2000 
coup. Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi interceded to calm relations between 
Qarase and the commander, but the military continued to insist on involvement 
during the election campaign, even on several occasions marching through the 
streets of Suva in a show of strength. this was all grist to labour’s mill. party 
president jokapeci Koroi, in an interview on Fiji tV, professed to support the 
commander’s threat to seize office, and her statement was subsequently defended 
by chaudhry.5 this was deeply ironic given the military’s role in deposing the 
Flp government back in 1987. But labour hoped that the military’s newfound 
support for constitutionality and the rule of law would calm fears that a return 
to office of the Flp might precipitate another coup. 
in the final stages of the campaign, chaudhry sought to consolidate the Flp 
vote and dismissed the significance of smaller parties: the contest would, he 
argued, be a two-way tussle between his Flp and Qarase’s SDl. in campaign 
meeting after campaign meeting, on sugar cane farm or in town hall, chaudhry’s 
message to voters was simple: ‘the choice is not between 13 parties, but only 
two. if you aren’t voting for labour, then you are actually supporting SDl’.6 
When Qarase and his party fought back by pushing the leadership issue onto 
the election agenda, asserting that Fiji was not ready for a non-indigenous prime 
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minister, chaudhry again took the moral high ground and refused to descend 
to the ‘gutter’ of the SDl’s racial politics, insisting on the Flp’s intention to 
stick to the bread and butter issues that mattered most to the electorate.7
two factors were critical in explaining the Flp’s defeat in 2006. First, its 
pre-election partners, the upp and pAnu, did not perform as strongly as their 
counterparts in the people’s coalition of 1999. Beddoes’ attempts to swing 
the general voters behind his upp were partially successful in that the party 
managed to secure a second seat in parliament. Bernadette rounds Ganilau won 
the Suva General communal seat, pushing labour minister Kenneth Zinck 
into third place. the SDl candidate came second. Yet Beddoes himself only 
narrowly won the Western/central General communal seat, and the north 
eastern General communal seat fell to an independent, robin irwin, on the 
fifth count. the upp candidate in that constituency obtained only 14.5 per 
cent of the vote. A West country liberal, originally from the united Kingdom, 
irwin was vigorously opposed to chaudhry’s ‘socialist’ philosophy, and made it 
immediately clear that he could in no way be a labour ally in the contest for 
the prime ministership. Although the SDl lost the only general communal seat 
it had gained in 2001, it is worth noting that it polled reasonably strongly in 
two of the three general constituencies, although less well in Suva city. 
pAnu also performed poorly, proving a faint shadow of its 1999 counterpart. 
the party had lost the all-important support of the Ba provincial council in 
2005. Despite no longer having the Bai Kei Viti to contend with, it polled 
poorly in the west. ponipate lesavua managed 31.6 per cent of the vote in Ba 
east, but the SDl obtained over 60 per cent and thus took the seat on the first 
count.8 Yasawa politician meli Bogileka fared still worse. He obtained only 7.7 
per cent of the vote in Ba West, barely denting the SDl’s ability to secure its 
nationwide average of 80 per cent of Fijian votes in this part of the country.  
Secondly, chaudhry and Beddoes under-estimated the popularity of the 
SDl, and did not anticipate its strong performance in traditionally upp and 
pAnu domains in western Fiji. 
the predicted splitting of Fijian votes arising from the emergence of many 
Fijian-dominated parties and independent candidates did not happen. All 23 
Fijian communal seats went to Qarase’s SDl, while labour obtained all 19 
indian communal seats. two of the 12 open seats obtained by the Flp had 
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majority Fijian electorates (nadroga and Samabula/tamavua), but these were 
secured as a result of vote preferences from minority parties like the nAp 
and the national Federation party. much to chaudhry’s displeasure, Fijian 
voters were not attracted by labour’s painstaking effort to field more Fijian 
candidates. nor did the decision to appoint several indigenous politicians 
– such as retired medical nurse jokapeci Koroi and former ambassador and 
public service administrator poseci Bune  – to the party’s top decision-making 
bodies noticeably boost the party’s Fijian support. 
the defeat of the Flp in 2006 was not solely a result of the weakness of their 
allies, or the unexpected strength of their opponents. there were also difficulties 
within the party; these exploded into the public domain after the election. in 
his years as party leader, chaudhry had developed what many people, rightly 
or wrongly, took to be a tendency to surround himself with ‘yes-men’ – men 
generally not as well educated as their leader and definitely not as articulate 
when speaking english. After emerging victorious in the 1999 general election, 
chaudhry, for this reason, found it hard to appoint competent ministers 
from his own party. Given the high number of indian graduates and young 
professionals in Fiji today, labour should have been able to choose from a huge 
reservoir of talent. Yet, the party has not proved very successful in attracting the 
new generation of younger professionals. By contrast, Qarase’s SDl was able to 
select his ministers from a good mixture of young and matured professionals 
– qualified accountants, economists, technocrats, lawyers and academics. 
Although chaudhry’s leadership style is often an issue of contention in 
Fiji, he never makes any concessions on this score. When asked by reporters 
whether he would re-consider his style in line with requests from the party 
‘dissidents’, chaudhry’s standard refrain is to remark that voters have decided 
on his leadership by voting him back into office at the may 2006 poll.9 this 
may be true as regards his Ba open constituency, but not for the country as 
a whole. national leadership differs from that required to represent specific 
interest groups, trade unions or farmers’ organizations. 
in the wake of the poll, the speed with which Qarase moved to conform with 
the country’s constitution and formed a multiparty cabinet left little room for 
chaudhry to reveal publicly his distress at leading his party to another election 
loss. He did not follow normal protocol by conceding to or congratulating 
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Qarase. When confronted by a reporter about this on the day the prime minister 
took his oath of office and invited labour into his cabinet, chaudhry said he 
did not see the need to do so.10 Writing a day or so after the elections results 
were declared, and after president ratu josefa iloilo had sworn Qarase back 
into office, former Fiji Sun journalist Victor lal called on the Flp leader to 
abide by Westminster conventions and tender his resignation for failing yet 
again to lead his party into an election victory.11 chaudhry did not react to 
lal’s public challenge. close aides confirmed the party leader’s disappointment 
about labour’s poor showing amongst the Fijian voters, a trend which some 
labour members blamed on the party’s Fijian coalition partner pAnu. no 
longer could the party respond quite so easily to the experience of defeat, as 
it had done in 2001, with allegations of electoral fraud and with outrage over 
the illegitimate and unconstitutional process of cabinet formation. 
if he wants to lead labour into victory in the next general election, 
chaudhry will have to come up with a new strategy that will enable labour to 
maintain its indian support while at the same time considerably strengthening 
its Fijian backing. Whatever that strategy turns out to be, chaudhry will have 
to convince Fijian voters that in his determination to push the interests of 
his indian supporters, he is not working against the indigenous community. 
For instance, fighting for the retention of AltA offers (largely indian) 
tenants the hope of security of tenure, but Fijian voters may want to see an 
increase in land rentals. However the indian leader approaches the matter, 
history shows that chaudhry is not, or is no longer, eager to jump into a 
coalition with a major indigenous political party. He witnessed the negative 
impact of such a manoeuvre after the 1992 election, when his minority 
labour party unexpectedly found itself holding the balance of power. then, 
whoever it supported in the SVt party, which had secured the majority, 
would become prime minister: ratu mara’s endorsed candidate, the late 
josevata Kamikamica, or the charismatic Sitiveni rabuka. through deals that 
chaudhry claimed rabuka later reneged on, the trade unionist rallied behind 
the former coup leader, an action which came to haunt the labour party 
when, after the collapse of rabuka’s government two years later, chaudhry 
and labour found their vote slumping as the party was punished by an 
unforgiving indian electorate.
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chaudhry had learned that lesson when the country prepared to go to the 
polls in 1999. this time, it was the nFp, the majority indian party in parliament 
at the time, that brokered inauspicious alliances. chaudhry’s nemesis, reddy, 
then the nFp opposition leader, ignored labour’s experience at the 1994 polls 
and decided to form a pre-election coalition with rabuka’s SVt. the two had 
earlier cooperated in a joint parliamentary select committee to produce the 
1997 constitution. in the lead-up to the polls, reddy agreed to become deputy 
to rabuka in the event the coalition won. rabuka’s SVt was relegated to the 
opposition and the nFp suffered its worst-ever defeat in the polls – a defeat 
which, sadly, led to the premature exit from domestic politics of reddy. the 
indian electorate punished the nFp leader and his party for ‘sleeping with the 
enemy’; the nFp did not win a single seat. it was to prove a long sojourn in 
the political wilderness for the nFp, with only its support in the municipal 
councils, amongst the older generation of sugar cane farmers and in some of the 
trade unions keeping the party alive. the nFp was again to find itself without 
seats after both the 2001 and 2006 elections. in the minds of indian voters, 
the man who denied their party the right to govern the island nation when 
he led soldiers of the Fiji military forces into parliament on 14 may 1987 to 
stage a coup d’état and remove the late Dr timoci Bavadra as prime minister 
should remain forever a foe, not a friend.
owing to the 1999 annihilation of the nFp, chaudhry was able to 
monopolize the indian communal electorates and, with his majority bolstered 
by the support of minorities like the late Adi Kuini Speed’s Fijian Association 
and Bune’s Veitokani ni lewenivanua Vakarisito (VlV) party, he was sworn into 
office as Fiji’s fourth prime minister. it was to prove a short-lived administration. 
precisely a year later, in may 2000, George Speight and a group of nationalists, 
with backing from renegade soldiers, seized parliament and took chaudhry 
and members of his government hostage for 56 days.
chaudhry’s years of struggle had hardened his resolve. He looked back on 
his time as general secretary of the public Servants Association that took on 
the might of the Alliance government with their austere financial measures 
– including wage freezes – in the early 1980s, and on his survival of two 
parliamentary takeovers, first as Dr Bavadra’s finance minister in 1987 and then 
as prime minister in 2000. As many who have mustered the courage to challenge 
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him only to seal their fate within the party will testify, the man is a strategist, 
a political animal and as much a fighter as he is a survivor. Serious allegations 
against chaudhry’s personal integrity have been made, some damaging – such 
as his alleged affair with a former journalist and the appointment of his son, 
rajendra chaudhry, as his private secretary in 2000. But, for the indian 
community, these criticisms did not stick. 
Former labour stalwarts, like Dr tupeni Baba and john Ali, report that 
picking a fight with ‘mahen’ tends to be a daunting prospect for two reasons; 
firstly, because chaudhry has overwhelming support amongst the grassroots 
supporters of the Flp, and, secondly, because he is a workaholic and as ruthless 
in internal leadership struggles as he is in battles against the Fijian government 
of the day. Fiji caught a glimpse of his tireless energy during the reign of the 
people’s coalition government in 1999–2000. As prime minister, chaudhry 
kept for himself a cluster of critically important portfolios, including the crucial 
ministries of finance, public enterprise, sugar reform and information. He 
arrived at the office well before other staff in the morning and worked until 
late at night. reporters had to get used to attending press conferences with 
the prime minister during weekends. this was a work routine that was hard 
to match even for younger members of his cabinet.
this industriousness is also reflected in the way chaudhry worked to build 
on his support. in 2005, when labour mps walked out of the parliamentary 
chamber in protest against the tabling of the SDl’s rtu Bill, the labour leader 
was not in the house. He explained his absence to the lower House the next 
day: ‘i was attending the funeral of a well-known social worker in Ba’, chaudhry 
told parliament. the fact that the funeral took place in his own constituency 
was indicative of the Flp leader’s retention of close links with his constituents. 
Whilst some of his members are content to remain within the cocktail circuit 
in town, mahen would rather work in his office or visit the people in their 
homes and settlements.
Such diligence and grassroots support make any attempt to challenge 
chaudhry’s leadership seem like political suicide. Several labour executives 
report that the dramatic 2006 post-election controversy between the ‘gang of 
five’ and chaudhry was only the spilling into the public arena of a conflict that 
had been simmering within the party’s management board for some time. ‘Some 
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of us have been battling mahen all this while’, said one executive labour party 
member. ‘there are a lot more challenges that happen behind the scenes and 
this challenge to mahen’s decision-making is not new. the only new thing is 
that this challenge has spilt into the public domain.’12 
internal conflict over the decision to participate in the multiparty cabinet 
was initially concealed from the public gaze. Several party executives reported 
that chaudhry was clearly opposed to the idea, but did not oppose participation 
when he realised that the majority of his mps wanted to accept Qarase’s 
invitation. chaudhry’s constant insistence, during the 2001–2006 government, 
that he supported the multiparty cabinet concept made it difficult for him to 
avoid sending nine of his members to join Qarase’s government. But the claim 
that he had personally authorized and inspired participation is unconvincing; 
labour’s participation was never the sole prerogative of the party leader but a 
decision for the entire party caucus. the intervening events – an outspoken Flp 
attack on the prime minister’s choice of portfolios for the nine Flp ministers, 
coupled with a sudden climbdown and unconditional acceptance of those 
portfolios – reinforces the view that chaudhry accepted this new direction for 
the party only under some duress. 
nadroga Flp mp lekh ram Vayeshnoi confirmed that he was reluctant to take 
up a cabinet position. ‘i only decided to accept the position when mahen asked me 
to’, Vayeshnoi said.13 A party executive later related that Vayeshnoi’s performance 
in cabinet only confirmed the suspicion held by many party members that he 
was deliberately sent into Qarase’s multiparty cabinet to do chaudhry’s bidding. 
Shortly after the formation of the new cabinet, Vayeshnoi’s public denunciation in 
parliament of the government’s affirmative action program triggered the debates 
directed toward establishing ground rules for the practical day-to-day working of 
the multiparty cabinet. When labour’s deputy leader poseci Bune admonished his 
cabinet colleague Vayeshnoi for his parliamentary outburst on national television 
and asked chaudhry to rein in the outspoken nadroga mp, the labour leader 
would hear nothing of the complaint.14 instead, chaudhry told reporters he stood 
by the remarks of his more junior party member. 
chaudhry has the numbers. Vayeshnoi is deputy to chaudhry, who is both 
parliamentary leader and general secretary of the party’s national council, 
labour’s supreme body. it was in the council, where he holds strong support, 
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that chaudhry wanted the case of his ‘renegade’ party executives to be heard 
and decided. on the management board, by contrast, the ‘rebels’ had five of 
the nine positions. At the last count, labour’s national council comprises 42 
members, including 18 branch representatives – most of whom, according to 
a party executive, are national Farmers union (nFu) stalwarts. chaudhry is 
general secretary of the nFu. urban-based workers have 13 representatives 
in the council and there are two representatives each from women and youth 
members of labour. party executives like Koroi, chaudhry, Vayeshnoi, Bune, 
Krishna Datt and Atu Bain are also members. party mps can attend national 
council meetings but have no voting rights.
With the numbers stacked against Bune and his allies, chaudhry had two 
clear options; sack the dissidents and throw them out of labour, or take out the 
olive branch and instigate reconciliation. At the time of writing, the outcome 
of that potential split within the Flp is unclear. chaudhry may even decide to 
take up the unsolicited advice of Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi, who, 
on the eve of labour’s first council meeting, held in a nadi school in early june 
2006, urged the labour leader to reconcile with internal and external foes. ‘mr 
chaudhry is in a strategic position to destroy the multiparty government’, ratu 
joni told a meeting of the Fiji institute of Accountants:  
this can be done by way of an ultimatum from the Flp to its members of 
parliament who are in cabinet. Alternatively, it will be a gradual erosion of cabinet 
cohesion by a series of sustained attacks on the government. the consequences will 
be serious for all of us. there will be recriminations and blame cast on all sides. 
they usually assume an ethnic hue in very short order. the resulting distrust will 
merely entrench the nay-sayers on all sides. So there are high stakes and failure 
has to be the last option available.15 
on national television, a day after ratu joni’s public address, chaudhry 
appeared taken aback by these precise and candid remarks, telling journalists 
that he couldn’t understand what moved Fiji’s second citizen to make the 
comments that he did.16
the day after Qarase had invited labour to help form a multiparty 
government, chaudhry singled out a word that the prime minister constantly 
used in their discussions: that it was his ‘prerogative’ as prime minister to decide 
which labour mp would be in his cabinet line-up. interestingly, chaudhry 
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used the same word when he defended his decision to finalize his list of eight 
senators, saying that it was his ‘prerogative’ as leader of the Fiji labour party to 
compile the senate list. prerogatives are natural, sovereign or god-given rights, 
theoretically subject to no restriction.17 they are exercised unilaterally, without 
consultation. As such, they are foreign to power-sharing arrangements, such 
as those Fiji chose for itself in 1997, which built flexibility, negotiation and 
consensus into political relationships. Fiji has had more than its fair share of 
prerogatives, exercised by communally based politicians. perhaps now, in the 
wake of the 2006 elections, is a good time not so much for unilateral take-
it-or-leave-it decision-making, but for a new style of politics based on greater 
give and take by both sides. 
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The failure of the moderates
The Yellow Bucket Team1
in the lead-up to the 2006 election, certain sections of Suva society and the 
media made much of the ‘moderates’ and the potential impact they would 
have at the polls. this was not a new phenomenon: exaggerated expectations 
of great gains for moderate parties were a feature of media reports and urban 
aspirations prior to the 2001 election. Similarly, prior to the 1999 election, 
many believed that the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei/national Federation 
party/united Generals party (SVt/nFp/uGp) coalition would fare well owing 
to its ‘moderate’ multiracial agenda. each time, however, the ‘moderates’ have 
been rejected and not by a small margin. 
First, let’s examine this term ‘moderate’ and what it really means within the 
context of Fiji. in western politics, occupying the political centre tends to be 
the key to victory, leading parties to compete vigorously for the middle ground. 
For observers familiar with such settings, it therefore seems illogical that the 
political centre of Fiji’s politics has proved such an electoral dead zone. the 
key difference is that the political wings of Fiji’s politics are dominated not by 
the more conventional economic and social ideologies but by race.
A close examination of the actual economic policies of both major parties will 
find a pragmatic mixture of philosophies that in the final analysis turn out to be 
very similar. So, for example, while the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni lewenivanua 
(SDl) is assumed to be more on the right wing of the political spectrum, it is 
very strong on the kind of affirmative action policies traditionally associated 
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with the left, while the Flp, despite portraying itself as worker-based and left 
of centre, vigorously promotes privatization.2
the reality of Fiji’s politics is that you have a Fijian political right wing with, 
at its most extreme, aggressive nationalists who have in the past supported 
political figures like Sakeasi Butadroka and who were enthusiastic backers 
of the various coups and George Speight. At the extreme left, within the 
outer edges of the indo-Fijian community, you will find figures with political 
views reminiscent of those expressed by Hindu nationalist politicians in 
india. Fueled by a fierce sense of grievance that finds its origin in the girmit 
(indenture) period, these views are rarely expressed openly, but provide a 
significant undercurrent to indo-Fijian politics. Fiji’s ideological spectrum, 
therefore, stretches between these two extremes, with, in the centre, a small 
group of educated élite promoting the cause of multi-racialism in its purest 
form. 
the vision of a multiracial country working together in harmony represents 
a commonly expressed utopia for many in Fiji. Whether it be in school oratory 
contests, public debates or letters to the editors columns, you will find this 
dream described over and over again. Why then does it represent a political 
tar pit – one into which numerous politicians have seen their futures sink 
without a trace?
Dig a little deeper and you find that multiracialism in Fiji is viewed as a 
positive concept, but only if practiced on each race’s terms. For example, you 
will find the view often expressed by Fijian voters that they welcome indo-Fijians 
and other races, but political power must remain in the hands of the Fijians. 
Similarly, indo-Fijians will talk warmly about Fijian friends and neighbours, 
but at the same time privately express extreme distrust as to their competence 
in running the country. Hence, the indo-Fijian argument runs, there is a need 
for an aggressive, strong leader who will keep them (the Fijians) honest.  
multi-racialism as a political policy is, therefore, a charade in Fiji. plenty play 
at it but very few really practice it – and this is why the so-called moderates have 
found it so difficult to dislodge the large Fijian- and indo-Fijian-based parties (at 
present the SDl and Flp, respectively). these two parties typify what has been 
a successful strategy since independence – dominate a racial wing and from that 
position move to the centre when appropriate. this strategy is particularly useful 
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as attitudes towards ‘multiracialism on our terms’ vary according to the political 
mood. in times of crisis, the support at the extremes hardens; during periods 
of calm and prosperity there is growth in the multiracial centre. it is, therefore, 
essential that a party have the flexibility to shift position to suit the prevailing 
mood. Getting it wrong, as the SVt and nFp found in 1999, is fatal.
this racial positioning is made all the more successful by Fiji’s communal-
based electoral system. With 23 Fijian communal seats and 19 indo-Fijian seats, 
dominating one racial wing provides an essential political base. moderate parties 
attempting to strike out from the centre have found this racial dominance of 
wings a huge barrier to achieving any form of electoral momentum.
the results of the 2006 election demonstrated this. While parties like the 
nFp and the new Alliance party of Fiji (nApF) tried to take a position in the 
centre, they were squeezed out by the Flp and the SDl, which both moved 
quite distinctly in their 2006 manifestos toward the multiracial centre. to 
quote the SDl manifesto:
the SDl has a very large tent. it is not only for indigenous Fijians. it has room for everyone. 
its membership has always been multiracial. increasingly, the party has received support 
from non-Fijians, and expects to win more of their votes in this election.3
Similar views were expressed by the Flp in their manifesto – and yet minimal 
cross-racial voting was recorded. if anything, such voting declined in the 2006 
election.
While it was always going to be a challenge to find room in the multiracial 
center of Fijian politics, both the nFp and the nApF added to their political 
woes by making a  number of strategic blunders.
the nFp, Fiji’s oldest political party, entered the election without the most 
basic of political requirements, a recognizable leader. After several attempts to 
find a leader, they fought the election under the nominal control of raman 
pratap Singh, but it was widely recognized that the party was in fact being run 
by a committee of leaders featuring people like trade unionists Attar Singh 
and pramod rae. they were the public face of the nFp and, along with a 
number of senior advisors, determined strategies, leaving their party president 
to campaign for his Vanua levu seat. the result amongst voters was total 
confusion. potential supporters had little idea as to who the real leader of the 
party was, and, up against a powerful figure like mahendra chaudhry, they 
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presented little competition. this confusion appeared an issue not only for 
voters; within the party itself there was considerable indecision over political 
direction and strategies to adopt. 
in the lead-up to the election, the nFp viewed themselves as the king-makers. 
recognizing that they would struggle to win a seat, they made much of holding 
the balance-of-power with what they hoped would be around 20 per cent of 
the indian vote. With that kind of vote-share, nFp preferences would decide 
which of the two dominant parties would win power. intense negotiations 
took place with both the SDl and the Flp about nFp preferences. While it 
was understood that the minor moderate parties would share early preferences, 
the real issue was whether the nFp would place SDl ahead of Flp or vice 
versa. it was assumed by many that ultimately the nFp would follow past 
practices and place the Flp last. in the SDl camp, prime minister Qarase 
handled negotiations personally, and, as the deadline for the filing of preferences 
approached, the SDl were confident they had nFp support – apparently in 
return for promises of Senate and, through the Senate, cabinet appointments. 
this, in the eyes of the SDl leadership, in addition to their own overwhelming 
Fijian support, would guarantee election victory for the SDl.
However, unexpectedly, the nFp ended up adopting a mixed approach to 
their preferences – switching the order of the Flp and SDl according to criteria 
based on the individual candidate in each seat, on the promotion of women 
candidates, and on making sure sugar-cane belt seats remained represented 
by an indian party. this decision turned what the SDl thought would be a 
minimum 42-seat victory into a very tight election race.
At the same time, it won the nFp no favours from their bitter rivals, the 
Flp, who continued their very successful strategy from the past two elections 
of accusing the nFp of selling out to the SDl. this was ironic because a key 
factor in the nFp’s decision to split preferences was to avoid just this accusation, 
but in taking this path they were caught in a classic no-win situation. the only 
way to avoid accusations of a racial sell-out by their opponents would have been 
to offer blanket support for the Flp, but this would have made participating 
in the election a rather pointless exercise.
in all this indecision, the nFp surrendered a politically advantageous position 
that appeared to be finally gaining some ground – that of being the indo-Fijian 
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party that could work with the Fijian community for the betterment of all. this 
position called for the abandonment of the past confrontational politics of 
the Flp (portrayed by some as ‘boycott or high court’). While it didn’t appear 
that this would enable the nFp to oust the Flp, it was at least a coherent and 
clear stand around which the nFp could have built a campaign.
it is hard to understand just what the nFp hoped to achieve with its 
approach to preferences. in addition to fears of an indo-Fijian backlash, it 
could have been that the nFp feared giving all their preferences to the SDl 
and thereby delivering to them a two-thirds majority and the associated 
power to change the constitution. Whatever the logic, the reality was that the 
nFp destroyed whatever political influence they could have hoped to have 
had and denied themselves alliances with either of the two powerhouses, the 
SDl and the Flp.
in addition, along with their moderate counterparts – the nApF, who 
adopted a similar strategy – they confused the electorate. With over 90 per cent 
of the electorate voting ‘above-the-line’ along party lines, the split preference 
approach left many unsure as to where their votes might eventually end up. 
Both the Flp and, particularly,  the SDl exploited this situation. the SDl 
took out newspaper advertisements warning Fijian voters not to take the risk 
and instead to ‘tick the dove [the symbol of the SDl] above the line’. this 
proved very effective and Fijian voters, already nervous about a repeat of 2000, 
decided to stick with what they knew and vote with either of the two major 
parties. Similarly, indo-Fijian voters were reminded in election gatherings by 
the Flp not to take the risk of being sold out to the SDl.
the nFp’s woes were shared by the ‘new kids’ on the political scene, the 
nApF. the nApF was created following the ousting of ratu epeli Ganilau 
as the chairman of the Bose levu Vakaturaga (Great council of chiefs). 
in this role, he had impressed many educated urban observers with the 
innovative manner by which he attempted to transform this very traditional 
and previously rather ineffective body into one more relevant to the challenges 
facing the Fijian people of today. in the process he almost inevitably entered 
into conflict with the more conservative elements of the vanua and with the 
SDl government.
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much was expected of the nApF, particularly within the Suva-based liberal 
élite, but ratu epeli never appeared very comfortable as a politician. He 
struggled to build a solid political base and relied heavily on the ‘leftovers’ of 
Fijian politics to stand as candidates. many of these aging figures had previously 
been members of the SVt and the Fijian Association. it gave the party a very 
stale feel, when it desperately needed a younger, more dynamic image.4 
to make this worse, the nApF decided to link ratu epeli with the chiefly 
legacy of his father, ratu Sir penaia Ganilau, and a long line of respected chiefs, 
including former president ratu Sir Kamisese mara and earlier post-war 
leader ratu Sir lala Sukuna. the images of these figures of history featured 
prominently on nApF advertising, reinforcing the very old feel of the party. 
the decision to try and give the party a chiefly image was a dangerous strategy. 
While it may have appealed to some within the General Voter category, to 
the critical Fijian electorate it did not relate to the Fiji of 2006 – and may 
even have appeared a little presumptuous.
the disastrous performance of the moderates speaks for itself. the nFp’s 
share of indo-Fijian votes dropped from 22.1 per cent to 14.4 per cent and, 
while they achieved a small increase in Fijian votes, this only amounted to 
1.3 per cent. Altogether, the nFp won just  6.3 per cent of the total vote. 
the nApF won 2.5 per cent of Fijian communal votes, 1.7 per cent of indo-
Fijian votes and, not surprisingly, 7.6 per cent of General votes. together, 
however, this represented a mere 4 per cent of the total vote.
Despite brave words in the wake of the election, it is difficult to see how 
either of these parties will survive their crushing defeats. tradition, and nFp’s 
base in municipal councils and within a faction of the trade union movement, 
may sustain the nFp, but it is hard to see how they will achieve any level of 
national influence without a charismatic leader and a fundamental change 
in indo-Fijian politics. the most likely fate of the nApF is to follow parties 
like the Fijian Association, the VlV and SVt and slide away into obscurity, 
perhaps to re-emerge in another form in 2011.
What of the moderate multiracial political agenda? it is very hard in this 
current political environment to see an opportunity for a moderate party to 
emerge from the centre.
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continued political and economic stability will see both the SDl and Flp 
move more and more towards the middle ground of Fijian politics. this is 
already evident in the early days of the Qarase-led multiparty cabinet – and 
the longer this lasts the more attractive moderate multiracial policies will 
become to voters. However, this shift will come at the initiative of the two 
giants of Fiji politics, and most definitely on their terms.
Notes
1 the ‘Yellow Bucket’ is a weekly column on Fiji politics and national affairs that can be 
found at <www.fijivillage.com>. inspiration for the column is found, like many things in 
Fiji, around a yellow bucket of yaqona or kava – hence the name. launched early in 2003, 
it has gained a reputation for providing astute observation of Fiji politics and its forecasts 
have proved remarkably accurate in recent years. Authorship of the column is credited to an 
editorial board that gathers regularly around a yellow bucket. 
2 mahendra chaudhry made such remarks on ‘the real Deal’ talkback show, VitiFm/radio 
Sargam, 3 may 2006; see also the references to ‘public private partnerships to “weed out 
corrupt practices” in state owned industries’ in the 2006 Flp manifesto, 2006, <http://www.
flp.org.fj/Fiji_labour_manifesto-final[2].pdf> (accessed 29 july 2006). 
3 SDl 2006 manifesto, p.8, <http://www.sdlparty.com.fj/SDlmanengSum.pdf> (accessed 
29 july 2006). 
4 ratu epeli even said that the party would finalize its list of candidates once the major parties 
had completed their pre-selection, so that the nApF could pick up rejected candidates from 
the other parties. certainly, beyond ratu epeli and one or two other figures the nApF looked 
like a party of rejects.
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The impact of the  
Reconciliation, Tolerance and 
Unity Bill on the 2006 election
Mosmi Bhim
‘the re-election of the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua-led government 
hinges on the success of the promotion of the reconciliation, tolerance and 
unity Bill… if the Bill goes down, the government goes down with it.’ So said 
Fiji’s Attorney General Qoriniasi Bale, a key ally of the prime minister, at a 
public meeting on 15 june 2005.1 that comment, a year prior to Fiji’s may 
2006 general election, indicated the great political importance attached by the 
government to legislation ostensibly aimed at bringing closure to five years of 
police investigations, settling differences between the victims and aggressors 
of the may 2000 coup, and establishing a framework for greater harmony 
between the country’s 55 per cent indigenous Fijian and 40 per cent indo-Fijian 
communities. Yet, from the time the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance 
and unity (rtu) Bill was first mooted, tensions between the Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni lewenivanua (SDl) and the major indo-Fijian party, the Fiji labour party 
(Flp), and between the government and the republic of Fiji military Forces 
(rFmF) were gravely inflamed by the proposed new legislation. opponents saw 
the amnesty provisions in the Bill as a dangerous concession to Fijian nationalist 
opinion, and as potentially entailing the release from prison of 2000 coup leader, 
George Speight, and of prominent chiefs convicted for coup-related offences. 
Despite so explicitly pinning its electoral fortunes to the fate of the Bill, after 
months of great controversy, the government eventually chose to shelve the 
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Bill shortly before the 2006 election, declaring its intention instead to revisit 
the issues thereafter. 
this chapter looks at why the government chose to introduce such 
controversial legislation in the run-up to the 2006 poll. it examines first 
the provisions of the Bill, and why, five years after the coup (rather than in 
its immediate aftermath), political difficulties arose that prompted resort to 
parliamentary legislation on the amnesty issue. in order to address that question, 
it is necessary to revisit the events of may–november 2000, and consider the 
coup-related offences committed at that time. the chapter then considers the 
positions of the government and other supporters, as well as the objections of 
opponents, including the Flp and the rFmF, and reviews the documentation 
arising out of the joint parliamentary select committee that was convened to 
deliberate on the proposed legislation. Finally, it considers why the rtu Bill 
was eventually deferred, prior to the 2006 election, and whether or not it 
nevertheless achieved important objectives for the SDl election campaign. 
The provisions of the RTU Bill
the idea of a reconciliation Bill was first raised in August 2004, and the fully 
drafted Bill was introduced on the floor of parliament on 31 may 2005. the 
Bill provided for the establishment of a reconciliation and unity commission 
with powers to conduct inquiries and to facilitate the granting of reparations, 
compensation and amnesty. the conduct of the inquiries, the Bill specified, 
would also take into account the traditional Fijian principles of restorative 
justice. two committees were to be established – a Victims and reparations 
committee, responsible for granting reparations and compensation, and an 
Amnesty committee, empowered not simply to release prisoners, but also to 
nullify the original convictions. Both of these committees were to have three 
members, who would deliberate on applications made and submit reports 
to the commission. in addition, a national council for the promotion of 
reconciliation, tolerance and unity was to be established and entrusted with 
developing strategies for the promotion of greater understanding between the 
two major racial communities. 
of the 36 clauses contained in the rtu Bill, the longest was clause 21, 
titled ‘Applications for Amnesty’, which had 15 sub-clauses. it allowed those 
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convicted of coup-related offences that were classified as ‘politically motivated’ 
and committed between 19 may 2000 and 15 march 2001 to apply for 
amnesty. ‘politically motivated’ activities were to be distinguished from those 
of a ‘criminal’ nature, a proposal which generated obvious difficulties: ‘treason’, 
for example, is usually highly politically motivated but nevertheless usually 
also considered the most severe form of criminal activity against the state. the 
intended application of the Bill to the 2000 coup-related prisoners was explicit, 
and the four clauses relating to this indicated some urgency in securing the 
release of prisoners on the part of government. the four clauses were:
(2) in dealing with applications for amnesty, the commission shall give priority to 
applications from persons in custody…
(6) if an applicant for amnesty is charged…or is standing trial…the commission may 
request the court to postpone the criminal proceedings pending the consideration and 
disposal of the application for amnesty…
(12) Any person who has been granted amnesty…shall be released from prison forthwith 
on a warrant issued by the president…
(13) An amnesty granted by the president…shall have the effect of erasing the 
conviction.2
the final reference to ‘erasing the conviction’ provides further insight into the 
objective of the rtu Bill. the 1997 constitution potentially already provided 
the government with the means, via a prerogative of mercy commission, to 
grant ‘pardons’ to chiefs and others imprisoned for coup or mutiny-related 
activities. indeed, that commission had been convened to commute a death 
sentence for George Speight to life imprisonment.3 But amnesties, unlike 
pardons, wipe out the stain of the preceding conviction, a matter of no small 
importance for Fiji’s status-oriented convicted chiefs, as shown in the next 
section.
Why was the RTU Bill introduced?
By 2005, the government had a number of good reasons for wanting to bring 
an end to the coup-related court cases. Fiji could not continue, forever, to 
thrash over the events of 2000. the police commissioner, Australian Andrew 
Hughes, would have liked to have finished the coup investigations before the 
2006 elections.4 in a statement to the media after introducing the rtu Bill 
in may 2005, prime minister laisenia Qarase said the main purpose of the 
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intended legislation was to bring closure to the turbulent era following the 
2000 coup: 
it will enable us to more effectively concentrate on nation-building, strengthening our 
economy and improving living standards, especially for the poor…the long delays in 
completing investigations are evidence that our law enforcement authorities are having 
difficulty coping. this is an issue of great concern…the concept of restorative justice is 
not new to Fijians. it is built into their culture. the whole community becomes involved 
in finding solutions and imposing sanctions. this is reflected in various customary practices 
such as veisorosorovi5 and matanigasau.6
Such appeals to traditional or customary ideals of reconciliation, however, 
were questioned by others, such as citizens constitutional Forum activist jone 
Dakuvula, who suggested that Fijian rituals of veisorosorovi and matanigasau are 
customarily undertaken only after there has been prior agreement between the 
perpetrator and the victim. the offender cannot force the offended to accept 
matanigasau. mr Dakuvula said the government’s proposed reconciliation and 
unity commission was not a genuine product of reconciliation because the 
victims had not been consulted.7
the Qarase government’s ministry of multi-ethnic Affairs and national 
reconciliation and unity, which sought to promote the ideals of christian 
forgiveness, harmony and cooperation as a way forward for Fiji, came to 
play a central role in promoting support for the rtu Bill. the government 
declared 4–11 october 2004 as ‘reconciliation Week’, to coincide with Fiji’s 
independence day on 10 october. the tui cakau and lands minister ratu 
naiqama lalabalavu led a matanigasau ceremony at Albert park, Suva, at 
which 20 tabua (whale teeth) were presented to seek forgiveness from the 
parliamentarians held hostage during the 2000 coup. He was accompanied by 
naitasiri chief ratu inoke takiveikata, Bau chief ratu tanoa cakobau and ratu 
inoke Seniloli, the younger brother of imprisoned Vice president ratu jope 
Seniloli.8 it was an act of contrition viewed by many as hypocritical. Deposed 
prime minister mahendra chaudhry and the mps held hostage in 2000 were 
not present to receive the matanigasau. Very few indo-Fijians attended the 
event. nevertheless, the themes of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘forgiveness’ struck a 
chord within predominantly christian Fijian communities and seemed, for 
the government, to provide a means of mobilizing support for nation-building 
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and perhaps also a means to marginalize critics in the Flp, who could thereby 
be accused of unwillingness to reconcile and forgive those who had, it was to 
be publicly acknowledged, done them such great injustice at the time of the 
may–july 2000 disturbances. this set the tone for the deliberations on the 
rtu Bill. 
in order to fully appreciate the context of the rtu Bill, it is necessary to 
revisit the events surrounding the 19 may 2000 coup. on that day, George 
Speight had led a group of gunmen to seize control of Fiji’s parliament, deposing 
the government of Fiji’s first indo-Fijian prime minister, mahendra chaudhry. 
the insurrection had coincided with a taukei march through Suva; some 15,000 
people took to the streets of the city, greatly outnumbering police officers. A 
total of 167 shops were looted, 15 shops and five kiosks burnt down and 269 
people arrested in the rampage, with total damage costs estimated at $30 million 
by then police commissioner isikia Savua.9 Around 7,500 people were to lose 
their jobs as a result of the 2000 coup.10 
the day after the coup, inside parliament, Bau high chief ratu jope Seniloli 
swore in a rebel prime minister and cabinet – many of whom were later to be 
convicted for taking an illegal oath. For the next 56 days, members of parliament 
from the government side, including prime minister mahendra chaudhry, 
were held hostage inside the Veiuto complex. they were surrounded by a 
human shield of supporters, who drank grog, ate and sang in the grounds of 
the complex, where they also did their laundry and cooking.11 
military commander Frank Bainimarama was far away in lebanon on the 
day of the coup, but cut short his trip upon hearing of events in Suva.12 Speight 
and his group had hoped to trigger full backing from the rFmF, but, instead, 
the military encircled the complex, commencing a protracted siege. Soldiers 
were reluctant to move into parliament for fear the rebels might carry out their 
threat of injuring the hostages.13 
Despite the loose cordon thrown around parliament, Speight and his 
followers were able to move in and out with comparative ease. A state of 
emergency was declared on 27 may 2000, but to little avail. that night, rebels 
marched through Suva and trashed the Fiji tV headquarters, threatening also 
to march on the president’s residence. 
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reportedly in response, on 29 may, the military commander asked the then 
president of Fiji, tui nayau ratu Sir Kamisese mara, to step aside. Bainimarama 
assumed executive authority, and issued a decree to abrogate the constitution. 
thereafter, the army strengthened its presence around Suva and oversaw 
negotiations with the rebels. Daily curfews were imposed, lasting from sunset 
until sunrise. the city suffered power cuts over the 56-day siege, as a result of 
the sabotage of the monasavu dam, the key hydro-electric power source for 
Viti levu. Speight and the rebels also encouraged takeovers of police stations 
and the setting up of roadblocks in other parts of the country. Victimization 
of indo-Fijian communities occurred in areas such as muaniweni, naitasiri, 
Dawasamu in northern tailevu and Dreketi near labasa, where farms were 
looted, indo-Fijian villagers threatened and cattle killed. Fears that the coup 
might trigger a bloody split in the rFmF seemed realized after a mutiny at 
the Sukunaivalu Barracks at labasa, on Fiji’s second largest island Vanua levu, 
in july 2000.
eventually, top military officers’ efforts to reach a settlement bore some 
success. Signed on 9 july 2000, the muanikau Accord promised to address 
the political demands of the coup perpetrators and to give them an amnesty 
in exchange for the release of the hostage parliamentarians and the return of 
all weapons. the remaining hostages – including the deposed prime minister, 
mahendra chaudhry – were released by 13 july 2000.
Although the rebels vacated parliament, instead of disbanding they shifted to 
the Kalabu Fijian School on Suva’s outskirts, and continued to destabilize the 
country. the military lost patience. George Speight, together with his lawyer 
tevita Bukarau, his media advisor josefa nata and his personal bodyguard, 
known only as ‘cakau’, were arrested on the night of 26 july 2000 at the 
laqere Bridge, for failing to stop at a military checkpoint and for carrying 
illegal weapons in violation of the muanikau Accord.14 the next day, the army 
stormed the Kalabu school, in an operation which resulted in the death of one 
rebel and 32 casualties, and the arrest of key figures, such as the rebel strategist 
colonel ilisoni ligairi and josefa Savua, the brother of police commissioner 
isikia Savua.15 Altogether, 415 people were arrested. others captured included 
lieutenant colonel rusiate Korovusere, former Fiji intelligence Services boss 
colonel metuisela mua and rewa mp ratu timoci Silatolu. As had been the 
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case for Speight, amnesty provisions were deemed inapplicable because the 
rebels were carrying illegal weapons. 
Four months later, the country appeared to be moving back to normality. But 
then, on 2 november 2000, a mutiny by rebel soldiers took place at the Queen 
elizabeth Barracks in nabua – not long before the date for a scheduled court 
hearing for George Speight. commander Bainimarama narrowly escaped an 
attempt on his life. mutinous soldiers from the counter revolutionary Warfare 
unit (crWu) killed three unarmed regular soldiers as the mutineers tried to 
take over the national operations centre. Five crWu soldiers were later killed 
when loyalist forces recaptured the military camp.16 the incident left a legacy 
of bitterness and tension within the army, and helps to explain officers’ strong 
hostility to the rtu Bill. 
Aside from wanting to bring an end to the long-drawn-out saga of coup-
related court cases, by late 2004 the government had become greatly concerned 
about the growing legal threat to Fiji’s customary chiefs. the initial arrests of 
the so-called ‘civilian coup’ leaders back in 2000, and then of the soldiers who 
had played a somewhat more secretive role, had left many of the country’s 
traditional chiefs untouched, although some were widely known to have 
Table 10.1 Police charges for offences committed during the 2000 civil unrest 
unlawful assembly 498 
mutiny 62 
treason1 24 
Wrongful confinement 25 
Arson 19 
robbery with violence 19 
incitement to mutiny 17 
Damaging property 17 
Shop-breaking and entering 15  
other offences 18 
total charges 714
notes: 1 includes taking an illegal oath. 
Source: police information provided for Report of the Sector Standing Committee on Justice, Law and Order 
on the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill, november/December 2005, p.53–54.
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played a powerful behind-the-scenes role. By late 2004, however, the Director 
of public prosecutions office had gathered sufficient evidence to launch such 
prosecutions. Vice president ratu jope Seniloli, along with Deputy Speaker of 
the House ratu rakuita Vakalalabure and three other chiefs were convicted on 5 
August 2004 for taking an unlawful oath to be part of Speight’s government on 
the day after the coup.17 ratu Seniloli was sentenced to four years imprisonment 
and ratu Vakalalabure to six years.18 on 23 november 2004, the Turaga na 
Qaranivalu, ratu inoke takiveikata, the paramount chief of naitasiri, was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for inciting mutiny in november 2000. in 
mitigation, ratu inoke, himself a former army officer, claimed that he had 
requested his backers to mount a non-violent takeover of the military camp, 
but this was not accepted by the presiding judge, justice Anthony Gates. 
Still more importantly, minister of lands and tui cakau ratu naiqama 
lalabalavu was convicted for unlawful assembly during the takeover of the 
Sukanaivalu Barracks in labasa between 4 july and 3 August 2000.19 in his 
defence, ratu naiqama acknowledged that he had entered the Sukanaivalu 
Barracks at the height of disturbances, but claimed to have been fulfilling 
traditional leadership responsibilities. He said he had been traditionally 
invited – along with the three other chiefs – by tui labasa ratu joseva ritova 
Qomate to go to the barracks to ensure nothing unlawful was done.20 the 
three other Vanua levu chiefs were ratu josefa Dimuri, tui nadogo ratu 
Viliame rovabokola and tui Wailevu ratu rokodewala niumataiwalu. All 
four, including ratu naiqama, were given eight month prison sentences; all 
four were admitted to labasa hospital with alleged illnesses after serving one 
week of their sentences. ratu naiqama and ratu josefa were released within 
two weeks of their conviction on compulsory supervision orders to serve their 
sentences extra-murally.21 ratu naiqama served, in total, only ten days of his 
sentence before being released to serve the rest by doing community work at 
the Sacred Heart catholic cathedral in Suva.22 Six months later, in August 
2005, ratu Viliame and ratu rokodewala were also released on compulsory 
supervision orders.23
For Qarase, the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of such powerful 
customary chiefs posed a far-reaching challenge to the leadership within Fijian 
society:
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police enquiries have so far implicated more than 2,500 citizens. A characteristic of the 
year 2000 law-breaking was that probably the majority of those involved were motivated 
by Fijian customary belief, tradition and duty…there was a clash of values between the old 
and the new, between the traditional communal system and one founded on the rule of law 
and individual human rights. A significant section of Fijian opinion felt those charged and 
convicted had been acting in furtherance of their traditional functional responsibility…they 
were seen to be responding to the cultural concept of the vanua – the chiefs, the people 
and the land…. the nation moved into uncharted waters when high chiefs were found 
guilty of coup-connected offences and sent to prison …. (this had) associated implications 
for social stability.24
there were also important political reasons why the prosecution and 
imprisonment of such important political figures posed difficulties for the 
Qarase administration. in the wake of the August 2001 general election, 
Qarase’s SDl had formed a coalition government with the conservative 
Alliance–matanitu Vanua (cAmV). the SDl had gained 32 mps, while the 
cAmV had six. of these six, Speight had been convicted – and, at a by-election, 
replaced by his brother, Samisoni tikoinasau – and both Deputy Speaker ratu 
rakuita Vakalalabure and ratu naiqama had been given prison sentences.25 At 
the time of his imprisonment, ratu naiqama was not only minister of lands: 
as tui cakau, he was also the paramount chief of cakaudrove, and thus leader 
of tovata, one of Fiji’s three traditional confederacies. perhaps most importantly 
of all, he was president of the cAmV. the imprisonment of such a senior figure 
in the government threatened to break up the SDl–cAmV coalition, which at 
least in theory might have resulted in an early election. in such circumstances, 
Fijians might have gone to the polls deeply split, with the consequence that 
the SDl might have lost.  
that the threat of a split was at least plausible was indicated by the revelation 
that, shortly before the government’s introduction of the rtu Bill, the 
cAmV had plans to introduce legislation of its own. cAmV mp Samisoni 
tikoinasau indicated that cAmV parliamentarians intended to table a motion 
in parliament for the government to grant immunity to coup perpetrators.26 this 
was not the first time that the cAmV had requested a pardon for imprisoned 
coup leaders. After ratu jope’s conviction on 5 August 2004, ratu naiqama 
reiterated the cAmV stance that all those charged with coup-related offences 
should be pardoned, as after the 1987 coup.27 tikoinasau had demanded the 
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Great council of chiefs do something about ratu jope’s conviction, and stated 
that the matanigasau performed in 2000 to seek forgiveness should have been 
given legal recognition. tikoinasau also questioned why army commander 
Bainimarama had not been charged for abrogating the constitution and 
removing then president ratu mara.28 But the new threat to put the issue 
before parliament left the prime minister in some potential difficulty. Any 
vote on such a motion would have left the SDl with the dilemma of either 
siding explicitly and emphatically with the coup convicts or lining up alongside 
the Flp in opposing the Bill. Both courses of action would have been deeply 
damaging for the government.  
Qarase was intent on assuaging these potential frictions in his governing 
coalition, and on preserving ‘Fijian unity’. ratu naiqama had resigned on 7 
April 2005, and was replaced by tikoinasau as minister of lands.29 earlier in 
the year, cakaudrove east constituency mp manasa tuqia had been appointed 
deputy speaker, after ratu rakuita lost his West cakaudrove parliamentary seat 
as a result of missing two parliamentary sittings due to his imprisonment.30 
that the SDl was being cautious in managing its relations with the cAmV 
was demonstrated by the SDl’s decision to not field any candidates for the 
cakaudrove West by-election in june 2005, resulting in an unopposed win 
by cAmV’s niko nawaikula, a lawyer and former native lands trust Board 
official.31 imprisoned cAmV chiefs were quickly welcomed back into the 
government upon their release. ratu josefa Dimuri returned as a senator and 
secretary general of the cAmV. ratu naiqama was appointed as the new 
transport and Shipping minister on 21 September 2005, after completing his 
prison term.32 unlike Speight and Vakalalabure, he did not lose his seat as a 
result of serving a prison term because the law insists on disqualification only 
if the sentence is more than 12 months.33 He had been convicted for only eight 
months, and had had his prison term reduced to six months for good behaviour. 
nevertheless, for ratu naiqama, the prison sentence was thought to have been 
harsh and unjust. After being released from prison, ratu naiqama reiterated 
in parliament that he and three other chiefs entered Sukanaivalu Barracks in 
july–August 2000 on the request of the police and military. 
As a traditional leader, i take slight that, at times, our traditional authority [has] been abused 
and exploited by the powers that be…During the 2000 crisis in labasa, the late tui labasa 
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and i, amongst a few other Vanua levu chiefs were approached, both by the police and 
military to intercede in the face-off between the soldiers at Sukanaivalu Barracks.…had it 
not been for our positive contribution, labasa would have been looted, burnt and soldiers 
would have been killed and probably maimed each other. Yet, when all was brought to 
normal, we were charged and convicted for offences against the public order Act. Here, 
Sir, is an example of abuse of our traditional authority …. For me as prisoner number 
lB32/05 at Vaturekuka is something i will live with for the rest of my life, without any 
regret or shame because…i know that what i did then was right.34 
Despite the protestations to the contrary, the stain of being found guilty 
in such a way clearly was not regarded lightly in Fiji’s status-oriented chiefly 
order. 
there had also been political risks associated with the conviction of senior 
figures within the SDl itself. ratu inoke takiveikata, for example, was the 
founding president of SDl, a government senator and, although by 2006 
behind bars, remained the vice president of the governing party. SDl member 
for lomaiviti, Simione Kaitani, was also dragged before the courts, although 
ultimately found not guilty; and new revelations suggested a threat to senior 
SDl ministers, such as Konisi Yabaki and Savenaca Draunidalo. coup convict 
maciu navakasuasua had also named ratu epeli Kanaimawi (a senior figure 
in the Assembly of christian churches in Fiji), pastor poate mata and then 
methodist church president reverend tomasi Kanailagi as supporters of the 
coup.35 Army officer Viliame Seruvakula (at the time serving as an instructor 
with the new Zealand army) revealed being offered a bribe of $250,000 to 
support the 2000 takeover, and implicated still more senior figures in coup-
related crimes. Although the seriousness of the offence for which ratu inoke 
takiveikata had been convicted ruled out his early release, the evident sympathy 
of the prime minister for his imprisoned ally was shown by his regular private 
visits to Korovou prison to brief ratu inoke on ‘the state of the SDl party and 
issues of political and national importance’.36 
The opposition position
the rtu Bill generated strong opposition among Fiji’s citizens, and from the 
leaders of neighbouring metropolitan powers. While the main supporters of 
the Bill were Fijian politicians, parties, provincial councils and related groups 
such as the methodist church and Fijian trade unions, those opposing the Bill 
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were the disciplined forces, indian religious groups, professional organizations, 
foreign governments and organizations, most civil society organizations, 
most of the non-Fijian political parties, and some of the christian churches. 
Amongst the representatives of the Fiji indian community, the Bill generated 
almost blanket condemnation, particularly from those who had been victims 
of the 2000 coup and held hostage at the parliamentary complex. many of the 
country’s european and part-european politicians opposed the Bill from a legal 
or human rights perspective, as did the bulk of non-Fijian lawyers.
opposition leader mahendra chaudhry initially called on prime minister 
Qarase to resign because stakeholders, including political parties, religious 
bodies, and non-governmental organizations (nGos) had not been fully 
consulted about the Bill’s provisions. chaudhry said the real purpose of the Bill 
was to free political prisoners and that this would mean legalizing terrorism.37 
the smaller, mainly indo-Fijian backed national Federation party (nFp) 
described the Bill as a catalyst for further political instability, and as likely to 
widen the racial divide and so derail economic recovery.38 the leader of the 
united peoples party, mick Beddoes, also claimed inadequate consultation.39 
chaudhry later said he might support the Bill if it were substantially re-written 
to facilitate genuine reconciliation. truth-telling, modelled on Bishop Desmond 
tutu’s activities in the South African truth and reconciliation commission, 
needed to be a core component of the process, enabling perpetrators of coup-
related crimes to divulge information about the events of may 2000 and the 
secretive backers of the coup.40
overseas reactions were tempered by reluctance to interfere in Fiji’s domestic 
affairs. Australian minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer said ‘the army 
commander had no business in politics and should stick to his job – running the 
military’.	41 His new Zealand counterpart, phil Goff, was more critical of the 
government, criticizing the idea that ‘people who have overthrown a democratic 
government by force may be exempted from the category of criminals if it was 
done for political reasons’.42 He urged prime minister Qarase to amend the 
controversial amnesty provisions. the uS Ambassador to Fiji, David lyon, 
expressed concern about the amnesty section saying that a coup culture had 
developed in Fiji since 1987 that was detrimental to Fiji’s reputation and would 
have a negative impact on investment, tourism and the 2006 elections.43 A 
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tebbutt poll of 1,008 people found that 44 per cent of residents were against 
the Bill, 35 per cent were for it and 12 per cent did not care.44
opposition was expressed by regional and international government 
bodies and nGos. the european union, local nGos – such as the citizens’ 
constitutional Forum, Women’s Action for change, the ecumenical centre 
for research education and Advocacy, and the Fiji Women’s rights movement 
– protested against the Bill, saying it breached un human rights conventions. 
the Fiji cane Growers’ council and the national Farmers union expressed 
opposition.45 Fiji public Service Association general gecretary rajeshwar Singh 
claimed solid opposition by trade unions around the world.46 the international 
confederation of Free trade unions wrote to the Fiji prime minister expressing 
apprehension about the rtu Bill, and was particularly alarmed by the amnesty 
provision for coup perpetrators.47 
the Fiji police Force opposed the Bill on the grounds that the amnesty 
provision would interfere with the authority of the police commissioner to 
investigate offences and prosecute offenders. the military, as discussed in 
more detail in the next section, likewise opposed the Bill on security grounds, 
expressing anxiety that the amnesty provisions would legitimize terrorism.48 the 
Fiji law Society opposed the Bill on the grounds that some of its provisions were 
unconstitutional and that granting of amnesty would erode and have a harmful 
effect on the role of the judiciary. Such a law, it said, would retrospectively license 
terrorism, was a recipe for instability and would interfere with the powers of the 
Director of public prosecutions. the society warned against improper use of 
customary law and tradition for political gain; society president Graham leung 
reminded the government that ‘no culture, no religion and no government 
are above the law’. the international commission of jurists said the amnesty 
provision appeared incompatible with international law and insisted that it 
be amended so as not to violate Fiji’s obligations under international human 
rights law. the Human rights institute of the international Bar Association 
expressed reservations that the Bill would be able to deliver the ‘reconciliation’ 
that it promised.49
the outcry amongst civil society organizations, political parties and 
international donors and diplomats came as a surprise to Qarase and Attorney 
General Qoriniasi Bale, who acknowledged the need for further consultation 
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and declared an intention to consider substantial amendments to the Bill. the 
prime minister assured the public that, given the strength of the public reaction, 
the Bill would be reviewed: the report of the sector committee entrusted with 
examining the proposed legislation was to play a major role in determining the 
final draft. the government also promised to ensure that the final legislation 
met the requirements of the constitution and did not compromise the office 
of the president.50
The military position
the rtu Bill exacerbated a previously existing rift between the government 
and the rFmF. the impasse between the military commander and the 
government had been ongoing since 2001. Frictions between the military and 
the government had forced the latter to change key position-holders in the 
Home Affairs ministry two times – Home Affairs minister jonetani cokanasiga 
was relegated to the back benches in December 2004 and replaced by josefa 
Vosanibola; and Home Affairs ceo jeremaia Waqanisau was transferred to an 
ambassador’s post in china in january 2004. the commander also distrusted 
the new Home Affairs ceo, Dr lesi Korovavala, and was later to hold him 
responsible for the stand-off between the military and the government in 
january 2006. the military then alleged that Korovavala and prime minister 
Qarase had encouraged lieutenant colonel jone Baledrokadroka to incite a 
mutiny in that month.51 the government had initially appeared reluctant to 
extend Bainimarama’s contract in February 2004, but president ratu josefa 
iloilo had decided to renew his term in office on 29 january 2004.52
For the rFmF, the rtu Bill was seen as a threat to its efforts to stabilize 
the security situation in the aftermath of the 2000 coup. rFmF commander 
Frank Bainimarama had faced a personal threat to his life during the november 
2000 mutiny. He had purged senior commanders with suspect loyalties, often 
keeping them close to military headquarters at Berkeley crescent in positions 
without major responsibility. top commanders believed that the Bill would 
derail their efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the insurrections of 
may and november 2000. 
the military conducted a succession of long-drawn-out trials from 2001. 
By April 2005, 159 sentences had been handed down: 58 soldiers had faced 
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court martial for their role in the 2000 parliamentary takeover, 63 were tried 
for the takeover of the Sukanaivalu Barracks in labasa, and the remainder were 
convicted for their part in the bloody mutiny of november 2000 and other 
coup-related offences.53 the military refused to accept back into employment 
any of the convicted soldiers. the rtu Bill was viewed as likely to reverse efforts 
to bring those responsible for insurrection to justice. even existing practices, 
such as the release of coup convicts under compulsory supervision orders, 
were strongly opposed by the commander. Bainimarama pointed out that the 
government was not only allowing people tainted by coup allegations to go 
free; they were ‘even getting plush government jobs and diplomatic postings’. 
this, he argued, was creating a generation of criminals with no respect for the 
rule of law.54 
Secondly, the formation of the Qarase government had, originally, been a 
military initiative, and the commander felt that ministers owed some loyalty 
to those who had put them into office. in the wake of the may 2000 upheaval, 
Qarase had headed an ‘interim administration’, with former military commander 
ratu epeli nailatikau as deputy prime minister. it had not been intended as a 
permanent fixture. originally, these interim leaders were apolitical technocrats, 
thrust into office to stabilize the political situation. that the government was 
characterized by appeasement of the nationalists combined oddly with their 
apparent support for the upholding of law. this was a contradiction expressed 
in the regular refrain that the prime minister supported the coup goals, but not 
its means. comprised of realist politicians, the SDl realized that the support 
of the nationalists was crucial if it were to win. only in 2001, in the wake of 
a court ruling rendering the government illegal, did Qarase reconstitute some 
parts of the group, first as a ‘caretaker’ cabinet, and then as the core of the 
new SDl party. in the process, the commander believed, the government had 
lost sight of its original mandate and proved itself to be in thrall to nationalist 
extremist demands.
the military’s formal submission to the parliamentary select committee 
entrusted with undertaking hearings on the proposed legislation stated: 
the Bill is ill conceived and is a recipe for internal conflict, unrest and violence. it is 
discriminatory and will breed ethno-nationalism… bring about despair, hopelessness and 
insecurity amongst the people as well as promote greater racial division. the majority of 
128 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
the offences committed during the period were predominantly by the indigenous race 
(offender) against those of indian descent (victim); it will allow for the pardoning of the 
indigenous offenders versus the interests of the victims, thereby breeding the ideology of 
ethno-nationalism that is detrimental to the safety and well being of our society.55
the conviction of ratu inoke takiveikata for inciting and aiding the 
november 2000 mutiny in which the commander narrowly escaped 
assassination sheds some light on why Bainimarama had been against the 
SDl since its formation in 2001. As discussed above, ratu inoke had called, 
so he admitted in court, for a peaceful takeover of the military camp. He had 
nevertheless later become the founding president of SDl and, even after his 
conviction, remained on close terms with the prime minister. this implied 
that, since its commencement, the SDl had prominently featured people 
who would have liked to have seen the army commander removed. that the 
threats to the commander in november 2000 were not confined to history also 
seemed, whether rightly or wrongly, demonstrated by the alleged attempted 
mutiny by acting land forces commander colonel jone Baledrokadroka on 
12 january 2006, which Bainimarama claimed had been orchestrated by the 
government.56 Bainimarama refused to rule out overthrowing the government 
if the Bill were passed.57
Great council of chiefs’ Senator jim Ah Koy, businessman and former 
finance minister, echoed the commander’s stance, explaining that ‘his priority 
is national security and that is why he is coming out strong against the Bill’.58 
Despite years of vociferous denunciation of the government, the commander 
succeeded in retaining his position at the helm of the rFmF. close connections 
with the office of the president placed the commander in a unique position. 
As the president was the appointing authority, according to one interpretation, 
the commander – although normally subject to oversight from the Home 
Affairs ministry – was ultimately under the control of the president. the 
military also insisted that its ‘reserve powers’ under the 1990 constitution had 
not been superseded by the 1997 constitution.59 As a result, the commander 
believed he could securely speak out against the rtu Bill. indeed, he vowed 
to continue doing so until the Bill was withdrawn.60 Bainimarama stressed that 
the rFmF would not take part in any reconciliation on the grounds that this 
would interfere with the military’s discipline and court martial processes.61 in 
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addition to opposing the rtu Bill, the army had reservations about the Qoliqoli 
Bill and the proposed Bill on the Fijian courts.62 nor was this oppositional 
activity confined to statements to the Fiji media. in the run-up to the 2006 
election, the rFmF public relations team campaigned against the rtu Bill 
by distributing pamphlets63 and visiting rural areas to warn people about the 
Bill’s disadvantages.64
The government’s reaction 
When the rtu Bill was introduced into parliament on 31 may 2005, the 
leader of the House requested the Standing orders be suspended to allow 
the House to deal with its first reading. in the public gallery, as if in a show of 
strength, military personnel sat quietly, closely observing the progress of the 
Bill through parliament.65 the opposition Whip, the Hon. Krishna Datt, 
objected, saying the Bill contained certain provisions that were inconsistent and 
repugnant to the constitution of Fiji.66 instead of circulating the Bill to all 71 
members of the lower House 21 days before the next sitting of parliament, as 
required by law, the government had initially introduced it to the nine-member 
parliamentary Business committee, where it had a 56 per cent majority.67 For 
Datt, the consultation had been inadequate. Datt pointed to the strength of 
opposition to the Bill around the country, emphasizing the concerns expressed 
by the president of the Fiji law Society and the director of the Fiji Human 
rights commission. nevertheless, the Speaker allowed the suspension of 
Standing orders to allow the first reading of the Bill before the House.
the second reading, on 2 june, occurred at the nasese police headquarters 
amid tight police security. military observers turned up again in the public 
gallery to show their disapproval. the Flp members walked out of parliament in 
protest, with Flp deputy leader poseci Bune hand-signalling an imminent rtu 
Bill-related electoral reversal of the positions of government and opposition as 
he departed the chamber with his colleagues. the sole remaining opposition 
mp voicing concern about the Bill inside the house was ofa Duncan. outside 
the makeshift and temporary parliament at nasese, nGos and concerned 
citizens protested against the Bill.68 many wore black in protest and lined the 
nasese seawall holding placards.69 At the same time, in an unusual mobilization, 
the SDl’s jale Baba organized busloads of rural Fijians to stage counter-
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demonstrations in support of the Bill down near the nasese seawall. After the 
second reading, the Bill was referred to the law and justice Sector committee, 
entrusted to listen to submissions around the country. the Hon. manasa tugia, 
cAmV mp from cakaudrove east constituency, was appointed chairperson 
of the committee by the government on 6 june 2005.70
the government reacted to criticisms inside and outside parliament by re-
emphasizing that the fundamental objective of the Bill was to promote, not 
force, unity amongst the people of Fiji. ‘it is to try and acknowledge that we 
are made up of many different races, cultures, customs, languages, religions 
and that we have been talking about the need for unity for decades and decades 
now’, insisted the Attorney General.71 Qarase reiterated that there would be no 
general amnesty, and that the Bill was not intended to free those who used the 
coup for their own gain or other criminal intent. He said that the victims would 
have a new opportunity to seek justice through compensation.72 in comments 
that echoed the concerns of many of the domestic critics, Qarase insisted that 
one of the main reasons for the Bill was to find out exactly what motivated 
people to concoct and support the coups of 1987 and 2000.73 He said that 
the government would embark on a wide-ranging consultation process and 
that it would take into account objections to the Bill, and make the necessary 
amendments. the ministry of multi-ethnic Affairs and national reconciliation 
and unity held three workshops, in Suva, lautoka and labasa, to inform the 
indian and minority communities about the Bill.74 
in addition, the prime minister and Attorney General appeared before an 
‘open forum’ at the university of the South pacific’s marine studies campus, 
again promising amendments to the Bill, and facing down criticisms. the view 
was expressed at the forum that pardoning criminals could dissipate the respect 
for law among young Fijians and encourage criminality. Some urged that the 
bitterly opposed prime minister and leader of the opposition set an example 
to the country by reconciling with each other. Attorney General Bale insisted 
the Bill would not entail a general amnesty for coup prisoners, arguing that 
the statute of limitations had passed for conviction on treason charges. this 
was inaccurate; the Bill was quite explicitly intended to apply retrospectively 
to those already convicted of treason, subject to satisfying the other conditions 
for amnesty.
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the extra-parliamentary mobilization for and against the Bill continued 
as the law and justice committee commenced its proceedings. the nGo 
coalition on Human rights launched a campaign encouraging people to wear 
yellow ribbons to show opposition to the Bill. Another nGo, the citizens’ 
constitutional Forum, hung a giant yellow ribbon at the gate to their office 
and Bernadette rounds Ganilau (interim Assistant minister for Women in 
2000–2001) unfurled and pinned up a giant yellow ribbon at the entrance to her 
home. in response, the SDl launched a rival campaign encouraging supporters 
of the Bill to wear blue ribbons. Blue ribbon committee advisor and Assistant 
minister for Women (2005) losena Salabula claimed that the majority of Fiji 
citizens, regardless of ethnic background, supported the Bill.75 the blue ribbon 
campaign proved a potent means of gearing up the SDl party machinery, and 
particularly the SDl women’s organizations, for the 2006 election. 
The Joint Parliamentary Sector Committee
the joint parliamentary Sector committee on justice, law and order 
received 272 formal written and oral submissions. the strong demand for 
wide consultation resulted in many extensions of the original deadline for 
submissions.76 the Bill was translated into Fijian and Hindi, and public hearings 
were held in the central, northern, Western and eastern Divisions. Formal 
submissions were received from the disciplinary forces (police and military), 
political parties (SDl, Flp, nFp, national Alliance party of Fiji (nApF)), four 
trade unions, 21 religious organizations,77 20 Fijian organizations,78 six nGos, 
the Director of public prosecutions, the Fiji Human rights commission, the Fiji 
law Society, the Fiji Women lawyers Association, seven women’s organizations, 
and from other professional groups. the committee received 124 formal written 
and oral submissions, and another 148 submissions were presented orally during 
public hearings by individual groups and organisations.79 interestingly, the 
muslim religious organizations did not make any submissions on the Bill, an 
absence that indicated some notable accommodation by some leaders with the 
SDl government. the Flp did not attend any of the meetings of the committee 
in the wake of their parliamentary walkout on 2 june.
in his report to parliament, presented on 1 December 2005, the committee 
chairperson, the Hon. manasa tugia, observed that villages and tikinas 
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throughout the country supported the Bill. the report noted, however, that 
some of these views were expressed by people who had not actually read the 
Bill and were focused rather broadly on the need for reconciliation and unity.80 
Supporters of the Bill often saw such legislation as a vehicle by which to resolve 
the inter-ethnic tensions, put an end to conflict and upheavals in Fiji and 
promote genuine and lasting national unity. this, many said, could only be 
achieved through a biblically and spiritually based process of reconciliation, 
tolerance and understanding, and by use of the concept of restorative justice. 
merely allowing normal judicial processes to take their course, it was argued, 
would not stop the kinds of events that occurred in 1987 and 2000 from 
recurring; the root causes of the problem, and the unresolved issues for both the 
indigenous and non-indigenous communities needed to be fully addressed.81 
As part of the consultation process, deliberations concerning the Bill occurred 
in Fiji’s 14 provinces. the prime minister and key cabinet members visited 
rural areas to encourage support for the Bill. Some nGos sought to attend 
those meetings. the lomaiviti provincial council was one which did not 
allow nGo representatives to speak at their one-day meeting in levuka on 30 
june 2005; roko tui lomaiviti ratu Filimoni Baleimua said only provincial 
council members were allowed to attend.82 Kadavu was the first province to 
give approval to the Bill at a provincial council meeting on the island of tavuki. 
council chairman ratu josateki nawalowalo said the way forward for Fiji was 
to express support for the government’s initiative. initial reservations about the 
amnesty clause were allayed by Attorney General Bale.83 
the lau provincial council was the last of the 14 provinces to endorse the 
Bill. 
Adi Koila nailatikau, daughter of the late president ratu mara and a 
member of Fiji’s Senate, condemned the rtu Bill saying ‘reconciliation 
cannot eventuate…until the proper legal procedures have been followed’. 
Adi Koila said genuine forgiveness would not be forthcoming until the truth 
about who was involved and who funded the coup was known; she blamed the 
2000 political events for contributing to her father’s grief, leading to his death 
on 18 April 2004.84 Adi Koila believed most members of the lau provincial 
council – especially at the grass roots – did not understand the amnesty 
clause. the ex-minister and representative from lakeba, Filipe Bole, opposed 
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the Bill, saying the word ‘truth’ should also be included so that investigations 
would become meaningful and useful, and urging that the amnesty clause be 
refined.85 But these two urban lauans were unable to prevail on their island 
kinsfolk. the lau provincial council decided to support the Bill, expressing 
a desire to move forward through the intended government-ordained process 
of reconciliation. 
Following the endorsement by all 14 provincial councils, Fiji’s Great council 
of chiefs – the Bose levu Vakaturaga – convened, and endorsed the Bill on 28 
july 2005; however, it urged the government to consider the concerns raised by 
the army and others.86 the Bill was also endorsed by the council of rotuma, 
the rabi island council, the taukei movement, the Fijian Dockworkers and 
Seafarers union, the methodist church, the Assembly of christian churches 
in Fiji, the Fiji institute of research and education, and the Fijian teachers 
union. it had the support of coup-related prisoners. josefa nata and timoci 
Silatolu made submissions supporting the Bill. oddly, both of these imprisoned 
coup-leaders sought to emphasize the importance of truth-telling, and struck 
a somewhat conciliatory tone. For ratu Silatolu:
the Bill will allay the fears of the rFmF; the fact that full disclosure is part of the amnesty 
provision…will enable everyone to tell the truth… the Bill will enable perpetrators to 
personally seek reconciliation through an arbiter otherwise the issue of 2000 will be used as a 
political tool when there is no closure… the concept of veisorosorovi or asking of forgiveness 
does not discount punishment; the seeking of forgiveness is still applicable.87
in his submission, josefa nata, who was also serving a life sentence for his 
part in the coup, stated:
Drop the amnesty clause and make truth telling through a truth commission …the 
main focus of the Bill. the commission should have an investigation adjunct to look into 
evidence that could not be verified through hearing.88
those who opposed the Bill emphasized dangers associated with the amnesty 
provisions, and the likelihood that these would legitimize the type of Fijian 
extremism that had so damaged the country in 1987 and 2000.89 the Group 
of concerned (Fijian) mothers circulated a petition rallying opposition to the 
Bill and attracted 25,706 signatures [as at 26 july 2005] of which 20,672 were 
indians, 4,903 Fijians and 131 others.90 the national council of Women 
and the Fiji Association of Women Graduates protested that the Bill lacked 
134 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
provisions for gender equality. the Fiji Women’s rights movement suggested 
that the Bill was biased in favour of ethnic Fijians and discriminated against 
non-indigenous Fijians because the majority of those eligible for amnesty would 
inevitably be indigenous Fijians.
in its final report, the joint parliamentary Sector committee on justice, 
law and order indicated concern that the draft Bill did not make clear what 
categories of crime would be considered as acts associated with ‘political 
objectives’. the committee rejected concerns about the constitutional 
implications of the Bill, about the possibility that entrenched powers of the 
judiciary might be usurped and about the likelihood of a post-passage legal 
challenge to the Bill. it stressed that there should be no interference with the 
courts’ deliberations and that only afterwards should any rtu Bill-related 
considerations of restorative justice be entertained.91
After weighing up submissions and general public reactions, the committee 
recommended that the government ‘slightly readjust the way in which 
the Bill is designed, whilst still maintaining the basic objective and the 
conceptual framework of the Bill’. in concession to the critics, the committee 
concluded:
the Bill also needs to be consistent with the existing statutory powers of stakeholders, 
like the police, Dpp and the Fiji Human rights commission. the Bill must in no way 
be, or be seen as to compromise or to undermine, the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary and these other constitutional offices. Any adjustments to the Bill must comply 
with the law.92
the committee also suggested limiting the scope for reference to the 
reconciliation and unity commission. Serious acts associated with the political 
and civil unrest, such as loss of life, grievous bodily harm, and offences against 
public order would, it was suggested, be referred to and processed by the courts. 
Amnesty should not be extended to those found guilty of murder, rape and 
other sexual offences. Where those given amnesty by the commission failed 
to obey any conditions set down, this would be regarded as an offence that 
could be prosecuted in court. the Bill did not intend, it was suggested, to 
provide any blanket amnesty to free persons already convicted for coup-related 
offences, neither did it aim to free those already charged or to be charged. As 
if to emphasize the likely limitations of such legislation in terms of practical 
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impact, the committee pointed out that, in South Africa, of the 70,000 amnesty 
applications made to the truth and reconciliation commission only 7,000 or 
10 per cent were successful.93 
these deliberations of the joint parliamentary Sector committee on justice, 
law and order largely escaped public attention, and the national debate 
remained starkly polarized despite the more cautious views expressed by the 
committee itself. the fairness of these deliberations and the sensible character 
of the conclusions surprised many, particularly given the chairmanship of 
cAmV parliamentarian, manasa tugia. that such measured advice came 
from a representative of the party representing the more militant wing of 
indigenous Fijian opinion perhaps eased the pressure on the government, and 
made the passage of the Bill less urgent for electoral purposes for the Qarase 
government. 
The impact of the RTU Bill on the 2006 election
the election was held over the period 6–13 may 2006, eleven and half 
months after the Bill had first been introduced on the floor of the House. the 
intervening period had proved an era of controversy, an era of Flp boycott of 
parliament and military threat of insurrection. Yet the Bill had nevertheless 
played the politically useful role of enabling the SDl to rally Fijian support. 
messages of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’ had played to perceptions of 
christian moral righteousness about the rtu Bill. indo-Fijian politicians also 
recognized something of the political role being played by the rtu Bill. Flp 
parliamentarian Ganesh chand claimed in late 2005 that the Bill was part of 
a fear campaign politicians were running for the next year’s general election 
– fear was being instilled in people over the rtu Bill, as well as the land and 
gay rights94 issues.95
in the highly polarized election that was to ensue in may 2006, the rtu 
Bill proved, for the governing SDl, a vehicle for mobilizing Fijian support. 
the labour party’s opposition – through boycotts and its refusal to enter into 
dialogue with the SDl – was portrayed as indicative of a hostile attitude towards 
the concerns of the vanua. Yet it was not so much the labour party’s opposition 
that inflamed the Fijian voters as the military’s implacable hostility to provisions 
that it felt would seriously undermine the rule of law. Fijians in many quarters 
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appeared alarmed by the military’s interference in the political process and by 
the rFmF’s open condemnation of the Fijian-dominated government. the 
military’s ‘truth and justice’ campaign thus received a hostile reception from 
many Fijians. Some provinces went so far as to tell the military that soldiers 
were not welcome in their village or province (see ratuva, this volume).
commander Bainimarama’s criticisms of the Bill were used during election 
campaigns by both major political parties. the SDl portrayed the commander 
as supporting mahendra chaudhry’s bid to return as prime minister, 
reviving longstanding Fijian fears about having an indo-Fijian leader. Qarase 
emphasized on the campaign trail that Fiji was not ready for an indo-Fijian 
prime minister and how important it was that Fijians ensure that the SDl win 
by giving them first preference votes. He portrayed the SDl as safeguarding 
Fijian interests through affirmative action programs, the Qoliqoli Bill, and 
the progress in converting crown land into native land. the prime minister 
capitalized on chaudhry’s support for Bainimarama’s outbursts by claiming 
this indicated labour party support for an illegal takeover of the government 
by the military.96
For the Flp, the commander’s outbursts were indicative of the military’s 
firm intention to uphold the rule of law and protect the 1997 constitution. on 
the campaign trail, mention of Bainimarama’s strong stance against the SDl 
government was used to allay fears that the re-election of a labour government 
might lead, yet again, to a coup. the military, it was said, clearly intended to 
uphold the authority of the legitimately elected government. For the Flp, 
the rtu Bill also proved a means of rallying a broader-based oppositional 
coalition. Back in 2001, it had been left in a marginalized position, without 
the broad-based coalition it had relied upon to achieve power in 1999. the 
‘moderates forum’ parties had favoured the SDl over the Flp, ensuring that 
the Flp could not win in the marginal open constituencies. the rtu Bill 
had so inflamed moderate opinion, particularly among the general voters but 
also among national Federation party supporters, that the Flp stood a better 
chance of attracting moderate support than in 2006 than in 2001, although, 
as it turned out, the moderate parties proved unable to command a substantial 
share of the national vote.
the rtu Bill also proved important for the SDl’s relationship with its 
137the  impact  of  the  rtu  bill
coalition partner, the cAmV. in the years after the 2001 election, cAmV 
ministers had been drifting towards the larger and better-financed SDl. 
Without the intervention of the courts, ratu naiqama lalabalavu and his 
colleagues would, in all probability (even without the rtu Bill), have contested 
the 2006 election as SDl candidates. the coup-related trials proved a millstone 
round the neck of this accommodation. they fuelled the objections of radicals 
at the grass roots of the party that the SDl had done little for the indigenous 
cause during its term in office. the rtu Bill thus played a potent ideological 
role: it convinced many of the cAmV rank-and-file that the SDl was sincere 
in its attempt to pardon the coup-related prisoners. it reassured key cAmV 
leaders that their interests and ideology would be looked after by the SDl and 
demonstrated that the two parties were basically on the same side. that SDl 
vice president ratu inoke takiveikata remained in prison on mutiny-related 
charges also reassured the cAmV that harsh prison terms were not biased 
against their own party leaders. 
in fact, the coup trials proved a double-edged sword for the cAmV; while 
they inflamed radical passions on the one hand, on the other they caused 
financial embarrassment for the party. the cAmV had an opening balance of 
over $36,000 on 26 may 2004; notably, this was boosted to over $50,000 by a 
$15,000 donation by the SDl in july 2004.97 A little over $31,000 was spent 
on legal fees for party members from 8 july 2004 to 6 may 2005, including 
costs for the cases of Sports minister isireli leweniqila, party trustee metuisela 
mua, and former mp peceli rinakama, and for the appeal for gaoled former 
deputy speaker ratu rakuita Vakalalabure.98 As a result, the cAmV was cash-
strapped, and had insufficient funds to contest the 2006 poll. its leaders, in 
particular, urgently desired a cosy ride back into cabinet as part of the SDl. 
the rtu Bill placated the radical fringes, and promised something to the 
prisoner fraternity. this eased the inevitable transition. cAmV parliamentary 
leader ratu naiqama fended off opposition to cAmV’s merger with SDl by 
insisting that the party had become impoverished because members had failed 
to contribute sufficiently. When the cAmV dissolved itself at its AGm on 17 
February 2006, it had a closing balance of a little over $3,000. the merger with 
SDl took place that same night at a traditional ceremony held at tamavua 
village, the birthplace of SDl.99
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Conclusion
the rtu Bill was temporarily shelved in February 2006 because, so it was 
announced, the government did not have enough time to make the necessary 
amendments prior to the may 2006 election.100 this was a strange decision 
given the electoral importance initially attached by SDl leaders to securing the 
passage of the Bill. SVt spokeswoman ema Druavesi criticized the consultation 
exercise as a huge waste of taxpayers’ money.101 that was undoubtedly true, 
but from the SDl vantage point it seems reasonable to conclude that the Bill 
had achieved key objectives, even without passing into law. it had warded off 
the threat of a split in the governing coalition occasioned by the cAmV’s 
announcement that it intended to table its own Bill in parliament for the release 
of prisoners. it had paved the way for a smooth liquidation of the cAmV, and 
for the Vanua levu and northern tailevu ministers to contest under the SDl 
banner – a situation that provided the SDl with a crucial five extra seats at the 
2006 election, giving the party an absolute majority in parliament.102 Whether 
or not this was the original intention is questionable. more likely, political 
recognition that solid strategic advantages could be obtained even without 
passage of the Bill only became obvious in early 2006. 
the SDl did not make a great play of the rtu Bill in the weeks immediately 
prior to the election. in its 32-page manifesto, ‘reconciliation and unity’ 
featured on the last page. SDl policy in this respect was described as based 
on internationally acclaimed principles of ‘restorative justice’ and it was made 
clear that the government intended to introduce ‘amendments based on wide 
public consultation’ and legislation that was ‘consistent with the constitution’. 
Yet the nature of those amendments was, perhaps unsurprisingly, not made 
clear. Had big concessions to the opposition been announced, this might have 
generated disillusionment among the former rank-and-file in the cAmV. 
Had the government remained firm and insisted on passage of the draft Bill 
unchanged, it might have alienated moderate public support for the governing 
party and generated further instability in relations with the security forces. the 
tactically astute option was to shelve the Bill, and instead make vague public 
pronouncements about future intentions. 
nevertheless, over the longer run, the Bill had played a potent electoral role in 
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inflaming racial emotions and polarizing voters during the year prior to the 2006 
poll. the amnesty clause automatically drove the indo-Fijian community against 
the Bill. outright rejection by the indo-Fijian political leaders of government 
proposals for reconciliation had been matched by an extraordinary mobilization 
of support for the Bill from the methodist church, provincial councils and 
the Great council of chiefs. Since this had become such a pivotal plank of 
government policy, it ultimately proved a powerful vehicle for consolidating 
support behind the SDl. ethnic polarization, exacerbated by the controversy 
over the rtu Bill, was nurtured during the 2006 election campaign by use 
of the familiar ‘us and them’  rhetoric to incite racial fears. the oppositional 
stance of the military only contributed to that electoral polarization. through 
mobilizing ethnic Fijian voters in this way, the SDl not only achieved its merger 
with the cAmV, but also secured an absolute majority in the post-election 
parliament, and left the Flp confined to its majority indo-Fijian strongholds 
in the west and north of the country and unable to build strong alliances across 
the ethnic divide. For these reasons, the sentiments expressed by Attorney 
General Bale, as cited at the start of this chapter – that the electoral fortunes 
of the SDl and the fate of the rtu Bill were inextricably linked – proved 
accurate, even though the Bill was put into cold storage for the duration of 
the campaign. Whether or not the rtu Bill, which would potentially cost the 
country millions of dollars in compensation and would continue to exacerbate 
communal tensions, is useful or suitable given the new post-election multiparty 
cabinet setting is much more doubtful. 
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Reflections on the economic 
and social policies of  
political parties at the  
2006 general election
Biman Chand Prasad1
political instability since 1987 has adversely affected Fiji’s economic growth, 
which averaged less than 3 per cent over the period 1980–2006. Fiji’s economic 
performance between 2001 and 2006, when the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
lewenivanua (SDl) government was in power, was even more modest. While 
the SDl government pursued policies that promoted private-sector-led growth, 
these largely failed as a result of continued perceptions of political volatility and 
the inability of political parties to agree on a solution to the impasse over land 
leases. in addition, over the two years prior to the 2006 poll, further political 
uncertainty arose from the disagreements between the government and the 
commander of the republic of Fiji military Forces. 
Fiji’s 2006 general election was the tenth since independence in 1970. During 
that 36-year period, the country experienced three coups and two changes of 
the constitution. nevertheless, the formation of the Fiji labour party (Flp) in 
1985 was seen by many as the beginning of a move towards more issue- and 
ideology-based, rather than race-based, political competition. However, the 
2006 election appeared, at first sight, to produce a very ethnically polarized 
result: the two major parties, the SDl and the Flp, defeated moderate political 
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parties trying to establish a position in the middle ground of Fiji’s politics. Yet, 
on further examination – and in keeping with the median voter theory advanced 
by political scientists and political economists – both the SDl and Flp tried 
during the 2006 campaign to move their policies towards the political centre 
in order to capture floating voters, and gain votes at the expense of the other 
major party. in the process, they ended up with very similar policies on key 
issues and avoided advocating controversial and extreme positions. 
the first section of this chapter provides an introduction to median voter 
theory, and the second section provides an extensive study of the positions of 
the major political parties with regard to economic policies, land, affirmative 
action, poverty and sugar industry reforms. the third section compares the 
manifestos of the two largest parties, the SDl and the Flp, at the 2006 and 
2001 elections. the final section discusses the implications of the median 
voter-based analysis for the understanding of contemporary Fiji politics and 
the challenges facing the new multiparty government.
The political economy of party orientation towards the  
median voter
political economy models assume that voters see governments as vehicles for 
maximizing the voters’ self-interest. people want public goods to be provided 
to them in an efficient manner, and this influences voting patterns. However, 
it is not possible to always achieve unanimity when making decisions about 
the allocation of public goods and, hence, the majority vote rule is often the 
best way to arrive at political decisions. 
While it is often argued that the median voter model is too simple to reflect 
real political settings, it does provide a useful way to analyze voter, candidate, 
and political party behaviour. the model has been accepted as the simplest 
possible model of majoritarian decision-making. congleton goes further and 
argues that: 
…the median voter’s age, sex, income, information, ideology and expectations should all 
be systematically affecting public policy.to the extent that these predictions are largely 
borne out by empirical research, the median voter model can be regarded not only as a 
convenient method of discussing majoritarian politics and a fruitful engine of analysis, 
but also a fundamental property of democracy.2
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the origins of the median voter model can be traced to the work of economist 
Hotelling3, but more specifically to Black4 and to Downs’5 extension of the 
model to representative democracy. Downs postulated that a vote-maximizing 
politician or political party is likely to adopt the position of the median voter. 
the median voters’ preferences are the middle of the distribution of different 
preferential positions. this can be explained more clearly using Figure 11.1.
Figure 11.1 shows a possible distribution of the preferences of voters. For 
this explanation we assume that there were only two major political parties 
standing in the 2006 election. Suppose that candidate X adopts the position 
of the median voter, and candidate Y adopts a position located to the right of 
X. Because X is the median voter, by definition, 50 percent of the voters lie to 
his or her left. candidate X will be expected to win all these votes as well as 
some of the votes between X and Y. X must therefore receive the majority. the 
only way Y could outvote X is to move as close as possible to the position of 
the median voter. therefore, in a two-party election, rational vote-maximizing 
candidates will try to move to the position of the median voter.
this model assumes that political parties with very different ideological 
positions will, for the purpose of winning elections, move towards the centre and 
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moderate their policies towards the centre-left or centre-right. the experiences 
of countries with two major political parties indicate that third parties with 
positions far away from the ‘centre’ do not fare well.
there are caveats to the median voter theory. First, outcomes may be affected 
by strong ideological positions and the leadership styles and personalities of 
candidates, rather than issues. Further, the fact that not everyone chooses to 
vote may influence outcomes, and, finally, there may be more than two parties. 
Despite these qualifications, the median voter theory offers a useful way of 
analyzing the behaviour of political parties and candidates. empirical evidence 
also supports the claim that median voter theory can help explain the policies 
of political parties and candidates.6
Party policies at the 2006 election
this section provides an analysis of the main policies in the election manifestos 
of the major parties in the 2006 election. Some of the policies had the potential 
to create controversy and disagreement. However, many of the policies of 
the two major parties converged in the run-up to the 2006 poll. During the 
campaign, the differences in the manifestos of the SDl and the Flp were 
minimal. Both prime minister Qarase and Hon. Krishna Datt, minister of 
labour, conceded after the election that there was about 80 per cent convergence 
of the policies of the two parties. 
the Flp was launched in 1985 on a strong socialist-oriented economic 
and social policy agenda. it was formed against the backdrop of deteriorating 
economic conditions in the early 1980s. in 1984, the Alliance government, led 
by ratu Sir Kamisese mara, had imposed a civil service wage freeze to curb the 
increasing government expenditure. However, within a short period of time the 
ideological position of the Flp came under scrutiny after it joined forces with 
the centre-right national Federation party (nFp) to fight the 1987 election. 
After its formation in 1985, the labour party had alleged that the nFp was 
supporting the wage freeze and that it was also looking after the interests of 
business. For political expediency and electoral gain, the Flp and nFp were 
quick to join hands to defeat the Alliance party. 
many observers of Fiji’s general elections have attributed results to voting on 
racial lines.7 However, the median voter theory suggests that the voting patterns 
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may also have been affected by differences in policies. the mainly ethnic Fijian 
political parties in office since independence in 1970 took a conservative approach 
to economic policy and emphasized affirmative action policies biased in favour 
of the indigenous Fijians. on the other hand, the mainly indian political parties 
and their leaders historically had the support of the indo-Fijian farmers, and 
many of their economic policies have derived from approaches to subsidies given 
to sugar farmers. the mainly indo-Fijian political parties also had the support of 
the trade unions, and thus their economic policies reflected socialist approaches, 
such as more state involvement in the delivery of basic services. it can therefore 
be argued that voting in Fiji does not have an overwhelming racial overtone, but 
instead is embedded in the historical perception of economic policies propagated 
by indo-Fijian and Fijian political leaders. 
perceptions of the economic policy agenda of Fijian and indo-Fijian leaders 
have created fear about Fijian dispossession of land. this is one area where indo-
Fijian leaders have taken a conservative approach. in the late 1960s, the leader of 
the nFp, A.D. patel, advocated the adoption of common roll voting. this was 
seen by Fijian leaders as an attempt to secure indian control over government in 
order to legislate individual rights to land, in place of the prevailing communal 
ownership of the bulk of Fiji’s land area. Some feared complete alienation of 
native land through ownership by non-Fijians. to maximize their share of the 
ethnic Fijian vote, Fijian politicians have often exploited this fear.
Economic policies
in the two-party systems that characterize many countries, differences in 
economic policies have narrowed significantly over the past 25 years. With 
the thatcherism of the late 1970s and reaganomics of the 1980s, and the 
broad acceptance of the Washington consensus, many political parties in 
developing countries have closely followed the advice provided by international 
organizations such as the international monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.8 this is also true for Fiji. Both the major parties in the 2006 general 
election adopted centre-right economic policies. Both the SDl and the 
Flp recognized the increasing global economic integration and the need to 
adopt macroeconomic and microeconomic policies that support market-led 
growth. the Flp reversed earlier policy stances and supported privatization of 
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public enterprises, including, to the surprise of many political commentators, 
the privatization of the water supply department. it also supported more 
competition in the telecommunications sector. the SDl took inspiration from 
the policies of the 1999–2000 labour-led people’s coalition government and 
abolished value added tax (VAt) on essential food items. its manifesto for the 
2006 poll placed the emphasis on poverty reduction.
the Flp proposed a target of 6 per cent growth annually to cater for the 
15,000 school-leavers entering the workforce every year. recognizing that 
investor confidence and prudent governance is integral to the successful 
realization of this target, the Flp proposed to (i) develop special economic 
zones for industries; (ii) establish a venture capital fund to stimulate small-
medium business; (iii) dismantle monopolies; (iv) keep bank charges/fees 
under surveillance; (v) invest in technical/vocational education; (vi) revitalize 
the sugar and garment industries; and (vii) promote rural development and 
sustainable development of natural resources. 
the national Alliance party (nAp) wanted to encourage more value added-
focused  manufacturing industries and the expansion of export capacity. land 
for agricultural development was to be made available through negotiations 
with landowners. it also advocated greater government input into developing 
necessary infrastructure, and the promotion of non-discriminatory education 
and training systems for the country’s work force needs. 
the national Federation party (nFp) proposed to provide a better business 
environment through targeting monopolies and putting in place policies to 
increase competition. it also proposed increasing government spending on 
infrastructure.
the SDl wanted a strengthening of ties with new trading partners (eg. 
china and india) to encourage additional investment and to expand the tourism 
industry. it proposed the establishment of a temporary seasonal worker scheme 
with Australia and new Zealand, to generate increased remittances. 
the united peoples party (upp) emphasized stability and investor confidence 
as key ingredients to improve the chances of success of policies aimed at 
achieving economic growth.
the setting out of broad economic policies in party manifestos is likely 
to continue. there is also likely to be more focus on reducing the size of the 
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government and putting in place economic infrastructure to support market-
led growth. the increasing emphasis on export promotion as one means of 
achieving higher rates of economic growth is also likely to be a major focus of 
future political party campaigns. 
Land policies
the most sensitive issue for the parties in the run-up to the 2006 election was 
native land leases. the Flp was not concerned so much about the leasing of 
additional land, as about securing a land tenure system that provided long-term 
security for the tenants and was mutually beneficial to tenants and landowners. 
the Flp was also concerned about the vast tracts of protected land that were 
lying idle, and wanted to open these up for productive use. in its manifesto, 
the Flp avoided mention of the Agricultural landlord and tenants Act (AltA) 
and the native lands trust Act (nltA). it obviously chose not to get into 
controversy over the AltA and nltA debate during the election.
the nAp and the nFp had similar land policies. they suggested the concept 
of a ‘master lease’ whereby the government would lease land from the native 
land trust Board and sublease this to tenants. Both parties proposed that 
landowners be encouraged to be more proactive in allowing their land to be 
leased.9 
in its 2006 election manifesto, the SDl party maintained its long-standing 
position that all native leases should be issued under the nltA. the SDl 
government had introduced a proposal in november 2005 to provide 50-year 
leases for farmers and more income for landowners.10 the proposal included 
the following:
• all agricultural leases to be issued under nltA rather than AltA (as per 
the wishes of the Great council of chiefs)
• on the consent of the landowners the lease duration to be 50 years
• if the landowners would not agree to 50-year leases, then shorter leases 
would be offered but they would not be shorter than 20 years
• leases would be renewable subject to the consent of the landowners
• decisions on the renewal of leases would be made two to four years before 
expiry of 50-year leases and three years before expiry for shorter-term 
leases
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• rents under the new arrangement would be a flat 10 per cent of the 
unimproved capital Value (ucV) of the land
• the new leasing arrangements under nltA would have fair and equitable 
arrangements for compensation, both for farmers and the landowners.
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) party, which fielded only one 
candidate, supported the overarching principles of nltA and laid emphasis 
on the inclusion of landowners in the decision-making process as regards to 
the development of land for cultivation. the upp did not share the view that 
landowners needed to give up more of their land for leasing to others. instead, it 
argued that settlement of the land issue required a fair and just rental mechanism 
from which both landowners and tenants would benefit.
the Flp and SDl would need to work together to change the AltA, because 
any amendments to, or replacement of, this legislation requires a two-thirds 
majority in parliament. However, the SDl and Flp have extreme positions on 
how to resolve the land lease impasse. During the 2001–2006 SDl government, 
the Flp maintained that AltA should be retained, while the SDl wanted 
all native agricultural leases to be issued under nltA. the formation of the 
multiparty government provides some hope for convergence towards the middle 
ground on this issue. the proposal for government to lease land from nltB 
under a master lease under nltA and sublease it to the tenants under a new 
arrangement may be the best option to resolve this long-standing issue.11 
Affirmative action policies
the affirmative action policies of the previous SDl government were a 
contentious issue between the SDl and the Flp. Both held strong positions, 
in tune with the expectations of their respective ethnic voter bases. the Flp 
strongly rejected the blueprint for affirmative action because it was based on race 
rather than on needs or circumstances, and thus discriminated against minority 
communities.12 the nApF’s position was more in tune with the Flp and nFp 
positions; it urged the need for affirmative action on the basis of needs rather 
than race. nApF said that it would devise its own non-race-based affirmative 
action program. the nFp believed that there was a need for affirmative action 
policies as enshrined in the constitution (that is, irrespective of race), but that 
the policies should not create a ‘handout culture’ amongst recipients. they 
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contended that affirmative action should be implemented to eradicate racial 
disparities in all sectors and not exacerbate them. 
the SDl party had put forward the Blueprint for Affirmative Action in 2001, 
believing that affirmative action was both just and long overdue, and that it was 
in the national interest because it would achieve equality of opportunity and 
overcome the burden of poverty.13 the upp rejected the blueprint in its current 
form because government had failed to deliver on its promises. Assistance had 
not been given to those who genuinely deserved it and 75 per cent of assigned 
funds had been lost or wasted in administrative costs, red tape, and blockages. 
the blueprint needed to be seriously overhauled and the upp proposed to 
establish a similar program for all citizens. 
Poverty issues
in its election campaign, the Flp said that about half the population of Fiji 
lived below the poverty line or were at risk of being in poverty. the Flp urged 
a ‘fair’ wage rate (the lack of which was, in the party’s view, one of the major 
causes of poverty), and provision of special health, housing, education, and 
affirmative action schemes for the poor. the Flp also proposed the introduction 
of a pension scheme for those over 60 years of age without income support; a 
national health insurance scheme for the poor; an increase in the social welfare 
budget; state housing allocations for the poor; control of prices of essential 
food items; and help to set up cottage industries and microfinance schemes 
for the poor. 
the nAp offered four solutions to poverty: food banks for the destitute; 
education funds for the poor; more exemptions from VAt; and subsidies 
for landowners for the use of their land. the nFp proposed to place greater 
importance on microfinance schemes; attract greater investment; introduce 
tax-free zones in neglected areas; stop the rural–urban drift by resolving the 
land lease problems; provide affordable housing; and double the family and 
destitute allowances. 
the SDl philosophy and strategy for poverty reduction was portrayed as 
one that would reduce poverty in all its forms. the party’s benchmark was the 
2002–2003 Household income and expenditure Survey (HieS), its analysis of 
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which suggested that basic needs poverty affected 28 per cent of the population. 
However, this analysis has not been made public and other preliminary 
investigations have suggested that poverty may be at a much higher level. 
the upp described the level of poverty as alarming and offered three broad 
solutions: (i) employment creation, tax free incentives, and subsidies on freight 
cost for companies that set up business in economically depressed areas; (ii) a 
five-year program to reduce the number of squatter homes to 5,000, and to 
improve access to health and education; and (iii) the creation of 42,000 new 
jobs over five years through various schemes. 
Sugar industry policies
in their proposal to revamp the sugar industry, the Flp emphasized the need for 
long-term land leases; maintaining cane incomes in the face of eu preferential 
tariff reductions; subsidies on farming inputs; crop rehabilitation/development; 
farming assistance for new indigenous Fijian farmers; a quality cane payment 
system;14 reducing costs of harvesting and transportation; retaining and 
upgrading the rail transport system; retaining the Sugar industry master Award; 
and reassessing the planned industry restructure.
the nAp emphasized policies to encourage more people to take up cane 
farming and wanted institutional reform in the sugar industry. it concentrated 
on the land lease issue as the prerequisite for a revival of the industry, proposed 
to abolish the 3 per cent sugar export tax and emphasized the need to adopt 
policies to increase the income of farmers. the SDl’s concerns were milling and 
farm efficiency and new economic opportunities for farmers via the Alternative 
livelihoods project. upp pointed out that survival of the industry could be 
facilitated only if all the stakeholders were involved in negotiations to resolve 
issues. it supported the sale of government shares in the Fiji Sugar corporation 
to landowners, farmers, millers, and Fiji citizens, thus giving ownership to the 
stakeholders, which in, turn would, create an environment of cooperation and 
support. At present, the government of Fiji is the major shareholder and the 
management of the FSc rests with the board of directors, appointed by the 
government.  
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2001 and 2006 manifestos of the two major parties compared
Analysis of some of the key pre-2006 election policies of the major political 
parties shows that they are broadly similar. in terms of economic policies, all 
recognized the need for higher rates of economic growth. All set out strategies 
for achieving economic growth, but most were broad statements of ‘favoured 
direction’ rather than detailed plans. Fiji’s progress in the 10 years prior to 
2006 had been held back by lack of consensus on major issues such as land, 
economic reform (including labour market reform) and civil service reform. 
the Flp, backed by unions, had a strong position on the mechanism for wages 
negotiation, and policies on corporatization and privatization. it had opposed 
privatization and reform of public enterprises in the past, but, in a striking 
reversal, it supported a much more pro-market reformist orientation in its 
public campaign in the 2006 election. 
An examination of the manifestos of the Flp and SDl in 2001 and 2006 
suggests that major political changes occurred over the intervening period. the 
2001 manifestos had been formulated at a time when Fiji was a deeply fractured 
country, marked by political instability and economic difficulties. Businesses 
were making losses, industries were collapsing, the economy had ground to a 
halt and development projects were frozen. the consequent mass migration 
had resulted in a severe brain-drain, depriving the country of much-needed 
skilled labour. there was also an enormous level of uncertainty on all fronts 
propelled by ethnic tensions, and the general atmosphere was one of great 
mistrust between ethnic groups. 
in its 2001 manifesto, the Flp reflected the objective of restoring the 
overthrown people’s coalition government. it applauded the successes of that 
government during 1999–2000 and took a highly confrontationist stance 
towards the newly formed SDl party. the SDl campaign in 2001 emphasized 
the centrality of affirmative action for indigenous Fijians, and advertisements 
in the newspapers played on the likely threat to indigenous interests (e.g. as 
regards land policies) if the labour party were to be returned to office. Both 
parties remained at loggerheads over key policies, and were firmly aligned 
with their prospective voters along racial lines. the Flp whipped up passion 
amongst the indo-Fijians and the SDl sought to do the same with indigenous 
Fijians. most minor parties aligned themselves with one or the other of the 
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larger parties, save for the nFp, which carried on dauntlessly on its platform of 
multiracialism, tolerance and non-racial politics (even though they had been 
defeated when they joined hands with SVt for the 1999 election). 
in summary, the 2001 manifestos of the two major parties had few similarities. 
the parties paid lip service to reconciliation, seeking instead to polarize the 
electorate. they were confident that their ‘own people’ would assist them to 
reach their goals of capturing the highest elected offices of the land. 
poor economic performance between 2001 and 2006, however, presented 
new challenges to both the SDl and the Flp. Both tried to take up positions 
normally associated with the other political party. the campaign rhetoric, 
however, continued to be couched in racial terms, even though the Flp tried 
to highlight the poverty issue as a major problem for indigenous Fijians. 
For the 2006 election, the two parties paid greater attention to grievances of 
the people that they each perceived had been neglected in their 2001 manifestos. 
the Flp 2006 manifesto included policies that addressed the concerns of 
Table 11.1 2001 election manifestos of SDL and FLP: similarities and 
differences on key issues
Issues Similarities Differences
land none  Starkly differing views held by the SDl and  
  Flp. each claimed that the other’s policies  
  were deeply damaging. SDl advocated  
  nltA whereas Flp advocated AltA and  
  the lands commission. the SDl took  
  the position of the landowners and  
  the Flp took the position of the tenants.
poverty none the Flp blamed the SDl and poor  
  ‘Fijian leadership’ for poverty in Fiji.  
  the SDl advocated the imposition of VAt  
  while the Flp bitterly opposed it.
Sugar Both parties conceded that the  conflicting views on the Sugar  
 industry was in dire straits. Both cane Growers’ council, the Fiji Sugar  
 parties stances towards the sugar  corporation, industry operations,  
 industry stemmed mainly from their  milling efficiency etc. compensation  
 policies on land tenure.  was also a contentious topic.
economy Both conceded that the economy  policies were based on differing  
 was depressed and that some  economic ideologies, centering on  
 reform was necessary. affirmative action (SDl-pro, Flp against).
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Table 11.2 2006 election manifestos of SDL and FLP: similarities and 
differences on key issues
Issues Similarities Differences
land considerable: the Flp ceased the attack on  marginal: the SDl shifted focus  
 SDl/nltB and adopted a more consensual  towards the farmers whilst the Flp shifted 
 approach. the SDl tried to promote a  focus towards land-owners.  
 mutually beneficial approach by paying  
 more attention to the plight of tenants  
 in the land crisis. 
poverty considerable: Both parties ceased to  Slight: the SDl believed that poverty  
 place the blame for poverty squarely  was not what the Flp claimed it to be, 
 on the other’s shoulders. Both decided  but did concede to some of the Flp’s 
 not to air their differences on the  arguments. 
 issue of VAt. there has been a concession  
 that poverty is a big problem. the SDl  
 also minimized rhetoric regarding  
 indians as the wealthier community.
Sugar Both parties maintained their  Both parties focused attention on the 
 2001 stances, but in a more moderate  pertinent issues in the industry rather 
 manner. Both believed that the industry  then blaming its shortfalls on each other. 
 was facing an uncertain future unless  they also re-aligned their positions, with 
 sweeping reforms were initiated urgently.  Flp paying attention to the difficulties faced  
  by incoming indigenous farmers and SDl  
  paying attention to the plight of evicted 
  tenants. 
economy considerable: Both parties sought to  marginal: Both parties addressed  
 rejuvenate the economy, mainly  core problems and concentrated their  
 targeting investors, private sector, manifestos on issues believed suitable  
 it, and remittances.  for winning over floating voters.
indigenous landowners and the incoming, new indigenous farmers who had 
commenced working on land left idle by evicted tenants. the SDl, on the 
other hand, focused attention on the plight of indo-Fijian evicted tenants and 
all those who had been affected by the land lease-related issues. Both parties 
concentrated on the electorate that they had previously chosen to disregard; 
that is, the Flp moved more towards indigenous Fijians and the SDl tried to 
gain the support of the indo-Fijians. Both parties also diminished the blame-
attribution game that so characterized their 2001 manifestos, when each held 
the other responsible for the economic woes of the country. 
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interestingly, both parties also sought to suppress focus on contentious 
issues, such as the debate on nltA/AltA, the native land trust Board 
and the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill during the 
campaign. there was some discussion of these issues during the campaign, but 
it lacked the venom and vigour of the 2001 campaign. the parties embarked 
upon extensive public relations exercises, and utilized the mass media in bids 
to influence voters. in particular, floating voters or those outside each party’s 
core support base were targeted. Both parties moved away from their usual 
left-wing and right-wing political positions towards seemingly more moderate, 
reasonable, and flexible platforms. this involved a removal of the focus on 
the more contentious issues and a greater emphasis on the national interest, 
particularly as regards key economic issues. 
this show of amity in the 2006 manifestos could be mistaken for more 
deeply rooted shifts in the philosophical position of the two parties, rather than 
a campaign tactic. it might be assumed to be a highly congenial shift in Fiji’s 
otherwise unstable sociopolitical climate (which is more normally characterized 
by deceit, suspicion, and racialism). unfortunately, this goes too far, and gives 
too much credence to stylistic, rather than substantial, changes of approach. 
Fundamentally, the two parties remained staunchly attached to their racially based 
ideological foundations but made leeway – for campaign purposes – in certain 
areas, hoping that this would cast them in a good light, secure positive publicity, 
and lure voters to support them. if there was something more genuine in the 
campaign-related shifts from the more normal political styles, as one must hope, 
it will depend on the success of the multiparty cabinet to make this a reality. 
Conclusion
Fiji’s 2006 election results were similar to those normally found in two-party 
situations. using the median voter theory it has been argued that, contrary to the 
popular perception that voting is always on a communal basis, perceptions about 
the respective economic and associated social policies have also determined 
voter behaviour. Historically, indo-Fijian political leaders have taken a left-
leaning approach to economic policies while indigenous Fijian leaders have 
taken a right to center-right position in terms of economic policies. However, 
in the 2006 election both the major political parties, the SDl and the Flp, 
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sought to woo floating voters amongst the indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians, 
respectively. in the process, they tried to move towards the centre of the political 
spectrum. Both tried to gain ground from the other in terms of their social and 
economic policies. As a result of this, the performance of the minor parties in 
the elections was not strong. 
Fiji’s economic performance during the period 2001–2006 was modest 
and, given the constraints on growth, neither a post-2006-election-style SDl 
government nor an Flp-style government, operating alone, would have been 
likely to improve economic performance substantially. As part of a multiparty 
cabinet, bringing both sides together, the prospects are considerably stronger. 
land has been one of the most divisive issues for Fiji. From 2001 to 2006, 
both the SDl and the Flp took extreme positions on the land issue. While 
both parties continued to debate the issue, thousands of farmers were forced 
off their farms, severely affecting both tenants and landowners and ensuring 
that incomes of both groups declined.15 
past discussion of the reform agenda has been thwarted by myths, including 
claims that weak economic growth is attributable to the smallness of markets, that 
reform would reduce jobs, and that change would inevitably be too costly and too 
painful. experiences of other small countries, such as Barbados in the caribbean 
and mauritius in the indian ocean, show that the greatest gains in efficiency, 
innovation and consumer welfare have come through promoting competition. 
the economic policies of the SDl and Flp indicate that there are few 
fundamental differences between the two parties. land and affirmative action 
policies could present some difficulties if the parties choose to take extreme 
positions. Finding the middle ground between AltA and nltA may present 
a way forward. Affirmative action policies may not present difficulties if the 
government develops them in accordance with the constitution, which provides 
for special state support based on the needs of individuals and families rather 
than on race.
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Broken promises: women and 
the 2006 Fiji election
Rae Nicholl
prior to the 2006 election, the two major political parties specifically promised 
that there would be an increase in the number of female candidates. Yet, of 
the 338 candidates they selected, only 27 (8 per cent) were women.1 this was 
a reduction of four compared with the 2001 election – and the same number 
that stood in 1999. How could there be so few women candidates when the 
parties had promised so much? 
promises to women began in 1993, when the Fiji government ‘established 
a policy to increase women’s membership of boards, committees and 
councils by 30 to 50 per cent within the following five years’.2 this policy 
initiative was followed in 1995 by Fiji’s ratification of the united nations 
convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (ceDAW). Although countries cannot be forced to comply, article 7 
of the convention requires signatory states to take ‘all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the 
country’. in particular, ceDAW refers to the right of women to vote and to 
stand for election; the right to participate in the formulation of government 
policy; and the right to participate in non-governmental organizations and 
associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.3 the 
1997 constitution also contains commitments to women, specifically in the 
Bill of rights. the constitution guarantees that ‘every person has the right to 
equality before the law’ and that ‘a person must not be unfairly discriminated 
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against, directly or indirectly, on the ground of his or her actual or supposed 
personal characteristics or circumstances, including…gender’.4 it is possible 
that the weight of expectation – engendered by government promises, ceDAW, 
and the constitution – led political parties to make some rash promises in the 
run-up to the 2006 election. 
the promises began in September 2004, when the Fiji labour party (Flp) 
announced that it had decided to set aside a significant percentage of seats for 
women in the 2006 election. A large proportion of these would be safe seats, a 
party spokesman announced, adding that gender equality was one aspect of the 
Flp’s broader commitment to human rights and social justice.5 eight months 
later, the national Alliance party (nAp) announced that it would allocate 50 
per cent of its seats to women in the next election.6 
Hopes rose further when the minister for Women, Social Welfare and 
poverty Alleviation, Adi Asenaca caucau, informed an international Women’s 
Day celebration on 8 march 2006 that, after giving the subject much thought, 
she had undergone a ‘change of mind’. After years of opposing quotas, she 
believed now that ‘quotas are the way forward, enabling women to become 
candidates’. She claimed to be in the process of making a submission to cabinet 
asking for a 30 per cent quota, which would apply to the SDl party only and 
would contain a sunset clause. there was, she admitted, no strategy for placing 
women in winnable seats.7 
Hopes were reinforced on the night before a huge rally in Suva on 17 march 
2006, when prime minister Qarase told viewers of Fiji one’s prime time 
television news that he was expecting to see a large number of female candidates 
running for his party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl). 
Women MPs
For women, the results of the election were bitter sweet: bitter, because there 
had been a reduction in women candidate numbers, but sweet because a total 
of eight women won seats in the House of representatives. this was an increase 
of three women compared with the 2001 election, but the same number as was 
elected at the 1999 election (table 12.1). 
in the 2006 election, the SDl won 36 seats, five (13.9 per cent) by women. 
the Flp won 31 seats, two of which went to women (6.5 per cent). the 
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upp won two seats, with one going to a woman (50 per cent). the two new 
independent members were men. 
the SDl consists mainly of indigenous Fijians, is both fiscally and socially 
conservative, and has close links to the methodist church of Fiji. While the 
party may appear to be an unpromising choice for career-minded women, 
it has attracted a number of female candidates. Historically, Fiji has had a 
number of influential women leaders. importantly, they have – until recently 
– either been chiefs themselves or have come from chiefly families and enjoyed 
high status among the indigenous people. Voting for such women is culturally 
acceptable.
on the other hand, the Flp, which has a large Fiji indian membership, 
does poorly in attracting women candidates. this is despite the party having 
had a woman president, jokapeci Koroi, since 1991.8 (Following the 2006 
election, Koroi was nominated by the leader of the opposition to the Senate. 
She had previously served as a Senator and vice-president of the Senate during 
the period 1999–2000 when the Flp was in power.) Koroi is one of the Flp’s 
Fijian members and, in general, women in the Fijian community are more 
likely to rise to prominence in their own right than women from the Fiji indian 
community.9 According to chandra reddy, Fiji indian women remain in a 
subordinate position because they live within a culture that ‘condemns women’s 
assertiveness as disrespectful to those with traditional power’.10 Such cultural 
norms may well inhibit women from seeking candidacies, but the paucity of 
female representatives in the Flp remains disappointing given the promises 
that the party had made to women in 2004. 
the mps forming the smallest party in the House were those elected to 
‘General’ electorates, seats set aside for representatives of citizens who do not 
Table 12.1 Fiji general elections: women candidates and members of 
parliament, 1999–2006
Year of election total number  number female  number women  percentage women  
 of seats candidates elected elected to parliament
1999 71 27 8 11.27 
2001 71 31 5 7.04 
2006 71 27 8 11.27
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belong to the other ethnic groups (Fijian, indian and rotuman). in the 2006 
election, the upp attained the feminist goal of achieving equality between 
the sexes. While it is acknowledged that the party has only two members, one 
female and one male, from a symbolic viewpoint, attaining parity is a significant 
achievement.
of the eight women elected, four were returning incumbents and four were 
new mps. the four incumbents – ro teimumu Kepa, Adi Asenaca caucau, 
nanise nagusuca and losena Salabula – had been ministers or assistant ministers 
in the previous SDl administration and went into the campaign with the 
advantage of name recognition in the electorate. 
not all four new members were well known nationally, although two of 
the women were household names. Known throughout Fiji as the ‘Hot Bread 
Queen’, the new SDl member, mere Samisoni, was contesting for the third 
time. She is a successful businesswoman – and founding owner of the Hot 
Bread Kitchen chain of bakeries. Bernadette rounds Ganilau, the new mp for 
the upp, had already achieved a high level of visibility through her broadcasting 
and other media work and her ‘larger-than-life’ personality. the other two 
new members represented the Flp. Adi Sivia Qoro was a former diplomat and 
women’s development adviser at the Secretariat of the pacific community, and 
monika raghwan, who is considerably younger than the other women mps, 
was an executive officer in a family business, raghwan construction, one of 
the largest construction companies in Fiji.
two women did not return to parliament after the election. marieta 
rigamoto, the independent member for rotuma, who had been the minister 
for information, communications and media relations, retired from politics. 
ofa Swann (Duncan), who had previously been a member of the new labour 
unity party, chose to run as an independent, and lost her seat. 
Cabinet appointments
By 24 may, the prime minister had selected his new cabinet. ro teimumu 
Kepa was reappointed minister for education, Youth and Sports, and the Flp’s 
new mp, Adi Sivia Qoro, was elevated to cabinet to become the minister for 
commerce and industry. in addition, the prime minister brought into cabinet 
a newly appointed woman senator, Adi Samanunu cakobau, as minister 
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Without portfolio in the prime minister’s office. in a controversial move, a 
man, George Shiu raj, was appointed the new minister for Women, Social 
Welfare and poverty Alleviation. 
in a new departure, the prime minister also named a number of state 
ministers, including Adi Asenaca caucau, who lost her position as minister 
for Women, Social Welfare and poverty Alleviation, and losena Salabula. 
Adi Asenaca caucau took on the position of minister of State for Housing, 
while losena Salabula, who had been an assistant minister in the previous 
administration, returned to a similar position as minister of State for the office 
of the prime minister. nanise nagusuca, who had been Assistant minister, 
culture and Heritage, was dropped from cabinet. Finally, subsequent to the 
upp becoming the official opposition, Bernadette rounds Ganilau became 
Deputy leader of the opposition.
The Senate
the term of the Senate, Fiji’s non-elected second chamber, is the same as that 
of the House of representatives and, as a consequence, new appointments are 
made after a general election. Six women (18.8 per cent) have been appointed 
to the Senate: Adi Samanunu cakobau and Adi lagamu Vuiyasawa (prime 
minister’s nominees); Adi Koila nailatikau and Adi laufitu malani (Great 
council of chiefs’ nominees); and jokapeci Koroi and lavinia padarath 
(leader of the opposition’s nominees). As four women (12.5 per cent) of the 
32 senators were appointed during the term of the 2001–2006 government, 
it is encouraging to see the increase in female presence in the Senate in the 
current government. 
Party manifestos
While party leaders made rash promises to women in public forums, the 
policies relating to female representation, as set out in their manifestos, were 
more implicit than explicit. the first manifesto to be released came from the 
SDl, which held a huge rally in Suva on 17 march 2006 designed to showcase 
both the manifesto and the party’s candidates. the glossy booklet, published 
in both Fijian and english, contained a section on women along with a raft 
of other policies. the manifesto told women that they were ‘the pillars of 
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the nation’ and ‘the backbone of our families’ and that ‘the government has 
always stressed the important part women play in the development of Fiji’. 
While acknowledging that ‘more effort is required to increase the number of 
women mps’, the manifesto made no suggestions as to how this goal would 
be achieved.11 
the Flp’s manifesto conveyed similar sentiments regarding women’s 
representation. it stressed that ‘women are equal partners with men, and should 
play a full and active role in the political, economic, cultural and social life of 
Fiji’. Further, the party noted that ‘there are still many barriers to women’s full 
participation’ and that women are ‘not adequately represented in parliament’ 
although, as with the SDl, the party provided no initiatives as to how the 
problem of equitable female representation could be resolved.12 the upp gave 
no commitment to a quota system but indicated that it would include women 
parliamentarians in cabinet and the Senate and on select committees.13
the two largest losing parties also carried policies for women in their 
manifestos. As it had promised in may 2005, the nAp proved to be the only 
major political entity suggesting a quota for women candidates – but with a 
slight twist. it appeared to be encouraging other political parties ‘to adopt a 50 
per cent target for women candidates as part of their manifestos’ but without 
committing themselves to a similar policy, although the party did promise 
to ‘create an enabling environment for women, including young women, to 
seek and advance political careers’.14 in this respect, the nAp policy had a 
resonance with the policy proposals not realized in the SDl manifesto, but 
mooted by the minister for Women, Social Welfare and poverty Alleviation, 
Adi Asenaca caucau, when she had stressed the desirability of ‘creating an 
enabling environment for women’.15 the other big loser in the election, the 
national Federation party, also promised to ‘increase representation of women 
in parliament and other private and public sector boards and institutions’, but 
failed to give any indication of how this promise was to be effected.16
Women as voters
election observers, especially those from europe, were concerned about the 
heavy daily workload of women in Fiji, especially of those living a subsistence 
lifestyle in the rural areas and outer islands, where there is often no electricity 
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or running water. they saw women, many of whom were elderly, with their 
backs bent double under huge loads of firewood, trudging along dusty roads. 
When the observers came into the villages, they found that it was the women 
who had set out fishing at midnight, who had cooked meals for all the visiting 
election officials, and who had then cleaned up afterwards before returning to 
their homes to carry on with their own household duties.17 
these same village women, including many of the very elderly, voted in what 
appeared to be large numbers, but some were illiterate and needed assistance 
with filling out their ballot papers.18 While observers could not see or hear if 
these women were being told how to vote by election officials, media reports 
suggested that family members, in particular, were grooming them to vote in a 
certain way. journalist Verenaisi raicola supported this suggestion in an article 
published in The Fiji Times on 9 may, which was part way through election 
week. entitled ‘elderly unable to cast vote’, Verenaisi raicola told the story of 
a blind and deaf 83-year-old woman, Seni,  from the remote island of Qoma 
in tailevu. According to the reporter:
Seini said her son had instructed her how to tick the Dove symbol above the line and that 
she knew that much was right because she had been reminded over and over again.19 
the symbol of the dove represented the SDl party. A day after the story 
appeared in The Fiji Times, Shamima Ali, executive Director of the Fiji Women’s 
crisis centre, told the media that she had received complaints that women in 
rural areas were being pressured by their husbands and community leaders to 
vote in a certain manner.20 
in anticipation of the ‘grooming’ problem, four of Fiji’s women’s organizations 
– fem’linKpacific, Fiji Women’s rights movement, Fiji Women’s crisis centre 
and Women’s Action for change – combined to place full-page advertisements 
in the daily newspapers on at least two occasions during the voting period. 
titled ‘no-one sees who you vote for. no-one will ever know’, the advertisement 
encouraged women to read the party manifestos; to remember what had been 
said in the campaigns; and to ask what politicians had done for the community. 
the advertisement ended by reminding women that ‘this is your choice, your 
vote – yours alone’.21 
Although it could be argued that the placement of the advertisements was 
mis-timed, to this reader it seemed clear that they were designed to alleviate 
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the pressure to vote in a certain way that some women might be placed under 
by family members. However, the reaction to the advertisements by the 
Supervisor of elections, Semesa Karavaki, was one of displeasure. According 
to pacific media Watch, the Supervisor confirmed that there would be a police 
investigation into what he described as ‘the breach of Fiji’s electoral laws that 
ban electioneering once polling has begun’.22 At the time of writing, no police 
action against the women’s organizations had begun.
As well as being voters, women played other roles in the election. the 
election cycle began with the registration of voters, a process carried out all 
over the country by teams of enumerators, people who travelled the length 
and breadth of Fiji to make sure every eligible citizen’s name appeared on the 
electoral roll. enumerators were expected to travel by foot and walk house-to-
house, often over rough and mountainous terrain. in some cases, they were 
required to travel overnight and sleep in villages. Because of racial sensitivities, 
one problem that arose during the voter registration process was the suggestion 
that more Fijians than Fiji indians were taking on the enumerator role. Some 
members of the Fiji indian population were suspicious of Fijian enumerators 
who came to their houses and felt that their enrolment details might not be 
treated with sufficient diligence. Another concern was the shortage of female 
Fiji indian enumerators, especially in rural areas where some older Fiji indian 
women were reluctant to give their personal details to men. According to the 
returning officer, northern Division, acquiring a racial – and gender – balance 
of enumerators was desirable, but it had proved difficult to maintain, and the 
necessity for enumerators to occasionally sleep away from home may have been 
a factor in the low recruitment of Fiji indian women.23
Besides being employed as enumerators, many women worked during election 
week as polling clerks, joining teams of up to 18 members (including two police 
officers). the teams were all of mixed gender, but, on the whole, the polling 
clerks were women and the presiding officers were men, although there was a 
handful of women who took on the senior roles in the polling stations and vote 
counting centres. many women voters, especially those with literacy or health 
problems, reported feeling more confident and comfortable if a woman assisted 
them. providing more senior women in leadership roles at election time would 
be another step towards making the electoral process more female-friendly.
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Action to increase women’s participation and representation 
the women’s movement in Fiji has worked for decades to improve the profile 
of women in public life, and its various organizations have produced numerous 
documents and reports on the issue.24 these publications have highlighted 
the many barriers to women’s advancement, but, as yet, there have been no 
incremental increases in the number of women elected to the Fiji parliament 
since eight women were elected in 1999. While disheartening, this stasis has not 
stopped women’s organizations from taking action to improve the situation. 
As previously discussed, four organizations jointly took out advertisements 
in the daily papers, reminding women that their vote was secret and that no 
one needed to know how they had cast their ballot. in addition to assisting 
with the advertisements, the fem’linKpacific women’s media organization 
broadcast interviews with women candidates and covered issues concerning 
the election. 
one of the well-documented barriers preventing women from campaigning 
effectively is the lack of campaign finance.25 the cost of running an effective 
campaign in Fiji can be considerable. ofa Swann (Duncan) spent two terms 
in the House of representatives (1999 and 2001) and was contesting her third 
election in 2006 as an independent candidate. She claimed that the estimated 
cost of her campaign was F$25,000 and that her main methods of fundraising 
would be hosting private parties and selling clothes.26 
political parties in many countries usually contribute a small amount to 
individual campaigns, sometimes through the production of advertisements 
featuring the party leader with the candidate, but large costs often remain to 
be absorbed by candidates. Women, generally, do not have the capacity to 
generate large sums of money, especially not in Fiji where wages and salaries are 
low. As well, women often are in no position to take out loans or mortgages. 
Feminists have understood this problem and, in some countries, financial 
assistance for women may come from organizations such as emilY’s list in 
the united States, which raises money for candidates who are members of the 
Democratic party.27
in an effort to assist women candidates in Fiji with their heavy financial 
obligations, the Fiji Women’s rights movement launched the Women in politics 
(Wip) Appeal by donating F$1,000 to start the fundraising campaign. the 
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appeal was designed to assist female candidates, irrespective of their political 
affiliation, and to mobilize women voters.28 While the time frame for the 
appeal was short, it was successful, and, on the first day of election week, the 
Fiji Women’s rights movement placed an advertisement in the press thanking 
all donors to the Wip Appeal and affirming that their ‘generous donation was 
shared equally amongst all women candidates in the 2006 elections, irrespective 
of their political party affiliations’.29 the movement also produced a leaflet 
that was inserted into the daily newspapers entitled ‘Women Ask’, which 
identified the ‘strengths and strategies proposed by political parties to address 
the concerns of women’.30
Recruiting female candidates
one reason why political parties fail in their promises to field more female 
candidates is the shortage of willing and credible women. unfortunately, 
attracting female candidates is problematic worldwide as capable women are 
not always interested in the prospect of a political career.31 Women in Fiji are 
no different. Adi Asenaca caucau noted that ‘the SDl has as much trouble as 
any other party in attracting credible candidates even though there is strong 
grass roots support in the party’. in the bid to find candidates, the SDl had 
‘not only approached chiefly women, but other women as well’.32 
if political parties really want to appear sympathetic to gender equality, they 
need to actively seek more women candidates and to allocate them safe seats, 
where they have a good chance of winning. once women are selected, parties 
must acknowledge the barriers that they face. in particular, they must help 
women candidates raise the funds to cover the costs of campaigning. 
The alternative vote and a quota system
Fiji uses the alternative vote electoral system to elect its members of parliament. 
imported from Australia, the alternative vote replaced the first-past-the-post 
voting system and has been used since the 1999 election. the alternative vote 
is a majoritarian system very similar to first-past-the-post in that both systems 
are based on single-member electorates; the principal difference is that the 
alternative vote gives electors the choice of ranking candidates in order of 
preference. in any system with single-member electorates, there is a strong 
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tendency to choose ‘safe’ candidates, who will not offend any citizens within 
the voting community. the result of this selection process tends to be a dull 
uniformity of middle-aged middle-class male candidates across all parties. 
the system does not assist those groups in society, such as women and ethnic 
minorities, who traditionally have been under-represented in parliament.33
the quickest way to bring diversity to parliament would be to abolish the 
alternative vote with its concomitant multiple communal rolls and introduce 
a proportional representation system, either the mixed-member proportional 
system used in new Zealand or the list system used in South Africa. Both these 
voting systems have been successful in bringing a critical mass of women (usually 
considered to be 30 per cent) into parliament. For instance, in 2004, women 
won 32.8 per cent of the seats in South Africa’s lower house, the national 
Assembly. in the following year, new Zealand women won 32.2 per cent of the 
seats in that country’s House of representatives.34 A critical mass is considered 
important because there is an assumption, supported by the united nations, 
that the greater the number of women in a legislature the more seriously women’s 
social, economic, legal and cultural needs will be taken.35 
one alternative to changing the electoral system could be the introduction of 
a quota system. political parties need to be encouraged to consider this option 
seriously, to look at overseas models, and to consider ways in which they could 
institute a quota within their organizations. For example, South Africa’s ruling 
party, the African national congress, has enshrined a 30 per cent quota for 
women within its constitution.36 
Another form of quota could be the use of reserved seats for women. Fijian 
constitutional lawyers could look at the new Zealand example of reserved 
seats for maori, although the difficulty of introducing a new system that asked 
citizens to complete accurately a third ballot paper (there is already one ballot 
paper for the communal roll and another for the general roll) might prove a 
disincentive in pursuing this idea.
Conclusion
Attitudinal changes will be needed if women in Fiji are to forge ahead into 
leadership roles. conservative views about women remain strong, as was 
evidenced by a recent letter to the editor in The Fiji Times. under the heading 
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‘Good leaders’, the correspondent stated that: ‘it is imperative to mention that 
we prefer a male president of Fiji. Women should be barred from holding the 
post’.37 While feminists may not have been too surprised by the correspondent’s 
misogynistic tendencies, they were dismayed and disappointed when the 
Assistant minister for culture and Heritage, nanise nagusuca, made several 
public statements that appeared to criticize the work of women’s organizations. 
in one statement, she said: 
the traditional Fijian set-up does not make mention of the woman being superior or even 
on equal standing with men. A lot of Fijian women know that they should be subservient 
to their husbands and be good mothers to their children. they should see that the home 
is well looked after and that the life of the family members is comfortable. Women’s rights 
is a western concept and shouldn’t be adopted.38
the stagnation in women’s political advancement in Fiji was apparent in 
the 2006  election. While the situation had improved over the 2001 result, 
women have yet to build on their 1999 success, when eight women were elected 
to parliament. unless mps and political parties decide on a critical review of 
the voting system and the consequent changes required to the constitution, 
or seriously consider introducing a quota system, women have little hope of 
increasing their parliamentary presence. if changes are not made, promises of 
increased representation for women will continue to be empty rhetoric and 
to be broken.
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The media and the spectre of 
the 2000 coup
Michael Field
A green prison truck pulls into the crowded alleyway behind the old government 
buildings in downtown Suva. A handful of photographers and reporters try to 
catch a glimpse of a ghost riding in the back. George Speight. Almost exactly 
to the day six years before – 19 may 2000 – accompanied by special forces 
soldiers, he had charged on to the floor of parliament and seized prime minister 
mahendra chaudhry and his government. Although he now whiles away a 
pleasant, if dull, life on nukulau as a convicted traitor, Speight’s before-election 
appearance – such as it was – had nothing to do with the balloting. rather, as a 
witness this time, Speight was part of the seemingly endless post-coup wash-up 
that Fiji and its interminable justice system just cannot throw. 
A little earlier, and across the road, a mellow Sitiveni rabuka had sat by 
a window at the Holiday inn restaurant having breakfast. He too had been 
in court, although as a defendant, facing a charge of inciting mutiny in the 
Fiji military. in earlier times, conviction on such a charge would have led to a 
firing squad; these days it is life imprisonment – but rabuka was calm. Having 
spent six weeks in india having knee replacement surgery, he was keen to talk 
about mahatma Gandhi and india’s political system. ‘minorities hold all the 
top positions in india’, he says. ‘the president is a muslim, the prime minister 
and the military chief are both Sikhs and the head of the largest political party, 
congress, is italian.’
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it could have been an odd conversation, given that, in 1986, rabuka had 
seized power to overthrow the newly elected indian-dominated government 
and was one of the founding prophets of Taukei, or indigenous rule. that it 
was not so unusual has much to do with the way in which post-independence 
Fijian political life, while obviously polarized, is still very much in the formative 
stages. History too is very compressed: the kind of events that elsewhere might 
have taken place over a century or more, in Fiji have occurred over the two 
decades since 1987. that rabuka should become an advocate of indian political 
processes is entirely natural in the context of Fiji. While racial and cultural 
divisions are mostly seismic in Fiji, with both sides well apart, refreshingly one 
also finds characters seemingly quite happy to live and partake of a multicultural 
Fiji.
At one level, it is kind of comforting: Fiji can get through these things. But 
at another, the whole air of uncertainty is distinctly destabilizing, and as Fiji 
moved into its elections in 2006, the whole sense of unfinished business created 
unease. Both rabuka and Speight were, at the candidate and party level, an 
irrelevancy; but among voters and the media covering the election they were 
ghosts to be noticed. there was, though, another coup plotter, although he does 
not see himself that way: republic of Fiji military Forces head commodore 
Voreqe Bainimarama. His view of himself as the nation’s saviour, and his refusal 
to acknowledge that his behaviour in 2000 was unconstitutional, meant that 
the 2006 election had to be conducted with an eye to what the man with the 
guns was saying and doing. Any comfort anybody might have drawn from his 
statements on good order soon evaporated under the heat of his immoderate 
and erratic behaviour. it was hard to pick what he might do.
rabuka’s first coup, 14 may 1987, was in a pre-digital age (one of the last 
big pacific events to be reported by a now forgotten machine – the telex) and 
one where the world media was content with the simple notion of a dashing 
lieutenant colonel saving his paradise nation from avaricious aliens. While the 
media were content with the glib, the regional politicians, not least rabuka 
himself, found themselves in a cul-de-sac. international opinion, which was 
given to tolerating third world coups and disorder, was heading into a new 
globalization, and in 1991 this climaxed with the Harare commonwealth 
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Declaration that was supposed to be the new benchmark for democracy. that 
host robert mugabe notoriously failed to honour the document is beside 
the point; Fiji, which actually cared about the commonwealth despite being 
treated badly by it, faced the prospect of severe isolation, on the sports field 
in places like new Zealand, in the commonwealth Games and in the wider 
social world that the commonwealth organization provides across professions 
and interests. isolation could only be avoided in the new post-Harare age with 
democracy for all citizens, not just the indigenous ones. to his credit, rabuka 
recognized the problem he had created with his coup and began to move away 
from the Taukei nightmare. this led to what was, at least for the 2006 election, 
the seminal event: the drawing up of what became the 1997 constitution by a 
former speaker, the late tomasi Vakatora, academic Brij lal and former new 
Zealand Governor General Sir paul reeves. the last, an indigenous maori, 
said soon after the report was tabled that the terms of reference the three had 
been given were ‘amongst the more significant political statements Fiji had 
made in quite a long time’.
rabuka, then prime minister, and the then opposition leader, jai ram reddy, 
accepted many of the constitutional proposals, particularly the introduction of 
open seats and the new alternative voting system, and reeves believed that what 
they came up with was the route away from communal politics.1 rabuka tabled 
the report in parliament on 10 September 1996 and on that day i wrote that 
it was ‘a poignant way of bringing to an end the indigenous dream’ that had 
ignited his coups nine years earlier. one line in the report got a lot of attention: 
‘… trying to keep a predominantly Fijian Government in office in perpetuity 
may not be the best way of securing the paramountcy of Fijian interests’.
then president ratu Sir Kamisese mara spoke to the joint session and, in 
a theme that has haunted Fijian politics since, he said traditional Fiji had a 
procedure for reconciliation. As in other polynesian cultures, the business of 
saying sorry has always been deeply ingrained and much honoured, but the 
problem with the president’s remarks was that he did not say who was meant 
to apologize to whom, and for what.
international media interest in Fiji’s constitutional debate was limited 
mostly to how rabuka would handle it – and, indeed, there was an element 
of surprise in his approach to the general election in 1999, the first under the 
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new system and one in which the key players involved in the 1987 coup were 
active participants. reddy and rabuka were in an alliance around the new 
constitution, but the result suggested both indian and indigenous voters were 
unimpressed by the coalition. in racially charged Fiji elections, such an artificial 
alliance was unacceptable to the majority, and the voters punished rabuka and 
reddy accordingly.
the scale of the Fiji labour party victory was a genuine international shock 
and the elevation of bruising trade unionist mahendra chaudhry to the top office 
quickly led to speculation on ‘the next coup’. As argued in Speight of Violence2, 
the Fiji media had a role in creating the environment that led to the 2000 
Speight coup. the rupert murdoch-owned Fiji Times, then under particularly 
intellectually barren editorial leadership, engaged in unethical, unsourced 
and frequently wrong scandal-mongering about the chaudhry government. 
chaudhry was right at the time: ‘Since taking office, my government has had 
occasion to be extremely disgusted by the antics of some elements in the media 
who have used the medium of the newspaper and television to further their 
own personal agendas to discredit the government’.
And so, as chaudhry prepared to cut the first birthday cake for his 
government on 19 may 2000, Speight and his thugs were coming through 
the front door in a bid to seize power and kill off multiculturalism. For a time 
they succeeded, although the partial success of the subsequent 2001 election, 
and the real achievement of the 2006 election, suggest the people of Fiji are 
learning.
naturally, the Speight coup – if that is what it was and many doubts still 
remain after successive treason trials – remains a defining political event for Fiji. 
But, within the context of the 2006 election, it was intriguing that the single 
most influential event was that which occurred 10 days after Speight charged 
into parliament – commodore Bainimarama’s declaration of martial law; an 
event which needs to be redefined now as a coup, and one eminently more 
successful than the hair-brained effort mounted by Speight. one casual piece 
of evidence for this occurred during the 2006 election: Speight was shipped 
over from nukulau to appear as a witness in court and only the small overseas 
media corps thought it was worth staking out. But when the commodore 
spoke, the nation was given to holding its breath.
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During the afternoon and into the evening of 29 may 2000, a series of 
events occurred that climaxed with ratu Sir Kamisese mara stepping down as 
president and commodore Bainimarama declaring martial law. the behaviour 
of those involved in this, which included rabuka and the impotent police 
chief isikia Savua, has – six years on – not been fully explained. on the face 
of it, the commodore had staged a coup of his own and, while he was no more 
successful at resolving the hostage drama at parliament than Speight, he had 
all the trappings and advantages of power – including military power. His key 
action was something he did not do – restore mr chaudhry to power. this 
single absence of action has resulted in the Fiji we see today.
Quite early in the piece, the commodore saw himself not only as the saviour 
of the nation, but also its grand director who would define its future according 
to a philosophy that was only accessible to his inner circle. it was a kind of 
military order that plays well on the poop deck. His ‘order of battle’ had him 
plucking an obscure senator and banker from lau, laisenia Qarase, and making 
him interim prime minister. it was never said explicitly, but was understood 
in those dark days of 2000, that Qarase was a caretaker, a stop-gap that would 
make long-term military rule of Fiji play well in the commonwealth (Fiji is, 
ironically, one of the few ex-colonies that cares about that faded institution) 
and amongst the neighbours. the commodore was not interested in a return 
to democracy, although he was to find out soon enough that in Wellington 
and canberra that was all they were interested in. 
Before the ‘new military order’ could be put in place, catastrophe struck, 
with a mutiny at the Queen elizabeth Barracks on 2 november 2000. eight 
men died, some tortured to death by loyal troops in what amounted to a bid 
to take out the commodore, either dead or alive. At the time, the arrival on 
the scene of rabuka, his uniform in the car and cell phone in his hand, was 
seen as little more than comedy and a media moment. He gave international 
radio interviews from the scene, gunfire crackling in the background. only later 
did allegations arise that rabuka was not the jester, but the organizer. these 
allegations were to splutter on for years, and at one point spoiled his chance 
of becoming Fiji’s uS ambassador. But he was not arrested until right in the 
middle of the 2006 election.
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international pressure for a return to democracy saw Fiji go to the polls in 
2001 and, to the chagrin of the commodore, his stand-in appointee suddenly 
formed a rag-tag party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl), and 
top-polled in the ballot. to form a government though, Qarase was obliged 
to make an alliance with those the commodore regarded as his enemy, the 
conservative Alliance that had successfully run George Speight as a candidate. 
As Speight was serving life on nukulau, he could not take his seat.
in understanding what happened in 2006, it’s important to recognize the 
biggest failing of the 2001 election process: the failure to form a multi-party 
cabinet, as required by the constitution. this, and the debilitating process of 
court action over it, was to sap Fiji in more ways than people recognized at the 
time. in the increasingly tedious and legalistic action, mahendra chaudhry 
traded off most of the goodwill he had earned as a hostage. He went from 
martyr to international bore in short order.
it was the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill and the 
commodore’s extreme reaction to it that turned Qarase’s first term in office 
into a see-sawing voyage of uncertainty. At several points, the commodore, 
plainly awash in his belief that he was the nation’s saviour, threatened to do it 
all again and remove the prime minister from office. the inability of Qarase 
to act against the commodore, who enjoyed tacit, if limited, support from 
president ratu josefa iloilo, prolonged Fiji’s political pain. rather than protect 
Fiji from the traitors and the coup-plotters, the battle between the two created 
a deep political malaise and consequently had an impact on the government’s 
ability to carry the country forward.
Another burst of activity from the commodore in early 2006, and claims that 
other senior officers were plotting against him, finally pushed the government 
to a slightly earlier than expected general election. All the ghosts of 2000 
were conspiring again: Bainimarama, like some Superman in a phone booth, 
was again ready to save the nation. As was explored in Speight of Violence, the 
military mounted an advocacy program which looked, at best, suspiciously 
hostile toward SDl. the message it offered was implicit: out of the 2000 coup 
came disorder, chaos, death and, by the way, SDl and its supporters. that the 
commodore had got things so wrong took a while to sink in, not least because 
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most of the population was smart enough to recognize that, while the military 
had helped cause the problems, their prime minister had put an end to them. 
But several factors counted against Bainimarama, not least a palpable if poorly 
documented weariness in the wider community. national saviours are good in 
their place, but not as a substitute for democracy. Bainimarama was showing 
signs of homespun megalomania.
the country moved into its immensely complicated election system, under 
the less than adequate leadership of election Supervisor Semesa Karavaki. 
in his defence, though, an outsider can readily recognize that Fiji’s poorly 
resourced voting process is always going to be a mess and of no attraction at 
all to anybody with real skills. the 2001 election under then supervisor Walter 
rigomoto was regarded much later as somewhat more successful; rigomoto, 
though, was exhausted by it all and was not interested in taking his skills onto 
the next election. Whatever Karavaki learnt in the 2006 election will mostly 
be lost to the 2011 ballot; he, too, found the process thankless.
the media approached the election in a post-coup mode, although few 
involved in the day-to-day coverage had even reported the 2000 coup, such 
is the high turnover in the domestic Fiji media. the three dailies provided a 
mishmash of stories about problems around the country, but with no coherent 
wrap. it was all tree-counting without seeing the forest. Fiji tV, other than 
providing a platform for a somewhat confused leaders debate, was given to 
providing lots of numbers but no pattern. When it came to announcing 
results during the three days of counting, they were often reluctant to break 
into programs such as Shortland Street. the real talent in election coverage this 
time around was found in radio, which seemed to have acquired a maturity 
it had not had in the coup or the last election. Stations, such as the english 
language Legend, plainly went into the election well-briefed and ready to devote 
considerable resources to the business of election coverage. the international 
media was distinctly uninterested in what was going on, and only a handful 
of the journalists – mostly representing news agencies – turned up. just one 
or two had been in Fiji for any other election, much less the coups. radio 
new Zealand established the pattern of leaning heavily on Fiji radio’s Legend, 
its solitary correspondent reduced to taping Legend. Auckland-based radio 
tarana, an Am radio station targeted at the indian community, weighed into 
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the election coverage scene with a big team, including riyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. 
Although he had been living in Auckland for two years, his long stint with Fiji 
tV’s Close Up program – including one broadcast during the coup that had 
prompted Speight’s gang to trash the television station – meant he retained 
strong local respect. the shame was that the effort was targeted at a largely 
irrelevant audience.
the 2000 coup kept breaking into the election campaign in a variety of 
ways, some of which had to do with the capacity of the Fiji and foreign media 
to keep re-spinning conspiracy yarns. it was easily done, in large part because 
of a very low institutional memory when it comes to matters Fijian. A small-
time ex-soldier, maciu navakasuasua, who, like many others, served time in 
gaol for his role in the coup, demonstrated this particular failing. Sometime 
later he got some form of religion, moved to Australia and started making 
claims about what really happened in the coup. most of it was recycled and 
had come out in the various trials earlier on, but the Fiji Sun and Australia’s 
Graham Davis of channel nine acted as if it was all startling and new. it was 
particularly centred around claims that nationalist politician iliesa Duvuloco 
had played a key role in the organization of the coup. two years after his role 
had been revealed in court, it all popped up again. it had the extraordinary 
effect of giving Duvuloco, a five-times-failed politician, a kind of status and 
mana he was simply not entitled to. He had burnt the constitution on the 
steps of parliament when it was passed, and voters in election after election 
had steadfastly dismissed his brand of nationalism. this background was not 
provided by the media covering him and so, as a result of the media’s fixation on 
short-term memory, he was elevated to some kind of anti-hero status. Happily, 
he managed to sink himself and his tiny nationalist Vanua tako lavo party 
with an appearance on Fiji tV’s candidates’ debate, chaired by richard naidu, 
when he seemed to lie in his chair almost flat, providing watchers with a view 
of his disproportionately bulky stomach. Voters were suitably unattracted.
Although the 2000 coup featured throughout the election campaign – largely 
as a result of the debate over the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and 
unity Bill and the army’s blundering efforts – during the calm week of voting 
the past was almost forgotten, until the Friday when, seemingly out of the 
blue, rabuka was arrested on mutiny charges. that he was something of a 
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relic was underscored by the way that his appearance in the Suva magistrate’s 
court was almost casual; no additional security, no anxious supporters. He just 
strolled in to be greeted, mostly by journalists. An air of conspiracy seemed 
to hang around the timing, but Fiji police commissioner Andrew Hughes, 
on the afternoon after the court appearance, quickly dispelled the notion it 
was aimed at the election. the arrest timing, he said, had more to do with the 
fact that rabuka had been in india having his knee caps replaced and had just 
come home. in the event, the arrest and court appearance proved merely to be 
a brief diversion in the election and had no obvious impact on its outcome. 
the High court trial, still to come, might well prove much more threatening, 
potentially to the commodore, whose distaste for rabuka has been evident for 
a while. it has to be recalled that, on the night Bainimarama usurped power 
from ratu mara, rabuka accompanied him. the rabuka trial could well be 
a landmine yet to explode.
the protracted vote counting – a process no country the size of Fiji should 
willingly put itself through – was a dense affair, requiring observers to constantly 
run various equations through their heads. it got too much at times, even for 
people like Qarase who, at one point, told international media it was looking 
like he might lose. only next day did he adopt a more positive demeanour 
and proclaim he had won. chaudhry, as has always been his way, did not 
concede and nor did he offer congratulations. Fijian politicians are big on 
divisiveness.
Given the record, it was hardly surprising that much of the international 
media interest in the election was built around the possibility of a coup should 
chaudhry return to power. it seemed to come as a genuine shock to discover 
that the one prospect of military action against an elected government would 
be against one led by Qarase. if one were to have taken place, it would most 
likely have occurred on 17 may, the day the commodore re-emerged in one 
last desperate bid to produce an outcome he wanted. in a country given to 
action-packed days, that was one. early that morning, Bainimarama was on 
Fiji radio’s Legend warning that the return of the SDl government did not 
‘auger well for the nation’.
Shortly after that comment, George Speight was briefly in Suva to appear 
in court and, as reporters waited, word came that Bainimarama would hold 
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a press conference in his headquarters, just behind Government House. His 
body language and his demeanour throughout the press conference manifested 
agitation, confusion and anger. Asked repeatedly to rule out martial law or 
some kind of military action against the government, he preferred to play a 
dangerous game of claiming some higher duty to order and power. Bizarrely, 
he kept saying that elections and democracy were not a numbers game; and 
yet that is precisely what they were at that point. ‘i prefer that the SDl don’t 
come into government…. We are going to fight those bills if he brings them 
up again’, the commander said. ‘take this message to the SDl party; we are 
going to fight them all the way.’
Bainimarama said that he hoped Qarase’s government would provide the 
leadership the nation deserved, but added: ‘the writing on the wall doesn’t say 
that’. it was, though, a parthian shot, as Qarase knew he had the numbers 
and an alliance ready to form government. the deals were sealed at a quickly 
called SDl caucus in a function room at jjs restaurant in downtown Suva. in 
the media huddle, Qarase was asked if he felt threatened by Bainimarama: ‘i 
don’t feel threatened by anybody, only God’.
By early afternoon he was at Government House being sworn in and, soon 
after, back at his less than grand office ready for the really big moment of the 
day. Without warning, and by way of surprise given the bitterness of 2001, 
Qarase popped out with a generous proposal for a multiparty cabinet – as 
required by the constitution.
And if Bainimarama, caught up in the last war he had fought, was not able 
to think ahead, Qarase spelled it out for him: ‘He like everybody else should 
respect the parliamentary system and parliament is the supreme power of the 
land’. the comment was endorsed by the media. the Fiji Sun commented: ‘He’s 
gone too far this time. And the commander ... now has to go the full distance. 
He has to quit’. The Fiji Times noted that the military head:
…has become a danger and threat. that danger and threat have to be removed for the sake 
of the nation. And as his employer, it is the Government’s task to do something about it 
quickly. no more pussyfooting around. the nation needs to move on.
it is too soon to believe that in the 2006 election the ‘coup era’ was buried. 
too many of the participants are still around, but it is comforting to know 
that many of them are now in their 60s, and many younger people have moved 
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beyond the crude, opportunistic use of indigenous causes for political gain. 
indeed, the defining influences for many who will be leaders at a community 
level in Fiji are today being learned on the streets of Baghdad and on the bloody 
convoys hundreds of Fijians ride each day in iraq.
the elder generation – both indian and Fijian – have failed their country in 
unseemly grabs for power over the years. What is striking in Fiji, and indeed 
across the South pacific, is the way in which politics excludes the young and 
the dynamic for the most part. politics in Fiji is about the clique, the club and 
the corrupt. the ineptitude of much of the political leadership has always been 
the sub-text for Fiji’s ‘coup politics’. the same old names every time. But 2006 
offers hints it might be different this time: new people have come in, some are 
of a different political mould, and the world has certainly changed from the 
day rabuka walked into parliament and took over. 
Qarase, who always seemed to be an incidental character in the political 
history of 1987 to 2001, has exhibited strong personal growth, and the 2006 
election has made him stronger – although paradoxically his mandate is weaker. 
the controversial ‘reconciliation Bill’ will, no doubt, finally see some legal 
light, but its biggest advocates have gone from parliament. A new order is slowly 
emerging. As Qarese said at his post-election press conference:
this election outcome is consistent with what i’ve always said, that in promoting national 
reconciliation and unity in Fiji, it is not enough and, in fact, it is totally unrealistic 
to regard society in Fiji as nothing more than a collection of individuals with equal 
basic rights and freedoms. We have to recognize that we are a society of communities 
with differences in the way they look at their security and confidence in living in Fiji. 
    the task before me and government in the next five years is to dedicate ourselves to the 
service of everyone in our nation, irrespective of their political loyalties, their ethnicities 
and cultures.
Notes
1 the joint parliamentary select committee, however, reversed the proposal for 45 open seats 
and 25 communal seats, settling instead on only 25 open seats and 46 communal seats. the 
original proposal to use the alternative vote in three-member constituencies was also dropped 
in favour of its use in 71 single-member constituencies.
2 Field, m., Baba t. & nabobo-Baba, u. 2005. Speight of Violence. reed publishing, 
Auckland.
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From marginalization to  
mainstream? Rotuma  
and the 2006 election
Kylie Jayne Anderson1
the rotuma communal seat is one of the ‘special’ privileges conferred on the 
rotuman people by the Fiji constitution. elections in 1999 and 2001 saw the 
seat contested by two candidates in each election. marieta rigamoto won on 
both occasions and was made a minister in the Fiji government; however, in 
2006, she chose not to stand for the seat, which was contested by five candidates 
(all male). the increase in candidate numbers as well as the recent attention 
given to rotuma and the community in general by prominent political parties 
in the campaign have links to broader political issues in Fiji. this chapter 
assesses the position of the rotuman community in current Fiji politics and 
raises questions about effective representation for the rotuman community 
in a Fiji parliament.
politics in Fiji usually revolves around the ‘major’ players. major political 
party manifestos tend to focus on the two majority communities, and media 
attention is ultimately focused on the major issues affecting the dominant 
populations of the country, often centralized in the capital or, at the least, the 
main islands of Viti levu and Vanua levu. For this reason, issues affecting outer 
islands and minority communities are often under-reported or pushed aside.
Fiji’s population can be divided into a number of minority groups, although 
the defining of who actually constitutes a political minority in Fiji is problematic, 
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with differing usages of the term minority and no international consensus.2 it is 
from this context that the position of minority communities within the political 
arena of Fiji can begin to be understood. Within the framework of the Fiji 
electoral system – in which the majority of seats in the House of representatives 
are decided by a communal roll system based on ethnic groupings – a minority 
community must, in electoral terms, be defined in terms of numbers and not 
power. As discussed elsewhere in this book, all eligible citizens in Fiji register 
on two electoral rolls – an open roll and a communal one. the four communal 
rolls are based on ethnic identification: 42 of the seats are allocated to ‘Fijian’ 
(23) and ‘indian’ (19) citizens, and the remaining four to voters identifying as 
either ‘rotuman’ or ‘General’ (those Fiji citizens who are ‘registered otherwise 
than as Fijians, indians or rotumans’3). the very existence of communal 
seats, and the number of seats representing between 5 and 8 per cent of the 
population4, has raised a number of questions about effective representation 
of minority communities in Fiji politics.
For the rotuman community, questions relating to the representation of 
the community in the parliament of Fiji can, arguably, be linked to broader 
questions about the status of rotuman people within the state. While much of 
the discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to recognize 
that the debate exists. As a minority group, the rotuman community is 
one of the more readily identifiable and recognized. With a population of 
approximately 10,000 throughout the Fiji islands (a minority of approximately 
2,000 living on the island of rotuma itself ) the rotuman language, culture 
and traditions (which are distinct from others in Fiji) continue to be relatively 
strong, and deliberate attempts have been made by many members of the 
community to safeguard them.5
Arguments have been made previously about the status of rotumans as 
a ‘marginalized’ minority within the Fiji population. While a number of 
notable rotumans have been high achievers academically and professionally, 
the community is sometimes overlooked in broader political decision-making. 
indeed, this political marginalization can be seen in a number of key government 
policy documents (including the ‘50/50 by 2020’ affirmative action blueprint 
in which rotumans are referred to as ‘indigenous Fijians’); in generalizations 
about the economic and other status of the community (ensuring that social and 
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economic reality for many members is not addressed); in the dismissal of the 
legitimate political concerns voiced by some members of the community; and 
in the way in which the island is treated as akin to other outer islands despite 
its ‘special status’ (the difficulty in delivering goods and services, the lack of 
development, the expense and difficulty in travel all indicative of the latter). 
it is these issues of the status of rotuma within the Fiji islands and effective 
representation (for the community as a whole and as individuals), which are 
arguably at the crux of many rotuman political arguments.6 Such arguments, 
however, are usually not aired by the media. Accordingly, contemporary 
rotuman electoral politics tends to be characterized by an image of consensus.7 
the electoral contest may not be plagued by the dramatic tensions evident 
in mainland Fiji, but the changes in the status quo of election candidacy and 
campaigning in rotuma for the 2006 election indicate that there is a need for 
further analysis of contemporary electoral politics in the community.
While past elections have seen few candidates and the absence of major 
political parties campaigning in the community, the 2006 election was different. 
What has changed? the characteristics of Fiji elections and the political arena in 
general have been altered somewhat by the events of the past decade. increasing 
attempts to have democracy settled through the legal process is one example; the 
attempts of major parties to broaden their appeal beyond ethnic stratification 
is another. it is this second change which could be construed as contributing 
to the increasing political mainstreaming of the rotuman community. 
this chapter assesses the 2006 election results vis-à-vis past elections in 
1999 and 2001. it reviews some of the key election issues for the rotuman 
community and addresses some of the continued ‘sticking points’ relating to 
the status of rotuma within Fiji.
Rotuma in the Fiji Constitution and electoral provisions
Annexed seven years after the colony of Fiji was created, rotuma has occupied 
an uncertain position within the state, and moves towards independence have 
been mooted at various times (in the late 1970s, 1988 and 2000).8 the 1988 
and 2000 moves both led to arrests and court cases, with slightly varying 
outcomes.9 the rotumans are recognised simultaneously as indigenous, but 
different from, Fijians, and their ‘uniqueness’10 has been given emphasis at 
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multiple legal and policy echelons. Such recognition is exemplified by provisions 
within the constitution of Fiji, including the presence of a designated seat for the 
rotuman community in the Senate, and the continued existence of the ‘rotuma 
communal roll’, which not only serves as recognition of the community, but also 
entitles the rotumans to one designated seat in the House of representatives.11 
the inclusion of three rotuman representatives in the Bose levu Vakaturaga, the 
body responsible for appointing the Head of State, also indicates the importance 
of rotuma as part of the broader political landscape in Fiji.
the population of rotuman voters currently stands at 5,373. of these, more 
than 4,000 live in parts of Fiji other than rotuma.12 technically, rotuman voters 
have more than one representative in parliament (as do all citizens in Fiji) by 
virtue of the dual roll system. individual voters are required to vote in both 
the communal and open constituencies. rotumans in rotuma are, accordingly, 
represented at one level by the communal member and at another by the member 
for the lau/taveuni/rotuma open seat. rotumans living in the rest of Fiji are 
also represented by their respective open roll members. the viability of the open 
seat as a source of representation for rotumans has been challenged in the past. 
in 1999, president of the rotuma independent movement Aleki Kafoa urged 
rotuman voters to boycott the elections, arguing, ‘We are now treated as sub-
class citizens, we are told that we have two seats to contest but in reality we have 
only one that is the rotuman communal constituency seat’.13
the question of representation in the open constituencies is valid when one 
realizes that, in most instances, the rotuman voters make up less than 1 per cent 
of each constituency. notable exceptions to this are in the laucala open and Suva 
city open electorates – where rotuman voters constitute 3.18 per cent and 4.61 
per cent respectively – and in the lau/taveuni/rotuma open electorate, where 
rotuman voters make up 7.65 per cent of voters (see table 14.1).
the rotuma communal roll and seat in the House of representatives has 
arguably been something of a mixed blessing for the community. While the 
communal seat secures some representation in the parliament, requests have 
been made that the number of seats reserved for rotumans be increased:
…to better represent the two communities [rotumans living on rotuma and rotumans 
living elsewhere in Fiji] because of the difficulties of travel between rotuma and Fiji and 
the wide distribution of rotumans living outside the island of rotuma.14
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Table 14.1 Rotuman voters as a percentage of the open electorates in the 2006 
election
electorate  total number  total number of  rotumans as a percentage 
   of voters rotuman voters of the electorate
tailevu north/ ovalau 17,893 58 0.32 
tailevu South/ lomaiviti 21,620 35 0.16 
nausori/naitasiri 19,977 253 1.27 
nasinu/rewa 21,273 162 0.76 
cunningham 24,087 380 1.58 
laucala  19,774 629 3.18 
Samabula/tamavua 17,137 384 2.24 
Suva city  15,206 701 4.61 
lami  17,815 253 1.42 
lomaivuna/namosi/Kaduva 19,819 87 0.44 
ra  19,670 15 0.08 
tavua  15,996 198 1.24 
Ba  20,759 38 0.18 
magodro  19,911 6 0.30 
lautoka city 19,084 249 1.30 
Vuda  20,275 143 0.71 
nadi  23,658 248 1.05 
Yasawa/nawaka 20,002 15 0.07 
nadroga  18,590 47 0.25 
Serua/navosa 22,642 107 0.47 
Bua/macuata 17,925 7 0.04 
labasa  15,651 22 0.14 
macuata east 16,306 7 0.04 
cakaudrove West 17,717 36 0.20 
lau/taveuni/ rotuma 16,906 1,293 7.65 
Source: elections office (2006), unpublished roll analysis.
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Despite the specific definition in the Fiji constitution of who can be classified 
as a ‘rotuman’15 and, in the Rotuma Act, a specific definition of who is a 
member of the rotuman community,16 there are differences in identification 
between those who live on the island and those who have ‘migrated’ or were 
born and raised outside of rotuma.17 this distinction in itself is complicated 
by the fact that the majority of constituents on the rotuma communal roll 
do not actually live on rotuma. As already noted, more than 75 per cent of 
the constituency lives off the island. of these, more than 2000, more than 43 
per cent of the entire rotuman constituency, live in electorates that could be 
considered part of the greater Suva area (laucala, cunningham, Suva city, 
lami, Samabula/tamavua). Adding the voting populations of Fiji’s next two 
major urban centres – lautoka and nadi – to the equation shows that more 
than 50 per cent (2,844) of the rotuma communal constituency can be 
considered city- or urban-based. As a result, rotumans living on the island of 
rotuma are effectively minorities in both of their constituencies – making up 
only 7.65 per cent of the lau/taveuni/rotuma open constituency registered 
voters (combined with rotumans living in lau and taveuni), and less than 
one-quarter of those in the rotuma communal constituency.
this urban–rural dichotomy is not only problematic in terms of effective 
representation of all rotuman people included in this constituency. As this 
chapter demonstrates, election campaigning has also proven to be difficult, as 
many candidates seem to try to campaign ‘to the island’, rather than taking into 
account the wider rotuman diaspora across the Fiji group. in terms of national 
government, there also seems to be some misunderstanding about the role of 
the elected rotuma communal member, with some politicians assuming that 
the member is the representative of the island alone and not of the broader 
rotuman community.
Overview of past elections
in past elections, only two candidates have contested the rotuma communal 
constituency, although in 1999 Aleki Kafoa was also announced as an early 
candidate for the party of national unity (pAnu)18, but withdrew before the 
election.19 the results of the 1999 and 2001 elections were close, and a relatively 
high number of invalid votes were cast. in 1999, independent candidate marieta 
192 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
rigamoto won the rotuma communal seat by a margin of 30 votes, securing 
50.38 per cent of the vote.20 of the 4,682 ballot papers counted, 688 (more 
than 14 per cent) were deemed to be invalid. rigamoto entered the interim 
government in 2000, and was re-elected as rotuma’s communal representative 
in the 2001 election (again as an independent). this was the second election 
in which rigamoto was (ultimately) the sole candidate opposing a lio ‘on 
Famor rotuma party candidate, riamkau tiu livino, and once again winning 
by a slight majority. Again, invalid votes were quite substantial. of the 4,255 
counted, 493 (more than 11 per cent) were deemed to be invalid.
the 1999 election also gave rise to the beginnings of ‘party politics’ on 
rotuma. the lio ‘on Famor rotuma party was created that year to more 
effectively campaign for development on rotuma and to represent the collective 
rotuman people.21 candidate Kafoa pene was reported as saying ‘For too long 
rotuma has been represented in parliament by an independent candidate, 
which has denied us our democratic rights.’22 the establishment of the party 
was intended to improve the representation of rotuman interests, and a number 
of areas addressed in the party’s manifesto continue to be issues today.23 
The 2006 election
2006 saw a record number of candidates contest the rotuma communal seat. 
of the five, two stood as independents while the other three represented major 
parties within Fiji. lio ‘on Famor rotuma did not field a candidate. marieta 
rigamoto decided not to stand, her time in office not having been without its 
difficulties,24 including concern that her role as a government member prevented 
her from being a true representative of rotuma. Her contribution to the 2006 
Budget addressed rotuman issues in passing, commenting that rotuma was a 
province the public relations unit had not been able to visit.25 An August 2005 
response to the president’s address in parliament mentioned the constituency 
as item 10 of 11 items, and thanked the government for its work on the island, 
without mention of the challenges it faces.26 in contrast to 1999, all candidates 
fielded by major parties ran for the duration of the election. Sosefo Kafoa stood 
on behalf of the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl), mua ieli taukave for 
the united peoples party (upp), Sosefo Sikuri inoke for the national Alliance 
party of Fiji (nApF), while Victor Fatiaki and former Fiji High commissioner 
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to Australia, jioji Konousi Konrote, ran as independents. A record number of 
voters – 5,373 – registered and early predictions were that Konrote would win 
the seat.27 in an interview with the Fiji Daily Post before the election, Konrote 
attributed the high number of candidates to a number of factors, including 
increased political awareness, and a sign ‘…that democracy is working well on 
the island’.28 He also noted the dissatisfaction felt by many, acknowledging:
…there are a lot of dissatisfied people on the island in terms of what the government 
could have done for the island. people feel let down in the areas of shipping and in 
terms of the little that has been done to create more income-generating activities 
on the island. Freight, for instance, is out of the question so people cannot export 
their crops and because of all this the rural to urban drift is now a major problem. 
the majority of the rotuman people live off of the island.29
campaigning for the election was conducted on multiple levels. candidates 
used ‘traditional’ methods (party manifestos, interviews with the media, attendance 
at rallies, constituency visits) as well as more contemporary avenues, such as the 
internet. the noa’ia mauri rotuma website (www.rotuma.net), a long-standing 
virtual community for rotumans around the world, invited all candidates to post 
their cVs and manifestos on the website. only the two independent candidates 
(Fatiaki and Konrote) and the nApF candidate (inoke) chose to do so. While 
the manifestos of Konrote and Fatiaki were succinct (and included their cVs), 
inoke chose not to post the official manifesto of the nApF, but created his own 
manifesto of election promises tailored for the rotuman electorate.
inoke’s choice of manifesto is an interesting one that can be seen to reflect 
the overlooking of rotuma in the manifestos of the major parties. of the three 
major parties fielding candidates for the rotuma communal constituency 
(nApF, SDl and upp), only the SDl party’s manifesto included specific 
mention of the rotuman community. the party’s mission statement included 
the statement, ‘Special assistance or affirmative action to reduce the economic 
gap between Fijians and rotumans and other communities’.30 in regards to 
‘values’, the manifesto promised the party would continue to demonstrate 
‘respect for the Vanua and the cultures and traditions of the indigenous 
Fijians and rotumans’, and ‘recognition of the paramountcy of indigenous 
Fijian and rotuman interests, as proclaimed in the constitution’.31 it also 
referred to the affirmative action programs, but there were no specific promises 
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made to the island or the community outside of those offered to the rest 
of the Fiji population. in contrast, the official manifesto for the nApF (as 
opposed to the inoke rotuma version) made no specific mention of rotuma 
or rotumans.32
the overlooking of rotuma by major parties, despite their fielding of 
candidates, reflects the ongoing marginalization of rotuma within the political 
arena of Fiji. it could be argued that the key election issues for at least the past 
decade have remained the same. As with past elections, the predominant issues 
in the 2006 election for the rotuma communal constituency were linked to 
effective representation of the community collectively and development of 
the island itself. in relation to representation, both on and off the island, key 
concerns for some included the potentially conflicting role of the rotuma 
communal member as a representative of the community while also being 
a member of the government. rotuma’s legal and constitutional position in 
Fiji, infrastructure, education, the environment and health continued to be at 
the forefront of political discussion on (and off ) the island. these issues were 
reflected in the manifestos tailored for the rotuma communal constituency 
and in all candidates’ election campaigning.
of the three ‘rotuma specific’ manifestos, all raised the issue of rotuma’s 
constitutional and legal position within Fiji, although with varying emphasis. 
Fatiaki noted that the review of the rotuman lands Act needed to be ‘pursued’, 
while Konrote argued:
As rotumans, our sovereign rights as members of the indigenous community are guaranteed 
in the compact of our constitution. in this regard we should appreciate and cherish with 
pride the old adage of ‘Viti Kei rotuma’.33
later in the document, however, he stated:
i am committed to engaging the Government of the day to ensure that the interests of our 
community and our special and unique status as an indigenous ethnic group are protected 
at all times. in this regard i am equally committed to ensure that all amendments to existing 
statutes (rotuma Act, rotuma lands Act etc) are done following wide consultations, but more 
importantly changes are effected with the full endorsement of the chiefs and the people.34
the latter statement can be read as indicating that there has not been 
consensus in all of the discussions regarding these two Acts and proposed 
amendments. it was the manifesto of inoke, however, which further highlighted 
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the challenges faced by the community. inoke’s manifesto argued strongly in 
favour of change. in relation to the rotuma Act he noted that: 
[t]he law worked well when we were a colony and the central government decided what 
was good for us. We have grown up as a people and as a nation and we don’t need to be 
spoon-fed anymore.35
inoke raised the issue of autonomy for the island, suggesting in an interview 
broadcast on the Australian Broadcasting commission’s Asia pacific program that 
rotuma could be governed in a similar way to Australia’s torres Strait islands.36 He 
also challenged the rotuman lands Act, arguing that the Act ‘discriminates against 
women and children’37 and ‘goes against rotuman traditional land rights’.38 
the status of women within the community, and in general, was addressed 
by all three candidates who posted manifestos on the website (perhaps 
something of an irony given that, in contrast to in the past two elections, there 
was no female candidate contesting the seat). inoke’s observations relating to 
discrimination against women were specifically related to the rotuman lands 
Act, and Fatiaki’s concerns about women were also linked to the review of 
the Act, the latter asking for ‘the assurance that registration of all rotuman 
land will be under both maternal and paternal lineages, and that women will 
not be disenfranchised from their traditional heritage’.39 in contrast, Konrote 
did not link discrimination of women with any specific legislation, but 
concentrated on the employment sector, saying ‘…i believe that women are 
often discriminated against and are significantly under-represented at senior 
and middle-management levels in both the public and private sector.’40
issues such as transport, infrastructure and development on rotuma were key 
issues noted by all candidates in their manifestos and in other campaign aspects. 
Fatiaki’s manifesto primarily concentrated on issues of sea transport, as well as 
infrastructure, such as roads, the oinafa wharf, rotuma’s airport, electricity and 
water. inoke wrote of the environment, investment and employment. Konrote 
addressed these issues as well as the need to improve the efficiency of shipping 
and air service. At a rally held in Suva before the election, Kafoa pledged to 
improve the shipping services to rotuma (a long-standing issue) as well as deal 
with infrastructural issues such as roads and electricity.41 
on the social welfare front, Fatiaki and Konrote both addressed the issues 
of health services and education. Fatiaki was more specific about these issues, 
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outlining problems facing the rotuma hospital and secondary school. inoke 
wrote of youth and the reintroduction of sports and traditional activities. 
interestingly, given the emphasis on religion and politics in Fiji, only Fatiaki 
emphasized religion as an issue for rotuma (although Konrote’s campaign 
symbol was the image of the island imposed over a christian cross). His 
‘vision’ (as stipulated in his manifesto) declared rotumans to be ‘a God fearing 
people with respect for tradition and culture, and for one another’.42 Fatiaki 
later noted that he believed ‘… that rotuma can only prosper and progress 
if all communities work together in Fear of God…’, and advocated religious 
tolerance.43 the other candidate’s non-emphasis of religion may be due to the 
fact that, unlike mainland Fiji, where the population split between major faiths 
has been used as a source of political tension, the vast majority of rotumans 
identify with the christian faith. in the 1996 census, slightly more than 95 per 
cent identified as being of the christian faith (various denominations, although 
the majority belong to either the methodist or catholic denominations), and 
less than 1 per cent identified with Fiji’s other major faith, Hinduism.44 While 
there have been difficulties in the past between congregations of the major 
christian denominations, sectarianism has not caused overt or public political 
disputes in contemporary times.45
the decision of major parties to campaign in rotuma was also a source 
of intrigue, and became a political issue in itself. inoke traveled to rotuma, 
launching the nApF manifesto there and discussing the need to change two 
key laws – the rotuma Act and the rotuma lands Act – to assist with the 
development of the island.46 neither inoke’s visit nor the campaigns of the 
other candidates caused as much controversy as the visit by upp party leader, 
mick Beddoes, with upp candidate taukave. 
Beddoes was more vocal than the leaders of other major parties, and his 
statements and promises were reported more often than those of his party 
candidate, taukave. Beddoes was critical of the SDl government’s treatment 
of rotuma during their five years of government, as was Flp’s mahendra 
chaudhry, who accused the SDl of vote-buying.47 Beddoes was scathing in 
his attacks; reportedly ‘shocked’ by his visit to the island, he apologized for not 
having visited in the past five years (while he was the representative of minority 
communities in parliament), saying:
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Table 14.2 Outcomes in the Rotuma Communal constituency 
 1st count 2nd count 3rd count
Sosefo Kafoa SDl 526 531 
mua ieli taukave upp 532 548 566 
Sosefo Sikuri inoke  nApF 245 
Victor Fatiaki independent 1,149 1,348 1,361 
jioji Konousi Konrote independent 1,983 2,008 2,508
informal  302 
total votes  4,737 
total registered  5,373
Source: Fiji elections website, www.elections.gov.fj
…it is because i have always assumed that with the rotuma member of parliament in 
cabinet, all of the problems of rotuma get resolved and acted upon on a continuous 
basis.48
He was reported as saying that it was time that the people of rotuma:
Wake up to the lies and stop being used. What good have you realized from having a 
cabinet minister in the SDl Government over the past five years? it has been nothing 
more than a showpiece and after five years, they have nothing to show for it and certainly 
it has not benefited the people in any real and tangible way.49
While Qarase dismissed chaudhry’s comments, saying he should ‘stop 
misleading the people and concentrate on the elections’,50 Beddoes’ statements 
were taken more seriously and a press release was issued by the government. 
Branding Beddoes’ comments as ‘irresponsible politicking’,51 outgoing 
representative and minister for information, communications and media 
relations marieta rigamoto’s press release emphasized the contribution of the 
SDl government to the island and was contemptuous of Beddoes, stating:
in his fly-by-night visit for the first time in five years to the island, mr Beddoes makes 
hollow promises of “immediate” developments for the island as a vote-catching gimmick 
for his candidate. And what’s worse he has acted irresponsibly by closing his eyes to the 
visible contribution of the SDl towards the welfare of the people. 52
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2006 election results
Despite there being 5,373 registered voters, only 4,737 cast their ballots (an 88 
per cent voter turnout).53 there were fewer invalid ballots in this election (6 per 
cent) than in previous elections, perhaps a result of it being the third time that 
the system had been used or, alternatively, a sign that the election education 
campaign (conducted throughout the country prior to the elections) had been 
effective. the three major party representatives were excluded in successive 
rounds of voting. the nApF’s inoke, securing 245 of the first preference 
votes, was the first to be eliminated from the contest (see table 14.2). most of 
his votes were transferred to Victor Fatiaki. the SDl’s candidate, Kafoa, was 
the second to be eliminated, but the difference in votes between Kafoa and 
the upp’s candidate, taukave, was minor. Kafoa secured 526 first preferences, 
taukave 532. Distribution of inoke’s preferences saw Kafoa collect an additional 
five votes, ultimately gaining 531, while taukave secured an additional sixteen. 
After the distribution of Kafoa’s preferences, taukave had won 566 votes, less 
than half of the votes given to either of the independent candidates.54
Konrote, the early favourite, led at every stage of the counting process. 
He secured 1,983 (41.86 per cent) of the first preference votes, his only real 
opposition being Fatiaki with 1,149 first preference votes (24.25 per cent). 
Distribution of preferences saw Konrote with 2,008 at the second round of 
counting and Fatiaki with 1,348. ultimately, Konrote won the seat having 
secured 2,508 votes (52.94 per cent), although it is interesting to note that 500 
of these were preferences from votes originally given to the SDl. Fatiaki was 
the runner up, gaining a total of 1,361 votes (28.73 per cent).55
Konrote’s win could be attributed to a number of key differences between 
his campaign style and that of the other candidates. While all three of the 
rotuma-specific manifestos made special note of tradition and culture, only 
Konrote’s used the rotuman language to any great extent (although two 
other candidates produced flyers using the rotuman language).56 Konrote’s 
manifesto also addressed the issues of human rights, good governance, access 
and equity. His manifesto was less overtly political than those of the others, and 
his campaign style of ‘not campaigning’ stood in stark contrast to the style of 
upp’s taukave. While Fatiaki and inoke emphasized key issues on the island of 
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rotuma and for the community as a whole, Konrote’s recognized some of the 
broader and contemporary issues facing rotumans living in the urban centres 
(the majority of the constituency). 
Konrote decided to work with the government of the day and, with the SDl 
winning the majority of votes, was made minister of State in the multiparty 
government. it remains to be seen what achievements he will make during his 
time in office, but his decisive win indicates that he has substantial support from 
the rotuman people in general. With secret voting, it is virtually impossible 
to ascertain if Konrote’s support is both on and off island. many of the key 
issues facing the rotuman community, in both rotuma and in Fiji, need to be 
addressed and brought to the fore of politics in Fiji to prevent marginalization. 
the inclusion of rotuma in the political campaigning of major parties indicates 
a change for the community, and the highlighting of a number of issues by 
re-elected leader of the opposition mick Beddoes may be conducive to future 
positive developments. 
Future pathways
many of the political difficulties facing rotuma have been related to a lack of 
development, the status of rotuma in the Viti kei rotuma (Fiji and rotuma) 
relationship, challenges to effective leadership, and representation at the 
parliamentary level. on the matter of leadership, Howard and rensel, who are 
amongst the leading authorities on political developments (and other aspects) 
of rotuma, wrote in 1997:
leadership on rotuma today is…in a state of crisis. the chiefs are at a great disadvantage. 
As members of the rotuman council they are supposed to formulate policies and guide 
the development of the island, but they are not well-equipped to do so. they lack the 
education and experience required to manage an expanding economy and to make informed 
choices concerning development opportunities. they are uncomfortable with bureaucratic 
procedures and with bureaucrats who control resources. internally, they are perceived by 
most rotumans as self-interested and ineffective, lacking in moral authority.57
And yet effective leadership cannot be considered a matter only for the 
chiefs, or the council of rotuma. in terms of national government and politics, 
leadership must be viewed at multiple levels. the chiefs have their role, as do 
all of the members of the council of rotuma. the Senator appointed by the 
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president of Fiji on the advice of the council of rotuma, Dr john Fatiaki, has 
his role to play, as indeed do the three members of the Bose levu Vakaturaga. 
While it cannot be said that effective leadership or representation should be 
demonstrated by one person alone, in a democracy it is essential that the 
elected members of parliament also demonstrate their skills in this area. there 
is currently only one elected rotuman member of parliament, jioji Konrote, 
and the responsibility for effective representation of the rotuman community 
in general in the House of representatives is his. Konrote may be the member 
needed to lead the community and oversee some of the much-needed 
developments. His manifesto indicated an acute awareness of the constituency 
and his time in office (both military and diplomatic) has provided him with 
expertise that may be conducive to many of the changes needed and apparently 
desired by the community.
in response to a seemingly overt politicization of rotuma and the community, 
the introduction of this chapter raised the question ‘what has changed?’. 
in many regards, it is clear that little has changed in the past decade. the 
relationship between rotuma and Fiji retains both benefits and disadvantages. 
the presence of the single communal seat remains unsatisfactory for some, 
transport to the island is still difficult and expensive, delivery of services and 
infrastructure to the island still problematic, and the generalizations made 
about the economic, professional and academic success of the community as 
a whole encourage a tendency to overlook those members of the community 
who are at a disadvantage. While it is true that individuals and communities 
must bear some responsibility, until the issues and concerns of all members of 
the rotuman community, both urban and rural, island and other, are addressed 
and taken seriously by the government of Fiji, then it is likely that many of the 
political arguments related to the position of rotuma in the Viti kei rotuma 
relationship and the existence of one communal seat will continue. 
in some regards, these issues are related to the broader political agenda 
of the current Fiji administration in the area of reconciliation and national 
unity. rhetoric and brushing aside key issues will not serve anyone well in 
the long run. the concerns of all minority communities in Fiji must be 
addressed in the interest of national cohesiveness and stability. in terms of 
broader political arenas, democracies are now being judged not only on their 
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successful representation of the majority of the population, but also on their 
ability to consider the concerns of minorities. increasing concentration on the 
members of the minority communities in Fiji may augur well for the state’s 
image internationally while also being conducive to more political harmony 
domestically.
Notes
1 the author is grateful for the noa’ia rotuma website, at <www.rotuma.net>, for its ongoing 
documentation of political issues and other concerns/events relating to rotuma. Without this 
valuable resource, this chapter could not have been written. thank you to professor Stewart 
Firth and Dr Bruce Yeates for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Also appreciation 
and gratitude to those who read the draft, made comments and provided feedback but wish 
to remain anonymous. A final thank you to liti Vasuturaga at the Fiji election office for 
supplying the 2006 roll analysis information. 
2 Anderson, K. (nd)‘the politics of identity and recognition: the status of protection and 
promotion of ‘global minority’ culture and language in Fiji’, unpublished working paper.
3 Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, part 2: 51(a) (iv).
4 Based on Fiji census statistics. the last census was conducted in 1996 and indicated that 
42,000 belonged to neither the Fijian or indian groups. estimates made in 2005 by the Fiji 
Bureau of Statistics indicate that the number is closer to 66,560 (<http://www.statsfiji.gov.
fj/>, accessed 15 june 2006).
5 Anderson, K. and isimeli, F. (forthcoming). ‘protection and promotion of culture from 
the community level: a Suva rotuma case study’, Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary 
Fiji.
6 the noa’ia website noticeboard will provide the reader with an overview of some of the more 
critical issues and arguments. See also, Howard, A. and rensel, j. 1997. ‘rotuma’, in B. V. 
lal and t. Vakatora (eds), Fiji in Transition, Vol. 1, Fiji constitution review commission 
research papers. School of Social and economic Development, university of the South 
pacific, Suva (available online) <http://www.rotuma.net/os/howsel/28Fijiconrpt.html>.
7 A useful overview of many of the mixed opinions is provided in Howard & rensel. 1997. 
‘rotuma’.
8 prasad, j. ‘rotumans want out: islanders seek republican status’, Fiji Daily Post, 27 
january 2000, pp.1,4; Howard & rensel. 1997. ‘rotuma’; State v riogi [2001] FjHc 
61; Haa0060j.2001s, 20 August 2001, (available online) < http://paclii.org.vu/fj/cases/
FjHc/2001/61.html>; tuwere, j.. ‘Allow rotuman independence Debate, Fiji court rules’, 
The Fiji Times, 30 march 2001.
9 Howard & rensel. 1997. ‘rotuma’.
10 irava, i. 1977. ‘the emigration of rotumans to Fiji’, in c. plant (ed.), Rotuma: Split Island, 
institute of pacific Studies, university of the South pacific, Suva.
11 information on Bose levu Vakaturaga from Fiji Government website, page ‘Fijian culture & 
tradition’, <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/history_culture.shtml>. information on electoral 
and parliamentary provisions as per the Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands (1998), 
chapter 6 ‘the parliament’, part 2 (section 51, 1 a and 4), part 3 (section 64, 1 d).
202 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
12 1996 census.
13 ‘Govt sold our rights’, Fiji Daily Post, 1 April 1999 (as reproduced on noa’ia rotuma website 
<http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os.newsArchive/Archive1999/elections.html>).
14 council of rotuma. 2001. ‘Submission by the council of rotuma to the constitution review 
commission, Ahau, rotuma’, as reproduced on noa’ia mauri website, <http://www.hawaii.
edu.oceanic/rotuma/os/Forum/Forum22.htm> (accessed 27 november 2001).
15 Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, chapter 6, part 2:55:5.
16 Rotuma Act, September 1927. in 1966, as a result of ordinance 37, the term ‘rotuman 
community’ referred to ‘the indigenous inhabitants of rotuma and also any Fijian resident 
on rotuma’.
17 Howard, A.. & rensel, j. 2001. ‘Where has rotuman culture gone? And what is it doing 
there?’, Noa’ia Rotuma website, <http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os/howsel/33where.
html>, (accessed 18 march 2002) (originally published in Pacific Studies, 24(1/2): 63–88). 
18 ‘candidate changes tune, joins race’, The Fiji Times, 6 April 1999 (as reproduced on noa’ia 
rotuma website <http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os.newsArchive/Archive1999/
elections.html>).
19 ‘candidate wants boycott’, The Fiji Times, 14 April 1999 (as reproduced on noa’ia rotuma 
website <http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os.newsArchive/Archive1999/elections.
html>).
20 ‘elections 1999 results by the count’, Fiji elections website, < http://www.elections.gov.
fj/results1999/constituencies/46.html>.
21 ‘lio ‘on Famor rotuma’s plans’, Fiji Daily Post, 25 April 1999 (as reproduced online < 
http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os/newsArchive/Archive1999/elections.html>).
22 ‘Vote pene, rotuma’, Fiji Daily Post, 14 April 1999 (as reproduced online < http://www.
hawaii.edu/oceanic/rotuma/os/newsArchive/Archive1999/elections.html>).
23 lio ‘on Famor rotuma party manifesto, as reproduced in Fiji Daily Post. See, ‘lio on Famor 
rotuma’s plans’ Fiji Daily Post, 25 April 1999 (as reproduced on line <http://www.hawaii.
edu.oceanic/rotuma/os/newsArchive/Archive1999/elections.html>).
24 ‘media Freedom in Fiji Vital to good Governance’, The Fiji Times, 3 may 2006 (as reproduced 
on pireprt <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/may/05-04-ed2.htm>). 
25 rigamoto, m. 2005. ‘contribution on the 2006 Budget Address’, 15 november, <http://www.
fiji.gov.fj/publish/printer_5754.shtml>.
26 rigamoto, m. 2005. ‘response to His excellency’s the president’s Address in parliament’, 8 
August 2005, <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5135.shtml>.
27 ‘elections 2006’, Fiji Village, <http://www.fijivillage.com/elections_2006/predictions.
shtml>.
28 movono, l. ‘Konrote heeds rotuma’s call’, Fiji Daily Post, 4 may 2006.
29 movono. 2006. ‘Konrote heeds rotuma’s call’.
30 SDl manifesto, 2006.
31 SDl manifesto, 2006.
32 nApF manifesto, 2006.
33 Konrote, j. 2006. Election Platform/Constitution, as reproduced on the noaia mauri rotuma 
website
34 Konrote. 2006. Election Platform/Constitution.
203from  marginalization  to  mainstream
35 Sosefo, i. 2006. My Manifesto and Vision for Rotuma, as reproduced on the noaia mauri 
rotuma website.
36 ABc Asia pacific, 2 may 2006.
37 Sosefo. 2006. My Manifesto and Vision for Rotuma, p.6, 7
38 Sosefo. 2006. My Manifesto and Vision for Rotuma, p.7
39 Fatiaki, V. 2006. manifesto, as reproduced on the noaia mauri rotuma website
40 Konrote. 2006. Election Platform/Constitution.
41 ‘race for rotuma seat intensifies’, The Fiji Times, 30 April 2006.
42 Fatiaki. 2006. manifesto.
43 Fatiaki. 2006. manifesto.
44 ratuva, S. 2002. ‘God’s will in paradise: the politics of ethnicity and religion in Fiji’, 
Development Bulletin, 59, october (cites Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1996, unpublished figures 
for religious affiliation, Fiji national census, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva).
45 ‘Difficulties’ may be a bit of a misleading term, given that there was a veritable war between 
the two in the late 19th century. Howard, j. & Kjellgren, e. 1995. ‘martyrs, progress and 
political ambition: reexamining rotuma’s “religious wars”’, <http://www.hawaii.edu/oceanic/
rotuma/os/howsel/22religiouswars.html> (originally published in Journal of Pacific History, 
39:131–152). 
46 ‘change laws on rotuma: Sosefo’, The Fiji Times, 25 April 2006.
47 ‘call for State funds probe’, The Fiji Times, 11 April 2006; ‘Flp alleges vote buying by SDl’, 
Fijivillage.com, 10 April 2006.
48 rina, S. ‘ rotuma trip shock Beddoes’, Fiji Sun, 3 April 2006.
49 rina. 2006. ‘ rotuma trip shock Beddoes’.
50 ‘Flp alleges vote buying’ Fijivillage.com, 10 April 2006, <http://www.fijivillage.com/ 
cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi?archive=50&num=28675>.
51 Fiji government, ‘upp leader’s statement on rotuma “irreSponSiBle” – minister’, 
media release, 4 April 2006, (<http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_6511.shtml>.
52 ‘upp leader’s statement on rotuma “irreSponSiBle”’. 
53 elections office. 2006. ‘election results by the count’, elections 2006 Fiji islands website, 
<http://www.elections.gov.fj/results2006/constituencies/46.html>.
54 Fiji times election results, <http://www.fijitimes.com.fj/fijielections/seat.aspx?seatno=46>.
55 The Fiji Times, election results, <http://www.fijitimes.com.fj/fijielections/seat.aspx? 
seatno=46>.
56 Senator john Fatiaki, pers. comm. to editors, 28 october 2006.
57 Howard & rensel. 1997. ‘rotuma’.
204 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
15
Tailevu North: five years 
down the line
Anare Tuitoga
tailevu north sprang to prominence in the 2001 election as the constituency 
from where the incarcerated coup leader, George Speight, was elected as an 
mp for the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua (cAmV). He survived only 
a short time as an mp, before being dismissed for missing three consecutive 
sittings of parliament. Yet his legacy lived on. Speight’s brother became mp 
for tailevu north after a by-election in 2002. in the run-up to the 2006 polls, 
sympathies remained strong for the imprisoned coup leader and his family. the 
people of the Wainibuka region, as shown in this chapter, are bati (warriors) to 
the powerful chiefs of Bau island, and thus traditionally obliged to follow the 
Bau chiefs’ backing of the more militant fringe of Fiji politics. the dissolution 
of the cAmV helped to draw the politics of this disadvantaged province back 
into the mainstream of Fiji politics, but tailevu north remains a dissident 
province in Fiji’s political firmament. 
Background
Fiji is traditionally divided into three confederacies or matanitu: Kubuna, 
Burebasaga and tovata. Kubuna is the leading matanitu and, within it, tailevu 
is the principal province. the five vanua of Bau, nakelo, Sawakasa, Verata and 
Wainibuka make up the province of tailevu. the tailevu north constituency 
consists of the vanua of  Sawakasa, Verata and Wainibuka. Within these three 
vanua are 22 tikina makawa. (Tikina is loosely translated as ‘district’ and was 
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a colonial concept, which was introduced into the traditional Fijian structure 
to help ease administration by the colonial administrators. A tikina makawa 
is loosely translated as an old district.) Within these tikina makawa there are 
a total of 78 villages.Within the vanua of Sawakasa are the following tikina 
makawa: Dawasamu, namena, nailega, namalata and Sawakasa, whilst Verata 
consists of tai, tai Vugalei, Verata and Vugalei. naloto, nasautoka, nayavu 
and Wailevu make up the vanua of Wainibuka. 
Data on candidates for the Tailevu North Fiji Provincial 
Communal constituency
As in 2001, 71 seats were contested in the 2006 elections. in total, there 
were 17 Fijian provincial constituencies. tailevu north Fijian provincial was 
contested by laisiasa cabenalevu of the Fiji labour party (Flp), Samisoni 
tikoinasau of the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) party, and iliesa 
Duvuloco of the nationalist Vanua tako lavo party (nVtlp).1 there were 
9,682 voters listed. But there were only 8,687 ballot papers counted. of these, 
923 were invalid; thus, there were only 7,764 valid ballot papers. to gain a 
majority the successful candidate needed to secure 3,883 votes. At the end of 
counting, cabenalevu secured 312 votes (4.02 per cent), tikoinasau obtained 
6,281 (80.9 per cent) and Duvuloco 1,171 (15.08 per cent). Duvuloco had 
also contested this seat in 1999, then gaining 1,814 votes, but losing out to 
Savenaca tikoinavo, tikoinasau’s father. 
in 2006, tikoinasau was declared the elected member for the tailevu north 
Fijian provincial communal constituency. 
Success of the SDL party and its candidate 
much of tikoinasau’s success in 2006 may be attributed to the fact that he 
was the SDl candidate. Across the country, support for the SDl in Fijian 
communal constituencies was overwhelming. it secured 44.59 per cent of the 
national total and a total of 36 seats. the party had been founded in 2001 
by the then caretaker prime minister, laisenia Qarase, and absorbed most of 
the christian Democratic Alliance and other conservative groupings. it had 
the informal endorsement of the Great council of chiefs and was seen to 
be a successor to the Alliance party. the SDl has campaigned on a platform 
206 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
of economic and social advancement of the indigenous Fijians along with the 
development of other ethnic groups. it promoted Fijian interests and advocated 
that Fiji be governed by indigenous Fijians. this appealed to the indigenous voters 
everywhere, but especially in tailevu north. one of the reasons why Fijians in 
tailevu supported George Speight’s civilian takeover in may 2000 was their wish 
to see the government remain in the hands of indigenous Fijian leaders. the 
voters of tailevu north, we can safely say, are not ready to accept a non-Fijian 
as prime minister. they are not interested in a moderate manifesto, such as that 
of the national Alliance party of Fiji, with its call for multiracial government. 
As far as these voters are concerned, people of other ethnic groups are vulagi and 
should not rule in their place.2 As elsewhere, voters in tailevu were advised by 
the SDl to tick above-the-line, and to cast their ballot along party lines rather 
than for an individual. the campaign speeches that were made, advised them to 
place their ticks next to the symbol of the dove above the line. 
Yet there were local reasons, too, that explain tikoinasau’s victory. 
First, there were family ties. tailevu north was won in 1999 by Savenaca 
tokainavo, tikoinasau’s father, and in 2001 by George Speight, tikoinasau’s 
brother. the Speight name was well known in the tailevu north area, and 
the prestige accumulated by the gaoled coup leader had some bearing on 
tikoinasau’s re-election – although unlike in 2002, when he was an unknown 
person, it was not the only factor. more important than his brother in attracting 
support to him was his father, Sam Speight Snr, who has served extensively in 
the region in his capacity as the general manager of the rewa Dairy company. 
Speight Snr was also a director of the Dritabua Dairy Farm, which is owned 
by the people of naloto. 
Second, tikoinasau was the sitting member for the constituency and a 
minister in the Qarase government, factors which he said counted in his favour. 
During his four years as a sitting mp, he had been able to make a name for 
himself. He campaigned effectively, visiting the villages in his constituency, and 
using the same successful campaign team he had used in the 2002 by-election. 
part of his build-up for the 2006 election included setting up a constitution 
office in Korovou so that he would be accessible to his voters. Korovou is the 
municipality of the tailevu north constituency. 
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Map 15.1 The Tikina Makawa of Tailevu North Fijian Communal
Source: pacific institute of Advanced Studies in Development and Governance (piAS-DG) mapping 
Database, university of the South pacific, Suva.
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third, there were traditional loyalties and obligations. tikoinasau claimed 
that the traditional links between the tikina of Wainibuka and those of Verata 
and Sawakasa contributed to his victory. these tikina belong to the vanua of 
Waimaro. in Fijian history, before Bau became powerful in tailevu, Verata 
was the dominant tikina. the people of tailevu north are militant people. 
they justified their participation in the events of 2000 by stating that they 
are traditional bati to the Vunivalu na tui Kaba of Bau.3 many of the people 
of the tikina makawa of namena and Dawasamu can trace their roots back 
to the province of ra, the war cry of which is ‘ma’e na ma’e’ – which loosely 
translates as ‘they are prepared to die for what they are fighting for’. So, the 
people of this constituency rallied behind the SDl and Samisoni tikoinasau, it 
is argued, because they believed that doing so was a fulfillment of their duty as 
traditional warriors fighting to retain power in the hands of indigenous Fijian 
leaders. While traditional loyalties clearly played their part in 2006, tikoinasau’s 
interpretation may need to be qualified in the light of further research, given 
the traditional hostility shown by Verata towards Bau, which can be traced to 
Verata’s defeat as a great chiefdom in the 19th century, and which could still 
be seen in Verata’s failure to support George Speight in 2000. 
The coalition of the CAMV and the SDL
the coalition of the cAmV and the SDl was particularly important for 
tikoinasau’s electoral victory. A majority of the voters of tailevu north had 
been strong supporters of the cAmV. the cAmV had been established in 
late 2000 and early 2001 in opposition to the direction being taken by the 
Soqosoqo ni Vakuvulewa ni taukei (SVt) under the leadership of ratu inoke 
Kubuabola as the leader of the opposition in parliament. those initially involved 
in establishing the cAmV included SVt mps ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 
ratu rakuita Vakalalabure and Sireli leweniqila and, later, Senator ratu 
josefa Dimuri. lalabalavu noted that there was a lot of disagreement amongst 
the SVt parliamentarians about the manner in which parliamentary leader 
ratu inoke Kubuabola was behaving.4 He was making decisions without 
fully consulting the other members. the SVt constitution stated that the 
parliamentary caucus would meet and make a decision on any issue that was to 
be dealt with. However, Kubuabola had gone ahead and advised Government 
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House that he was available for the position of prime minister. this took place 
after the 1999 election. 
At an emergency SVt management board meeting there was a head-on 
disagreement, and the group decided to form their own party to represent Vanua 
levu. lalabalavu, in his position as tui cakau, had visited the tui macuata 
and tui Bua to solicit their support, and the chiefs of Vanua levu unanimously 
agreed with the setting up of the cAmV and to disassociate themselves from 
the SVt. the result was a gradual decline in support for the SVt in Vanua 
levu. At the official launch of the cAmV in june 2001, ratu epenisa cakobau 
was appointed the president, while ratu naiqama lalabalavu of tovata and ro 
Alivereti tuisawau of Burebasaga became the two vice presidents. What this 
meant was that the apex of the party was represented by the leading chiefly 
clans of the three confederacies to which all Fijian chiefs belong. And where 
the chiefs went so did their subjects.
tailevu north’s inclusion in the cAmV was by default rather than by 
design. the leaders of the cAmV had registered the party in labasa, the main 
urban centre in the north, but during one of their management meetings in 
Suva they received a delegation from tailevu north requesting membership 
of the cAmV party. the delegation took this step because they could not 
form a party of their own, but, nevertheless, wanted to sever ties with the 
SVt. many resented the clampdown by the military in their area that had 
followed the arrest of Speight and his supporters in 2000, and some still 
harboured rebellious sentiments. By joining the cAmV they hoped they could 
get George Speight set free, and revive his cause. lalabalavu argues that the 
cAmV was set up primarily as a political party with its own manifesto rather 
than as a rebel party.5 Yet, it was widely seen as a party for the militants, and 
attracted followers on this basis. 
When it was established, the cAmV sought to fight for the paramountcy of 
Fijian interests and advocated that the governing of Fiji remain in the hands of 
Fijians and their chiefs; in other words, that the offices of president and prime 
minister be reserved for indigenous Fijians. they also wanted the return and 
preservation of Fijian land and qoliqoli.6 this was to correct previous wrongs by way 
of legal processes. cAmV also sought the academic and economic development of 
Fijians. this appealed to the people of tailevu north, many of whom mistakenly 
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thought that by joining the cAmV their nationalistic ambitions would be fulfilled 
and their petition for George Speight’s release would be successful. 
the cakobau family, moreover, supported the cAmV. lalabalavu, again 
in his capacity of tui cakau, had paid a visit to the family of the Vunivalu of 
Bau. lalabalavu explained that he came to the family of the Vunivalu as a vasu 
– a descendant of the female line.7 As is common in Fijian culture, the vasu is 
held with high regard and, being aware of this, the members of the Vunivalu’s 
family joined forces with the tui cakau and the cAmV. As previously noted, 
the people of tailevu north are bati to the Vunivalu, so wherever the Vunivalu 
and his family go his warriors follow, as it is their traditional responsibility to 
guard and protect the Vunivalu and the members of his family.
in the 2001 election, it was too late for the SDl and cAmV to coalesce, 
as the two parties had already been registered separately. So, it was decided 
that they would contest the elections separately and then form a coalition in 
parliament. the cAmV won six seats in 2001. the Flp tried to woo support 
from the cAmV in an effort to form a government after the 2001 polls, despite 
the party being associated with the instigators of a coup against mahendra 
chaudhry’s government. lalabalavu claims that there was an offer from the 
leader of the Flp to make him prime minister and rakuita Vakalalabure the 
deputy prime minister.8 there was also the promise of amnesty. But the cAmV 
joined with the SDl instead.
in preparation for the 2006 election, at its annual general election meeting 
in February 2006, the party voted to dissolve itself and merge with its coalition 
partner, the SDl, to form the Fijian united party. it is alleged that ratu tanoa 
cakobau, as part of the merger, wrote a letter requesting that the six cAmV 
parliamentarians be endorsed unopposed as SDl candidates. But cakobau said 
that certain portions of the letter were not authentic. lalabalavu clarified that 
the cAmV had not set any conditions prior to the merger.9 
there was some dissent surrounding the deregistration of the party. Some 
rebels claimed to have been railroaded into liquidating their cherished party, and 
that this entailed an abandonment of the ideals for which they had fought hard 
during 2000. lalabalavu claimed that those within the party who opposed this 
decision did so because of self-interest. He had explained at the final cAmV 
meeting that Fiji president ratu josefa iloilo had been informed of the decision, 
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as had the chiefs of Vanua levu, naitasiri and tailevu, the areas where the party 
had most support. others condemned the merger. Some thought the decision 
unwise as it would polarize Fiji’s ethnic communities, while the military saw 
it as betrayal of the trust that it had invested in Qarase and the SDl when 
appointing him prime minister in 2000.
Constraints
two key constraints hindered full participation in the 2006 poll. one was 
the high number of invalid votes. of the 3,883 votes cast, 923 were invalid, 
a similar number to that in the 1999 election, when 958 votes were invalid. 
it seems that some voters are still not familiar with the voting system, while 
others may have deliberately invalidated their ballot papers because the person 
or party of their personal choice was not represented. 
proper voter education is needed to reduce the number of invalid votes. the 
current ‘alternative vote’ system, first used in 1999, is relatively new. Before 
that, Fiji had used the first-past-the-post, simple majority system inherited 
from the united Kingdom. the new system requires that the voters are well 
educated in order to vote correctly. it is not enough to have officials from the 
elections office visit the voters to conduct training a few months before the 
election. this should be on-going, so that the voters understand the system 
thoroughly, and the number of invalid votes is reduced.
A second constraint arose from the logistics of setting up eight polling stations 
daily. this consumed a lot of the time and effort of the different candidates. 
there were instances when tikoinasau, for example, had set up his sheds at 
the polling stations in the early hours of the morning. then, when he came 
the next day, the shed had been usurped by members of other parties. Setting 
up polling stations in tailevu north is not easy, as most of the roads are a 
challenge to the travelling public. 
Conclusion
the 2006 election saw the voters of tailevu north expressing the same 
sentiments as in 2000 and 2001. they were not ready to accept mahendra 
chaudhry as prime minister in 2000, and six years later were still not ready 
to accept a non-indigenous prime minister. the traditional links between the 
212 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
people of this constituency are important, and any politician who disregards 
this is jeopardizing his or her chances of getting voted into parliament. in 
addition to traditional links, the service that a candidate has provided to the 
people is taken into account. tikoinasau’s father had served previously in this 
constituency and this augured well for tikoinasau as he sought election for a 
second term in parliament. the support he received was overwhelming.
is there hope that the voters of tailevu north will entertain moderate 
sentiments in future elections? perhaps. But in order to accept moderate policies, 
education is necessary. this would take a long time. it must not be forgotten 
that these are a people who value their traditional links and are proud to go 
to battle on behalf of their chief as his warriors. to get them to change their 
mindset would be to alter the social and traditional fabric of their lives.
Notes
1 the nVtlp was founded in the late 1990s by a merger of Sakeasi Butadroka’s Fijian 
nationalist party and Duvuloco’s Vanua tako lavo party, and champions Fijian ethnic 
nationalism. Both leaders strongly opposed the adoption of the current constitution. Duvuloco 
calls it a betrayal of the Fijian people. the nVtlp campaigned on a platform of ‘Fiji for the 
Fijians and that their rights at all times should be preserved’.
2 Vulagi is a word used normally to refer to visitors. So those of other ethnic groups are still 
viewed as visitors though they have lived in Fiji for a long time.
3 Vunivalu na tui Kaba is the title of the paramount chief of the Kubuna confederacy.
4 personal communication, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 2006.
5 personal communication, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 2006.
6 Iqoliqoli is the traditional fishing grounds for a clan/tribe or yavusa, especially for those living 
in coastal areas.
7 personal communication, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 2006.
8 personal communication, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 2006.
9 personal communication, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 2006.
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16
Bose ni Vanua1 and democratic 
politics in Rewa
Baro Saumaki
the most intense intra-Fijian struggle of the 2006 election occurred in rewa, 
historically a dissident province in Fiji’s highly diversified political firmament. 
the contest was between independent candidate ro Filipe tuisawau and 
his aunt, Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) education minister ro 
teimumu Kepa. this was potentially a contest that defied party lines and 
threatened outcomes that diverged from broader national trends. the history 
of chiefly leadership in the province was important: following the death of ro 
lady lala mara, the wife of former president ratu Sir Kamisese mara, her sister, 
ro teimumu Kepa, had succeeded to the highest title in rewa. that succession 
had been contested by ro Filipe tuisawau, whose father had previously been a 
challenger for the roko tui Dreketi title. the 2006 electoral contest, between 
the same two contestants, was initially one for the SDl nomination. After 
losing that, ro Filipe stood as an independent, and was widely expected to 
do well within rewa. Yet, ro teimumu easily won, ro Filipe pulling up well 
short of the share of the vote required to force a second count – an outcome 
that showed just how strong party loyalties were at the 2006 election.
the rewa contest provides an intriguing study of how traditional Fijian 
leadership is shaping in the 21st century. rewa people are debating the 
importance of chiefs and the legitimacy of current chiefly political practice. 
this case study focuses on the two main issues at the forefront of Fijian 
leadership today: the duality of traditional and democratic leadership, and 
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the ethical challenges of public leadership that appear to take advantage of 
traditional means to satisfy democratic ends. in Fiji, there exists a duality of 
values, a duality of laws and a duality of leadership authority. traditional values, 
modes of authority, and custom law exist alongside democratic values, modern 
legal law and political authority. Fijians recognize their chief as the person 
who occupies the traditional leadership office; however, they cannot easily 
and appropriately blend traditional systems of authority with the democratic 
system. nayacakalou argued that ‘…a traditional Fijian leader as distinct from 
various types of modern leaders is the person who occupies the customary 
office of chief of the group and thus the chief ’s jurisdiction covers all matters 
‘vakavanua’ (matters of the land) and he has a definite right to make decision 
on behalf of the group’.2
owing to tongan intervention, rewa lost the protracted pre-cession wars 
that ended in Bau chief ratu Seru cakobau assuming ascendancy over the Fiji 
islands. With a land area of just 272 square kilometres (the smallest of Fiji’s 
provinces), the province of rewa includes the capital city of Suva and is made 
up of two parts – one including part of Suva’s hinterland to the west, and the 
other a non-contiguous area to the east, separated from the rest of rewa by 
naitasiri province. At the 1996 census, the province (including Suva) had a 
population of 101,547, making it Fiji’s third most populous province. Without 
Suva city proper, as indicated by the data shown in table 16.1, the population 
is 11,634, of which slightly over 36 per cent live in the core rewa river delta 
tikinas, 32.8 per cent in Fijian villages linked to rewa within Suva city, a little 
under 20 per cent in the territory known as ‘rewa’ tikina to the west of Suva 
and 10.6 per cent on Beqa (in the tikinas of Sawau and raviravi).3
map 16.1 shows the rewa Fiji provincial communal constituency, which 
excludes those areas of rewa province that are covered by Suva’s urban 
constituencies (although the wider provincial boundary, is also shown by the 
dotted line). Some villages within Suva are, for administrative purposes, counted 
as part of rewa province and entitled to vote on the rewa Fijian communal 
roll. Both ro teimumu and ro Filipe, for example, campaigned in the four 
villages of navukavu (Waiqanake) and in other villages along the highway 
from lami westwards, although these are officially part of the South West Fiji 
urban communal constituency. rewa ballot boxes were also present at many 
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polling stations throughout the capital city. the ‘rewa connection’ of many 
of the villages shown as part of rewa tikina to Suva’s west is a post-cession 
administrative innovation. pre-cession, some of these villages were more closely 
linked with naitasiri province.4 
For both socioeconomic and traditional reasons, rewa is a powerful province. 
it is not only the hinterland of the national capital, but also the heart of the 
Burebasaga, one of three traditional chiefly confederacies. in population 
terms, Burebasaga is the largest of the confederacies represented at Fiji’s Great 
council of chiefs.5 it covers the southeastern part of the island of Viti levu, 
stretching around the south coast to the extreme west of Viti levu. it consists 
of the provinces of rewa, nadroga, namosi, Serua, Beqa and Kadavu island off 
the coast of Suva, and parts of Ba. At the zenith of its power, in 1817, rewa’s 
territories extended through the river tribal areas as far inland as naitasiri, 40 
miles from the mouth of the river.6 lomanikoro (in rewa tikina) is the capital of 
this confederacy. the roko tui Dreketi is the paramount chief of the province 
and of the Burebasaga confederacy. this title is considered to be the second 
most senior to Bau in Fiji’s House of chiefs. the dynasty holding the title is 
Table 16.1 Selected features of Rewa Province, 2004–2005
Tikina population Households land area 
   (acres)
rewa 2,429 453 3,130 
noco 1,409 296 2,129 
Burebasaga 617 132 1,173 
Vutia 344 80 739 
toga 946 183 3,318 
Dreketi 848 185 1,316 
Suva 3,812 645 32,787 
Sawau 636 153 4,466 
raviravi 593 147 4,344 
total 11,634 2,274 53,405
note: this table shows the results of a survey conducted by the rewa provincial council during 2004–5. 
the population figures do not include those away from their villages at the time of the survey.  
Source: rewa province website, www.rewapc.com/prov_profile.aspx
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the tuisawau family. unlike some chiefly titles in other parts of the Fiji group, 
this one is not reserved for males. the present roko tui Dreketi is, as previously 
mentioned, a woman: ro teimumu Vuikaba tuisawau-Kepa, who was also the 
minister for education in the 2001–2006 Qarase government.7 
rewa is governed by a provincial council.8 the position of chair of the council 
was vacant at the time of the 2006 poll, and the council had decided not to fill 
it until the constitution was changed to allow parliamentarians to hold national 
and provincial office simultaneously: this would allow their paramount chief, 
ro teimumu Kepa, to assume the position. in the interim, pita tagicakiverata 
from Vutia, was the acting chairman. 
Historically in rewa, the democratic process through the ballot box has 
indirectly been used as a means of bolstering the traditional legitimation of 
authority. this continued to be the case in 2006, when the two prominent 
chiefs from the ruling chiefly household both vied for endorsement as the SDl 
candidate. ro Filipe was a popular choice because of his previous involvement 
with the people as a former president of the provincial rugby union. ro 
teimumu’s decision to stand was based on the claim that traditional stature 
should also acquire a political expression by way of a ministerial portfolio. She 
argued that ‘if you’re not in cabinet even if you’re not in the house of reps 
there’s no assistance in rewa, i cannot see any other way we will be able to 
help our province’.9
Before the primary election, SDl received two petitions from the vanua 
representatives supporting ro Filipe. SDl officials advised ro Filipe not to 
stand, but to await the following election. they were worried that ro teimumu 
might be defeated in the primary election. ro teimumu’s supporters argued 
that leaders of the various traditional houses (liuliu ni veibure vakaturaga) in 
rewa were effectively the SDl branch representatives, and were the rightful 
people to cast votes in the primary election rather than the ordinary leaders 
in the villages.10  on the day of the primary election, the vanua of rewa held 
a meeting in lomanikoro. During the meeting, despite a motion from the 
Vunivalu, ro jone mataitini, urging the meeting not to discuss any political 
issues, the roko tui Dreketi’s spokesperson told tikina representatives that ro 
teimumu would be their representative.11 the move to consolidate support 
behind ro teimumu was obviously backed by the SDl campaign team, which 
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emphasized that ‘A vote for ro teimumu is a vote for the Vanua of Burebasaga’, 
and that the SDl would not endorse any second party or shadow independent 
candidates. Voters were to be urged to tick ‘the dove above the line’; by doing 
so they would endorse the party’s preferred candidate, ro teimumu.12
ro Filipe tuisawau demurred and, to reinforce his case, initiated a debate that 
provides some insight into the nature of political institutions in the province. 
He argued that ‘the vanua and the chiefly system has been used many times 
to manipulate Fijians for political gain and this has confused them into not 
accepting democratic values’.13 this comment followed ro teimumu’s call for 
the ‘Bose ni Vanua’, a meeting reserved only for traditional purposes, to discuss 
pre-selection of the province’s candidate for parliament. ro Filipe suggested 
that democratic party politics should be based only on the choices exercised 
by individual voters, and that the Bose ni Vanua was a meeting only for the 
hereditary chiefs. ro Filipe argued:
…the two essentially are in conflict and when you hold a meeting to discuss political issues, 
you are undermining the integrity of the Bose ni Vanua, because they make the decision 
but then the people will have an individual vote later which might contradict the decision 
they make. it undermines the whole basis of the Bose ni Vanua, and really they shouldn’t 
be discussing political issues.14  
to probe more deeply into the background of this pre-election dispute, we 
need to revisit the earlier, succession-related differences that emerged between 
provincial factions following the passing away of the late roko tui Dreketi, ro 
lady lala mara, in july 2004. For many people in rewa, the ballot box was 
another way of resolving customary contests for chiefly leadership.
there is an age-old succession struggle within the tuisawau clan, the current 
holders of the roko tui Dreketi title. in the previous generation, it was between 
ro lady lala mara (1931–2004) and her half brother, ro mosese tuisawau 
(1926–2000). With their passing, the saga appears to be continuing between 
ro teimumu and her nephew, ro Filipe tuisawau (ro mosese’s son). the 
origins of the dispute involved questions about the legitimate inheritance of 
the title. ro George tuisawau had four children, the oldest, ro Aporosa rageci 
tuisawau, ro mosese, ro lala and the youngest, ro teimumu. ro lala and 
ro teimumu’s mother, Adi Asenaca Vosailagi, was from the chiefly Ka levu 
clan of nadroga.15 ro lala’s marriage, on 9 September 1950, to ratu mara was 
219bose  ni  vanua  and  democratic  politics  in  rewa
considered a dynastic marriage, as it united two powerful feudal families. ratu 
mara was later to become the tui lau and tui nayau (the traditional ruler of 
the lau islands), and Fiji’s long-serving post-independence prime minister. ro 
lala inherited the title of roko tui Dreketi from her father.
the dispute between the ruling families of rewa can be traced back to 
the 19th century. in 1821–22, dissension among the members of the ruling 
family – a result of the system of polygamy among the high chiefs and of 
intermarriage among the chiefly families – split rewa into hostile factions.16 
jealousies and intrigue between the children of one father with different mothers 
led to intervention by interested kingdoms and, occasionally, to war. Derrick 
argued that the tale of the disintegration of the roko tui Dreketi family was 
intimately connected to the 19th century downfall of rewa.17 the fate of the 
tuisawau dynasty (1936 – to the present) has echoed some of those earlier 
difficulties. While ro George tuisawau, who reigned for 25 years (1936–1961), 
was revered by the people of rewa, ro lala was not as popular amongst her 
people. During the 2000 coup, for example, one account has suggested that 
ro lady lala mara’s half-brother, ro mosese tuisawau:
…rode the tide of popular opposition to the mara dynasty, with the aim of having himself 
installed as roko tui Dreketi. Flyers circulated in and around Suva pointed to years of top-level 
chiefly appropriation of rent incomes derived from the Fijian Hotel, dredged up controversies 
about the relocation of the peoples of Suvavou (the traditional landowners of Suva) and made 
allegations about the spiriting away of port clearance fees and hurricane relief funds.18
rewa province has produced some of Fiji’s most influential political leaders, 
including Semesa Sikivou, tomasi Vakatora, Berenado Vunibobo and Sakeasi 
Butadroka. Sikivou graduated from new Zealand’s Auckland university, and 
went on to become the first Fijian to acquire a postgraduate degree from the 
london School of economics. He served as a member of the legislative council 
in the 1960s, and in january 1963 was one of the eight who signed the Wakaya 
letter, which affirmed the principles of Fijian paramountcy. When Fiji gained 
its independence from the united Kingdom in 1970, he was appointed Fiji’s 
first Ambassador to the united nations, serving until 1976. He re-entered 
politics in the 1980s, and served as minister for Foreign Affairs. Sikivou was 
offered a knighthood by Queen elizabeth ii, but declined it, saying that it was 
his honour to serve her without remuneration.
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in the first post-independence election, rewa became an Alliance party 
stronghold, with Sakeasi Butadroka taking the then rewa/Serua/namosi 
Fijian communal seat in 1972, with 91.2 per cent of the vote. Butadroka 
was a politician noted for his strident ethnic nationalism, but his first falling 
out with Alliance prime minister ratu mara had more to do with grievances 
about the government’s failure to assist Fijian development (and, in particular, 
his rewa provincial council Bus company). Butadroka was expelled from the 
Alliance party in 1973, after he assisted an opposing candidate in a by-election 
for the Suva east Fijian national seat.19 in october 1975, he introduced a 
parliamentary motion calling for a resolution to repatriate indians back to 
india, and for their travelling expenses and compensation for their properties 
in Fiji to be met by the British government. Butadroka founded the Fijian 
nationalist party, which took 25 per cent of the Fijian vote in the general 
election held in April 1977. Although the party won only one parliamentary 
seat, its votes were mostly at the expense of the Alliance. this allowed the 
opposition national Federation party to win 26 seats to the Alliance’s 24, 
precipitating a constitutional crisis. rewa was where Butadroka’s nationalist 
party received its strongest showing in the country.
Butadroka lost the September 1977 election, when he secured 40.2 per 
cent of the vote in comparison with new Alliance candidate tomasi Vakatora’s 
59.8 per cent. Vakatora had trained as a teacher at nasinu teachers training 
college and briefly attended ruskin college, oxford, and the london School of 
economics. He became the permanent Secretary and commissioner of labour 
in 1969, one of the very few locals to attain such distinction at that time. prior 
to his retirement from the civil service, he was permanent Secretary of Works 
and tourism. After a brief stint in the Senate he unsuccessfully contested a seat 
in the House of representatives as Alliance candidate for rewa in April 1977. 
However, after success at the September poll, he served in a range of ministries 
before being appointed Speaker of the House from 1982–1987. in the wake 
of the coups, he served in ratu mara’s interim administration, becoming 
Deputy prime minister and minister of Finance and economic Development 
in 1992. Vakatora held the rewa communal seat from September 1977 until 
the elections in 1992, when Butadroka and ro mosese tuisawau won the two 
rewa seats (Vakatora did not stand). Vakatora’s greatest achievement was as a 
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member of the 1995–96 three-person Fiji constitution review commission, 
headed by Sir paul reeves. election results over the period 1972–2001 are 
shown in table 16.2.
in the wake of the 1987 coup, a new (1990) constitution was promulgated; 
it gave rewa two seats in parliament. Butadroka had been one of the leaders of 
the 1987 taukei movement, whose agitation formed the backdrop to the two 
military coups of 1987 that deposed the elected government and severed Fiji’s 
ties to the British monarchy. otherwise, however, he operated largely on the 
political fringes, although he secured one of the rewa seats in 1992. He strongly 
opposed the adoption of the 1997 constitution, which reversed most of the 
provisions institutionalizing ethnic Fijian supremacy in the 1990 constitution. 
When parliament passed the new constitution, Butadroka publicly burned a 
copy. in 1999, he merged his party, now called the nationalist united Front party 
(nuFp), with iliesa Duvuloco’s Vanua tako lavo party to form the nationalist 
Vanua tako lavo party. the party obtained one seat at the 1999 poll, although 
Table 16.2 Election results for Rewa Fijian communal constituency, 1972–2001
Year Winner party Votes won total valid  Votes won/total valid  
    votes cast votes cast (per cent)
1972 Sakeasi Butadroka Alliance 6,263 6,868 91.2 
1977 (Apr) Sakeasi Butadroka nationalist 4,640 8,684 53.4 
1977 (Sept) tomasi r Vakatora Alliance 5,231 8,743 59.8 
1982 tomasi r Vakatora Alliance 7,492 11, 164 63.3 
1987 tomasi r Vakatora Alliance 6,002 10, 826 55.4 
1992 ro mosese tuisawau nationalist 2,288 7,498 30.5 
 Sakiasi Butadroka nationalist 2,269 7,498 30.3 
1994 Berenado Vunibobo SVt 1,955 7,122 27.5 
 Atunaisa B Druavesi SVt 1,790 7,122 25.1 
1999 timoci Q Silatolu FAp 3,100 5,193 20.5 
2001 teimumu V Kepa SDl 2,636 5,133 51.4
notes: results shown cover the rewa/Serua/namosi Fijian communal seat from 1972–1987, the two-
member rewa Fijian provincial seat in 1992 and 1994, and the single member rewa Fijian communal 
seat in 1999 and 2001. 
SVt = Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei; FAp = Fijian Association party;  SDl = Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
lewenivanua
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Butadroka himself was not elected. the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) 
emerged as the dominant ethnic Fijian party of the early 1990s, and Berenado 
Vunibobo and Atunaisa Druavesi took the rewa seats for this party in 1994. the 
switch in political allegiances from nationalist to SVt between 1992 and 1994 
was indicative of the long-run volatility of rewa politics.
nationalist sentiments brewed beneath the surface during the late 1990s. 
the rewa seat was taken in 1999 by ratu timoci Silatolu, who was a member 
of the Fijian Association party (FAp). led by navosa politician and high chief 
Adi Kuini Speed, the FAp entered the people’s coalition government with the 
labour party. Adi Kuini became deputy prime minister, while ratu Silatolu 
remained on the backbenches. When George Speight burst into Fiji’s parliament 
on 19 may 2000, the one politician who immediately joined the insurgents was 
timoci Silatolu. He was also, at one point, announced as the Speight group’s 
favoured choice for the prime ministership. ratu timoci pleaded ‘not guilty’ to 
charges associated with his role during the 2000 coup, and, as a result, received 
a much stiffer sentence than many of the other coup-instigators.
in the 2001 election, ro teimumu Kepa, for the first time, took the rewa 
seat. rewa had played an important role in the formation of the SDl prior 
to the 2001 poll, particularly as a result of the backing of tui noco, ratu 
josaia rayawa20, who later became a government nominee ito the Senate. ro 
teimumu had entered the interim cabinet formed by laisenia Qarase in july 
2000 as minister for Women, culture, and Social Welfare.21 in the August 
2001 election, she secured a 51.5 per cent majority, defeating the incarcerated 
Silatolu, who stood alongside George Speight for the newly formed conservative 
Alliance–matanitu Vanua and obtained 34.4 per cent of the vote. Another 10 
Table 16.3 The 2006 election result in Rewa 
candidate political party Votes won Votes won/votes 
    cast (per cent)
ro teimumu Kepa SDl 3,401 56.4 
ro Filipe tuisawau independent 2,371 39.3 
taniela r. Senikuta Flp 167 2.8 
Viliame V. raile independent 95 1.6 
total   6,034 100.0
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per cent of the rewa vote in 2001 was taken by the SVt, which at that time 
still had a dwindling following in the province. ro epeli mataitini, a member 
of the family of the Vunivalu of rewa, had been SVt president, and fought a 
losing battle to sustain the SVt vote in the new millennium.
in 2006, the contest was a race between ro teimumu Kepa (who won 56.4 
per cent of the vote) and ro Filipe tuisawau (39.3 per cent). the other parties 
jointly obtained only 4.4 per cent of the vote. the SVt did not stand. the 
results (see table 16.3) suggest that ro Filipe had considerable backing (despite 
lacking the official SDl nomination), and may pose a threat to ro teimumu 
in future elections. While ro Filipe had strong support in some districts within 
the rewa delta region, ro teimumu had overwhelming support in districts 
along the coast westward from Suva, on Beqa island and in the rewa villages 
within the Suva urban constituencies. the SDl’s affirmative action policies 
assisted the coastal districts, where electricity, telephones and piped water had 
been connected through the villages. the perception amongst these voters 
was that, should they vote for ro Filipe, they might be excluded from further 
assistance. the SDl campaign team had a strategic development plan used to 
court support in rewa and other provinces around Fiji. Although election-
related hostility between aunt and nephew was marked, it is notable that both 
put the Fiji labour party last on their list of preferences. 
in Fiji, chiefly power remains firmly embedded in indigenous social and 
political tradition. As shown in rewa in the 2006 poll, chiefs are able to use 
their traditional position to gain political mileage. the political endorsement of 
ro teimumu, and her achievements as minister of education, also legitimized 
her traditional position as the roko tui Dreketi. However, a growing younger, 
urbanized and educated generation is emerging, who are probably the vanguard 
of a new style of legitimate national leadership. they are not necessarily of 
chiefly status, but some are younger chiefs who have a measure of support in 
the provincial districts. the prevailing duality of political systems means that 
there is occasional conflict between traditional and democratic criteria for 
leadership. Good governance principles are essentially principles that promote 
democracy. Fijian chiefs face an ethical challenge arising from the dual legal 
and cultural systems and dual modes of authority, and some people argue 
that chiefs should concentrate solely on their traditional roles and keep out of 
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politics. When they do decide to participate in national politics, they need to 
ensure there are transparent democratic processes of selection and ensure that 
their political positions are based on meritocracy.
Notes
1 ‘State council’ or ‘traditional district meeting’.
2 nayacakalou, r. 1975. Leadership in Fiji, melbourne, oxford university press in association 
with the university of the South pacific, melbourne, p.31.
3 uncertainty about the figures arises from the fact that both the area to the west of Suva and 
one of the tikinas in the delta to the east of Suva are known as ‘rewa’ tikina. Both are included 
in the data provided in table 16.1.
4 personal communication (with editors), Sakiusa tuisolia, chief executive officer of Airports 
Fiji, 4 june 2006.
5 the Great council of chiefs comprises representatives from Fiji’s 14 provinces and the 
council of rotuma, as well as representatives nominated by the minister of Fijian Affairs and 
the president, Vice president and prime minister, as well as former prime minister Sitiveni 
rabuka who was made a ‘life member’ after the 1987 coup. 
6 Derrick, r.A. 1946. A History of Fiji, Government press, Suva, p.56.
7 ro teimumu Kepa succeeded her late sister, ro lady lala mara, Fiji’s former First lady, in 
2004. Hence, the last two holders of the title have been women. 
8 the provinces have direct input into national affairs through the Great council of chiefs 
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political parties hostile to the dominance of the eastern chiefly élite in national 
politics have regularly emerged in western Viti levu.1 most have emphasized 
the economic centrality of the west as the source of most of the country’s sugar, 
gold, timber and tourism earnings.2 twice since independence, prime ministers 
from the west have been deposed by coups (Dr timoci Bavadra in 1987 
and mahendra chaudhry in 2000), fuelling western perceptions of regional 
injustice. the party of national unity (pAnu) gained four seats at the 1999 
poll and became part of the short-lived labour-led people’s coalition until the 
coup of 19 may 2000. At the election of 2001, the emergence of a new rival 
western-based party, the Bai Kei Viti (BKV), split the western Fijian vote and 
enabled the governing Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) to take all 
the western Fijian communal constituencies. pAnu hoped to avoid a repeat 
of that outcome. Yet, in 2006, the SDl again took all of the western Fijian 
communal seats. this chapter looks at the background to the SDl’s triumph 
in the west, and at the shifting politics in Ba province.  
Ba province extends around the north-western side of Viti levu, and 
includes nadi town, lautoka city, Ba and tavua (see map 17.1). it covers a 
region of fertile cane fields, from where sugar is transported to the lautoka and 
rarawai sugar mills. it also includes the nadi international airport, the main 
gateway for tourist arrivals into the country and a key crossroads for trans-
pacific air transport. to the north, Ba province includes the scattered islands 
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Map 17.1 The Tikina Makawa of Ba Province
Source: pacific institute of Advanced Studies in Development and Governance (piAS-DG) mapping 
Database, university of the South pacific, Suva.
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of the Yasawas, a major destination for tourists. close to nadi, the island of 
Denarau features a major golf course, a high-end residential development and 
several internationally renowned hotels, which are regularly used as venues for 
international conferences. in addition, the province has rich forestry resources 
(particularly pine and indigenous hardwoods), mostly in the interior tikinas 
of Savatu, Qaliyalatina and naloto. the country’s only operating goldmine is 
at Vatukoula in tavua. Ba province is easily the richest province in terms of 
natural resources in Fiji, as well as being the country’s biggest foreign exchange 
earner. 
political power, however, has been traditionally concentrated in Fiji’s east. 
leading 19th century chiefs, such as ratu Seru cakobau and enele ma’afu 
were, respectively, from Bau island, off Viti levu’s eastern coast, and the lau 
group, further east towards tonga. their 20th century successors, ratu Sir lala 
Sukuna and ratu Sir Kamisese mara, were also from the eastern islands. the 
country’s great Fijian confederacies (matanitu), which play an important role 
in the decision-making of the Bose levu Vakaturaga (BlV – Great council 
of chiefs), are Kubuna, Burebasaga and tovata, all of which are centred on 
the eastern part of Fiji. the western part of Viti levu is nominally divided 
between Burebasaga, at the helm of which stand the rewa chiefs, and Kubuna, 
the confederacy centred on Bau island, off the eastern coast of Viti levu. this 
partitioning of the west reflected, first, the establishment of larger chiefdoms 
in the east during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the greater 
fractiousness of tribes in the west. Second, it reflected the colonial development 
of a neo-traditional order, which brought the west under the provincial controls 
of the Fijian administration. Aspirations for a separate western confederacy, the 
Yasayasa Vaka ra, have at times proved politically significant, but this has never 
formally materialized or been accepted by the Great council of chiefs.  
the political marginalization of the west resulted in a long history of dissent 
and revolt.3 Warfare from around 1867 was between coastal and interior groups, 
and was triggered by land sales and european settlement.4 clashes at the upper 
reaches of the Ba and Sigatoka rivers were the most difficult to subdue. in 1873, 
european officers acting for the cakobau government (1871–74) led around 160 
trained native troops and a larger number of auxiliaries through magodro to seize 
the mountain stronghold of nubutautau, taking around a thousand prisoners, 
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many of whom were forcibly relocated away from their interior villages.5 After 
cession, British Governor Arthur Gordon led a military campaign to suppress 
uprisings in the Ba interior in 1876 (known locally as the Valu ni Lotu – the 
‘church War’).6 the 1892 separation of colo north7 from colo West and colo 
east, with a new headquarters at nadarivatu, was in part intended to ‘lessen 
dangerous combines’ and isolate the ‘tuka’ movement of navosavakadua.8 in 
all the interior provinces, including colo West and colo east as well as colo 
north, villagers were, after the advent of colonial rule, without single rulers, and 
as a result fell under the control of european district administrators.9 Hostility 
to the new order also festered on the grounds that Ba and nadi chiefs had not 
been represented amongst those who had signed the Deed of cession in 1874. 
indeed, 300,000 acres of land in the interior tikina of magodro had been formally 
appropriated in the schedule attached to the Deed, although the appropriation 
was later rejected by the colonial administration.10 in 1945, colo north, like the 
other inland provinces, was incorporated into the coastal provinces.11  
Dissident movements also emerged in 20th century western Viti levu, 
sometimes as echoes of the ‘tuka’ movement.12 Apolosi r. nawai, from narewa 
in nadi, commenced the Viti Kabani (Fiji company) in 1912–13 with the 
objective of challenging colonial control over commerce, starting a movement 
that spread eastwards to tailevu and rewa.13 in the post-colonial period, Fijian 
political leaders in Ba have sometimes aligned themselves along provincial or 
regional, rather than ethnic, lines, and found common cause with local indo-
Fijian leaders.14 For many left-wing intellectuals, the predominantly indian 
support base of the Fiji labour party (Flp) could potentially be extended by 
alliances with Fijians in the west.15 labour’s Dr timoci Bavadra, from Viseisei 
village, briefly became prime minister in 1987 before being dislodged by a 
military coup in may. For many in the west, the overthrow of that government 
was yet another attempt by Fiji’s eastern rulers to retain power and authority. 
the population of Ba, as recorded at the 1996 census, was 212,197, 
making this easily the most populous province in the country. the majority 
of the population is Fiji indians (63.9 per cent). ethnic Fijians have just over 
half that share (32.9 per cent).16 As a result, the major indian party, the Flp, 
has been able to win all seven of the Ba-located open constituencies at the 
elections of 1999, 2001 and 2006.17 including also communal constituencies, 
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Ba province controls just over a quarter (18) of the seats in the 71-member 
parliament. Western-based Fijian parties have, in earlier years, been centred 
on provinces other than Ba. the 1960s Fijian national party and the 1980s 
Western united Front, for example, had their strongholds in the neighbouring 
nadroga province. Since the 1990s, however, emergent western parties, such as 
the All national congress (Anc) and pAnu, have been Ba-based, and relied 
critically on the sponsorship of the Ba provincial council.
the Ba provincial council brings together the region’s 21 tikinas, each of which 
has a chiefly representative and a tikina representative (the total membership is 42). 
politics on the council are influenced by the fact that there is no single ascendant 
paramount chief, unlike provinces in most other parts of the Fiji group.18 the tikina 
of Vuda has occasionally claimed pre-eminence. its chiefs have assumed leading 
positions in national affairs. in the early post-independence years, tui Vuda ratu 
Sir josaia tavaiqia was a minister in successive Alliance governments (1977–87) and 
in the post-1987 coup military and civilian council. He became vice president 
from 1993 until he passed away in 1997.the Vuda title and the vice presidency 
then passed to ratu josefa iloilo, who acceded to the presidency in 2000. Vuda’s 
claims are also strengthened by the Fijian legend that the first people to arrive in 
Fiji disembarked at Vuda point, where a popular resort called ‘First landing’ now 
exists. When the British royal family visits Fiji, they regularly visit Vuda. Yet, this 
claim to pre-eminence can rest uncomfortably in neighbouring tikinas, such as 
Vitogo, nadi and Sabeto. tavua’s leading chief, ratu ovini Bokini, is fond of saying 
in some provincial council meetings that, in Ba province: ‘xo da na momo ni Ba 
dei tautauvata, xei tixai tla xei cecere tatla qa tixai tla xei te momo sewa’ (‘We, the 
chiefs in Ba, are equal in rank’). this type of appeal to an egalitarian distribution 
of authority amongst western leaders is sometimes used by the current chairman 
of the Ba provincial council to quell any push for pre-eminence.19
the chiefs of the coastal tikinas are the most wealthy and powerful within the 
province. they are recipients of large agricultural and commercial rents from the 
native land trust Board (nltB), and have access to capital. Some, like the tui 
nawaka and the Saunaka chiefs, have provided residential plots for resettlement 
on the outskirts of nadi, where displaced indians have established hundreds of 
new homes without obtaining nltB leases (via ‘vakavanua’ arrangements).20 
the interior chiefs tend to be less prominent, despite their important role in 
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political campaigning. their tikinas are nowadays sparsely populated, and some 
villages are so remote that people do not understand the Bau dialect, the lingua 
franca across most parts of the Fiji group. they are considerably poorer than 
their coastal counterparts, owing to the hilly terrain and the paucity of access 
roads to regions such as Vaturu, nalotawa and naloto. During provincial council 
meetings, tikina representatives from the interior of the province often lament 
the lack of access to markets, and the difficulties of bringing sugar cane to the 
lautoka or rarawai mills. interior peoples remain predominantly subsistence-
oriented, although cash incomes are secured by migrating to cut cane in the 
coastal districts or by sales of inland produce in urban markets.
the five tikinas of the Yasawas also have a less central influence in the 
affairs of the Ba provincial council than do the Viti levu coastal chiefs. 
the islands do not have the land resources of the mainland peoples. their 
main sources of income are fish, yams, and subsistence agriculture, as well as, 
increasingly, tourism. the Yasawa group has, historically, done well in winning 
national scholarships. prominent officials, such as the ceo in the ministry 
of Agriculture, the commissioner northern and the commissioner eastern 
and the country’s catholic Archbishop, come from the group. Yet, the islands 
themselves remain under-developed. there is only one secondary school in the 
Yasawas, there are difficulties with the water supply and, although every island 
has a health centre, there is no hospital. linkages between the Yasawas and 
Ba are sometimes contested. Questions have been raised at the council about 
the size of the Yasawa contribution to the tikina levies, and there have been 
occasional calls to re-establish the five island tikinas as a separate province.21 
there have also been separatist commercial aspirations; an islander initiative 
in the early 1990s was the Asayawa Holding company limited, established 
before Ba provincial Holdings company limited (BpHcl). the former was 
shelved in 1994, in response to appeals for a more unified provincial company. 
Ba Holdings, the commercial arm of the Ba provincial council, was registered 
in 1995.22 By 2006, BpHcl had interests in shipping, property, hardware and 
a satellite television company (pacific Broadcasting Services), and ran the Ba 
province Secondary School on behalf of the council.
Animosities between rival chiefs in Ba province, often centering on land 
disputes, exert a critical influence over local political alignments. the dispute 
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between the tui Ba (Bulu) and the tui Ba (nailaga) blew up in the 1860s and 
centres on rival claims to lands on the border between these neighbouring 
regions.23 in the early colonial days, the headquarters of the provincial 
administration was at Vitogo village, until it was brought to lautoka. many 
Vitogo people believed that this was at the instigation of the Viseisei chiefs 
(of Vuda), and that Viseisei peoples had also otherwise been favoured under 
colonial rule. When Viseisei’s ratu tevita moemeodonu took control of 
BpHcl in the wake of the 2006 election, amongst those who stormed the 
rogorogoivuda building in opposition to the takeover, people from the vanua 
of Vitogo (or those who had blood ties to Vitogo) figured prominently. many 
had been workers at the company under the previous administration, and 
had been sacked by ratu moemoedonu. claims by the people of Sabeto to 
ownership of the land around nadi airport have been vigorously contested 
by the Saunaka people (from within the nadi tikina), some of whom benefit 
greatly from rental incomes from land and commercial interests at nadi 
Airport. Whatever the characteristic political frictions of the day, some of 
the Saunaka chiefs will tend to be on one side, and some of the people of  
Sabeto on the other side.
Fissions are as common within as between tikinas. the Sabeto peoples once 
lived in fortified villages up in the range separating nadi and lautoka, until the 
cakobau government troops forced them to burn their villages and move down 
to the coast.24 Apisai tora, a veteran trade unionist and instigator of pAnu, is 
the head of one of the yavusas within Sabeto, but had major differences with the 
tui Sabeto, who was a supporter of rabuka’s 1992–99 Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni taukei (SVt) administrations and later of Qarase’s SDl governments. tavua’s 
ratu ovini Bokini had been a cabinet minister in the SVt government, but was 
sacked in the mid-1990s after he was charged with several offences relating to 
official bribery, including complicity in the national Bank of Fiji fraud case.25 
this also contributed to the diminishing respect he commanded within the 
anyway large and fractious tavua area. Saunaka landowners have also fallen out 
over the Westfield city development near the airport. A long-running dispute 
over the tui nadi title stems from an incident many decades ago when the 
title was rightfully to have passed to a small child, but was instead given to the 
uncle from a collateral i-tokatoka (sub-clan). today, the title includes rights to 
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earnings from the Denarau development, believed to amount to more than a 
million Fiji dollars a year. the native lands commission clearly established the 
genuine title-holder, but local political allegiances were more uncertain. While 
the dispute remains unresolved, royalties and rental incomes are frozen, and 
held by the nltB on behalf of the rightful owner. the heads of the two rival 
i-tokatoka invariably support different parties, in the hope of using modern 
political triumphs to settle these deeper disputes. the continued fractiousness 
of the sub-clans arising from support for rival candidates for the nadi title often 
spills into backing for different political parties or candidates.
intra-Fijian conflicts are also reinforced by chiefly linkages with the big indian 
companies that operate in Ba province, which themselves have internecine 
squabbles that at times curiously resemble those among Fijian landowners. top 
Gujarati executives are sometimes humorously called ‘Guja-ratus’, appending 
the Fijian honorific ‘ratu’. these companies have benefited from the affirmative 
action programs of the post-1987 coup era, cashing in by way of joint ventures 
with nouveau riche Fijians. many of them originated from Ba town.26 
Saunaka landowners have a joint venture with motibhai co. ltd., responsible 
for the prouds duty-free store at nadi Airport. executive chairman mahendra 
motibhai patel is close to the Qarase government, and doubles as the chairman 
of post Fiji. motibhai co. ltd also had close relations with the mara and rabuka 
governments, which for many years enabled the company to secure important 
commercial concessions. the tappoo Group of companies is the other major 
duty-free chain at nadi Airport, although it has been less favoured by Fijian 
governments. rumours circulating within the business community alleged that 
tappoo had given $50,000 to the Flp for the 2001 election campaign. 
Business rivalries amongst leading Gujarati firms are often sparked or 
reinforced by expansion into each other’s traditional areas. the wholesale 
distributor and flour manufacturing firm, punjas, is opposed to tappoo because 
of  the latter’s diversification from retail of luxury goods into foodstuffs and 
spices, traditionally the specialities of punjas. closest to the BpHcl is the 
hardware retail giant Vinod patel; the two have a joint venture called Bavin 
ltd. Vinod patel managing director is Bachubhai patel, another close associate 
of prime minister Qarase. company chair Vinod patel was mayor of Ba town 
and then stood successfully for the national Federation party (nFp) in 1992 
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and 1994. Because of their stiff competition in the hardware market, r.c. 
manubhai, yet another Ba-originated firm, is a great rival to Vinod patel, and 
the two often engage in behind-the-scenes backbiting (‘kuch kuch’). 
For many, but not all, of these indian business leaders, the chaudhry 
government’s socialist policies and the threat of tax probes encouraged alliances 
with the Fijian opposition. chaudhry himself, and the Fiji military Forces’ 
lieutenant-colonel Viliame Seruvakula, went so far as to allege that some 
indian business leaders had been involved in backing the coup in may 2000.27 
Yet, chaudhry also had friends in high business circles, which were in part a 
legacy of the alliance he forged with president ratu mara at the time of his 
1999 election victory – such friends included, for example, mahendra patel, 
rc manubhai and other non-Gujarati figures such as rajendra prasad.28 most 
of the big Gujarati firms played it safe in 2006 by giving tacit support to both 
sides. there were also claims that the Flp was proactively seeking the support 
of Gujarati businessmen in the lead-up to the 2006 general election. When the 
Flp launched its campaign for the 2006 election in Ba, Vinod patel, despite 
his long association with the nFp, was one of the chief guests. 
Although links with the indian companies have grown in commercial 
importance over recent decades, the dynamics of western Viti levu-based 
indigenous party formation have centred primarily on rivalries amongst the 
Fijians themselves.  
prior to the 1999 general election, with the support of the Ba provincial 
council, a group of prominent western politicians who were dissatisfied with 
the rabuka-led SVt government, formed pAnu. the SVt had convincingly 
won all three communal seats in Ba province during the 1994 election.29 in 
1995, prime minister rabuka had embarked on a constitutional review in 
cooperation with nFp leader jai ram reddy. When pAnu was formed, a 
major element of its case against the SVt was that it had ‘sold out the Fijians’ 
by passing the 1997 constitutional Amendment Act.30 Ba politicians believed 
that, by establishing a new party, they might emerge victorious in the province’s 
18 seats, thus effectively controlling 25 per cent of the House of representatives. 
Sabeto chief Apisai tora played an important role in the party’s formation, 
and became the pAnu general secretary.31 Another major player was ratu 
Sairusi nagagavoka, the tui Ba (Bulu) and one of the largest landowners in the 
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province. the Vice president and tui Vuda, ratu josefa iloilo, was appointed 
patron of the party.32 the SVt strongly challenged this appointment, arguing 
that, as stipulated in the constitution, the office of the president is a ‘Symbol of 
unity of the nation’, and should not therefore be identified with any political 
party. As a result, ratu josefa iloilo resigned from pAnu. 
in the lead-up to the 1999 elections, pAnu at first courted a coalition 
arrangement with the SVt, but eventually signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the Flp. this was an odd coalition as the labour party 
had been critical of the nFp’s close relationship with the rabuka-led SVt 
Government, labelling it a ‘sell out’. parties from different ends of the political 
spectrum were rallying together against those which had reached a cooperative 
arrangement at the centre of Fiji politics. cracks soon appeared in the marriage 
between the Flp and pAnu. part of the agreement between the two had been 
to avoid fielding parallel candidates in certain constituencies. After the Flp 
stood pradhman raniga against Apisai tora for the nadi open constituency, 
antagonism emerged between the Sabeto politician and mahendra chaudhry. 
A year after the election, tora was one of the leaders of the revived taukei 
movement of ethnic nationalist Fijians that marched through the streets of 
Suva while George Speight seized control of Fiji’s parliament.    
tora’s newfound antipathy to chaudhry and the Flp after the may 1999 
election led to a realignment within the board of the BpHcl. At the time, 
Table 17.1 Western Fijian parties’ shares of the first preference Fijian 
communal vote in target constituencies, 1999–2006 (per cent)
 1999  2001  2006
 pAnu pAnu  BKV pAnu
Ba east Fijian communal 52.5 25.3 19.8 31.6 
Ba West Fijian communal 49.2 14.8 36.2 7.8 
northwest urban Fijian communal 43.1 3.9 13.1 – 
ra Fijian communal 31.7 11.3 6.4 – 
total Fijian communal 9.6 2.9 4.7 2.0
total open constituencies 3.9 0.8 1.3 0.5
notes: pAnu = party of national unity; BKV = Bai Kei Viti. 
Source: Basic data from the database of the pacific institute for Advanced Studies in Development and 
Governance, university of the South pacific, Suva.
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the company was run by SVt minister isimeli Bose. tora had previously been 
highly critical of the running of the company. together with pAnu president 
ratu Sairusi nagagavoka, he had filed a writ in the High court against the 
company and Bose. Yet, in the wake of the election-related fall-out with 
chaudhry, tora’s relationship with the BpHcl management improved, while 
his relationship with ratu Sairusi soured. the Bulu chief remained loyal to 
mahendra chaudhry. in one of the BpHcl debates in the wake of the 1999 
general election, he described chaudhry as ‘Kai Ba’ , adding that this was the 
first time that Bulu had a direct line to a prime minister.
pAnu obtained four Fijian communal seats at the 1999 election. in addition to 
the two Ba seats, eloni Goneyali took the ra Fijian seat and Akanisi Koroitamana 
took the northwest Fijian urban seat. the two Ba mps entered the people’s 
coalition cabinet. meli Bogileka, from Yasawa island, served as the minister 
for civil Aviation; ponipate lesavua, a native of nawaka Village in nadi and a 
former policeman, became minister for Youth and Sports. like the Flp, pAnu 
was assisted by advisors from the Australian labor party at the 1999 polls. 
land issues were always going to be difficult for the new labour-led 
government, and were of particular importance for the nltB rent-dependent 
chiefs in this sugar-rich province. prior to the polls, Ba landowners had issued 
a report rejecting renewal of land leases under the 1976 Agricultural landlord 
and tenants Act.33 prime minister chaudhry, who also led the national Farmers 
union, hoped for renewal of that legislation, and, failing that, needed land 
for resettlement of evicted indian farmers. He sought to purchase land in the 
Qara region from close ally ratu Sairusi nagagavoka. the tui Ba (nailaga), Adi 
Senimili cagilaba, challenged the sale, claiming the land belonged to her. the 
ministry of Agriculture found in her favour. this renewed the long-running 
dispute between the nailaga and Bulu chiefs, with Adi cagilaba emerging as 
a vociferous critic of the chandhry government.34 While in office, chaudhry 
built a substantial bure for ratu Sairusi at Sorokoba, clearly hoping to thereby 
cement that politically important alliance. 
When pAnu ministers toured the west seeking to forestall the threat posed 
by the revived taukei movement to the chaudhry government, the two chiefs 
who opposed them were tui Sabeto ratu Kailova mataitoga and marama tui 
Ba (nailaga) Adi Senimili cagilaba.35 
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the 2000 coup further exacerbated frictions amongst the Fijian chiefs in 
Ba province, in ways that remained evident at the 2001 polls. ratu Sairusi and 
the pAnu ministers continued to support deposed prime minister chaudhry, 
and threatened the formation of a breakaway state in western Viti levu. A 
two-day meeting of western chiefs at the mocambo Hotel that ended on 8 june 
2000 appeared to have opted for the more moderate course of establishing a new 
confederacy. the day after the end of the mocambo meeting, a delegation of 
western chiefs and politicians, including Vice president ratu josefa iloilo, visited 
Speight’s stronghold in parliament. Taukei leader Apisai tora hugged Speight in a 
ceremony of mutual reconciliation that included nadroga chief ratu osea Gavidi. 
Speight had held the chairs of both Fiji pine and the Fiji Hardwood corporation, 
but he had been sacked by the people’s coalition government. ratu Gavidi also 
had interests in timber exports.36 From that point onwards, Speight and his group 
forged a new alliance with western chiefs, calling on the military to pass a decree 
appointing tui Vuda ratu josefa iloilo president.37 this was a call that later drew 
Sabeto landowners to set up one of the many roadblocks around Viti levu in 
early july 2000, a disturbance for which Apisai tora was later convicted.
tora entered the post-coup interim cabinet, and became minister of 
Agriculture. instead of joining the SDl in july 2001, however, he formed a 
new western Viti levu-based party, the Bai Kei Viti, to challenge pAnu in 
the latter’s core Fijian communal constituencies (Ba West, Ba east, ra and 
northwest Fijian urban). Both of these parties put the other as last preference, 
ensuring a mutual destruction of the two contending western-based parties. in 
both of the Ba Fijian communal constituencies, the SDl candidate leapfrogged 
from second place at the first count to win on the basis of transfers from one 
or other of the western parties.38 
in the polarized post-coup circumstances, pAnu’s alliance with the Flp 
government took its toll. ponipate lesavua’s first preference vote in Ba east fell 
from 52.5 per cent in 1999 to 25.3 per cent in 2001, while meli Bogileka’s vote 
in Ba West plummeted from 49.2 per cent in 1999 to 13.5 per cent in 2001. 
the Qarase government’s triumph at the 2001 polls proved a disaster for both 
Ba-based parties. Ba province no longer had any representation in the post-
election SDl cabinet, although the SDl victor in Ba West, tomasi Sauqaqa, 
became Assistant minister for Health. tora received a seat in the Senate as one 
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of the prime minister’s nominees; pAnu’s ponipate lesavua received an Flp 
seat in the Senate; and the tui nawaka, ratu Apisai naevo, was one of the 
Great council of chiefs’ nominees to the Senate. tavua chief ratu ovini Bokini 
also became chairman of the Great council of chiefs in july 2004. Although 
these were powerful positions, Ba politicians were no longer in core positions 
in government. in ratu mara’s cabinets, there had always been ministers from 
Ba province, and politicians from the west had also been strongly represented 
in the cabinets of rabuka and chaudhry. 
Both pAnu and the BKV were merely electoral vehicles, whose survival rested 
in part on the blessing and financial sponsorship of the Ba provincial council. 
in the wake of the 2001 election, meli Bogileka broke away from pAnu and 
formed a new people’s national party (pnp). in october 2004, efforts were 
made through the Ba provincial council to merge the BKV and pAnu under 
the new pnp banner, but these met with resistance. Both pAnu and the BKV 
had received loans from the Ba provincial council for their election campaigns, 
which had not been repaid. the pnp’s latest request, backed by some who had 
also figured as executives in the BKV and pAnu, was seen as use of a party front 
as a cash-raising mechanism. Some walked out of the meeting, not wanting to 
hear the pnp presentation. ratu ovini Bokini announced that the council would 
Table 17.2 Election results in Ba Fiji Provincial Communal constituencies in 
2006  
 party Votes per cent
Ba East Fijian Provincial  
  paulo ralulu SDl 5,528 60.4 
  Apimeleki nabaro nFp 732 8.0 
  ponipate lesavua pAnu 2,888 31.6 
  informal  1,067 10.4 
  total registered  11,836  
Ba West Fijian Provincial
  pauliasi namua nFp 257 2.2 
  ratu meli Q Saukuru SDl 9,211 80.0 
  taniela Wai Flp 1,156 10.0 
  meli Bogileka pAnu 883 7.7 
  informal  1,143 9.0 
  total registered  15,348
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remain apolitical, and that people had a right to choose whatever political party 
they wanted.39 in the midst of the multiparty cabinet disputes in the law courts, 
which kept the polarization witnessed at the 2001 poll to the forefront of Fiji 
politics, pAnu announced its own liquidation. Bogileka’s pnp joined the ‘Grand 
coalition of Fijian parties’, spearheaded by former speaker tomasi Vakatora.40 
By contrast, ponipate lesavua, because he was an Flp nominee to the Senate, 
inevitably retained stronger links with the Flp leader. 
Shortly before the 2006 poll, pAnu was revived, again bringing together 
ponipate lesavua and meli Bogileki as party leaders.41 Apisai tora had retired 
from active politics, an event which also brought an end to the Bai Kei Viti, 
his brainchild for the 2001 election. pAnu emerged again as a close ally of the 
Flp, with these two parties exchanging second preference votes.   
unlike in 2001, the SDl was able to take both of the Ba Fijian communal seats 
at the first count in 2006. in Ba West, ratu meli Saukuru, whose traditional title 
is the taukei navo, secured 9,211 votes, while pAnu’s meli Bogileka obtained 
only 883 votes. ratu meli, yavusa head from the village of Dratabu in nadi, 
acquired prominence owing to his achievements within the methodist church 
and as a businessman. He is a lay preacher and former vice president of the 
methodist church. He rose to prominence through the successful organization 
of the methodist conference in nadi in 2005, when he was chosen to head the 
church’s investment company. He later accepted instead the SDl nomination 
in response to entreaties from within the church. Bogileka’s support would have 
come from his home island of Yasawa, and perhaps also Vuda, but the tui Sabeto 
was behind the SDl. the SDl must have also secured the bulk of the nadi and 
Vitogo vote.42 Here, as throughout Fiji, the backing of the methodist church 
exerted a powerful influence on Fijian voting patterns. 
in Ba east, the SDl faced a sterner challenge, but paulo ralulu, from 
natunuku (Bulu tikina), nevertheless easily won with 60 per cent of the 
first preference vote, defeating pAnu’s ponipate lesavua, who managed only 
31.6 per cent of the vote.43 pAnu would have received support from ratu 
Sairusi nagagavoka’s area, including the village of Sorokoba and parts of the 
surrounding Bulu tikina, and perhaps from dissident areas in tavua and from 
parts of lesavua’s home region of nawaka. But even in his home region of 
nawaka, the pro-SDl influence of the tui nawaka must have lost lesavua votes. 
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He also would have had negligible support in nailaga, where retired nurse Adi 
laite Kotoiwasa had succeeded her sister as tui Ba (nailaga), and staunchly 
backed the SDl. the tui tavua was behind the SDl, although that was a mixed 
blessing. in the tavua by-election of january 2004, the SDl had fielded ratu 
ovini’s son, inoke Bokini. He was a human resources manager at emperor 
Gold mines at Vatukoula, a position that earned him some unpopularity 
amongst the emperor employees and their family members that was reflected 
in the by-election outcome. He obtained only 28 per cent of the vote in a 45 
per cent indigenous Fijian constituency.44 ratu ovini Bokini is nevertheless an 
important linkage for the SDl in the province. His mother is from the island 
of Bau, giving him vasu relations with that politically important island, and his 
wife is from the prime minister’s island of Vanuabalavu in the lau group.  
Support for labour and its allies had once been strong in interior tikinas 
like magodro, where, in the 1980s, left-wing university of the South pacific 
lecturer Simione Durutalo rallied many villagers in opposition to the SVt 
party supported by his father, the tui magodro.45 Durutalo’s support had come 
largely from his mother’s people, descended from the earlier taukei inhabitants 
who were related to the nearby navosa peoples, whereas his father’s family 
came from a line of conquering chiefs, related to the tui tavua and the tui Ba 
(nailaga).46 By the time of the 2006 election, both father and son had passed 
away, and the father’s elder son had assumed the title. most in Bukuya, the 
key magodro village and tikina government station, backed the SDl in 2006, 
as did those in the surrounding villages. the former remoteness of the interior 
tikinas has been diminished by links with resettled interior peoples in coastal 
districts, which act as conduits for intermittent migration and, by and large, 
for the consolidation of support behind mainstream Fijian political parties. 
the SDl’s second triumph in western Viti levu in 2006 signaled a watershed 
in Ba provincial politics.47 not for the first time, the objective of a distinct 
western Fijian alliance with the big indian-backed parties had been frustrated. 
As nicholas thomas found in 1990, internal divisions amongst western political 
leaders and cultural connections with other parts of the Fiji group mean that ‘the 
thesis of a persistent east-west divide cannot be sustained in any strong form’.48 
Sixteen years later, new factors influenced political organization in the west. 
in particular, the development of the tourism industry and affirmative action 
240 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
programs had encouraged the emergence of a growing western indigenous élite, 
with strong connections with Gujarati big business. on balance, these ventures 
have tended to exacerbate, rather than soothe, rivalries among the coastal 
chiefs, which now play a greater political role than do dissident movements 
from the interior. that so much of the country’s economic activity and foreign 
exchange earnings stem from the west probably enhances the potential for the 
emergence of western Viti levu-based political organizations. Whether these 
will prove any more successful than their predecessors or whether the SDl will 
consolidate support in the west by giving this part of the country a greater stake 
in cabinet, remains to be seen.   
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The ‘Generals’ – where to now?
The Yellow Bucket Team1
the 2006 election resulted in fundamental change for the General voter2 
community in Fiji. For the first time, the ‘Generals’ party, the united peoples 
party (upp) – with two of the three general communal seats – found itself 
forming the opposition. this was not entirely unfamiliar territory for party 
leader mick Beddoes, as he had played the role of leader of the opposition 
for the opening period of the previous parliamentary session. However, on 
that occasion he was a party of one (albeit with support from new labour 
unity party (nlup) member ofa Swann), the remaining general communal 
representatives – nlup/ independent Ken Zinck and the Soqosoqo ni 
Duavata ni lewenivanua’s (SDl’s) David christopher – having joined the 
government.
the ‘Generals’ as opposition represents a huge shift from the traditions of 
General voter politics. it gave rise to spirited debate in the letters to the editor 
columns3 about the betrayal of indigenous Fijians by their vasu (part-european) 
relatives, is the cause of some concern, particularly amongst the older members 
of the part-european community.
the upp is the latest in a succession of General voter parties that trace 
their origins back to the General electors Association (GeA) established pre-
independence. led by figures like charles Stinson, Doug Brown, Bill clarke 
and ted Beddoes, it stood in partnership with ratu Sir Kamisese mara’s Fijian 
Association as part of the Alliance party, and some of its members occupied 
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prominent cabinet positions. mick Beddoes himself, as a young and enthusiastic 
party organizer, played a role in those early elections, and often fondly reminisces 
about those post-independence days. Sitting now in opposition, having fought 
an election in coalition with the indo-Fijian-dominated Flp, those Alliance 
days of power must seem a long way off.
But first, who are the Generals? the answer is complex, as they represent 
a mixture of all the ‘others’ – that is, anyone who can’t be classified as Fijian, 
indian or rotuman. While most in this community fall under the very broad 
category of part-european, or  kai loma, they share the title with europeans 
(usually more recently settled in Fiji), chinese, Banabans,  Koreans, melanesian 
descendants of Solomon island ‘blackbird indentured labourers’, Samoan and 
tongan communities and other smaller communities. to add to the confusion, 
Fiji’s various constitutions have added to and subtracted from the communal 
roll. pre-1987, the rotumans were ‘Generals’. under the 1990 constitution, 
they were given their own seat (although many rotumans remain unsure where 
to register!). Similarly, the melanesian community was formerly regarded as 
Fijian, but then moved to the General roll.
As a result, the Generals are notoriously difficult to typecast. Attitudes and 
voting behaviour can vary dramatically within an individual community. to 
complicate matters further, the three General communal electorates are quite 
distinct in their make-up and require individual analysis. it also appears that 
the number of voters on the General communal roll is in decline, possibly 
due to migration, but also to official confusion about the exact racial origin 
of a person. Such factors have led to potential Generals being registered on 
the Fijian roll – sometimes by request, but often as a result of mistakes by 
registration officials.
in recent years, in contrast to the early success of the GeA and, in the early 
1990s, the General Voters party (GVp), unifying the ‘Generals’ has proved 
difficult. there have been numerous splits – a history of which could be a chapter 
on its own – resulting finally in the formation of the united Generals party 
(subsequently, the upp) under mick Beddoes’ leadership. this last name change 
was part of an ambitious attempt to capture the middle ground of Fiji politics. 
up until the mid-1990s, General politics, beyond internal personal rivalries, 
shared a common philosophy. With tiny numbers, the only way the Generals 
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could play a significant role in politics was to unite and align themselves with 
the dominant Fijian party of the time. However, despite all the talk of vasu, 
equally important was a belief that it was vital to stand independent and separate 
from the Fijians and Fijian politics. this fierce kai loma sense of racial/cultural 
pride has its roots in colonial segregation, and it contrasts with views held, for 
example, by the Banaban, melanesian or other communities, which appear 
more comfortable voting with a Fijian party like the SDl. this drive to stand 
apart from the Fijians surfaced with the rise of Sitiveni rabuka and the rise of 
Fijian nationalism.
Analysis of General politics has to take into account the varied views of the 
individual communities that make up this electorate. to make it even more 
complex, each of these communities tend to live in geographic pockets around 
the country – resulting in the three General communal constituencies having 
quite different dynamics. 
Suva city General communal is the smallest of the constituencies: its 
registered roll of just 3,515 for the 2006 election was down by 598, or 14.5 
per cent, on 2001. traditionally, the chinese vote played a key role in this 
seat, but in the 1997 constitution, the number of General communal seats was 
reduced from five to three, and nasinu was included in the Suva city General 
communal constituency. this extension, combined with the political apathy 
of the local chinese and a general decline in the legal chinese population, has 
meant chinese influence has declined. nowadays, the constituency is much 
more varied in its make-up. While still dominated by part-european voters, 
the electorate has become much more westernized and liberal in its thinking, 
and has a recent history of being driven by individual qualities rather than by 
party politics. For example, Suva city General communal and Suva city open 
were the only seats where new labour unity party candidates were successful 
in the 2001 general election.
the part-european voters of the Suva city General communal electorate, 
described by one Fijian nationalist as the ‘eurocentrics’, are particularly 
disturbed by the rise of Fijian nationalism, and of all the electorates Suva city 
General communal appears most attracted to the politics of ‘moderation’ or 
multiracialism. A number of the more liberal churches, in particular the catholic 
church, have helped promote the moderate philosophy in this electorate. they 
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campaigned vigorously against the perceived erosion of human rights by the 
nationalists in the methodist and evangelical churches. religion reflects much 
of the difference between the kai loma community and their Fijian cousins. 
the vast majority of kai loma are catholics, Anglicans or members of the more 
liberal methodist congregations, like the Wesley Butt Street church in Suva. 
the promotion of reconciliation tolerance and unity Bill enraged them, 
confirming concerns and doubts that they had about the SDl government 
and, despite SDl’s attempts to diffuse the issue, possibly contributing to the 
first count victory of the upp’s Bernadette rounds Ganilau.
the resounding defeat of incumbent independent candidate and minister of 
labour Ken Zinck came as a surprise to many observers. it was a comprehensive 
victory on the first count for rounds Ganilau who, as a prominent broadcaster, 
social worker and everyone’s favorite mistress of ceremonies, swept to victory 
despite upp’s coalition with the labour (Flp) party (more on this later). She 
was impressive on the campaign trail and, married to ratu Sir penaia Ganilau’s 
son, is a reminder of those reassuring times when the four great chiefs, led by 
ratu Sir Kamisese mara, ruled, and Fijian nationalism had yet to surface. 
Ken Zinck’s strong ties with the SDl, plus his very public and enthusiastic 
social life (Zinck consistently displayed himself live on local television, 
ukulele in hand, leading the cheer squad at most of Fiji’s international sevens 
tournaments), was a bit much, particularly for the older section of the electorate. 
that, combined with strong female support for rounds Ganilau and respect 
for the efforts of her leader, delivered the seat to the upp.
the Western/central General communal electorate is the largest in terms 
of geographic area. it extends from the tamavua river, including parts of 
upper tamavua on the outskirts to Suva, across the western division to ra. 
it encompasses a number of quite separate communities, including a large 
melanesian group in Delainavesi, and quite separate kai loma clans in lami, 
Sigatoka, nadi, lautoka, Vatukoula and areas stretching to the tailevu 
provincial boundary.
Kai loma politics isn’t easy to read or understand; it is almost impossible for 
those born outside the culture to comprehend. the great families operate like 
mini-dynasties, often controlled by matriarchs who guide the activities of family 
members from birth to marriage and through all the trials and tribulations of 
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life. loyalties are fierce and outsiders regarded with deep suspicion. While most 
clans have connections into the Fijian community, these are typically stronger 
in the more northern rural communities.
mick Beddoes is a master at playing kai loma family politics. He understands 
the various genealogical connections that tie these clans back to their various 
home bases. He worked hard and publicly as a constituency representative, 
holding regular constituency meetings – usually at the homes of key figures 
within the community – not only in his own constituency but across the 
country. His linkage with labour disturbed some, but he overcame this with his 
energy, prominence and the strong stand he took against the Fijian nationalist 
element. interestingly, however, the SDl did close the gap in this seat by 
presenting a strong melanesian candidate. But the candidate was unknown 
outside his own community and appears not to have won much support beyond 
the Solomon islanders.
Finally, there is the north eastern General communal constituency that 
covers Vanua levu and taveuni, down to ovalau, through tailevu, skirting Suva 
and stretching down to Kadavu. this was once dominated by Savusavu kai loma 
politicians like ted Beddoes and leo Smith, but the inclusion of the Banabans 
and Kioa islanders in the electorate changed this constituency dramatically – as 
was seen in 2001 when Banaban David christopher won for the SDl. 
like the Viti levu kai loma, northern clans’ loyalties are strongly held – but, 
in contrast, they have greater empathy with the Fijian community. it is in these 
more rural communities that you see the real vasu relationship in action. Stories 
of fair-skinned, part-europeans riding down from the hills and communicating 
solely in Fijian are common and reflect a key difference between the northern 
clans and their Viti levu cousins. they love their politics, are notorious ‘bush 
lawyers’, and fierce rivalries often spring up within the community. However, 
the reality is that, as long as the Banaban/Kioa vote is united, the kai loma of 
the north have little chance of winning the northern seat. (Another factor in 
this constituency is the changes that tourism is bringing to Savusavu; many of 
the old freehold plantations are being sold to foreigners, reducing the power 
and influence of the old families.)
the Banaban vote is also heavily influenced by the views of the paramount 
chief, the tui cakau ratu naiqama lalabalavu. However, in 2006, the Banaban 
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vote partially split, with two alternative candidates challenging christopher for 
the seat and, fatally for christopher, giving preferences to candidates outside the 
Banaban/Kioa communities – in particular to the independent, robin irwin. 
Despite holding a good lead on the first count, the SDl incumbent failed 
to cross the 50 per cent threshold, handing the seat on preferences to irwin. 
irwin is an interesting character; a long time european Savusavu resident, he 
is a former vet and property developer. By standing and tirelessly campaigning 
in the last few elections, he built a solid support base; successfully negotiating 
preference support gave him victory. the upp failed badly in this constituency, 
reflecting the very different attitudes held by northerners.
So where to now for the Generals and, more specifically, the upp? mick 
Beddoes has long dreamed of creating a political party capable of grabbing 
the middle multiracial ground of Fiji politics. He first attempted this in the 
1990s with the formation of the All national congress in partnership with the 
mercurial Apisai tora. its collapse led him to help form the united General 
party. His spell as leader of the opposition during the court battles that took 
place after the 2001 election encouraged him to try again, and he adjusted 
the name of his party with the promise that they would contest all 71 seats 
in 2006. 
As it turned out, he was only able to field 10 candidates and  – squeezed 
between the Flp and the SDl, both of which moderated their position for 
the 2006 elections, and facing competition from the national Alliance and the 
nFp – he failed dismally to win support outside his core General base.
Six months before the general election, Beddoes made a coalition deal with 
the Flp. it seemed to many observers almost suicidal to commit so early to one 
of the major players, particularly to the Flp, whose leader, mahendra chaudhry, 
was not particularly popular amongst General voters. 
if a week is a long time in politics, six months is an eternity – and so it proved 
for the upp. in committing so completely to the Flp, Beddoes relinquished 
the one key bargaining chip he could bring to Fiji’s political table – two of the 
three General voter’s seats. in such a close-fought election this was valuable 
currency, as independents robin irwin and jioji Konrote found out.
With only two seats – well short of the eight required to demand a position in 
cabinet – and committed to supporting chaudhry, who didn’t have the numbers 
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to win power anyway, the upp was the only party shut out of government. 
this leaves the upp and the ‘Generals’ in a difficult position. However, if the 
Flp were to return to the opposition benches, the upp would be consigned to 
a parliamentary ‘no man’s land’ – a far cry from the Generals glory days when 
figures like Stinson, clarke, Brown, Falvey, ted Beddoes and, more recently, 
leo Smith and David pickering held positions of real power.
Demographics will determine the future of Fiji politics. With a rapidly 
growing Fijian population and declining numbers of indo-Fijians and others, 
the upp and the General voters are in real danger of finding themselves 
irrelevant in Fiji politics. For the moment it seems unlikely that the upp can 
win more than two or three seats. their only hope is to return to the centre 
of Fiji politics, where they can hold the balance of power and ensure that the 
Generals win back their place at the political table. 
Notes
1 the ‘yellow bucket’ is a weekly column on Fiji politics and national affairs that can be found 
on fijivillage.com. inspiration for the column is found, like many things in Fiji, around a 
yellow bucket of yaqona or kava hence the name. launched early in 2003, it has gained 
a reputation for providing astute observation of Fiji politics and its forecasts have proved 
remarkably accurate in recent years. Authorship of the column is credited to an editorial 
board that gathers regularly around the yellow bucket. 
2 General voters are those other than Fijian, indian or rotuman voters. colloquially they are 
often referred to as ‘the generals’. three of the 46 communal seats in the Fiji parliament 
are reserved for general voters. their seats represent the constituencies of Suva city 
General communal, north eastern General communal and Western/central General 
communal.
3 See, for example, ‘the curse of the Kai loma Vote’, Fiji Daily Post, 24 February 2006. 
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Elections and nation-building: 
the long road since 1970
Robbie Robertson
in Fiji it is communalism that has most given distinctive shape to politics 
and vice versa. When Fiji became independent in 1970, its freshly negotiated 
constitution endorsed a communal basis for voting. this was not surprising 
given that colonialism had divided the country ethnically, with each community 
isolated from the other geographically, economically, educationally and socially.1 
industrial and political forms of organization – often closely related – also 
assumed ethnic characteristics. indo-Fijian cane-farmer organizations easily 
transformed into political parties, the most notable being the Federation party 
(formed in 1963) and the shorter-lived indian Alliance (formed in 1966). Fijian 
organizations similarly derived in part from the chiefly-led and vanua-structured 
Fijian Association, which, after 1956, lobbied for Fijian interests.
However, social change would always sorely test such neat ethnic 
demarcations. indeed, these early political developments can easily be read 
as attempts to deal with social change: for Fijians the gradual breakdown of 
communal lifestyles; for indo-Fijians the need to correct the perceived injustices 
of colonial practice. But long before colonialism ended, the limitations of 
communalism had become obvious for those who wished to see them. As 
urbanization gathered pace and employment patterns changed, new multiracial 
unions began to form and make their presence felt, the most notable example 
being the 1959 Fiji oil workers’ strike in Suva. 
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Although the impact of colonial pressures diminished in the 1950s and 
1960s, the illogic of communalism continued to affect the operation of political 
parties. As an independent country, Fiji’s prosperity would be tied closely to 
cooperation between its communities. After all, Fijians would rely on income 
derived from sugar – then the country’s greatest annual source of wealth – to 
fund the programs that they envisaged would lift Fijian economic performance. 
Antagonizing indo-Fijians – the main producers of sugar – could hardly help 
their cause. Both communities might appear to have had separate goals, but 
neither could achieve them without the other’s support. the zero-sum attitudes 
fostered during colonialism had the potential to seriously erode nation-building 
efforts; certainly they hindered the evolution of at least one aspect of nation-
building – national identity.
interdependence was the new reality and, as the country neared independence, 
it was reflected in political manoeuvrings: in 1968 the largely indo-Fijian 
Federation party joined forces with the small Fijian national Democrats party, 
based in the west of Viti levu, to become the national Federation party (nFp); 
and the Fijian Association became the dominant component of the Alliance 
party (established in 1966), which itself was made up of the indian Alliance 
and the General electors Association (GeA). (the GeA represented citizens 
who were neither Fijian nor indo-Fijian.) the Alliance was more successful 
than the nFp, capturing 84 per cent of the Fijian vote in 1972, as well as, 
between 1972 and 1987, 16–24 per cent of the indo-Fijian vote and nearly 90 
per cent of the General vote. in fact, it owed much of its success to this wide 
appeal, especially among the General voters population, which effectively held 
the balance of power.
even the 1970 constitution represented accommodation between the 
communities. indo-Fijians had wanted a simple one person/one vote system 
in single electorates, but accepted the Fijian wish for a communal-based 
constitution on the understanding that a degree of cross-voting would prepare 
Fiji for a less communal-based electoral system in the future. that future is yet 
to arrive, not so much because communalism itself is entrenched, but because 
the political parties, themselves communal, appear resistant to change. this 
outcome was not necessarily apparent to the framers of the 1970 constitution, 
who declared that the lower House would be made up of 22 representatives 
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of the Fijian community, 22 representatives of the indo-Fijian community and 
8 members representing the remaining voters. twenty-seven of the 52 seats 
were communal seats; that is, members of each community voted for their own 
communal representative, thereby producing 12 Fijian, 12 indo-Fijian and three 
General members. in the remaining 25 General communal constituencies, 
everyone had three additional votes to elect a suitable Fijian, indo-Fijian and 
General elector representative; resulting in 10 Fijian, 10 indo-Fijian and five 
General elector representatives, respectively.
this constitutional form of post-colonial accommodation – promoted 
politically as multiracialism – had two principal weaknesses. First, despite 
the appearance of multiracial political groupings, the two main parties each 
remained dominated by a different community. no amount of cross-voting 
could disguise the constitution’s emphasis on communal identification as the 
basis for political activity. this effectively made intra-communal divisions more 
politically damaging than inter-communal rivalry because the former threatened 
the party itself. Second, it held communities hostage to the fortunes of their 
political parties. to succeed, parties had to demand communal unity. issues of 
leadership or governance always took second place. not surprisingly, the zero-
sum logic of political competition soon superseded the cooperative ideal fostered 
by the post-colonial ideology of multiracialism. party survival demanded it. 
communal unity always came first. thus, the ideology of multiracialism and 
the cooperative nation-building it underpinned were undermined by the very 
structures it promoted. 
the weaknesses discussed above are the ones that have most shaped Fiji’s 
politics since independence in 1970, with the coups of 1987 and 2000 being 
extreme manifestations of the same features, in that they represented extra-
legal means for the Fijian governing élite to overcome the effects of communal 
disunity. However, such reactions failed to acknowledge that the cause of 
communal disunity did not lie in inter-communal rivalry. the political system 
only gave that appearance.
community disunity has largely resulted from two factors. the first has to 
do with popular expectations that independence would deliver development. 
in part, as in any country, development would be affected by the quality and 
organizing skills of the country’s leaders. it would also be affected by the 
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strategies for development they pursued, and by the nature of the regional and 
global environment they confronted. All influenced the access to and availability 
of resources for meaningful development.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the external environment did provide new 
opportunities, which Fiji’s leaders tapped into. the opportunities were in new 
timber, clothing and light manufacturing activities, and in the expansion of 
tourism and sugar production. clothing and sugar, however, were dependent 
on preferential access to markets and, in the long term, these industries would 
suffer both from the global trend towards free trade and from the failure of 
political leaders to use preferences as the basis for economic diversification. 
But development would also be frustrated by the growing disjuncture between, 
first, rural and urban development and, second, state nationalist rhetoric and 
transnational economic linkages. in the 1970s, the former was the greatest 
test of communal unity for the Alliance; in the 1980s, the latter. in many 
respects, it was development that most affected the 1990s. However, the push 
towards external alliances strengthened, and the local impact of these alliances 
was offset in part by the suspension of democracy (between 1987 and 1992) 
and in part by the introduction of the 1990 constitution, which consolidated 
Fijian political dominance. these offsetting factors did not of themselves 
address the key development issues facing the country, but they did highlight 
and make more obvious the key importance of leadership and governance as 
ingredients of development, thus providing new scope for division within all 
communal blocs.
the first three decades of independence demonstrated the fundamental 
weaknesses of communalism as the basis for political organization. unity in 
both main communities depended on maintaining the status quo, yet the goal 
of communal leadership was development, which – whether successful or not 
– held the potential to destabilize the status quo as a result of the social change 
it effected. over time, education alone created tensions; it either further raised 
expectations or helped expose the failures of leadership. urbanization had a 
similar impact, but, in addition, it undermined communal distinctiveness, 
as more and more people from different communities lived together, worked 
together and schooled together. these were not rapid processes of change, 
although urbanization was more rapid in and after the 1990s because of the 
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failure of rural development plans, the negative impact of the coups and poor 
leadership on economic growth. But the political impact of urbanization tended 
to be delayed because, initially, it brought together people with little experience 
of multiracial living, who sought to maintain their communal distinctiveness by 
way of urban settlements and social/religious associations. At least in the short 
term, urbanization created as many obstacles to multiracial accommodation 
as it resolved.
Accordingly, social change – although consistent throughout the first 
three decades of independence – was neither rapid nor necessarily politically 
destabilizing. nonetheless, communal disunity could dramatically change party 
fortunes, as the Alliance party first discovered in April 1977 when the dissident 
Fijian nationalist party, riding on the back of rural dissatisfaction with the pace 
of development, managed to secure 24 per cent of the Fijian vote and destroy the 
Alliance’s majority. only intra-communal (muslim–Hindu) rivalries prevented 
the nFp from claiming a narrow victory and, in the subsequent September 
poll, the Alliance learned the value of raising the spectre of indo-Fijian political 
dominance to offset indigenous Fijian divisions. this hardening of racial 
polarization increasingly came with notions of Fijian paramountcy – the idea 
that, as the original indigenous people of Fiji, Fijians possessed an inherent 
right to political rule. indeed, by the same logic, they alone were permitted to 
use the national name to describe themselves. ‘indians’ – for some, even use 
of the descriptor indo-Fijian became contentious – were portrayed variously 
as foreigners or as guests ungrateful for the hospitality already given them by 
Fijians. Although, by the 1980s, transnational corporations, many of them 
in association with Fijian investment companies, clearly dominated the Fiji 
economy, indo-Fijians monopolized very visible sectors, such as cane farming, 
transport and retail. this enabled Fijian nationalists to characterize their struggle 
as one against both indo-Fijian political and indo-Fijian economic domination. 
While Fijian nationalists saw their purpose as healing intra-communal division, 
such political campaigning carried immense dangers for stability and national 
development.
in many respects, the nFp never recovered from the ruptures of 1977 – 
although it did manage to give the appearance of recovery in the 1982 election, 
when it regained much of the ground it had previously lost. it was assisted by a 
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new coalition with a small western Fijian party (the Western united Front, or 
WuF) that won two seats on the strength of western Viti levu dissatisfaction 
with the Alliance’s handling of its pine resources. However, economic recession 
and conflict with trade unions shifted the focus of politics in the 1980s and left 
the still divided, business-oriented nFp increasingly marginalized. the vacuum 
was filled in 1985 by a Fiji trade union congress-sponsored Fiji labour party 
(Flp), a multiracial alternative to both the Alliance and nFp, which declared 
that the handling of issues rather than race should be the crucial determinant 
of fitness for office. As a worker-based party, it wished to focus on economic 
and social issues that all communities faced in common, and which it felt the 
two main parties neglected because of their concentration on communalism. 
However, in late 1986, in a major change in tactics, the Flp formed a coalition 
with the nFp. in the following April 1987 election, as a result of increased Fijian 
support in four Suva open constituencies, where labour’s issues-based strategy 
had most appeal, this coalition narrowly defeated the Alliance government.
labour’s sudden victory demonstrated the impact social change could have 
on political outcomes, especially in open seats where margins were potentially 
tighter. For those who lost, it also demonstrated the inability of communalism 
as established under the 1970 constitution to maintain Fijian paramountcy. 
consequently, in may 1987, the losers re-seized power through a military 
coup and introduced a completely new dimension to Fiji politics that survives 
to this day. For, once invited in, the military demonstrated great reluctance 
to return to the barracks. Although the Governor General, ratu Sir penaia 
Ganilau, succeeded in taking charge of the regime which came to power 
after the coup, he was powerless to control the military. indeed, when he and 
former Alliance prime minister ratu Sir Kamisese mara sought to head off 
economic collapse by seeking accommodation with the ousted Flp, they were 
deposed in a second coup in September 1987. this time, the army imposed a 
military government on the country and, in order to forestall legal challenges, 
declared Fiji a republic. military commander Sitiveni rabuka did permit both 
chiefs to return to their respective positions as president and prime minister 
at the end of 1987, but, for the next five years, relations between the interim 
government and the military were strained. indeed, once a new constitution 
was promulgated in 1990, rabuka, to prevent any possibility of future indo-
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Fijian political rule, moved swiftly to seize control of, first, the new political 
process – gaining leadership of a new Fijian establishment party (the Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa ni taukei or SVt) – and then, in 1992, the prime ministership. 
the SVt signaled the demise of multiracialism. Despite its shortcomings, the 
Alliance had at least symbolized a coalition of communities. the SVt made 
no such pretence; it was defiantly a Fijian-only party constructed on the basis 
of Fijian paramountcy.
the military’s role as guardian of national security was enshrined in the new 
constitution. in addition, the new constitution specifically bestowed immunity 
from prosecution on all people who had engaged in the coups of 1987. it also 
strengthened communalism as a bulwark against social change, reserving all 
senior political and constitutional posts for Fijians, increasing the role of the 
Great council of chiefs, doing away with open seats and the cross-voting they 
entailed, provincializing Fijian electorates, and penalizing all communities 
deemed disloyal in 1987, including those of western and urban Fijians. it 
produced a 70-member lower house made up of 37 Fijians, 27 indo-Fijians, five 
General electors, and one rotuman. indo-Fijians no longer enjoyed equality 
with Fijians, and General electors lost their once influential balance of power 
role. urban Fijians, proportionately entitled to 13 seats, received only five, 
while provincial seats were disproportionately weighted to favour the eastern 
provinces of the chiefly establishment.
ironically, this remaking of communalism failed to achieve one of its main 
objectives – Fijian reunification. Shorn of its raison d’être – the potential threat 
of indo-Fijian dominance – the new Fijian governing party was never able to 
emulate the Alliance’s command of Fijian support. in 1992, it gained 66 per 
cent of the Fijian vote, well short of the Alliance’s 84 per cent in 1972. What 
the constitution did do, however, was to create a form of political apartheid 
in which each election resembled two separate elections, one Fijian and one 
indo-Fijian, with the former representing a struggle between the governing party 
and dissident individuals and provinces, and the latter a struggle between two 
supposedly ideologically opposed (but, in reality, simply differently led in terms 
of style) parties for the hearts and minds of indo-Fijians. While the former took 
government as its prize, the latter had to settle for opposition leadership.
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this system ended abruptly with the introduction in 1997 of another new 
constitution. the SVt’s monopolization of power had not prevented political 
drift and economic decline; if anything, it had contributed to the malaise. Sham 
democracies that prevent the turnover of government, such as that created 
by the 1990 constitution, rarely provide a check on the exercise of political 
power. perhaps sensing this, rabuka sought to reinvent himself by forming 
a partnership across the communal divide with the nFp in order to reduce 
the most obvious obstacle to national development. But such a partnership 
represented a (largely unstated) recognition that 1987 had been a mistake and 
that the country needed to revert to the principles of multiracialism espoused 
in 1970. However, little was done to prepare Fijians for this transformation 
in political rhetoric. rabuka refused to concede explicitly that 1987 had been 
a mistake, and planned vanua consultations on the new changes were never 
completed. 
nonetheless, the new constitution was promulgated. it introduced a new 
lower House of 71 members derived from 46 communal and 25 open seats. 
twenty-three of the communal seats were reserved for Fijians, 19 for indo-
Fijians, one for rotumans and three for General electors. the constitution also 
foreshadowed rabuka’s planned partnership, by mandating that any party that 
received more than 10 per cent of the seats (that is, eight seats or more) had the 
right to share proportionately in cabinet posts. it also introduced a new system 
of voting – the alternative vote system – that was promoted as more likely to 
produce multiracial accommodation than the older first-past–the-post system. 
in practice, however, it didn’t; it was to prove every bit as non-accommodating 
of minority views as its predecessor (see Fraenkel, this volume). Finally, although 
progressive compared with its predecessors (especially with respect to human 
rights), the new constitution’s electoral provisions still produced large disparities 
in electorate sizes (particularly among Fijian communal constituencies) and 
still under-represented urban Fijians. 
nevertheless, the first election under the 1997 constitution, in may 1999, 
did produce a significantly different result, although more for political than 
electoral reasons. uncertainty over the power-sharing provisions of the 
constitution and widespread dissatisfaction with SVt rule saw the latter’s share 
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of Fijian votes plummet to 38 per cent. the SVt’s proposed partner, the nFp, 
suffered a worse fate, winning no seats at all. From this election, a new people’s 
coalition government emerged, dominated by a now strongly indo-Fijian Flp, 
but partnered with very substantial dissident Fijian parties that, together, had 
garnered about 60 per cent of the Fijian vote	.2 For this reason, perhaps, the Flp 
did not feel obliged to honour the constitution’s power-sharing commitment; 
when the SVt imposed conditions on its involvement in a multiparty cabinet, 
the Flp rejected them and excluded the SVt from cabinet.
As in 1987, the upset victory was short-lived. on 19 may 2000, Fijian 
nationalists and a rebel military unit (originally established by rabuka to protect 
his 1987 ‘revolution’) staged a coup that, although ultimately unsuccessful for 
the coup-leaders, enabled the Fijian establishment to reassert itself and conduct 
– in 2001 – fresh elections, with a new all-Fijian party (the Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni lewenivanua or SDl) that carried none of the baggage of its predecessor. 
like the Alliance in the September 1977 election, the SDl employed nationalist 
rhetoric to heal Fijian divisions and to minimize the impact of another new 
Fijian party, the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua (cAmV), which 
was allied to the 2000 coup plotters. the tactic succeeded, and the new 
establishment party, the SDl, won 70 per cent of the Fijian vote (if the 20 
per cent share of its eventual partner – the cAmV – is included). the Flp 
similarly consolidated its hold on indo-Fijian support at the expense of the 
nFp, with the Flp winning 75 per cent of the indo-Fijian vote.3 the result 
reflected the uncertainties created by the 1999 election and, more particularly, 
the 2000 coup, and the failure of the alternative vote system to give space to 
minority voices.
Such polarization also effectively meant that these uncertainties could not 
be easily resolved. only inter-communal cooperation could have that impact, 
and, in the wake of 2000, with each party boxed in with their respective 
community, there was little possibility of cooperation. thus, differences 
over land rentals, which had simmered all through the late 1990s, remained 
unresolved because of political obstinacy. the SDl went to the polls in 2001 
on a platform of affirmative action for Fijians. the Flp opposed this as a form 
of racial discrimination, and, although differences between the parties were not 
great, rhetoric alone made a meeting of minds impossible. the SDl refused to 
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entertain power-sharing with the Flp as the constitution mandated, just as the 
Flp had refused power-sharing with the SVt in 1999. However, unlike the 
SVt, the Flp rigorously pursued the matter through the courts until 2005, 
when it finally accepted a role as opposition party. Despite the basic legality 
of its position, its court action served to reduce possibilities for cooperation 
further.
in 2005, the SDl introduced a controversial promotion of reconciliation, 
tolerance and unity Bill, which labour dismissed as an attempt to heal divisions 
within the Fijian community over post-coup investigations and prosecutions. 
the matter might have remained as yet another symbol of intercommunal 
division but for the military’s defiant stand against the Bill. As a largely Fijian 
institution, the republic of Fiji military Forces had traditionally supported 
ruling Fijian parties. However, the 2000 coup revealed serious divisions within 
the military that were dramatically exacerbated in november of that year when 
the military unit responsible for the 2000 debacle suddenly mutinied. this 
second failed initiative hardened the military leadership against reconciliation 
and, during early 2006, its troops were displayed around the capital as a sign 
of its displeasure with the government, a move that was eerily reminiscent of 
its behaviour towards the interim government between 1988 and 1992. prior 
to the 2006 election, its leadership even hinted at the possibility of a coup if 
its views were ignored. [See ratuva, this volume.]
the unconstitutional role of the military was not the only issue of debate 
after 2000. increasingly, the rapid decline in the indo-Fijian population gained 
greater public recognition.4 indeed, nearly one-quarter of the indo-Fijian 
population had left Fiji in the two decades after 1987, and that decline had 
electoral implications, particularly in open seats. in effect, it meant that, in 
time, indo-Fijians as a bloc were unlikely ever again to achieve political power in 
their own right, as they had in 1999. instead, they would have to return to their 
roots, and devote more attention to developing a multiracial constituency. this 
was always one of the goals of power-sharing, and perhaps one reason why, at 
the conclusion of the 2006 election, both parties saw advantages in the practice 
that they had previously neglected. certainly, it provided an opportunity to 
reduce political heat and effect a more cooperative environment in which to 
address the many unresolved issues that affected all communities alike.
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Whether such power-sharing accommodation will extend to the joint 
development of Bills to resolve these issues remains to be seen, but at the very 
least it suggests that, with political will and responsible leadership, a way can be 
found to overcome the inherent dangers communalism has always inflicted on 
the nation, and to create the necessary political trust on which to build a more 
responsive political system for the future. this has been the one undeniable 
lesson of Fiji’s long road since 1970, a lesson Fiji has constantly been forced 
to confront after each occasion of communal polarization. then, as now, 
the behaviour of political parties and their leaders have most determined the 
success or otherwise of multiracialism, and with it the development prospects 
of the country. 
Notes
1 From the end of World War ii until quite recently, Fijians and indo-Fijians constituted 
approximately the same demographic proportion of the community.
2 the party of national unity (pAnu) was a Ba-based party with four seats. the Fijian 
Association party (FAp), founded in opposition to rabuka in 1994, won 10 seats. these 
two parties were in coalition with labour on the eve of the election. not so, the Veitokani 
ni lewenivanua Vakarisito (VlV), which had been set up as an unofficial methodist party 
in opposition to the new constitution, and which demanded both the return of the 1987 
‘Sunday Ban’ and that Fiji be declared a christian state. its three members promptly joined 
the people’s coalition after the election.
3 this communal polarization behind two large parties would be repeated in 2006, with both 
parties gaining around 81 per cent of their respective communal votes.
4  the indo-Fijian population has fallen rapidly since 1987 and by 2006 is assumed to make 
up only 37 per cent of Fiji’s total population.
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Indigenous title disputes: 
what they meant for the 2006 
election
Morgan Tuimaleali’ifano
the 2006 poll produced a mixed score-card for Fiji’s customary chiefs. on the 
one hand, finding a place for Fiji’s ruling dynasties at the centre of government 
remained a central concern for the re-elected Qarase government, not only 
because Fiji’s Bose levu Vakaturaga (Great council of chiefs) holds the 
critical swing votes in the Senate, but also because the newly elected prime 
minister felt obliged to bring top title-holders from all three of the country’s 
confederacies into the post-election multiparty cabinet in order to guarantee 
ethnic Fijian support. on the other hand, as is shown in this chapter, chiefs 
have fared increasingly poorly at the last three elections, indicating a profound 
social transformation. What is the role of chiefly titles in determining success 
or failure at modern elections? Are there discernible trends in the performance 
of customary leaders at the polls? 
this chapter explores the influence of chiefly rivalries on modern-day Fiji 
politics, particularly the performance of chiefs as traditional indigenous leaders 
at the 1999, 2001 and 2006 polls, and how these influenced the post-election 
formation of governments. 
After more than a century of colonial structures, the hereditary chiefly 
hierarchy continues to exercise a major influence on the majority of indigenous 
Fijians and other citizens of Fiji. the colonially instituted Bose levu Vakaturaga 
is the highest indigenous political body, comprising representatives of Fiji’s 
hereditary hierarchy. Approximately 7,170 yavusa (tribal) and mataqali (clan) 
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titleholders are represented in this body.1 in concert with the native land trust 
Board, it controls 89–90 per cent of the land (this figure has increased with the 
return of Schedule A and B crown lands). of the 7,170 tribal and clan titles, 
25 per cent remain vacant, not through lack of interest, but because of strongly 
contested clan views that, in former times, could only have been resolved by 
warfare. At the time of the 2006 election, these title vacancies included some 
of the highest in the land – for example, the tui Kaba na Vunivalu of Bau and 
titular head of Kubuna (vacant since 1989), na ratu mai Verata and head of 
pre-contact Fiji (since 2001), tui nadi (covering the nadi airport), tui Ba of 
nailaga and tui navitilevu of rakiraki (the latter two covering the western cane 
belt), and the tui nayau and the concurrent title of Sau ni Vanua ko lau, of 
the lau group of islands. A successor to the late roko tui Dreketi title-holder 
was installed in early 2005, but the political ramifications of this appointment 
for the vanua and lotu (itself an important issue in the electoral contest in 
rewa) appear unclear at this stage. these long-standing succession issues are 
embedded in indigenous Fijian society and frame Fiji’s political history; they 
inform, fuel and shape local perspectives and national disputes.
customary chiefs in Fiji do not necessarily win at the polls, but social 
ranking in local hierarchies can prove highly significant to the outcome of the 
elections. From the 1970s to the 1980s, politics was dominated by the ratus, 
particularly the big four, ratu Sir George cakobau, ratu Sir edward cakobau, 
ratu Sir Kamisese mara and ratu Sir penaia Ganilau. With the exception of 
ratu edward, all held vanua and matanitu titles. ratu George held the tui 
Kaba na Vunivalu titles of Kubuna, ratu penaia the tui cakau title of tovata, 
ratu mara held the tui nayau and most senior title of lau while his wife, 
ro lady lala mara, held the roko tui Dreketi title and paramountcy of the 
confederacy of Burebasaga. 
in the 2006 election, leader of the national Alliance party ratu epeli 
Ganilau, was the son of a former tui cakau and former president. ratu epeli 
was a candidate for the tui cakau title and is married to the daughter of former 
president ratu Sir Kamisese mara, but his party gained not a single seat. in 
contrast, his rival and successor to the tui cakau title, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, 
who had formed the conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua (cAmV) prior to 
the 2001 election, was elected and formed a coalition government with lauan 
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prime minister Qarase’s Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) party. 
As the paramount titleholder of tovata in the pre-tui lau ma’afu period, an 
area which covers Qarase’s constituency, lalabalavu was immediately elevated 
to cabinet and appointed to the all-important land portfolio. During his term 
in office, he was charged and convicted for inciting a mutiny during the 2000 
unrest in the northern Division. After serving his sentence extramurally at 
the nadera catholic parish, he was reinstated to cabinet though not to the 
same portfolio. During the lead-up to the 2006 election, lalabalavu disbanded 
the cAmV, joined the ruling SDl and was elected under the SDl ticket. in 
terms of traditional Fijian polities, lalabalavu’s membership of the SDl has 
considerably strengthened its position in northern Fiji. 
included among the SDl’s senior party members are well-placed chiefs. As 
well as ratu naiqama (the tui cakau), they include ratu Suliano matanitobua 
(the tui namosi) and ro teimumu Kepa (recently appointed roko tui 
Dreketi). the tui cakau and roko tui Dreketi titles are the paramount 
positions in two of Fiji’s three confederacies. the third confederacy, which 
was unrepresented at the parliamentary level, is Kubuna. the close association 
among the three ruling families made the absence of a direct representative of 
the Bau conspicuous in the parliament. this was redressed by  nominations to 
the Senate. Soon after the 2006 election, the prime minister decided to appoint 
a member of the Vunivalu family to cabinet through the Senate. She is Adi 
Samanunu cakobau-talakuli, eldest daughter of the late Vunivalu, and one of 
the most eligible contenders for her father’s title. in this way, it would appear, 
Qarase has galvanized Fijian support while forming a multiparty cabinet with 
the Fiji labour party (Flp). 
How did customary chiefs fare as political candidates in the 2006 elections? 
From table 20.1 it can be seen that the number of chiefs standing as political 
candidates increased by eight between 1999 and 2001, but decreased by 20 
in 2006. the number of chiefs elected fell (by five) between 2001 and 1999, 
but increased (by four) between 2001 and 2006. However, while these figures 
show a declining number of chiefly candidates between 1999 and 2006, the 
decline is compensated for by the number of chiefs holding high titles among 
the elected candidates. in other words, chiefs vested with high titles, such 
as tui cakau and roko tui Dreketi, continued to be returned, while the 
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number of electorally successful chiefs with lesser vanua titles (or none at all) 
fell. the reason for the declining number of chiefs in national politics is not 
because of lack of Fijians’ interest in their chiefs, but because of the intense 
competition among rival candidates for chiefly titles. many of the title disputes 
are under investigation by the native lands and Fisheries commission, and 
decisions on others are undergoing judicial review. Because of the intensity of 
competition, rival candidates and supporters have agreed to disagree, postpone 
an appointment and continue the discussion until a consensus has been reached. 
this was confirmed by a leading member of the mataqali tui Kaba and former 
speaker of the House, ratu epeli nailatikau: when asked whether the mataqali 
was losing interest in the leading title of Kubuna, he was adamant that there 
was no loss of interest. ‘on the contrary’, he said. ‘as soon as the election and 
the methodist conference are over, we will meet to settle it. it is largely an 
internal family dispute’.2 
Limitations in identifying who is and who is not a chief
While some chiefs indicate their vanua status by prefacing their candidacy with 
the ratu/adi/bulou/ro style of address, many do not. many enter the election 
without chiefly style, but, once they enter parliament, a chiefly style suddenly 
appears, conferred either by themselves or by someone else. in theory, it should 
be possible to identify a Fijian chief by the style of address used during the 
election campaign: ratu for men, adi and bulou for women and ro in rewa 
for either gender. But identifying who is and who is not a chief at elections 
Table 20.1 Performance of chiefly candidates in parliamentary elections
election  no. of candidates  no. of candidates  no. of chiefly no. of elected  no. of elected
year standing in 48  known as candidates chiefly  chiefly candidates 
 constituencies customary  expressed as candidates expressed as 
 (23+25) chiefs per cent of  per cent of 
   total candidates  total candidates 
1999 240 30 12.5 12 5
2001 256 38 15 7 3
2006 247 18 7 11 4
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is a complicated matter. in this regard, two kinds of chiefs are distinguished: 
one who inherits a chiefly style by birth, and the other who is a chief by birth 
and by appointment and installation to one of various offices within the 
vanua. normally accompanied by ceremony, such offices include na turaga na 
mataqali, yavusa, tikina, vanua or a matanitu. Another term signifying a chief 
is apparent in kin relationship. Between equals, relations are usually conducted 
on a first-name basis, but between unequals, or those acknowledged as lower 
position or younger, use of ratu/adi/bulou/ro styles of address often punctuates 
the conversation. identifying election candidates who are chiefly is particularly 
difficult in Fijian elections because, unlike Samoa or tonga, Fiji has electoral 
regulations that do not distinguish between chiefs and non-chiefs. 
Was there a discernible pattern in the number of chiefly candidates and 
elected chiefly candidates over these past three elections? the following analysis 
focuses on candidates whose chiefly rank is clearly established. 
Chiefs in the 1999 election
in 1999, there were 30 candidates of known chiefly rank out of the 240 
candidates from the 48 constituencies in which Fijians can stand (23 Fijian 
and 25 open). of these, 12, or 5 per cent of the 240 candidates, were elected. 
Among the casualty list were important chiefs of vanua and yavusa/mataqali, and 
siblings of vanua and matanitu chiefs. one vanua chief who lost was ratu tevita 
Bolobolo, holder of na tuvitilevu title and paramountcy of ra. His defeat was 
doubly humiliating because he is a paramount titleholder. moreover, his defeat 
was at the hands of Fiji-indian candidates. in the first count, ratu Bolobolo 
lost out to the Fiji labour party (Flp) candidate Sanjeet chand maharaj, and, 
when the count went to preferences, he lost to independent candidate George 
Shiu raj. Another paramount titleholder who failed to secure a seat was the na 
Ka levu of nadroga. contesting the nadroga open constituency, ratu Sakiusa 
makutu polled the largest number of votes on the first count. However, he 
failed to secure a simple majority and, when the count went to preferences, he 
was beaten by the Flp candidate, a chief of lower rank, ratu mosese Volavola. 
other casualties included: the children of Fiji’s former Governor General 
and Vunivalu of Bau, Adi litia cakobau (tailevu north/ovalau open) and 
ratu epenisa cakobau (tailevu South/lomaiviti open); the son of a former 
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president and tui cakau, ratu epeli Gavidi Ganilau; the sister of former 
president and tui nayau, Adi Senimili tuivanuavou (lau/taveuni/rotuma); 
and ratu Kamisese mara’s brother-in-law, ratu tu’uakitau cokanauto (tailevu 
north/ovalau open).3
of the twelve winning chiefly candidates, nine were in government and three 
in the opposition. in government were: Koila nailatikau-mara (Veitokani 
ni lewenivanua Vakarisito); esira rabuno (Fijian Association party (FAp)); 
isimeli jale cokanasiga; isireli Vuibau (Flp); tu’uakitau cokanauto (FAp); 
tevita moemoedonu (Flp); mosese Volavola (Flp); Kuini Vuikaba-Speed 
(FAp); and ema tagicakibau (FAp). in opposition were Kinijoji maivalili, 
inoke Kubuabola, and naiqama tawake lalabalavu. 
the opposition had higher-ranking chiefs than the government. one was 
the head of a matanitu, tovata, and the other two were leading members of 
leading clans of the leading province within tovata. ratu inoke Kubuabola 
is a member of the important ‘Ai Sokula clan, and ratu Kinijioji maivalili is 
the heir apparent to the tui Wailevu and Vunivalu titles of Wailevu; both have 
close ties to the ‘Ai Sokula. the tovata number was strengthened when another 
cakaudrove chief from natewa entered parliament. Former prime minister 
Sitiveni rabuka resigned from his cakaudrove West open seat, and was replaced 
by ratu rakuita Vakalalabure, contender for the Vunivalu of natewa title. 
While the government side had nine ratus and adis, and represented all 
three matanitus (Kubuna, tovata and Burebasaga), they were clearly not of 
the same ranking. Adi Koila nailatikau mara’s mother and father covered 
both Burebasaga and tovata, and her husband, the former Fiji military Forces 
commander, former ambassador to the united Kingdom, roving ambassador 
to the pacific region, and former Speaker of the House, covered Kubuna. Adi 
Kuini Speed was tui noikoro, a vanua chief in navosa. Because navosa had 
been marginalized due to its resistance to colonial authority, it did not have 
the same clout as other vanuas. ratu tu’uakitau cokanauto is from the tui 
Kaba and king-making clan of the Vunivalu of Bau, but he was not from the 
dominant household, the mataiwelagi. Similarly, ratu tevita moemoedonu 
and ratu mosese Volavola were not holders of vanua titles, and so did not have 
the same standing as the others within the vanua and matanitu.
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in terms of the Fijian hierarchy’s support for the labour coalition government, 
only Adi lady lala mara, as the roko tui Dreketi, could be counted upon. 
Her daughter and a collateral cousin (who was also her brother-in-law) were 
members of the Flp coalition government. the other paramount chief, tui 
cakau, was in opposition, and the leading siblings of the other matanitu, 
Kubuna, from the competing sides of the mataiwelagi household, each failed 
to secure a seat.
Chiefs in the 2001 election
in 2001, 38 candidates of known chiefly rank were amongst the 256 candidates 
that stood in the 48 constituencies (up from 30 candidates in 1999). out of 38, 
only seven, or 3 per cent of the total number of candidates, won – considerably 
down from 1999. the successful chiefly candidates were:
• ratu Suliano matanitobua (SDl)
• ro teimumu Vuikaba tuisawau Kepa (SDl)
• ratu jone Yavala Kubuabola (SDl)
• Adi Asenaca caucau (SDl) 
• ratu naiqama tawake lalabalavu (cAmV) 
• ratu rakuita Saurara Vakalalabure (cAmV) 
• ratu Savenaca Draunidalo (independent – and heir apparent to the tui 
moala title).
the only survivor from the 1999 election was ratu lalabalavu, who was then in 
the opposition; once the two parties joined in coalition, he was given the lands 
portfolio. unlike the 1999 election, the 2001 ‘casualty list’ did not include a high 
number of significant vanua or yavusa chiefs, or their siblings. the losses included 
two vanua chiefs: ratu Kinijioji maivalili, heir apparent to the tui Wailevu title; 
and ratu Aisea Katonivere, the then heir apparent to the tui macuata title. 
the other losses include chiefs of secondary ranking, such as Bauans like ratu 
tu’uakitau cokanauto, Adi Finau tabakaucoro and ratu timoci tavanavanua, 
rewans like ro Alipate Doviverata mataitini, and cakaudrovens like ratu Aisake 
Kubuabola and Adi ema tagicakibau, the latter four contesting in constituencies 
outside areas of their chiefly standing. in doing so, it was commonly observed, 
many chiefs did not style themselves as ratus/adis.
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of the seven chiefly candidates who were elected, four were from SDl, two 
were cAmV and one was an independent. none belonged to the Flp. the 
two cAmV chiefs and the independent chief joined the SDl-led coalition 
government, two in cabinet and one as Deputy Speaker. As for the opposition, 
the only support they could count on from chiefs came from those in the Great 
council of chiefs and the Senate. But they were very few, the notable one being 
the tui Ba-i-Bulu, ratu Sairusi nagagavoka, who wielded considerable influence 
over his party of national unity from inside the Great council of chiefs. 
Chiefs in the 2006 election
in 2006, the total number of candidates that stood for the 48 constituencies was 
247. the number of candidates of known chiefly rank that stood for election 
dropped from 38 in 2001 to just 18. of those 18, only 11, or just 4 per cent 
of all the candidates in the 48 constituencies, were elected. 
the 11 chiefly candidates that were elected, all SDl members, were ratu 
isikeli tasere, ratu Suliano matanitobua, ro teimumu Kepa-tuisawau, ratu 
meli Saukuru, ratu naiqama lalabalavu, ratu jone Y Kubuabola, ratu 
jone Waqairatu, Adi Asenaca caucau-Filipe, ratu josefa Dimuri, ratu osea 
Vakalalabure and ratu Savenaca Draunidalo.
candidates of chiefly rank were not conspicuous among the Flp’s newly 
elected Fijian mps. After the election, a new female member with an impressive 
majority from the Yasawa nawaka open constituency, Adi Sivia Qoro, appeared 
in the Flp line-up for the multiparty cabinet and was given the commerce 
portfolio. Adi Sivia is from naviti island in the Yasawas. Her mother, Adi 
titilia, is tui marou and she herself is vasu to marou village on naviti, where 
she grew up.4 overall, though, the overwhelming Fijian support in parliament 
firmly lies with the SDl government.	
How representative is the SDl government of Fijian confederacies? two 
vanua/matanitu titleholders are included, those of Burebasaga and tovata 
through ro teimumu Kepa-tuisawau and ratu lalabalavu, respectively. 
the only other vanua chief who stood and was elected was ratu Suliano 
matanitobua, the tui namosi, and representing the vanua of Serua and namosi. 
nadroga/navosa is represented through ratu isikelu tasere, nadi-Ba-tavua 
through ratu meli Saukuru. in addition to the tui cakau, the representation 
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of tovata is strengthened by ratu Savenaca Draunidalo (tui moala of Yasayasa 
moala), ratu josefa Dimuri of Bua/macuata, and natewan chief ratu osea 
Vakalalabure, and non-resident cakaudrove chiefs, such as the powerful finance 
minister, ratu jone Yavala Kubuabola. A potential tovata ally was ratu jone 
Waqairatu, a lauan from Yaroi in Yasayasa moala, who stood and was elected 
to the tamavua/laucala communal constituency.5 (ratu Draunidalo is an 
example of an urbane category of chiefs who consistently spurn being styled a 
ratu; on every occasion that i have met him his outstretched hand has always 
been accompanied by just ‘Bula, Save’.)
the sole elected chiefly representative from Kubuna was Adi Asenaca 
caucau-Filipe. the scarcity of Kubuna’s presence in the lower House and 
the conspicuous absence of a cakobau descendant was addressed by a Senate 
appointment. After the 2001 election, the failure of any of ratu George 
cakobau’s children (Adi litia, ratu jioji and ratu tanoa Visawaqa) in elections 
was compensated for by the appointment of three cakobaus at different times 
to Senate. in the 2006 election, none of the children contested and, in order 
to maintain a balance of representation at the parliamentary level, prime 
minister Qarase appointed the former ambassador to malaysia, Adi Samanunu 
cakobau-talakuli, to cabinet as minister of State through the Senate. With her 
appointment to cabinet, the SDl/Flp multiparty cabinet has representation 
from all of Fiji’s 19th century confederacies.
While the number of chiefly and successful candidates has decreased, 
those elected constitute a strong representation of Fijian vanua interests and 
hierarchy. in other words, while the overall number has decreased, the ‘quality’ of 
representation at the highest level has remained constant – an indication of the 
tenacity of the indigenous hold to nineteenth century governance structure.
Conclusion
in contemporary politics, succession struggles over vanua chiefly titles continue 
to plague current indigenous leadership. one striking theme from recent 
elections has been the consequence of the absence of leadership from Kubuna, 
particularly the mataqali of tui Kaba. ‘Because of the longstanding vacancy 
[in Kubuna], …you cannot expect mana to flow down to the minor chiefs 
when there is no one holding that powerful position.’6 Vacant since 1989, 
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the title of Vunivalu of Bau has generated a long-standing power struggle 
within the mataqali tui Kaba, centred on the mataiwelagi household, ratu 
George cakobau’s household. Failure to resolve this indigenous issue has, i 
suggest, contributed to the events which brought Fiji to its knees in 2000. 
the consequences include pitting close siblings against each other in the 
1999 election (consider the tailevu north/ovalau open contest between 
litia cakobau of mataiwelagi and collateral cousin tu’uakitau cokanauto 
of naisogolaca). the split resulted in a victory for Flp candidate ratu isireli 
Vuibau, who did not command the same level of status within indigenous 
leadership. When the 2001 and 2006 elections were held, not a single 
member of the mataqali tui Kaba stood, reflecting the unresolved leadership 
struggle. the mataiwelagi family squabble within the tui Kaba is just the 
tip of a growing iceberg. Figures released by the native land and Fisheries 
commission in 2004 show the increasing number of vacant vanua/yavusa/
tikina/mataqali titles. Such vacancies result in power vacuums all over Fiji 
at the local level.7 if the local leadership issues are not addressed, the Great 
council of chiefs and its associate arms, as a conglomerate institution of 
indigenous authority, risks becoming a refuge for unelected customary 
chiefs. the council has already been labelled an anachronism by some 
observers, including Fijians. the all-too-familiar pattern that emerges is 
the use of both the council and the Senate as havens for failed politicians 
of chiefly rank.
General elections provide an important indicator of the state of health of 
Fiji’s chiefly institution. it has been a long-standing assumption that titled 
candidates such as chiefs have better chances of getting into parliament. the 
outcome of the past three elections disproves this. titleholders who rely solely 
on ancestry are unlikely to fare well in politics. Higher levels of education 
and professional experience in the modern globalized world and selective 
church engagement are increasingly more important. political aspirants of 
hereditary stock may display their titles in preference to qualification and 
experience, but most voters will judge them by their performance. this 
is a trend that is likely to continue, in line with contemporary politics in 
Samoa and tonga. 
271indigenous  title  disputes
Notes
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2 ratu epeli nailatikau, pers. comm., 30 April 2006.
3 ratu tu’uakitau later won the tailevu north/ovalau seat after the court overturned the earlier 
result because of an error in the way preferences were summed.
4 Apolosi Bose and jon Fraenkel, pers. comm. 18 August 2006.
5 Adi ema tagicakibau, pers. comm. july 2006.
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Bipolar realignment under the 
alternative vote system:  
an analysis of the 2006  
electoral data
Jon Fraenkel
Fiji’s third election under the alternative vote (AV) system showed some startling 
developments, including a shift towards robust, single, rival political parties 
representing, on the one hand, the indigenous Fijians and, on the other, the 
indians. 
this trend needs to be viewed over the longer term. At the first election 
after the introduction of the AV system, held in may 1999, two multi-ethnic 
coalitions emerged, and entered into deals with each other over the exchange 
of preference votes. the resulting government, led by the country’s first indian 
prime minister, was overthrown in a coup a year later. At the second AV-using 
election, held in August 2001, a moderates Forum emerged, bringing together 
several centrist parties, but this was badly defeated at the 2001 poll. moderate 
Forum preferences went mostly to one or other of the more radical, mainly 
ethnically based, political parties. At the 2006 election, there was no sign of 
1999’s cross-ethnic alliances, nor was there any repeat of 2001’s moderates 
Forum. instead, anticipating that the contest would be a two-horse race 
between the Fiji labour party (Flp) and laisenia Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata 
ni lewenivanua (SDl), moderate parties prior to the poll sought to make deals 
with the more ethnically based parties.
this strategic realignment towards a two-party system over the three elections 
merits some investigation. the AV system was originally introduced as part of 
the 1997 constitution, and had been aimed at encouraging the formation of 
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multi-ethnic governments. By requiring voters to rank candidates, it was hoped 
that moderate parties would fare well. it was also thought that political parties 
might moderate policies to appeal to floating voters across the ethnic divide. 
party arrangements over the exchange of preference votes would, it was hoped, 
generate strong inter-ethnic coalitions.1 in practice, however, the major strategic 
advantages accrued to the big parties, whether or not they were moderate. many 
votes were transferred between Fijian-based and indian-based parties, but such 
preference transfers tended to undermine, rather than reinforce, the centrist 
coalitions that emerged in 1999 and 2001. the shift back to a two-party system 
in 2006 undermined the claims that had been made for preferential voting as 
a tool for promoting multi-ethnic government. it had been assumed that the 
system would generate multiparty constellations, and necessarily so. only with 
multiple parties would outcomes be decided on preferences, allowing the AV 
system to work in the way it was supposed to.2 even with multiple parties, in 
1999 and 2001, those claims had proved inaccurate; and with only two large 
parties in 2006, even the basic premise was absent.
Seats and votes
Figure 21.1 examines party shares of votes secured and seats won at the 2006 
election. together, the two largest parties received 84 per cent of all votes, and 
94.4 per cent of seats. in other words, both major parties secured a modest 
seat bonus; their shares in seats were above their shares in the vote. the SDl 
took out all 23 Fijian communal seats, while the Flp obtained all 19 indian 
communal seats. And the SDl secured 13 of the 25 open seats, while the Flp 
won the other 12. 
this bipolarization of Fiji’s politics was, at least to some degree, a response 
to the electoral experience in 1999 and 2001. in 1999, the Fijians had been 
split, enabling the mainly indian-backed Flp to secure a landslide victory. in 
2001, the long-standing split in the indian vote between the Flp and national 
Federation party (nFp), and centrist parties ranking the Flp in last position, 
were sufficient to hand the predominantly indigenous Fijian-backed SDl the 
largest number of seats. 
in 2006, the indian parties settled their differences and exchanged preferences 
with each other, while the ethnic Fijian parties formed a ‘Grand coalition’ 
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spearheaded by former constitutional review commissioner tomasi Vakatora.3 
the middle ground in Fiji’s politics had so diminished that centrist preferences 
decided fewer outcomes in 2006 than they did in 1999 or 2001, although 
some contests were so close that even these small shares of votes delivered the 
margin of victory.
of the registered voters, 53 per cent were ethnic Fijian and 43 per cent were 
indian, reflecting an ongoing shift in the demographic balance towards the 
indigenous community.4 the 2006 indian turnout (88.7 per cent) was slightly 
above that of the indigenous Fijian community (87 per cent), but the share of 
invalid ballots was slightly higher among indians (9.4 per cent) than among 
indigenous Fijians (8.7 per cent). in the General communal constituencies, 
both turnout and invalid voting were lower than average (83.9 and 6.8 per 
cent respectively). turnout was notably lower than average in the Fijian urban 
communal constituencies, and in many of the urban open constituencies. 
nevertheless, at 87.7 per cent, the overall average turnout was well up on 2001 
levels (79.1 per cent).
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A total of 1,778,900 ballot papers, including 120,000 for postal votes, were 
produced, although there were only 479,693 registered voters. each eligible 
voter has two votes and thus needs two ballot papers, bringing the required 
total ballot papers to 959,386. Additional ballot papers were required because, 
under the new compulsory voting system, voters may cast their ballots in any 
polling station within their communal constituency, so where they may choose 
to vote is uncertain. even bearing in mind that need for additional ballot 
papers, however, that nearly twice as many ballot papers were in circulation as 
were required generated problems of administration.5 Since fines for failing to 
vote were not implemented in 1999, 2001 or 2006, the heavy administrative 
cost of shifting away from designated polling stations may, for the future, not 
be worth paying. 
All three elections under the AV system have produced a high degree of 
invalid voting – 9 per cent in 1999, 12 per cent in 2001 and 9 per cent again in 
2006, despite the widespread introduction in 2006 of ‘ushers’, who shepherded 
citizens into the polling booths and assisted even able, literate voters.  
A collision of landslides 
in 2006, in the indian communal constituencies, the Flp repeated its previous 
achievement of securing a clean sweep of all 19 seats. in 1999 and 2001, the 
Flp had secured, respectively, 66 and 75 per cent of the indian communal vote. 
in 2006, the party obtained an average share of 81 per cent of indian votes, 
again with little variation across the country (see Figure 21.2). claims of a likely 
muslim rebellion or north/South indian schisms denting the Flp vote proved 
false, as they had in 1999 and 2001. So, too, did the notion, repeating the 
1970’s illusions of ratu mara’s Alliance party, that the ruling SDl might make 
substantial advances in the indian communal constituencies, or even gain three 
indian seats. imraz iqbal, former Fiji tV personality and SDl deputy campaign 
manager, who featured prominently in SDl tV propaganda, obtained only 
222 votes in nasinu, a seat easily taken by veteran Flp frontbencher Krishna 
Datt. overall, the SDl obtained only 2 per cent of the indian vote, indicating 
a negligible level of indian support for the governing party.
the national Federation party (nFp), under the leadership of jai ram 
reddy, had been the largest of the indian parties in the 1990s. But it slumped 
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to 32 per cent of the indian communal vote in 1999, and on down to 22 per 
cent in 2001. the nFp’s Sugar cane Growers’ Association had long been 
fighting a losing battle with mahendra chaudhry’s national Farmers’ union 
for the hearts and minds of the cane farmers. in the 1990s, the nFp’s strength 
had been in some of the urban areas, but out-migration by middle class 
professionals led to an erosion of the party’s support base. continuing changes 
in the party leadership, and association with prominent Gujarati businessmen, 
lost the party support amongst the descendents of indentured labourers.6 the 
nFp also suffered from being left without seats in 1999 and 2001, and thus 
lacked candidates with extensive parliamentary experience. it had increasingly 
to make appeals to past glories. in 2006, the party gained only 14.6 per cent 
of the indian vote, despite having strategically given strong preferences to the 
Flp in the hope of avoiding electoral annihilation. As in 1999 and 2001, the 
nFp was left with no seats in parliament. As a result, the Flp consolidated its 
claim to be the majority indian party, leaving the nFp reliant on its base in 
the municipal councils and among older unionised cane farmers if leaders opt 
for some kind of nocturnal survival. 
the ruling SDl was able to mirror the Flp’s performance in the indian 
constituencies, taking out all 23 of the Fijian communal seats at the first count. 
Back in 2001, Qarase’s party had faced more powerful rivals, both to the west 
and in the east. then, the SDl was troubled by those provincial schisms that 
frequently prevent Fijian parties from sustaining homogeneous ethnic support. 
localized vanua ties, and rivalries based on the struggle over hereditary titles, 
often underpin contests between indigenous candidates in a way that differs 
markedly from the more ideologically based differences that define indian 
politics. 
Yet, in 2006, the SDl secured close to 80 per cent of the Fijian vote, well up 
on the 50 per cent it had received in 2001 (see Figure 21.3), and, again unlike 
2001, its vote share was reasonably steady across the country. only in rewa 
and Ba east Fijian communal constituencies did SDl candidates face strong 
opposition. in rewa, ro teimumu Kepa saw off the challenge from her nephew, 
ro Filipe tuisawau, who stood as an independent after having been unsuccessful 
in securing the official SDl nomination (see Saumaki, this volume). in Ba east 
Fijian communal, the threatened re-emergence of a Western Viti levu-based 
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Figure 21.2 Major party vote-shares in the 19 Indian constituencies, 2001 and 
2006
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Fijian party was thwarted, despite the vanishing act by the 2001 SDl front 
party in the west, the Bai Kei Viti (see Bose and Fraenkel, this volume). on 
Kadavu, jim Ah Koy, the sitting member during the rabuka years and a major 
financier of development projects on the island, stood as an independent, but 
failed to stop the SDl’s Konisi Yabaki retaining the seat with 74.4 per cent of 
the vote. even relative newcomers to politics, as long as they stood on an SDl 
ticket, were able to defeat sitting members or veteran politicians. 
the Fijian nationalist party performed poorly at the 2006 election. it had 
commanded 25 per cent of the indigenous vote at the polls in April 1977, 
and remained a small, but significant, force through the 1990s. under the 
leadership of Sakeasi Butadroka, the party had been the standard-bearer of 
the Fijian extremist cause, even at one point calling for the expulsion of the 
country’s indian population. the renamed nationalist Vanua lavo tako party 
(nVtlp) managed 9.1 per cent of the vote in 1999, but thereafter it faded. 
After the 2000 coup, the emergence of the conservative Alliance–matanitu 
Vanua (cAmV) party, led by cakaudrove chief ratu naiqama lalabalavu 
and counting imprisoned failed coup leader George Speight as one of its 
mps, resulted in an eclipse of the nVtlp. it obtained only 1.4 per cent of 
the vote in 2001. the liquidation of the cAmV shortly before the 2006 poll, 
and the movement of most of its mps into the SDl, might have left space 
for the older Fijian nationalist party to re-emerge. Yet, the nVtlp obtained 
only 1.1 per cent of the indigenous Fijian vote in 2006. party leader iliesa 
Duvuloco mustered 15 per cent of the vote in tailevu north Fiji provincial 
communal, well below what was required to dislodge SDl sitting member 
Samisoni tikoinasau, brother of the still imprisoned George Speight. nVtlp 
president Viliame Savu, recently released from prison for his part in the may 
2000 coup, secured only 57 votes in lami open. the key characteristic influence 
over policy-formulation under the SDl’s first administration – looking over its 
shoulder at the threat from Fijian extremists – will not necessarily characterize 
its second administration.
there was no sign of the military’s ‘truth and justice’ campaign having a 
major impact on the indigenous Fijian vote. in the weeks leading up to the 
election, army commander Frank Bainimarama made increasingly vociferous 
denunciations of the SDl government. the natural beneficiary of that campaign 
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would have been the newly formed (or reformed) national Alliance party of 
Fiji (nApF), led by former military commander ratu epeli Ganilau. like the 
new labour unity party back in 2001, the nApF was the focus of greatly 
exaggerated expectations before the poll. Yet, ratu epeli’s party secured only 
2.2 per cent of the Fijian communal vote, and a similar share of the indian 
communal vote. ratu epeli himself obtained only 14.6 per cent of the vote 
in the Suva city open constituency, and the party’s other major leader, Filipe 
Bole, a former minister in the rabuka-led governments of the 1990s, managed 
only 7.2 per cent in Samabula/tamavua open. the failure of newly emerging 
moderate and multi-ethnic parties to make an impact at the 2006 poll was, at 
least in part, a product of a longer-run polarization. But it also reflects the fact 
that more centrist approaches, when they do emerge in Fiji politics, tend to 
come from within the mainstream ethnically based parties, rather than springing 
up afresh on un-nurtured ground. 
the Flp’s vote share in the Fijian communal constituencies was 6.3 per 
cent, above its totals in 1999 (1.9 per cent) and in 2001 (2.3 per cent). this 
was partly because the increasingly well-oiled Flp party machine was able to 
stand a larger number of candidates in the Fijian communal constituencies. 
only four Flp candidates stood in the Fijian communal constituencies in 
1999; this rose to six in 2001, and to 15 in 2006. on average, they obtained 
10.2 per cent of Fijian votes in 1999, 7.3 per cent in the fraught post-coup 
circumstances of the 2001 elections and 8.6 per cent in 2006. At the 2006 
election, unlike those in 1999 and 2001, even the nFp stood candidates in 
the Fijian communal constituencies, hoping that some Fijian communal voters 
would simultaneously mark ballots in favour of the nFp in the more winnable 
open constituencies.  
the strength of party affiliations in determining vote shares was evident even 
in the general communal constituencies – where those other than the ethnic 
Fijians, indians and rotumans vote. Sitting member in the Suva city General 
seat, Kenneth Zinck – who crossed the floor to join the Qarase government 
after the 2001 poll, but who rejected the offer of an SDl ticket for the 2006 
poll – obtained only third position behind the SDl’s Aca lord. the major 
political parties fought more fiercely for the General Voter and rotuman 
constituencies than at previous elections. nevertheless, it was only in these 
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that independents or smaller parties stood any chance. the Suva city General 
seat was taken by Bernadette rounds Ganilau, a popular former radio show 
host and member of the united peoples party (upp). mick Beddoes, the upp 
leader, narrowly won in the Western/central General communal constituency, 
and the third and final General communal seat was taken by an independent, 
robin irwin, whose anti-labour economic philosophy led him to align himself 
with the SDl. the upp had entered a pre-election coalition with mahendra 
chaudhry’s Flp, signalling a major turnaround for the historically Fijian-allied 
General voter parties. 
The battle for the open seats
Because all the Fijian and indian communal seats were divided between the 
two major parties, the ultimate election outcome was inevitably decided in the 
25 open constituencies, as had been the case in 1999 and 2001. Yet, this time 
around, the fracturing of the Fijian vote witnessed in 1999 was no longer in 
evidence, rendering impossible a repetition of one of the critical elements in 
the Flp success at that previous election. on the indian side, the long-standing 
two-party Flp/nFp divide no longer had the same potential influence as in 
2001, when nFp’s across-the-board ranking of the Flp as last preference gave 
the SDl several crucial marginal open constituencies. in the run up to the 
2006 poll, the nFp entered negotiations with the SDl and was offered seats 
in the Senate as the price for favouring the governing party. Yet, shortly before 
the deadline for party preferences to be lodged with the elections office, the 
party mended its fraught relationship with Flp leader mahendra chaudhry. 
the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding in which the nFp 
promised the Flp superior preferences to the SDl in seven of the ten potentially 
marginal open constituencies.7 SDl leaders and newspaper editorials fumed at 
the nFp betrayal, calling the party ‘liu muri’ (figuratively translating to ‘lowly 
and untrustworthy’8), but the governing party nevertheless gained two seats 
thanks to nFp preferences. the nFp strategy had been to avoid giving ‘blanket 
preferences’ to either of the major parties, in the hope that, in that way, with 
one or two seats, it might hold the balance of power.   
the outcomes of the 2006 poll in the all-important open constituencies 
were strongly determined by ethnically based voting patterns. in Figure 21.4, 
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constituencies are ordered from right to left in accordance with the ratio of 
indians to ethnic Fijians in electorates. the black columns show the ethnic 
Fijian share of registered voters in the 25 open constituencies, and the grey 
columns show the indian shares. constituencies towards the right are those 
in the densely indian populated sugar cane districts of western Viti levu and 
northern Vanua levu. constituencies towards the left are mostly those outer 
island constituencies where ethnic Fijians form the overwhelming majority of 
the population. those towards the centre of the chart are mainly in the urban 
and peri-urban areas around the capital, Suva, where indians and ethnic Fijians 
each form close to 50 per cent of the electorates, although recent demographic 
changes have ensured that some of the western Viti levu constituencies are now 
also much closer to having equal numbers of ethnic Fijians and indians. 
the dashed horizontal line in Figure 21.4, at the 50 per cent mark, shows 
the share of the vote required to secure victory under Fiji’s AV system. the 
grey sloping line shows a projected Flp 80 per cent of the indian vote, and 
indicates the seats that the Flp could be expected to take at the first count 
(from Vuda rightwards to Ba – those electorates where the grey 80 per cent line 
is above the horizontal 50 per cent threshold). the black sloping line shows a 
projected SDl 80 per cent of the Fijian vote, and those seats which the SDl 
could be expected to take at the first count (Bua/macuata leftwards to tailevu 
north/ovalau). in the middle of the chart are the marginal open seats, where 
most results were always likely to depend on transfers of preference votes 
(Yasawa/nawaka through to Suva city). 
As Figure 21.5 indicates, results corresponded fairly closely with the model 
shown in Figure 21.4. Figure 21.5 shows the 25 open constituencies, again 
ordered from right to left in accordance with the ratio of indians to Fijians 
among registered voters. the block at the base of each column shows the 
ultimate victor’s first preference votes, and additional blocks above the base block 
show transferred preference votes that were required to take the victor over the 
50 per cent threshold (shown by the horizontal line). owing to ethnically based 
voting, all the seats to the right of the chart were taken by the Flp at the first 
count, and all those to the left of the chart were taken by the SDl. the only 
constituency towards the left of the chart that went beyond the first count was 
Serua/navosa open, a large, highly dispersed and mountainous constituency 
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Figure 21.4 Ethnic composition of open constituencies  
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on the southwestern side of Viti levu. this was a contest complicated by the 
fact that the sitting member, pio Wong, had been de-selected by the SDl in 
favour of newcomer jone navakamocea, a civil servant previously employed 
in the prime minister’s office. navakamocea eventually won, at the 7th count, 
and only then because the nFp ranked the SDl (6th) above the Flp (7th) 
in its preferences. negative ranking, and victory for the penultimate placed 
party, featured in 2006 – as it had done in 1999 and 2001, even though the 
number of seats decided on preferences was considerably lower than at those 
previous elections.
in both 1999 and 2001, 18 open constituencies were decided by transfer of 
preference votes. this time around, only nine were decided in this way. the 
middle ground of Fiji’s politics was much smaller than it had been in 1999 and 
2001, due to the decline in the nFp’s indian vote and the weak performance of 
ratu epeli Ganilau’s nApF. it was in those constituencies shown towards the 
centre of Figure 21.4, where Fijians and indians approach parity in electorates, 
that results were so close that minor party preferences decided outcomes. these 
close-to-parity open constituencies are mostly located in the Suva-nausori 
corridor, where urban drift by evicted indian tenant farmers had spawned SDl 
fears that the Flp might do well.9 Yet, Fijians as well as indians had moved 
towards the towns, and continued overseas migration countered the indian 
influx. outcomes thus remained highly uncertain in these parts of southeast 
Viti levu. the SDl tactic of fielding Flp renegades tupeni Baba and john 
Ali in marginal urban open constituencies like Samabula/tamavua open and 
nasinu/rewa open backfired. more effective was standing women candidates 
in the marginals, a tactic that gave victory to the SDl’s losena Salabula in 
laucala open and the Flp’s monica raghwan in Samabula/tamavua open. 
Fielding popular indian former naitasiri rugby team manager rajesh Singh in 
cunningham also proved effective, and gave the SDl at the first count what 
might otherwise have been a marginal seat. 
ethnically based voting in Fiji has for long meant backing political parties 
because their policies are deemed to favour one or other ethnic group, not 
backing particular candidates because they are indigenous Fijian or indian. 
ethnic Fijians had no qualms voting for indian candidates like George Shui 
raj in ra or rajesh Singh in cunningham, because they were members of the 
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pro-indigenous SDl party. indians were unperturbed about voting for ethnic 
Fijians like poseci Bune in the labasa open constituency or for Sivia Qoro in 
Yasawa/nawaka open, because they stood for the solidly indian-backed Flp. 
racial politics in Fiji has long been much more sophisticated than the mere 
exercise of voter prejudice based on skin colour, culture, religion or language. 
overlaying the strongly ethnic dimension to Fiji’s politics was a regional 
divide. Flp candidates performed more strongly in western Viti levu, taking 
out marginal open seats like nadi open, tavua open and lautoka city open, 
while nadroga open in the west, a seat secured by the SDl in 2001, this time 
fell to the Flp.   
remarkable was that, for the first time, below-the-line voting made a major 
difference in highly marginal open constituencies. Across the country as a 
whole, the vast majority of voters – as in 1999 and 2001 – ticked their ballot 
papers above-the-line. in so doing, they endorsed their first choice party’s list 
of preferences that had earlier been lodged with the elections office. Yet, in all 
three elections, around 5–8 per cent of voters chose to rank candidates ‘below-
the-line’. in most elections, the big blocks of above-the-line votes commanded 
by the parties make the overwhelming difference – a feature strongly condemned 
by even some of the greatest enthusiasts for Fiji’s AV system. But in this election, 
results were so close in the 10 marginal open constituencies that in some cases, 
below-the-line votes decided outcomes. this was not the result of voters marking 
ballots below-the-line to any greater extent than previously. For example, in 
laucala open, where marking the ballot paper in this way decided the outcome 
in favour of the SDl’s losena Salabula, who won by only 11 votes, only 3.5 
per cent of ballots were cast below-the-line.10 
Discussion
party strategizing under the AV system in 1999, 2001 and 2006 illustrates the 
danger inherent in the use of majoritarian voting systems in bipolar societies. 
under Fiji’s previous first-past-the-post system, monolithic ethnically based 
parties also emerged. then, as with AV after 1997, communal seats tended 
to give each party a number of ‘safe’ seats and contests were decided in the 
common roll or ‘national’ open constituencies where the two ethnic groups 
approached parity.11 in these, minor splits in the vote on either side, or slight 
285bipolar  realignment  under  the  alternative  vote  system
variations in turnout, could decide outcomes one way or the other. parties 
sought to sustain homogeneous ethnic backing from their own group, while 
hoping for – or actively fomenting – splits amongst parties representing the 
other group.12 Such splinter parties were more common among Fijians than 
among indians (owing to the greater importance of provincial or hierarchical 
ties for Fijians), encouraging a repeated emphasis on ‘Fijian unity’ in the run 
up to general elections. 
the new AV system potentially lessened the danger of party splintering, in 
the sense that it allowed like-minded parties to field separate candidates but 
exchange second preferences. this, after all, had been the rationale behind the 
original introduction of the system in Australia in 1918.13 in Fiji, however, 
the split format (above-the-line and below-the-line) ballot paper, and the fact 
that around 95 per cent of voters tended to tick above-the-line, gave political 
parties extraordinary control over preference votes. parties tend to strategize 
more than voters.14 Where they are battling for the support of specific sections 
of the electorate, they will often do everything possible to destroy close rivals. 
the Flp, for example, put the nFp as last preference in 1999 because they were 
fighting for pre-eminence in the indian electorates, and the nFp reciprocated 
in 2001. Fijian splinter parties put rabuka’s SVt as last preference in 1999. in 
2001, the two western Viti levu parties (the Bai Kei Viti and party of national 
unity) each put the other as last preference, ensuring their mutual destruction 
and the victory of the SDl in the west. 
As a result of this tactical usage of preferences, the type of party strategizing 
witnessed under the 1970 constitution applied also under the new electoral 
system, but with increased potency. Fomenting splits in the other camp no 
longer simply made possible plurality victories. it also created the potential 
for actually acquiring the splinter votes of breakaway parties. the pressures for 
‘ethnic unity’ were thus just as acute, if not more so, under the new system.
in ethnically bipolar circumstances, all single-member district-based systems 
tend to encourage the types of strategic dynamics witnessed in Fiji in 1970–87 
and 1999–2006. in contrast, multi-member district-based proportional systems 
diminish the electoral incentive for ‘ethnic unity’. party shares of the vote 
determine party shares of seats, although there are various different ways of 
accomplishing this.15 there may still be some pressure to avoid the emergence of 
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small splinter parties if, as is commonly the case, there is a threshold below which 
small parties do not acquire seats. otherwise, there are fewer disincentives to 
the emergence of multiple parties. if ethnicity remains the crucial issue, nothing 
stops different political parties aligning along racial lines within parliament. no 
electoral system can abolish ethnically based voting. Guyana, for example, uses 
list proportional representation, but has two robust ethnic parties representing 
the indo- and Afro-Guyanese. What proportional systems can do is take the 
electoral system-driven heat out of contests, and allow politics to shift in new 
and unexpected directions.  
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Fiji’s electoral boundaries and 
malapportionment
Kesaia Seniloli
it has been claimed that demographic distribution and the drawing of constituency 
boundaries together had significant impacts on the outcomes of Fiji’s 1999, 
2001 and 2006 elections. in part, this was due to constitutionally entrenched 
provisions by which Fiji’s parliament mainly comprises members from ‘communal’ 
constituencies – currently 23 for the ethnic Fijians, 19 for the Fiji indians, three for 
the General voters and one for the island of rotuma – and a number (since 1997, 
25) of open constituencies, with the boundaries drawn in such a way that ‘voters 
should comprise a good proportion of members of different ethnic communities’.1 
the constituency Boundaries commission (cBc) could do little about the 
constitutionally entrenched provisions. nevertheless, many commentators felt 
that the 25 open constituencies were insufficiently heterogeneous. Furthermore, 
prior to the 2006 poll, many political parties claimed that substantial population 
movements over the period 1998 to 2006 necessitated some redrawing of the 
open constituency boundaries. the aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it outlines 
the process of electoral boundary demarcation for the 1999 election. Second, it 
explains the implications of the use of the 1998 boundaries in the 2006 election. 
it concludes with some reflections about the future.
Delimitation of constituencies in Fiji, under the constitution (Amendment) 
Act 1997, was an enormous undertaking in terms of time and resources. 
Delimiting was complicated because four different sets of boundaries had to 
be drawn – one set each for urban Fijian, General voter, ethnic indian and 
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the open constituencies. in addition, three provinces each had to be divided 
into two constituencies. the determination of the electoral boundaries by the 
cBc in 1998 was final and could not be challenged through the courts; it 
was intended to serve for the 1999 elections. However, these same electoral 
boundaries were also used in the elections of 2001 and 2006. 
Accurately delimited electoral boundaries ensure geographic representation 
for areas that may otherwise be neglected, and may improve the accountability 
of representatives to their voters. 
The legal framework (structure and rules)
the distribution of seats in Fiji’s House of representatives is determined, as 
follows, by section 52 of the 1997 constitution:
(2) in determining the boundaries of the constituencies for the election of members to the 
communal seats to be filled in accordance with subparagraph (51)(1a)(i), the constituency 
Boundaries commission: 
 (a) must ensure that the boundaries for 17 of the constituencies are in accordance 
with the provincial boundaries prescribed under the Fijian Affairs Act and that, subject to 
paragraph (b): 
 (i) the provinces of Ba, tailevu and cakaudrove comprise 2 constituencies each; 
and
 (ii) the other provinces comprise 1 constituency each;
 (b) must ensure that the remaining 6 constituencies comprise predominantly urban 
or peri-urban areas in which the number of voters is, as far as reasonably practicable, the 
same; and 
 (c) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), must give due consideration, in relation to each 
proposed constituency, to: 
 (i) the physical features of the proposed constituency; 
 (ii) the boundaries of existing recognized traditional areas; and
 (iii) means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency. 
(3) in determining the boundaries of the other constituencies, the constituency Boundaries 
commission: 
 (a) must try to ensure that the number of voters in each communal seat (other than a 
communal seat referred to in subsection (2)) is, as far as reasonably practicable, the same; 
 (b) must try to ensure that the number of voters in each open seat is, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the same; and 
 (c) subject to paragraph (a) or (b), must give due consideration, in relation to each 
proposed constituency, to: 
290 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
 (i) the physical features of the proposed constituency; 
 (ii) the boundaries of existing administrative and recognised traditional areas;
 (iii) means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency; and 
 (iv) if the proposed constituency relates to an open seat – the principle that 
the voters should comprise a good proportion of members of different ethnic 
communities.
(4) in this section: 
communal seat means a seat to be filled in accordance with paragraph 51 (1)(a);
open seat means a seat to be filled in accordance with paragraph 51 (1)(b).
Delimitation of new electoral constituencies for the 1999 election
the cBc, charged with drawing up the boundaries for the 1999 election, 
was appointed for a term of 12 months. Different ministries cooperated in 
this undertaking, as did the cartography section of the ministry of lands, 
the public Service commission, Government printing and the Bureau of 
Statistics. the process involved a number of steps, including data collection, 
delimiting of constituencies and the evaluation of the boundaries before they 
were finalized.
Data collection involved obtaining the census population data and maps 
from the Bureau of Statistics. the Bureau provided the cBc with provisional 
results of the 1996 census covering the population aged 20 years and over. 
maps, needed to identify physical features, administrative boundaries, urban 
boundaries and enumeration areas (eAs), and to ensure that contiguous 
geographic population entities were allocated to constituencies, were provided 
by the ministry of lands.
While collecting all the data needed for delimitation, the cBc invited the 
public (political parties, provincial councils etc), through the press and radio, 
in english, Fijian and Hindi, to make submissions on prospective constituency 
boundaries. the original period for submissions (31 january to 1 February) 
was extended to 16 February because no submissions were received during the 
initial period. Still, very few submissions were received by the new deadline. 
residents of urban villages were also consulted about whether they wanted to 
be included alongside the urban Fijians or within the provincial communal 
constituencies.
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Problems with the database
the data provided by the Bureau of Statistics were only the provisional data 
from the 1996 population census. Furthermore, at the time, no registration of 
voters had taken place. the electoral commission was waiting for the cBc to 
complete its work before commencing registration. Hence, there was no voter 
registration roll to use. even when registration of voters began, not all eligible 
voters registered for the elections, despite the legal requirement for compulsory 
voting. in addition, the detailed local maps were in some instances dated or 
unavailable. 
Delimitation
The Fijian urban, Indian and General communal constituencies
the cBc determined the boundaries of the six Fijian urban communal 
constituencies, the three General communal constituencies and the 19 indian 
communal constituencies, as dictated by the constitutional requirement to 
‘ensure that the number of voters in each communal seat is, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the same’. each ethnic communal constituency followed the 
principle that ‘all voters should cast a vote of equal weight’. For example, an 
urban Fijian communal voter was supposed to cast a vote equal in weight to that 
of another urban Fijian communal voter and an indian communal voter in any 
one constituency was supposed to cast a vote of equal weight to that of an indian 
communal voter in any other constituency. the ideal average of voters in the six 
Fijian urban communal constituencies was 12,173; the indian urban communal 
average was 9,621; while that for the three General communal constituencies 
was 6,036. All the Fijian urban communal constituencies were within the 
(+/-)10 per cent tolerance levels; all the General communal constituencies were 
within the (+/-) 15 per cent tolerance levels and all the indian urban communal 
constituencies were within the (+/-) 20 per cent tolerance levels (tables 22.1, 
22.2 and 22.3). in these constituencies, the geographical size did not matter. 
However, the cBc tried to ensure that, as much as possible, the electoral 
boundaries coincided with communities of interest.
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Table 22.2 General Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 18,108
number of constituencies = 3
Average number of people per constituency = 6,036
maximum and minimum number of electors per General communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (604) 15 per cent (905)
maximum number of voters 6,640 6,941
minimum number of voters 5,432 5,134
note: only 1 of 3 constituencies – north eastern General communal constituency – was outside the 10 
per cent tolerance level; all were within the 15 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.1 Fijian Urban Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 72,776
number of constituencies = 6
Average number of people per constituency = 12,129
maximum and minimum number of electors per Fijian urban communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,213) 15 per cent (1,819)
maximum number of voters 13,342 13,948
minimum number of voters 10,196 10,310
note: All 6 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.3 Indian Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 182,799
number of constituencies = 19
Average number of people per constituency = 9,621
maximum and minimum number of electors per indian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (962) 15 per cent (1,443) 20 per cent (1,924)
maximum number of voters 10,583 11,064 11,545
minimum number of voters 8,659 8,178 9,697
note: 15 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 4 of 19 constituencies – Viti levu 
east maritime, tavua, labasa and Bua/macuata West indian communal constituencies – were outside 
the 10 per cent tolerance level; only 1 of 19 constituencies – Bua/macuata West – was outside the 20 per 
cent tolerance level.
293fiji’s  electoral  boundaries  and  malapportionment
The open constituencies
Section 52(3)(b), (c)(i-iv) of the constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 stipulates 
that the cBc must ensure that the number of voters in each seat is, as far as is 
practicable, the same, and section 52 (3) (c) requires it to give due consideration 
in relation to each proposed constituency to:
i. the physical features of the proposed constituency
ii. the boundaries of existing administrative and recognized traditional areas 
iii. the means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency and
iv. the principle that voters should comprise a good proportion of members of different 
 ethnic groups.
Delimitation of the open constituencies was quite a difficult undertaking 
because the constitution required them to have parity of numbers as well as a 
good proportion of different ethnic groups. in the real world, of course, people 
do not settle in a place for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements for drawing 
up the ideal constituency. ethnic indians tend to concentrate in western Viti 
levu, northern Vanua levu and urban areas. the outer islands, the interior 
of the two main islands and the urban areas are largely populated by ethnic 
Fijians. the cBc considered dividing the two main islands into strips or into 
oblong-shaped constituencies, but was restricted by other considerations as 
stipulated in the constitution, such as respect for administrative boundaries, 
geographic criteria and community of interest. electorates were also to be 
contiguous geographic areas.
the cBc attempted to have parity of numbers of voters in every open seat 
so that all voters would cast a vote of equal weight. this resulted in the number 
of voters in all but one constituency falling within the 10 per cent tolerance 
level (table 22.4).
Delimitation of the open constituencies resulted in ten of them being 
dominated by Fijians and ten by indians. the remaining five had close to 
parity of numbers in the two major ethnic groups. the current situation of 
dominance of most open seats by a particular ethnic group will not change, 
because of the demographic situation. However, many commentators, including 
political parties, want the number of open constituencies to be increased to 45, 
as recommended by the reeves commission. 
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After the electoral boundaries were delimited, the public was again invited 
to make submissions to the cBc regarding the proposed boundaries. many 
comments suggested minor additions to or contractions of the constituencies. 
these were considered before the final determination of Fiji’s electoral 
boundaries. there were no objections. many political parties, including 
the Soqosoqo ni Vakatulewa ni taukei (SVt) and the national Federation 
party (nFp), major parties at the time, were very happy with the proposed 
boundaries.
However, some academics were critical of the determination of the electoral 
boundaries.2 they wanted more of the ethnically mixed open constituencies. 
they had hailed the adoption of the AV system in Fiji, believing it to be the 
most appropriate system. they and the architects of the constitution believed 
that the AV system would promote cooperation across ethnic lines. they were 
particularly critical of the large number of open constituencies created by 
the cBc determination of the electoral boundaries that did not have a good 
proportion of different ethnic groups. the effective operation of AV as a tool 
for promoting ethnic accommodation depended on these constituencies having 
near parity of numbers in relation to the two major ethnic groups in Fiji.
the past three elections have shown that even the ethnically mixed open 
constituencies did not bring about cross-ethnic vote trading or genuine inter-
ethnic cooperation. coalitions were created purely for electoral advantage, rather 
than on the basis of genuine shared goals and values. most parties tried to win 
Table 22.4 Open constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 403,625
number of constituencies = 25
Average number of people per constituency = 16,145
maximum and minimum number of electors per open constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,615) 15 per cent (2,422)
maximum number of voters 17,760 18,567
minimum number of voters 14,530 13,723
note: only 1 of 25 constituencies – cakaudrove West open constituency – was outside the 10 per cent 
tolerance level.
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seats on the first count. moderates, who the electoral engineers assumed were 
going to be successful, were obliterated. the AV system had the opposite to its 
anticipated effect – it resulted in limited representation of some of the moderate 
parties and increased ethnic polarization. if moderation and inter-ethnic 
cooperation are to be achieved, we need to rethink our electoral system. 
The case for redistribution in 2006
redistribution is the process of altering electoral boundaries to accommodate 
changes and movements in population. in 2005, the Bureau of Statistics 
acknowledged that there had been much internal movement of people in 
Fiji since the previous census in 1996, but admitted that there was no way of 
obtaining accurate and detailed data on current population distribution because 
there had been no more recent census. redistribution can be controversial, 
especially in open constituencies with near parity of different ethnic 
populations, because those who are included in or excluded from an electoral 
constituency can determine the election outcome. in other words, there is the 
potential for gerrymandering. redistribution is important to political parties 
because it can affect their support base.
the decision to change the boundaries must be taken well before a general 
election to ensure transparency, particularly when there has been considerable 
internal movement of population. A number of politicians called for the review 
and change in boundaries for the 2006 election.3 the members of the cBc 
were appointed in early 2005, a year before the general election, to review the 
electoral boundaries and to determine whether or not to alter them.4
The electoral boundaries: to alter or not to alter
Database
the 1996 census figures were the only official figures available to the cBc in 
2005, so the cBc could not ascertain the shifts in Fiji’s population since 1996. 
they therefore commissioned the Bureau of Statistics to undertake a survey of 
urban and peri-urban constituencies to assess populations. the Bureau surveyed 
13 open constituencies to compare the data with the 1996 census data. the 
survey started in April 2005 and took seven months to complete. the cBc 
296 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
was able to establish that there had been population growth in a number of 
constituencies and declines in others. the constituencies that had significant 
gains were nadi open, cunningham open, nausori/naitasiri open and 
nasinu/rewa open, while losses were recorded in labasa open, Suva city 
open and Vuda open. Survey results also established that the ethnic proportions 
remained stable despite the changes in total population of the constituencies. 
the survey was, however, a futile exercise, because the cBc could not get data 
for the areas not surveyed in order to make meaningful ‘redistricting’ possible. 
they were, however, satisfied with the unchanging ethnic distribution within 
the constituencies surveyed and, as a result, made no attempt to increase the 
number of heterogeneous open constituencies. 
As mentioned earlier, the cBc sought public comment on the proposed 
boundaries in january and February 2006. Almost all groups that made 
submissions wanted to maintain the current boundaries because current 
population data were not available to review. in addition, the electoral 
commission was using the 1998 electoral boundaries in its voter registration 
program and it would have been a mammoth task to reallocate people within 
new boundaries, especially in the time available. As a result, the cBc determined 
that there should be no change to the existing constituency boundaries for the 
2006 election.
Table 22.5 Fijian Urban Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 95,582
number of constituencies = 6
Average number of people per constituency = 15,930
maximum and minimum number of electors per Fijian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,593) 15 per cent (2,390)
maximum number of voters 17,523 18,320
minimum number of voters 14,330 13,540
note: 4 of 6 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 5 of 6 constituencies were within 
the 15 per cent tolerance level; 1 constituency – Suva city Fiji urban communal – was outside the 20 
per cent tolerance level.
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Malapportionment
malapportionment refers to the discrepancy between the shares of parliamentary 
seats and the shares of population by constituencies. it applies when a set of 
boundaries in each of the ethnic reserved seats (Fijian urban communal 
constituencies, the General communal, and the indian communal) and 
in the open constituencies have unequal numbers of voters. in other 
words, malapportionment refers to uneven distribution within each type of 
constituency, not to that constitutionally entrenched inequality in the value of 
votes between the different types of constituency. malapportionment violates 
the principle that all voters should cast a vote of equal weight and can occur 
if constituencies are not redrawn to accommodate population movements. 
malapportionment was seen in the 2006 election in the indian communal 
constituencies and the open constituencies, where a number of constituencies 
lie outside the 20 per cent tolerance level (tables 22.5, 22.6, 22.7 and 22.8).
The future
if elections in Fiji are to be egalitarian, there is a need to redraw the electoral 
boundaries to reflect population shift in the past decade. redistribution must 
be undertaken two or three years before an election to ensure transparency. 
the constitution stipulates that redistribution must be done after each census. 
However, there are other factors that are important in redistribution, such as the 
proportion of constituencies that experience significant change in population 
proportions, and whether or not there are marked departures from any proposed 
and accepted prescribed levels. 
redistribution in future will depend on Fiji’s changing population 
composition. Bureau of Statistics’ projections for 2006 show Fijians as making 
up 54.7 per cent of the population, ethnic indians 38.1 per cent and others 
7.2 per cent. in addition, Bakker’s (forthcoming)5 analysis of Fijian and indian 
fertility shows that Fijian fertility decline is slow compared with that of indians. 
the indian fertility decline is resulting in a below replacement level of fertility. 
the impact of this will be reflected in the ethnic distribution of the population 
in future, and of course on the delimitation of electoral boundaries.
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Table 22.6 General Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 13,820
number of constituencies = 3
Average number of people per constituency = 4,607
maximum and minimum number of electors per General communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (461) 15 per cent (691)
maximum number of voters 5,068 5,298
minimum number of voters 4,146 3,916
note: 1of 3 constituencies was within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 1 constituency – Western/central 
General communal – was outside the 15 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.7 Indian Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 204,477
number of constituencies = 19
Average number of people per constituency = 10,762
maximum and minimum number of electors per indian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,076) 15 per cent (1,614) 20 per cent (2,152)
maximum number of voters 11,838 12,376 12,914
minimum number of voters 9,686 9,148 8,610
note: 7 of 19 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 8 constituencies were within 
the 15 per cent tolerance level; 9 constituencies were within the 20 per cent tolerance level; 10 indian 
communal constituencies – Viti levu east maritime, tavua, Ba east, nadi urban, Viti levu South/
Kadavu, Vanua levu West, laucala, nasinu, labasa rural and macuta east/cakaudrove – were outside 
the 20 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.8 Open constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 479,693
number of constituencies = 25
Average number of people per constituency = 19,188
maximum and minimum number of electors per open constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,919) 15 per cent (2,878) 20 per cent (3,837)
maximum number of voters 21,106 22,065 23,024
minimum number of voters 17,268 16,309 15,350
note: 15 of 25 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; another 4 constituencies were 
within the 15 per cent tolerance level; another 3 – were within  the 20 per cent tolerance level; three 
constituencies – cunningham open, nadi open and Suva city open – were outside the 20 per cent 
tolerance level.
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Notes
1 constitution of the republic of the Fiji islands 1998, S52(3)
2 reilly, B. 2001. ‘evaluating the effect of the electoral system in post-coup Fiji’, pacific 
economic Bulletin, 16(1):142–49.
3 According to Section 53 of the 1997 constitution:
 (1) the constituency Boundaries commission must, in the year following each official census, 
and may, at other times, review the boundaries of constituencies and determine whether or 
not the boundaries should, be changed to give effect to the requirements or subsections 52 
(2) and (3). 
 (2) the parliament may make laws relating to reviews conducted by the commission 
under subsection (1), including law requiring the commission to give notice of proposed 
redistributions and to hear objections before making a determination.
 (3) upon the making of a determination on a redistribution, the commission must report 
its findings to the House of representatives, together with; (a) a summary of any objections 
made to it; and (b) the reasons for its determination. 
 (4) Subject to the jurisdiction of a court to entertain an application for judicial review, a 
determination of the commission is final.
4 The Fiji Times 24/4/06.<http://www.fijitimes.com/fijielections/no-change-in-boundaries.
aspx>.
5 Bakker, m. 2006. ‘recommendations to the Government Statistician (and census 
commissioner) concerning the inclusion of retrospective questions on the 2007 census 
Questionnaire’.
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The role of the Assembly of 
Christian Churches in Fiji in 
the 2006 elections1
Lynda Newland
towards the end of the polling week of the 2006 election, the Assembly of 
christian churches in Fiji (AccF) ran a full-page advertisement in the Fiji 
Times. on the right side of the page was a christian cross, below which the Fiji 
flag flew over a map of Fiji. the text on the left side of the page ran:
tHe ASSemBlY oF cHriStiAn cHurcHeS in Fiji (AccF) iS reQueStinG 
cHurcHeS 
that we all please go    
and vote during this election! 
note: pArliAment iS tHe Supreme lAW mAKinG BoDY oF tHiS 
nAtion. 
it is God’s Will that the laws of this land are based on the laws of God!  
it iS tHereFore tHe DutY oF All citiZenS oF tHiS nAtion to elect 
A GoD-FeArinG & proVen prime miniSter2 
whose party will make righteous laws
prov 29:2
When the righteous are in authority the people rejoice:
But when a wicked man rules, the people groan. nKjV3
GoD iS WitH uS
when we build our nation according to His ways!
But nAtion BuilDinG WitHout GoD iS A reWArDleSS lABour!
ps127:1
unless the lorD builds the house, they labour in vain who build it;
unless the lorD guards the city, the watchman stays awake in vain nKjV
in nation building, Fiji must be ruled
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By the laws of God given at
mt Sinai and at calvary.
Building with the practice of compromising christian and non-christian values
as already reflected in the constitution4
is misleading the nation to stand on false foundation
which is demonic and distasterous [sic] in nature.
tHiS Will SurelY BrinG curSeS upon tHe nAtion:
· Droughts and famines! · earthquakes and tsunamis!5
· poverty and slavery! · Diseases and Deaths!
 (Amos 4: 7–11)
Healthy nation Building should be founded on God’s law
which reflects the higher and eternal values of the Kingdom of God
· loVe  juStice · peAce
· reconciliAtion · unitY
We tHereFore HAVe no option But to Vote For tHAt leADer WHo 
cHeriSHeS AnD liVeS BY GoD’S lAWS
only then would we be assured of peace and prosperity
 (ezekiel 34: 22–31)6
putting aside questions of the legality of this kind of advertisements during 
the election – when political advertising is banned – the advertisement raises 
questions about the style of governance proposed for Fiji. it is indicative not of 
the views of a small fundamentalist section of the community, but of major and 
influential christian churches, including the methodist church, the Assemblies 
of God (AoG), the christian mission Fellowship (cmF), the church of 
God (coc), and a host of other pentecostal churches, all of which form the 
membership of the AccF.7 For people living in Fiji, its message was clear: vote 
for laisenia Qarase and the SDl (Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua) or face 
spiritual and material disaster. moreover, it was a clear call to mobilize Fijians to 
participate in the election in order to achieve a christian state in which Fijians 
would hold paramountcy. the advertisement relied heavily on established 
cultural structures and values in calling the methodist and pentecostal churches 
to respond to issues within the Fijian community.8 in this chapter, i explore 
the common ideological framework of the member churches of the AccF in 
relation to the political sphere; and the way it informed the religious rhetoric 
of the 2006 election. 
to understand the underlying logic of these churches, it is necessary 
to understand how christianity has become central to Fijian identity and 
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the values it implies for Fijians. methodism first came to Fiji through the 
Wesleyan methodist missionary Society in 1835.9 the conversion of cakobau, 
a paramount chief, was pivotal for the missionaries, as large numbers of 
conversions followed. called lotu (religion), methodism became appropriated 
to such an extent that it has become viewed as one of the three pillars of Fijian 
society and culture, of which the other two pillars are the vanua (land and 
community) and matanitu (chiefly system).10  the introduction of catholicism, 
Anglicanism, presbyterianism, Seventh-Day Adventism and, later, Hinduism, 
Sikhism, and islam, brought by the indentured labourers, meant that religion 
in Fiji quickly became pluralistic, but the majority of indigenous Fijians have 
remained methodist. current figures suggest that 93 per cent of the methodist 
church members are Fijian.11 
if the methodist church has remained the largest christian church – with 
36.3 per cent of the total population of Fiji – it has, since the 1960s, also played 
an increasingly important political role. Before then, indigenous Fijians were 
tied to their villages, and obliged to provide services for the chiefs under the 
Fijian regulations. With the abolition of the regulations in the mid-1960s, 
the strength of the rural chiefly order was eroded, with the result that many 
Fijians migrated to urban areas. During this process, the methodist church 
also became progressively more influential in the political sphere.12  
to begin with, many politicians and political agitators have been trained as 
pastors in the methodist church, and, therefore, their politics are informed 
by a combination of Fijian cultural values, the specific type of methodism 
that arrived with the missionaries, and by more recent contact with the 
middle east. For instance, in the 1970s, Sakeasi Butadroka, the founder of 
the Fijian nationalist party and a politician who was vocal in fighting for 
Fijian paramountcy, was a methodist lay preacher.13  While he and his party 
advocated the deporting of indo-Fijians back to india, Fijian soldiers returning 
from peacekeeping in the middle east brought back reports about israel. 
According to Garrett, this revived the methodist emphasis on Sabbatarianism, 
the old testament notion that the seventh day should be a day of rest, in 
conjunction with Fijian ideas of tabu, where holiness is associated with 
prohibition. the ideas that the descendants of the indentured labourers 
should return to india with their idolatrous religions and that Sunday should 
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be an enforced day of rest became central themes for the increasingly political 
rhetoric of the taukei.14 
then, in 1987, coup leader Sitiveni rabuka claimed he was ‘moses of the 
chosen people’ and that christianity should be the official religion of Fiji 
– at the expense of the indo-Fijians who were represented as heathens who 
threatened to overtake Fijian land.15 Aligned closely with the methodist church, 
rabuka invited people such as his kinsman and methodist minister, raikivi, 
to serve as a minister in the interim government.16 Further, while rabuka was 
filmed preaching his politics in his role as pastor for the methodist church, 
indo-Fijians were harassed and beaten in disturbances on the streets of Suva.17 
meanwhile, the general secretary of the methodist church and supporter of 
rabuka, reverend manasa lasaro, was central in influencing the military’s 
decision to impose the Sunday Decree, which prohibited all work on Sundays. 
in response to the interim government’s attempt to lessen the impact of the 
decree, roadblocks were set up at 70 places around Suva. At the same time, a 
split was deepening between rival factions in the methodist church, with the 
consequence that the president of the church, rev. josateki Koroi, who opposed 
rabuka, was ousted in favour of reverend ratu isireli caucau.18  
looking back at that period, lasaro explained that he would still ‘like to see 
that Sunday is kept a special day in this country’.19 For him, keeping Sunday 
as a day of rest is a sign that moral values are kept and maintained. the 1980s 
were about Fijians finding a voice:
We don’t want to be pushed around by any other country, no matter who it is: the colonial 
government or other foreign countries which are very active in this region, particularly 
new Zealand and Australia and of course india…  even now the feelings are still strong… 
What rabuka did [the 1987 coup] sort of opened the door to indigenous Fijians. now, 
with the present government [under SDl], we have seen affirmative action and since 
then we find a lot of Fijians going into commercial activities, a lot of Fijians have gone to 
higher educational institutions, a lot of Fijians have started asking questions about their 
own destiny as a people…
Here, lasaro combines the politics of maintaining indigenous identity in 
the face of the forces of globalization with the religious and moral expression of 
keeping Sunday as a day of rest. Although lasaro seemed to be arguing that it 
was not so much the indo-Fijian community that was to blame for the threats 
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to indigenous identity, but foreign governments, in an interview conducted a 
few days before, he had noted:
Fijian interests are not exclusive to Fijians. traditionally, Fijians are a very caring community. 
they will inconvenience themselves to accommodate the needs of their guests and friends. 
But the impact of economic and social changes has changed this dramatically in terms of 
property ownership; Fijians feel that sooner or later they will – what they hold so dear to 
them will be taken away by somebody else, whether he’s european, indian or anybody 
else for that matter.20 
the perception of Fijians as the authentic landowners and indo-Fijians as 
guests strongly resonates with the view that the AccF has placed at the centre 
of its ethos. However, it differs in that lasaro’s emphasis remains on a fear that 
Fijian land and, by association, their culture, will be taken away from them by 
foreigners. By contrast, the AccF emphasises the importance of Fijian unity, 
in accordance with God’s plan.
Despite the visibility of methodist church leaders in politics, the church’s 
dominance has not remained uncontested by those Fijians who converted to 
other denominations. While pentecostal and evangelical churches had been 
entering Fiji since the Assemblies of God was first established in 1926, their 
numbers burgeoned after independence in 197021 and most of their converts 
have been Fijian methodists. in the villages, such churches were perceived as 
threatening the chief and the chiefly system,22 and, before 1987, they had to be 
registered. now, however, they are free to establish themselves, despite periodic 
calls from the methodist church for their numbers to be limited. thus, the 
post-election coup led to methodist leaders undertaking a different strategy 
and spearheading the unification of many of these churches with the methodist 
church under the umbrella organisation, the AccF.	23
the 2000 coup demonstrated that sentiments from 1987 remained strong 
in parts of the Fijian community, despite much of the community rejecting 
the arguments of George Speight, or no longer viewing a coup as an acceptable 
way to achieve Fijian ethno-nationalist objectives. this became clear when the 
actions of christian leaders differed during and after the coup. For example, 
rev. ratu epeli Kanaimawi, head of the Worldwide church of God and a chief 
of cakaudrove, led the Great council of chiefs into a meeting of mediation 
with Speight.24 meanwhile, reverend Kurulo, head of the christian mission 
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Fellowship, wrote to Speight to demand the release of the hostages, and called 
prayer meetings. Speight then asked Kurulo for a reconciliation meeting to be 
held at parliament, at which a group of pastors spoke with him and visited the 
hostages.25 While the timing of Kurulo’s visit is not clear, it was reported that 
leaders from the methodist church, All nations, and Apostles Gospel outreach 
Fellowship international (AGoFi) participated in a ‘Festival of praise’ at the 
parliamentary complex.26
churches such as the Seventh-Day Adventists,	27 the AoG, Fiji, the cmF, 
the united pentecostal church international of Fiji, and the Anglican church 
denounced the coup in advertisements in the The Fiji Times and the Daily 
Post.28 the president of the methodist church, reverend tomasi Kanailagi, 
also took out a full-page advertisement which said that, while Speight’s terrorist 
activities could not be supported, the methodist church supported the interim 
government, because all of Speight’s objectives had been met,29 a view often 
reiterated during the coup.30
As a result of feelings that ‘the Fijian people were very much fragmented’, 
leaders from the AoG made a traditional approach to rev. Kanailagi and asked 
him to call a meeting of churches, the consequence of which was the formation 
of the AccF.31  pastor tamani, an influential leader in the cmF, noted that, 
‘we wanted to prove to the Great council of chiefs that these small churches, 
we can work together. the problem is not in the church. the problem is in 
leadership’.32 in this way, the member churches of the newly established AccF 
shared the vision of uniting the indigenous Fijian community into a political 
force through the unity of churches as part of God’s plan. if the methodist 
and pentecostal God is the spiritual pinnacle of the AccF, the administrative 
organization is chaired by a leading member of the methodist church: in 
2006, that member is reverend Waqairatu, the methodist church’s assistant 
general secretary. 
in the view of AccF leaders, the wounds between Fijians must be healed 
before any healing of the nation can be undertaken.33  Such a view is predicated 
on the continuing theme that Fijians as the indigenous landowning people 
should have privileges over and above other Fiji citizens, particularly indo-
Fijians, who are viewed as guests. this was echoed in an interview with rev. 
matalomani, coordinator for the AccF:
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Forget about the indians. it’s amongst the Fijians and, if the Fijians are unhappy, the 
indians will be in trouble too because we will not give up our land. When the Fijians 
are satisfied that their land, their right to belonging comes back to them, we are a giving 
people, we are an accommodating race, and it is only the differences in the political field 
that are blowing out the racial differences.34
this view is typical in that it continues to promote the idea that Fijian 
landownership is threatened by changes in the law, despite the fact that, by 
1992, 87 per cent of the land in Fiji has been categorized as native land35, and 
despite the protection of Fijian land in the constitution. in contrast to rabuka 
and lasaro, people like reverend matalomani no longer consider indo-Fijians 
an imminent threat. rather, they view Fijians as having suffered primarily from 
colonization, when laws robbed Fijians of land that was rightfully theirs, and 
they consider, therefore, that such laws need to be revisited.36  However, once 
again, the threat to Fijian unity is seen to come from outside. 
the AccF’s vision statement is that AccF members must strive to make 
Fiji ‘God’s treasured possession’, as a nation that honours and glorifies God. 
Further elaborated into four principles, the mission statement notes that all 
flocks must unite, members should live God’s way of love, leadership should be 
God-fearing, and Fiji should be reconciled for peace and prosperity. reverend 
Kanaimawi (the acting chairman at the time of interview) further explained 
that the last principle is drawn from corinthians ii:5, which describes God’s 
reconciliation to humanity through christ.37 the principle also resonates with 
concerns regarding the reconciliation of Fijian communities (vanua) after the 
2000 coup, and echoes the Fijian notion of the good chief, who, by virtue of 
his wisdom, bestows peace and prosperity upon the village, thus revealing a 
conjunction between ideas about chiefliness and lotu.
in advocating that members strive for a nation that honours and glorifies 
God, the vision statement implicitly endorses the notion of a christian state, 
where all laws are based on christian teachings as interpreted by the member 
churches of the AccF. While this is the same stance that rabuka held in 
1987,38 many accept that, if Fiji were to become a christian state, those who 
are not christian should be tolerated, providing they conducted themselves 
according to christian law.39 the notion of the exclusively christian state has 
periodically emerged since the 1987 coups, and it reappeared in march 2006 
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in an AccF project aimed at healing the land, which then became a call to 
make each province in Fiji christian. 
‘Healing the land’ is the core project of the evangelical Fellowship, recently 
renamed the covenant evangelical church and a member of the AccF. under 
the project, a team visits the provinces to reconcile chiefs and all the christian 
denominations in the villages, and to eradicate social ills. reverend Kanaimawi, 
who was acting chairman of the AccF in 2005, described them as:
very skilled in healing the land. they go out to the village and get all the villagers, 
irrespective of what church they are, look at their problems, do a spiritual mapping, map 
out where the devil has been influential – whether it’s a killing field in one place or it’s 
where they worshipped demons in the past – and then they cleanse those out. then the 
people repent for what they have done and ask God to come in and the whole village just 
transforms itself.40
critics have noted that ‘healing the land’ includes exorcising gods of other 
religions (including Hinduism) from the land, and supporting the political 
rhetoric of the SDl; a counter to the army’s truth and justice exercise.41   only 
two months before the 2006 election, ratu Soqosoqo, an influential member 
of the AccF and Kadavu chief, was reported as saying that, ‘if we cannot 
make Fiji a christian country then we chiefs should make our territories and 
everyone in it christians’.42
While the provinces experience a particular kind of christian revival, Fijian 
allegiance to the increasing diversity of emerging pentecostal/evangelical churches 
is not, according to Kanaimawi, considered a threat to the established churches, 
but rather ‘a link for us to some greater things that God is preparing’.43 this 
statement demonstrates the AccF’s strategy of incorporation and cooperation 
between churches as much as it does the theological importance of the return of 
jesus to harvest souls at the ‘end-times’, in which most of the member churches 
believe. indeed, as almost all these churches except the methodist church are 
pentecostal/evangelical, with roots in the uS pentecostal movement, their 
theology is based on the idea of being born again with the entry of the Holy 
Spirit and the conviction that the end-times, when christians will be saved 
and havoc wreaked upon the earth and unbelievers, are near.44  the extent to 
which most member churches are theologically similar enables the AccF to 
draw upon and coordinate the different strengths of the churches in different 
308 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
activities. For instance, the cmF has AccF support in inviting international 
evangelists to Fiji, and the covenant evangelical church conducts ceremonies 
to heal the land in the provinces on the AccF’s behalf.45 
under the previous government, the AccF worked closely with government 
and was perceived as a think-tank for the prime minister. AccF leaders 
justified this as furthering the project of reconciliation among Fijians, which is 
criticized by those arguing for ethnic equality.46 certainly, the prime minister 
is known for his devout methodism, and his comments before the election 
showed his commitment to AccF principles. He argued the need for a Fijian 
prime minister and for the notion that Fiji was a nation of communities rather 
than a nation of individuals, where communal needs (and particularly those 
of Fijians) needed to be respected over and above the individualism that he 
perceived in human rights, saying:
now for the Fijian people, we need to be acutely aware that democracy in terms of every 
individual being equal in their basic rights and freedom is quite different from the value 
systems that provide the basis for traditional Fijian society.47
According to Qarase, the fact that Fijians were both numerically ‘the majority 
community’ and the landowners meant that the Fijian people should be 
consulted first over national issues. if this suggests a belief in Fijian paramountcy, 
the SDl manifesto openly expresses the values behind their objectives as:
1) the ideals and principles of the christian faith
2) respect for the Vanua and the cultures and traditions of the indigenous Fijians and 
rotumans
3) respect for the cultures, traditions and religious beliefs of other communities in 
Fiji
4) recognition for the paramountcy of indigenous Fijian and rotuman interests, as 
proclaimed in the constitution
5) respect for legal authority and law and order
6) respect for human and group rights
7) Honesty in public life and general standards of conduct, which reflect our fundamental 
beliefs.48
With christianity at the apex of SDl values, SDl uses the symbol of the 
dove to represent their commitment to christianity, but, for Fijians, this is 
clearly a reference to a christianity embedded in the particular brand of Fijian 
cultural values propagated by the AccF. reflecting AccF concerns, points 
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1, 2, and 4 all show that the SDl give priority to indigenous christian Fijians 
and rotumans and their communities over other citizens and individual rights 
in Fiji.49 likewise, point 6 suggests that group rights should be considered 
as much as human rights, which are often perceived by AccF members as 
individualistic and therefore foreign.50 in addition, if the SDl shares its ideology 
with the AccF, their allegiance is also displayed openly in political events. For 
example, religious leaders from the methodist church and the AoG led the 
prayers at the launch of the SDl manifesto at a rally in Suva.51
As the turn-out in the elections steadied, the AccF advertisement discussed 
earlier, appeared in The Fiji Times, a clear call to indigenous Fijians to vote in 
support of Qarase and the SDl, and a sign of AccF’s continued participation 
in the political sphere. many AccF principles appeared in this advertisement, 
with particular emphasis on mobilizing members to vote for God-fearing 
leadership in order that they may live by christian laws, especially in response 
to the constitution’s tolerance of homosexuality.52 the latter became publicized 
in a local case in which an Australian tourist and a local were sentenced to 
two years’ prison for homosexuality. the High court over-rode the sentence 
by referring to the constitution, which effectively legalizes private consensual 
homosexual relationships. in response, the methodist church publicized its 
rejection of homosexuality as a civil right by organizing a protest march in 
nausori, with the intention of organizing further marches around the country, 
a move supported by the AoG.53 reverend Waqairatu was further reported as 
saying that homosexuality could only be eradicated if everyone was converted 
to christianity or other religions.54 in support, the AccF leadership sent a 
letter to the government, arguing against ‘all sexual perversions that somewhat 
has [sic] been encouraged by the so-called ‘sexual orientation’ clause in the 
constitution Section 38 (2) (a)’.55 commonly viewed as foreign, this clause is 
perceived as threatening the morality of the Fijian community and disengaging 
them from God’s blessings.56
thus, the AccF’s concerns about Fiji legislation relate specifically to 
existing laws about land, reconciliation between Fijians, and sexual morality, 
as instances of the need to correct the relationship of indigenous Fijians to each 
other and to God. in the leadership’s view, when the relationship with God is 
correct, all else will fall into place (a concept i have heard many times when 
310 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
interviewing AccF leaders). notwithstanding this view, the advertisement 
in the election showed that the AccF leaders were also aware that christians 
belonging to AccF churches needed to be mobilized to vote for the correct 
political leader. Given their close relationship and shared vision with Qarase 
and the SDl, the AccF leaders were faced with a potential problem over and 
above that of ensuring that a Fijian prime minister was elected: the problem 
being that, if Fijians were not mobilized into voting and the indo-Fijian Fiji 
labour party (Flp) were to win, the political influence of the AccF would 
likely cease altogether.
After the election, Qarase thanked God for his victory, saying, ‘i would like 
to acknowledge the hand of God for the victory. i believe God has a plan for 
Fiji and the SDl is part of that plan for Fiji’.57 elsewhere, he is reported as 
thanking ‘the christian churches and people for their prayers and members 
of the Great council of chiefs for their support’, saying that he believed, ‘it 
is the lord’s choice that allowed his party to remain in power for another 
term’.58 the swearing-in was opened with methodist prayers. many of Qarase’s 
ministers are methodists, including josefa Vosanibola, ratu meli Saukuru, 
misaele Weleilakeba, and jone Waqairatu; the last of whom is also the brother 
of reverend Waqairatu, assistant general secretary of the methodist church 
and chairman of the AccF.59
therefore, it might have been a surprise for the AccF leadership that, despite 
Qarase’s belief in the need for a Fijian government to promote Fijian interests 
and his preference for the Flp to stay in opposition,60 he offered the opposition 
seats in the cabinet.61 As the offer was perhaps a tactical manoeuvre, Qarase 
was himself a little surprised that the Flp accepted.62 For his part, Kanaimawi 
noted that a multiparty cabinet would not work, but that it was ‘worth giving 
it a try’.63 Given the oppositional aspirations of the two parties, whereby the 
SDl wishes to promote christian and Fijian interests, while the Flp seeks to 
promote indo-Fijians as citizens with equal political rights, the move towards 
a multiparty cabinet is indeed ambitious. 
the rhetoric of the AccF’s advertisement thus draws from culturally 
accepted ideas about how to bring God’s blessings to Fiji, which are circulating 
in many of the christian Fijian communities. According to these ideas, if 
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people in Fiji do not recognise the need for God’s leadership, the end-times 
will bring retribution to all. A multiparty cabinet, therefore, brings with it the 
ambivalence and tensions of a compromise, which, in the final judgement, is 
not in the interests of the AccF.
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The role of Hindu and Muslim 
organizations during the 2006 
election
Jonathon Prasad1
on the walls of many Fiji indian households, next to pictures of Hindu deities, 
hangs the photograph of mahendra chaudhry. routinely garlanded whenever 
pujas (religious ceremonies) are performed, the image depicts a leader often 
cast in the role of saviour, deity and martyr. transcending the realm of politics 
and entering into mythology, chaudhry evokes the role of King rama in the 
ramcaritmanas, a popular Sanatan religious text; a good, just ruler banished 
from his kingdom and forced to wander in the wilderness enduring numerous 
trials at the hands of raksas (demons) until he is permitted to return home and 
take up his rightful place on the throne. the tragedy of labour’s rise and fall 
between 1999 and 2001, and the righteousness of its cause at the 2006 poll 
seemed to mimic Hindu mythology. on the campaign trail, Fiji labour party 
(Flp) candidates appealed to the symbolism of Hinduism, weaving marigold 
garlands normally used for prayer and laying these at the feet of elders whilst 
touching their feet as a traditional sign of respect.
the relationship of Hindu and muslim symbolism to the politics of Fiji 
needs to be seen in the broader context of the relations between the migrant-
descended and indigenous Fijian communities. nearly all ethnic Fijians are 
christian, whereas the Fiji indian population is approximately 76.7 per cent 
Hindu, 15.9 per cent muslim and 6.1 per cent christian.2  the christian 
churches in Fiji, in particular the methodist church, have often been associated 
with a virulent brand of Fijian nationalism, including calls for the country to 
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become a ‘christian state’.3 the governing Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua 
(SDl) party’s manifesto explicitly paid homage to ‘the ideals and principles 
of the christian faith’.4 As with minority religious groups elsewhere in the 
world, Hindu and muslim religious leaders have, unsurprisingly, responded 
by emphasizing the importance of secular politics, the importance of distance 
between faith and state, and their own lack of strong ties to any of the major 
political parties. in addition, the collectively felt pressures on the indian 
community in the wake of the coups of 1987 and 2000 have emphasized the 
need for a common front, and diminished political articulation of internal 
cultural difference. As a result, the influence of religious organizations and 
symbolism on the indian community has become more subtle, nuanced 
and indirect – on balance, lessening in favour of a greater engagement with 
educational advancement. 
the way in which indian religious organizations influence the political 
process has changed over the past two decades along with the culture of politics 
in Fiji. previously, charismatic political leaders linked to religious organizations 
could count on the support of the leadership of those organizations and, in turn, 
the votes of their members. Voting was based on religious affiliation as much 
as on political persuasion. the events of 1987 did much to alter the political 
landscape, with religious groups becoming increasingly self-conscious of their 
activities and public profile. this led them to adapt their strategy and sphere of 
influence to a more focused approach, targeting education as a specific policy 
issue, as it is an area in which they have a vested interest.  
this is not to say that communal voting is no longer relevant for both indo-
Fijians and Fijians; it is still very much a part of the political culture of Fiji. 
Both groups continue to vote for those parties that have the highest levels of 
communal appeal. party policies and political manifestos rarely receive close 
scrutiny from the electorate. As a result, ethnic block voting, with its emphasis 
on ethnic allegiances, is commonplace, and religious persuasion acquires 
political salience. this chapter aims to assess the extent to which indo-Fijian 
religious organizations continue to influence the electoral process, and the way 
in which this is achieved. in order to understand the culture of indo-Fijian 
politics, we need to begin by understanding the origins of intra-communal 
divisions, which continue to shape political realities.
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The myth of the Indian ‘community’
to the gaze of the outside world, Fiji begins with the Fijians and ends with the 
indians: two neatly packaged identities that need little explanation and can be 
interpreted without difficulty. these two truncated forms of grand traditions are 
regarded as unproblematic and immediately accessible. the international media 
chose to adopt this interpretation in order to portray the coups of 1987 and 
2000. However, such a view fails to take account of the degree of fragmentation 
that exists within both communities. in the case of the Fijians, challenges to 
the idea of group homogeneity are based upon regional power struggles, which 
have led to a fragile political unity during elections.5 this is highlighted by the 
elections of April 1977, 1987 and 1999, when divisions within the community 
led to defeat for each of the parties presumed to have majority ethnic Fijian 
support. in order to avoid a repeat of this during the 2006 election, and in part 
also because of the large number of parties (20) contesting in Fijian communal 
seats, calls were made for Fijian unity.
A number of divisions exist within the indian community; these developed 
historically as a result of the indenture process and, later, during the post-
indenture period. they generated distinct regional and linguistic identities, 
which would later crystallize around new religious organizations and lead to 
the formalization of deep hostilities. Beneath the umbrella term ‘indian’ are a 
number of religious groups – Hindus, muslims and Sikhs – each claiming a 
distinct cultural heritage and identity on which they continue to draw. Further 
sources of differentiation resulted from the various regions from which they 
originally came – particularly the divisions between northern and southern 
indians, which in turn led to linguistic divisions.6 the arrival of free indians 
– mainly punjabis and Gujaratis who paid their own fares to Fiji in order to 
provide services for the indentured labourers – led to strained relationships 
between the two groups, as the later-arriving free indians prospered to a greater 
degree than did the former indentured labourers.7 
During the indenture period, these differences were irrelevant, due to the 
shared experience of living through narak, or hell, as the labourers referred to 
it. this provided them with a shared identity based upon the suffering they 
endured8, and was further strengthened by the concept of the jahazi bhai 
(‘ship brothers’). Ship brothers were the fictive kin who had travelled together 
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from india and worked together on the plantations. their relationships were 
based upon common experience, and cut across religious, regional and caste 
differences, with groups co-existing and sharing in one another’s culture and 
religious functions. Such was the extent of interaction between the two groups 
that an early mosque was built at nausori with funds largely contributed by 
Hindus prior to 1920.9 However, such generosity was short-lived; during the 
post-indenture period of the 1920s and 1930s, differences became apparent 
when various religious groups began organized programs of building schools, 
temples and mosques.10 indians formed groups to advance these objectives 
– often with the guidance of missionaries brought from india. it was these 
missionaries from outside the colony who highlighted the differences between 
groups and led to the formation of oppositional identities.
romila tharpar convincingly argues that Hinduism is an ‘invented modern 
tradition’ from which an ancient identity was constructed during the 19th 
century. By drawing together a number of local traditions11, political support 
was mobilized for indian independence.12 As a modern construct, the term 
Hinduism remains a contested category. in the absence of a clear definition 
of what Hinduism was, two major streams emerged – Sanatan Dharm13 (the 
eternal tradition) and Arya Samaj, both of which vied for authenticity in 
india and, subsequently, Fiji.14 the Sanatanis are regarded as orthodox; they 
emphasize the importance of the epic tradition of the mahabharata and 
ramcaritmanas. integral to the faith are deity worship and ritual performances. 
its devotees regard it as the most accessible form of Hinduism due to its emphasis 
on bhakti (devotional) forms of worship. in Fiji, the Shree Sanatan Dharm 
pratinidhi Sabha (SDS) has the largest following of any of the indian religious 
organizations. it was established in 1928 to improve literacy and education 
among indians, but also to provide a countervailing voice to the reformist Arya 
pratinidhi Sabha (ApS/Fiji).15 
the Aryas dominated the political scene in Fiji in the period immediately 
after indenture, establishing a central body in 1917.16 in contrast to the 
Sanatanis, the Aryas adhere only to the Vedic tradition. they reject the epics 
and what they regard as the superfluous rituals attached to them. Bitter 
debates erupted between the two groups during the late 1920s and early 
1930s.17 these controversies were largely instigated by several preachers, and 
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played out variously in public debates and the media, which focused on child 
marriage, widow remarriage, and the sexual conduct of prophets and gods. 
Several controversial published works critical (often obscenely so) of religious 
leaders from the Sanatan, Arya and muslim faiths were imported.18 the 
Aryas were scornful of the Sanatan corpus of the epic tradition, especially the 
ramcaritmanas, which led to heated debates between the two groups. these 
debates tore the indian community apart at the time, and left it weakened 
when negotiating with the colonial government and sugar companies. Whilst 
the divisions are still evident today, they are not as pronounced as they were in 
the 1930s and 1940s, and tend to be focused on fundamental differences in 
religious practice. politically, this has led to divisions between the groups during 
the post-independence era. most notably, the ApS/Fiji originally supported ratu 
mara’s Alliance party, but subsequently shifted support to the Flp; most of its 
members, it is believed, then shifted to the SDl party in 2006. By contrast, 
the leadership of the SDS has consistently supported the national Federation 
party (nFp). 
Further divisions within the Hindu community arose between those 
originating from northern india and those from the south (the latter arriving 
in Fiji as indentured labourers later than the former). those of south indian 
origin, despite being Sanatan Hindus, bore the brunt of what may be termed 
‘black-racism’ as a result of them generally having a darker skin tone than north 
indians. culturally and historically, they were perceived as different from the 
other migrant communities.19 Forming only a quarter of the indian population, 
they were victimized as a minority group. in some instances, indian community 
schools in western Viti levu refused to admit south indian children. this 
demonstrated a belief widely held by south indian families that, as a socially 
isolated and economically marginalized group, they counted for little in the 
social and political agenda of the Fiji indian leadership.20 
reaction to exclusion and disadvantage led to the formation of the tiSi 
Sangam in 1926. through the preservation and promotion of south indian 
culture, that organization sought to protect people of south indian origin 
from prejudice, while at the same time providing an educational base for the 
south indian community. Despite being closely identified with the Sanatan 
religious tradition, the tiSi Sangam considers itself a cultural organization, 
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open to members of various religious backgrounds as long as they are able 
to trace their ancestral roots to south india. However, the idea of a unified 
south indian group was short-lived as divisions began to appear within the 
Sangam. telugu-speaking indians originating from Andhra pradesh felt that 
their interests were not being represented. A prominent leader from Andhra 
pradesh, Alipaty tataiya, accused the executive members of the tiSi Sangam 
of deliberately recruiting unqualified people to executive posts within the 
tiSi Sangam in order to ensure that they would receive no opposition in the 
promotion of the tamil community and culture.21 Future leader of the nFp 
A.D. patel was at the time legal advisor to the tiSi Sangam executive, and a 
target for telugu criticism.22 this led tataiya, who was one of the founders 
of the tiSi Sangam, to found a separate organization, the Andhra Sangam 
(AS), in 1941, to protect the interests of the telegu-speaking community. 
this mirrored events in india, where active agitation would eventually lead to 
the creation of the state of Andhra pradesh in 1953. As a result, the Andhra 
Sangam sustained a long-run hostility towards A.D. patel and the nFp. While 
these hostilities are no longer as pronounced, they still continue to influence 
the pattern of support for political parties. in recent elections, the leadership 
of the tiSi Sangam has continued to support the nFp, while the leadership of 
the Andhra Sangam has supported the Flp.23 
Another minority group in Fiji, the muslims, began to assert their 
communal identity during the 1920s, partly as a result of increased religious 
and political tensions in india. the Fiji muslim league (Fml) was formed in 
1926, and was to serve as a central coordinating body that would try to realize 
the ambitions of muslims to hold office.24 it also made possible a unified 
muslim voice against the activities of the Arya Samaj in Fiji –  and especially 
against its preacher, Sri Krishna. Sri Krishna preached that the muslims and 
indian christians were against progress, a claim that generated considerable 
anxiety on the part of the muslim community.25 Since the 1920s, the Fml 
has resisted muslim incorporation into the indian communal rolls, agitating 
for separate representation based upon distinct muslim religious and cultural 
identity and history. the rift between the Aryas and Fml was reinforced by 
the experience of Hindus and muslims during the partition of the indian 
subcontinent during independence. Following Fiji’s independence in 1970, 
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the call for separate muslim representation found considerable support from 
sections of the indigenous Fijian élite, who saw it as a means of decentralizing 
the indian community’s numerical strength. in the aftermath of the 1987 coup, 
the leadership of the Fml gave its support to the Great council of chiefs’ 
proposal for Fijian dominance in parliament, in the hope that it would lead 
to them receiving separate political representation.26 lal suggests that this 
effectively provided support for the nationalist taukei movement.27 A section 
of the muslim community was instrumental in helping to establish the Alliance 
party28 and maintained strong relationships with it – and later the SDl party 
– after independence; however, they are pragmatic when it comes to securing 
their goal of separate representation, and backed the Flp in 1999. 
A significant cleavage, which continues to influence the culture of politics 
in Fiji, is the division between those who arrived as free indians (Gujaratis and 
punjabis) and those descended from indentured labourers. the free indians 
were more successful in maintaining a distinct identity in the post-indenture 
period, partly because their ties to their homeland and their freedom to return 
whenever they chose meant that family ties were maintained – with two-
way trade, in remittances from Fiji, and in merchandise from india, being 
established. cultural and linguistic traditions were also maintained and renewed 
through visits ‘home’ for marriage etc. most Gujaratis chose not to wed Fiji 
indians, but to return to india to marry within their caste. caste remained 
important for Gujaratis, as most immigrants from the same caste were related, 
which in business meant that they joined together to fight against non-Gujarati 
competition. this sense of group loyalty was an aid to their business success, 
but also led to resentment from other, less successful, groups. Several Gujarati 
families continue to enjoy considerable business success: Vinod patel, tappoo 
and r.c manubhai being prime examples.29 A further source of differentiation is 
that Gujaratis, as Hindus, have tended to align themselves with the ApS/Fiji; this 
places them in a minority compared with the majority Sanatani community.
Gujarati merchants were instrumental in establishing and funding the 
nFp in 1960.30 it is claimed that they were also able to control the political 
loyalties of their indebted farmer customers.31 nevertheless, consciousness of 
potential resentment due to business success and the threat that this might 
jeopardize the intended aim of the party to represent cane growers, led those 
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early Gujarati leaders to quickly relinquish control. Divisions within the nFp 
in 1977 (outlined in further detail below) led many in the Gujarati community 
to move to the Alliance for the 1982 election, a liaison encouraged by close 
links established and maintained by way of joint ventures with Fijian élites, and 
by the Alliance party’s promise of ‘business as usual’.32 the promise of a stable 
economy has subsequently proved to be an important influence over Gujarati 
political loyalties, and in 2006 it is widely believed that they placed significant 
support behind the SDl.
Divisions within the indian community continue to persist, although in new 
shapes and forms. it has been suggested that a group of indian businessmen 
funded the 2000 coup against chaudhry’s government owing to fears that the 
Flp’s pledge to root out corruption would damage their business interests. 
mahendra chaudhry made similar claims on the Flp website, stating that 
several indian businessmen had ‘actively assisted the rebel elements in labasa 
with food and cash’33, in the hope of thereby dispelling the myth that the coup 
was racially motivated. Despite chaudhry’s claims, no indian businessmen have 
been charged in relation to the 2000 coup. 
Voter alignment in the past
Despite occasionally severe divisions, the indian community has, at times, 
aligned itself with political parties during elections. An early example of religious 
divisions influencing voting patterns occurred during the 1929 election for 
the legislative council. this was the first time that indians were permitted to 
elect members, albeit on a communal franchise. in the eastern constituency, 
two candidates stood, one, Khalid Sahim, was a muslim, the other, james 
maharaj, was a former Arya Samaji who had converted to christianity. out 
of the 83 valid voting papers, 63 had voted for maharaj, and 20 for Sahim. 
it was claimed by the Fml that, having become tools of the Arya Samaj, the 
Hindus had voted en bloc by ‘herd instinct’, as the other two winning candidates 
were also Arya Samajis.34 later, the divisions between the Arya Samaj and the 
muslim community would heal, enabling them to form alliances. During 
the 1951 legislative council election, the Fml supported a political leader 
strongly linked to the Arya Samaj. A request was made of the muslims in the 
rural constituency of namboulima to vote for this candidate, which they duly 
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did.35 this alliance is still in evidence today. During the 2006 election it was 
widely believed that the leadership of the Fml and ApS/Fiji supported the 
SDl, the reasons for which are examined below.
the events surrounding the April 1977 election provide a telling example 
of the role played by religion in politics. the outcome was an unexpected, 
but narrow, victory for the nFp and defeat for ratu mara’s Alliance party, by 
26 seats to 24. Yet, in the wake of the poll, the Governor General exercised 
his power of discretion to return the Alliance party to power under the 
leadership of ratu mara, rather than handing the reins to the leader of the 
nFp, Siddiq Koya. His reasoning for this was that the country had failed to 
provide a clear mandate and that mara was the person best able to command 
the support of the majority of members of parliament. internal divisions 
within the nFp before the election led to speculation that it was members of 
Koya’s own party that had informed the Governor General that they would 
be unwilling to work with Koya. it was suggested by Koya some years later 
that his Hindu colleagues withheld their support for him, as they did not 
want a muslim prime minister.36 mara’s government was later toppled by 
an nFp-led vote of no confidence, which led to fresh elections being held in 
September 1977. 
in that election, both sides exploited religious divisions. the nFp was 
divided into two factions – known as the ‘flowers’ and the ‘doves’. the flowers, 
led by K.c. ramrakha and irene jai narayan, were widely regarded as a Hindu 
party, whilst Koya led the doves, commonly believed to be a muslim party.37 
the campaign was characterized by the manipulation of religious symbols for 
political gain. Hindus were urged to vote for the flower, which is commonly 
used in practices of Hindu religious worship, whilst advertisements for public 
meetings organized by irene jai narayan of the flower faction featured a 
caricature of her with her hands clasped together as in prayer; flanking the 
corners of the advertisement the clasped hands were reproduced and enlarged.38 
the language used during the election was also designed to manipulate religious 
sentiment – Koya was described by ramrakha as a ‘high priest who was trying 
to set up a rival temple’,39 an allusion to the nFp as a strongly religious and 
sacred body. the divided nFp subsequently lost the election, with the Alliance 
party being returned to office with a stronger majority. Koya claimed that the 
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loss was because the leaders of the flower faction had ‘sown the seeds of discord 
in the indian community, setting Hindus against muslims’.40 
Hafizud Dean Khan and the FML
claims that religious organizations continue to influence the political process 
are strongly denied by both parties and religious organizations alike. After the 
death of former SDl minister for information, Ahmed Ali, in 2005, the SDl 
party appointed the Fml president, Hafizud Dean Khan, as his successor to the 
Senate. He maintained a high-profile relationship with Qarase, which led many 
commentators to predict that the 2006 election would see significant increases 
in the muslim vote for the SDl at the expense of the Flp. When the election 
candidates were announced, it was revealed that the SDl would be fielding 
muslim candidates in nine out of the 21 indian communal constituencies, and 
in four out of the seven open seats in which it had placed indian candidates. 
this was disproportionate to the size of the muslim community, and indicates 
a strategic attempt to swing votes away from the Flp. Whilst the Fml did not 
make any public statements in support of the SDl, nor ask their members to 
vote for the party, it was believed that the close relationship that developed 
between Hafizud Dean Khan and Qarase indicated some measure of political 
support.41 
traditionally, some leaders of the Fml have pragmatically supported those 
parties that went on to form the government. Because of their pragmatism, they 
maintained a strong relationship with the Alliance party. in previous years, all 
parties tried to court the support of the muslim community.42 However, in the 
2006 election, muslim candidates did not win any of the indian communal 
seats. While the leadership of religious groups, like the Fml, may maintain 
high profile relationships with political leaders, it does not follow that the 
rank and file membership will follow. During the 2001 election, the leaders 
of several religious organizations contested seats. D.S. naidu, president of 
the tiSi Sangam, stood for the nFp in his home constituency – nadi urban 
indian communal – in which is located the iconic Sri Subramaniyam temple. 
Yet, the nFp vote fell by 0.5 per cent in the constituency compared with the 
1999 result. this pattern was repeated in the nadi rural indian communal 
constituency, in which Surendra Kumar, president of the SDS, stood in 2006. 
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Again, he stood for the nFp in his home constituency, but failed to win the 
seat, delivering a 4.5 per cent drop in the nFp vote compared with the previous 
election. the secretary of the AS, immanuel manu,43 also stood for the nFp 
in nadroga in 2006, but secured only 5.2 per cent of the vote at the first count 
and lost to the Flp candidate.44   
Similarly, when religious leaders stand down, it seems to have little impact 
on electoral outcomes. ApS/Fiji leader Kamlesh Arya vacated his laucala 
indian communal seat just before the 2006 election. He had won the seat in 
2001, with a 9.5 per cent increase on the previous election. in 2006, a new 
candidate contested the seat for the Flp, winning by a margin similar to that 
of his predecessor. this suggests that the votes cast in 2001 were for the Flp, 
rather than for Kamlesh Arya, as president of the ApS/Fiji. 
The FLP and the Chaudhry effect
it seems likely that rank and file members of most Hindu and muslim religious 
organizations voted for the Flp in the indian communal constituencies in 
2006. prior to the election, chaudhry suffered considerable setbacks when 
several high-profile mps announced that they would not be re-contesting their 
seats. Some suggested that this was the end of his career. Yet, chaudhry remained 
a strong and popular leader with the indian electorate, with support cutting 
across religious and cultural boundaries. results in the indian communal 
constituencies at the 2006 election show that, out of a total of 165,398 valid 
votes, the Flp won 134,022 (81%), whilst the nFp polled 23,263 (14%) and 
the national Alliance and SDl parties had a combined indian communal vote 
of 7,000 (4.2%).45 the Flp’s vote was also reasonably steady across the country, 
suggesting that variation in religious affiliation had little impact.46  
Divisions within religious organizations also called into question the political 
credibility of the organizations. Both the AS and tiSi Sangam, in unrelated 
incidents, had suffered from internal problems, which led to a loss of confidence 
in their leaders and attempts to replace them. With both of the south indian 
groups in disarray, it seems unlikely that they would have appeared credible 
advocates for one or other of the major parties in the eyes of their members 
during the election. the electoral influence of the SDS is also open to question. 
With a claimed membership in excess of 200,000 people, academic Ganesh 
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chand suggests that the SDS is too big an organization to be able to influence 
voting preferences at grassroots level.47  
the real source of influence rests with the individual Ramayan mandalis (local 
congregations), located throughout Fiji.  the purpose of these organizations is to 
encourage the reading of religious texts in a group setting; however, due to their 
relatively small size, these localized units are also better equipped to encourage 
informal political debate. While, officially, candidates are not permitted to 
use the mandali as a political platform, many candidates and people close 
to them are members of them and able to informally circulate their political 
message. Hock points out that the SDS as a national organization grew out of 
the mandali system.48 However, a number of sources suggest that few of the 
mandalis have regular formal contact with the SDS executive, and so are free 
from any executive influence. 
candidates have also used religious events for political gain.  the 2006 
election fell during three religious festivals – ram naumi (Hindu), easter 
(christian) and the prophet mohammed’s Birthday (muslim).  each was 
used as a platform by election candidates to address potential voters. lek 
ram Vayeshnoi, who stood for the Flp in the nadroga indian communal 
constituency, attended a religious event at a private house at which he gave a 
speech on good governance. For Vayeshnoi, ‘religious functions are one of the 
few places where young and old are together – as such this is why religion is 
used as a weapon to get votes’.49
A number of factors contributed to mahendra chaudhry’s success in 
attracting indian votes in 2006, including compulsory voting and increased 
voter awareness of issues arising from comprehensive media coverage.50 Disputes 
between the army and the governing SDl also appeared to make another coup 
a less likely accompaniment to a 1999-style Flp victory. What of the role of 
religious convictions? chaudhry’s close ties to india and his well-documented 
religious beliefs mean that he is seen as a leader reflecting indian values, as 
well as one with a strong record of defending indian interests. As mentioned 
above, chaudhry is often venerated with quasi-religious respect, with his 
photo adorning the walls alongside a pantheon of gods, and his strident 
condemnation of injustice echoing lingering popular bitterness about the 
experience of indenture and the coups of 1987 and 2000. the comparisons 
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with rama’s banishment continues the popular theme of suffering within the 
indian community, and places chauhdry as the inheritor of a tradition that 
extends from the indentured labourers to the present.
1987: A time for change
the changing relationship between indian religious organizations and the 
political scene can be seen by the response to the coups of 1987 and 2000. 
Writing three years after the 1987 coup, john Garrett talked of the silence of 
the indian community, which had previously been vocal and assertive through 
the nFp. He found instead a ‘silent citizenship’ alternating with occasional 
non-violent protests. these protests were mobilized through trade unions rather 
than religious groups, and it was the unions which increasingly voiced indian 
political concerns.51 there were no explicit statements from religious groups 
condemning the coups, partly due to the internal divisions within both the 
Hindu and muslim communities. 
there were other, more problematic, reasons for indian silence. the ever-
present threat of targeted violence against those speaking out is highlighted by 
the case of chandrika prasad, who filed a lawsuit in which he claimed that the 
interim government installed in 2000 was illegal. He won his case, bringing into 
question the legitimacy of the interim government. on the day his victory was 
announced, another farmer with the same name was seriously assaulted in what 
is believed to have been a case of mistaken identity. in the wake of the coups, 
Fiji indians ‘…had few public forums within the country where they felt safe 
to voice their grievances’.52 indian places of worship were attacked, adding to 
the sense of a community under siege.53 During the 2006 election campaign, a 
temple in Waila nausori was broken into, which led chaudhry to propose an 
intelligence network for the police to curb attacks on places of worship.54 
the falling indian population after 1987, owing to significant numbers 
leaving for overseas, further heightened the sense of insecurity. in 1986, the 
indians had been the majority population, with 347,445 people (48.6%) 
compared with the Fijian population of 330,441 (46.2%).55 in the months after 
the 1987 coup, large numbers of well-educated professionals fled the country, 
settling in Australia, new Zealand and America; this was repeated after the 
2000 coup.56 perhaps 80,000 or 90,000 indians have left the country since 
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1987, around 20–25 per cent of the 1987 population of indians. numbers 
have continued to fall, and the current population is 316,093 compared with 
a Fijian population of 463,432.57 
in the aftermath of the 1987 coup and subsequent political upheavals, indian 
religious organizations began to distance themselves from the political process. 
the desire to separate religion and politics is understandable given rabuka’s 
post-coup rhetoric, in which he claimed, for example, his role as coup leader 
to be a mission ordained by God, and referred repeatedly to both Hindus and 
muslims as heathens.58 rabuka also famously declared that he wanted to turn 
Fiji into a christian state:
those that do not choose to become christians can continue to live here but they will 
probably find it a difficult place to live in, for we may not have Hindu religious occasions 
celebrated as such, and their holy days may not be holy days from now on.59 
these sentiments were echoed in the Assembly of christian churches in 
Fiji’s 2006 election advertisement, which called for Fiji to be ruled by the 
laws of God (see newland, this volume). Against this backdrop, Hindu and 
muslim religious organizations have chosen to remain quiet, in order to avoid 
becoming a visible target for attack. they have moved their attentions to forcing 
the education agenda as a way of maintaining their influence over the political 
process. it is an area in which they have a long-standing interest.
Education: for the future or for security?
education had always been a priority for Fiji’s indian community, particularly 
after the end of indenture. After 1987, it took on an added urgency in that it 
offered a degree of security. An indian student at the university of the South 
pacific commented to me, ‘…they can take away my land and my home, but 
they can’t take away my degree…with my degree i can escape and start a new 
life if things become difficult’.60 this sentiment is widely held by indian families 
from across the various communities.
in a country in which few indians own land61, education is regarded as the 
most important thing the indian community can provide for their children: it 
offers security through financial independence. With this in mind, most indian 
religious organizations have established a range of educational institution62, 
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with most of them either having expanded into the tertiary education market, 
or having plans to do so in future. While these schools are owned and run 
by the various religious groups, they rely heavily on government support 
and funding to provide teachers’ pay, grants and loans for building repairs, 
scholarships, academic accreditation and curriculum planning. it is because 
they provide funding and are involved in the day-to-day running of schools, 
that most religious groups wish themselves to be seen as politically neutral, as 
to align oneself with a particular political party could jeopardise future sources 
of funding. 
However, education is not the exclusive concern of the indian community. 
A tebbutt poll in The Fiji Times indicated that 41 per cent of ethnic Fijians 
identified it as their most significant concern during the 2006 election.63 As 
education has broad appeal, it is a safe issue around which religious organizations 
can influence the political agenda. During the election, the president of the 
SDS, Surendra Kumar, requested the newly elected government to allocate 
approximately F$50,000 to registered religious groups, in order to alleviate 
the financial hardships that forced children to leave school:
i urge the government to help poor children in all levels of education…religious groups 
are the best means by which they can support poor children…the government and 
religious groups should work in partnership to provide scholarships to children in primary 
and secondary schools. We can curb social problems by making families feel they are 
wanted.64 
in this way the political agenda shifts to social policy, with poverty alleviation 
and crime and disorder entering the debate. the continuing struggle to secure 
funding lies at the heart of the political debate around education, with parties 
conscious that this is a significant vote-winning issue. mindful of this, the then 
minister for multi-ethnic Affairs, George Shiu raj, stated that his ministry 
would provide more than 8,000  scholarships over the next parliamentary session 
if the SDl were re-elected, this being an increase of 2,400 on the previous 
parliamentary session, when 5,600 scholarships were distributed.65
Further promises were made to help religious groups establish nursing schools 
for students unable to secure a place at the Fiji School of nursing. With an eye 
to wider policy issues, Shiu raj stated that:
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the setting up of nursing schools would ease the lives of many families when their children 
graduated and started working…if 1,000 nurses graduated each year from the schools, 
the problem of poverty would be solved. the graduates could work locally or migrate to 
countries that needed their skills…foreign earnings would increase because they would 
send money back home to their families.66 
the government saw the expansion into tertiary education and the sending 
of nurses overseas as a way of increasing national wealth and reducing 
unemployment. 
the official reason for the founding of the university of Fiji67 was that it 
would have a Fiji focus, something that the university of the South pacific was 
unable to do as it serviced the educational needs of 12 pacific nations. the 
decision was prompted by the need to provide a home for indian students who 
perceive themselves to have been marginalized under the affirmative action 
schemes of successive governments since 1987. During his june 2005 speech 
to open the AD patel centenary carnival in Ba, professor rajesh chandra, 
the Vice-chancellor of the university of Fiji stated:
in a very real sense, the indian community had been searching for some time for a way 
to expand the provision of higher education in Fiji, and to avoid its dependence on the 
government-controlled university of the South pacific. Despite having access to the 
university and the obvious benefits of the uSp to Fiji, people in Fiji had been feeling 
that their access was being limited by quotas or threats of quotas, and that people in 
the Western Division and those in the northern Division did not have good access to 
higher education in the way that the residents of Suva and surrounding areas had…[t]he 
university is fulfilling the dreams that AD patel, pandit Vishnu Deo, and other leaders 
had, and the dreams that the indo-Fijian community had to ensure that it had good access 
to high quality higher education.68
the founding of the university of Fiji may be seen as a politically motivated 
decision, but its establishment was dogged by problems. the minister for 
education, ro teimumu Kepa, tried to prevent the name ‘university of Fiji’ 
being used, whilst it was unclear as to whether or not government funding 
and accreditation would be forthcoming. At the start of the 2006 election 
campaign, the two people most closely identified with the establishment of the 
university – Ganesh chand and Kamlesh Arya, both Flp mps – announced 
that they would not be re-contesting their seats at the forthcoming election.  A 
week prior to this announcement, both Arya and chand had been with SDl 
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leader and prime minister Qarase at a high profile dedication function at the 
university of Fiji. the Flp leaders were absent from the event, with no reason 
given for their absence. Arya claims that the Flp had been invited, and that he 
hand-delivered an invitation to chaudhry. in addition to this he had ‘personally 
cajoled several of them [Flp members] to come but they were not there’.69 
in the weeks prior to the dedication ceremony, Arya had publicly criticized 
chaudhry.70 At the same time, Qarase strengthened the relationship between 
the SDl and Arya Samaj by saying at the dedication, as quoted in The Fiji 
Times: ‘the SDl coalition and the motivating spirits behind the new university 
had a shared belief in the high importance of education’.71 in making such a 
statement, Qarase was able to plant in the public mind the idea that the two 
organizations had a shared vision for Fiji, and touched on an issue of importance 
to indian voters – that of education. At the same time, the motivating spirits, 
Arya and chand, were two former Flp members who had left the party due 
to disagreements with its leadership. 
the public perception of these events was well illustrated by a letter titled 
‘Bad leader’ printed in The Fiji Times during the election campaign. in it, the 
author accused the SDl of orchestrating mr Arya’s public condemnation, and 
departure from the Flp, and said that mr Arya willingly went along with it 
for personal gain. it was alleged that it was done in order to secure the victory 
of the SDl party, which, in turn, would provide government grants for the 
university of Fiji.72 Whether this is true or not, it represents a suspicion that 
was around at the time. it is unclear whether or not this was deliberate political 
positioning by the prime minister in order to win votes; however, as with 
Hafizud Dean Khan and the Fml, this did not translate to rank and file votes 
migrating to the SDl party.73
Conclusion
the way in which religious organizations influence the political process has 
altered over time. in the post-indenture period, divisions between religious 
groups resurfaced, and led to the establishment of a number of religious and 
quasi-religious groups dedicated to the protection and promotion of education 
and culture. through the post-war years, the leadership of these groups was 
able to influence voting patterns and provide religious blocks of support to a 
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particular candidate or party. After 1987, there was a movement away from 
this style of direct support for political parties. increased political sophistication 
in the electorate, with information drawn from a number of sources, means 
that religious organizations are no longer such a powerful source of opinion 
during election campaigns. While religious leaders may align themselves with 
particular parties, it does not follow that rank and file members will follow their 
lead – as the cases of D.S. naidu and the tiSi Sangam, Surendra Kumar and 
the SDS, and immanuel manu and the AS demonstrate. Whilst the leaders of 
religious bodies may have political ambitions, their members do not necessarily 
share these. As a result, organizations that were once vocal backers of political 
parties are now more circumspect when making political statements, tending 
to focus only on those issues that the public expects them to speak on – such 
as education policy, temple desecration and the promotion of reconciliation, 
tolerance and unity Bill.74 they have, however, found that, through their focus 
on education and its expansion, wider issues of social policy can be debated, and 
the political agenda shaped. the 2006 election resulted in a multiparty cabinet 
– with individuals from various ideological persuasions coming together for the 
national benefit. Similarly, while divisions between the different indian religious 
groups persist, and are essential in sustaining indian identity, the movement 
towards the expansion of higher education can be seen as these groups working 
together for a common cause. However, the question remains whether this is 
for the national benefit or for the betterment of a specific community.
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Fiji’s system of elections and 
government: where to from 
here?
The Honourable Laisenia Qarase
Since my party’s victory in the may 2006 general election, i have concentrated 
my attention on the formation of the multiparty cabinet with the Fiji labour 
party (Flp), and on laying the groundwork to ensure the success of this new 
approach to the governance of Fiji.
i am committed to ensuring that the multiparty cabinet with labour will 
successfully take us through the next five years. this is not only because it is a 
requirement of the 1997 constitution. more importantly, it is because i believe 
it provides our country with an exceptional opportunity to start a new era of 
cooperation between our major communities through a multi-ethnic form of 
government.
Since the 2006 election, suggestions have been made about the appropriateness 
for Fiji of a system of proportional representation, as opposed to the current 
alternative vote system provided under the 1997 constitution. proponents of 
proportional voting consider it to be more democratic and fair in ensuring 
a direct correlation between votes for, and seats won by, a political party 
campaigning on a national scale. As ‘purists’ in the application of democracy, 
they believe that an electoral system based on proportional representation more 
accurately reflects the wishes of the voters. Furthermore, they assert that, in a 
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multi-ethnic society, proportional representation helps to mitigate the effects 
of racial political polarization. 
this chapter posits that the people of Fiji would be best served in exercising 
their democratic rights, both to elect their members of parliament and to elect 
a strong and effective government, by an electoral arrangement that promotes 
a political party system dominated by two parties, even though those parties 
are mainly ethnically based. i argue that this would be more appropriate than 
a system that would tend to encourage the proliferation of small political 
parties within each of our ethnic communities. experience has shown that 
such proliferation in the Fijian polity is a recipe for instability. 
i am, therefore, suggesting that we keep the election method established under 
the 1997 constitution and allow it to operate in a few more elections before we 
consider any major changes. this does not exclude adjustments recommended 
by the electoral commission to improve the operations of the current system.
the challenge in a political party system dominated by two major and ethnic-
based parties is to devise a form of multi-ethnic government, which, in the words 
of section 6 (h) of Fiji’s constitution, would take ‘full account…of the interests 
of all communities’ in our multi-ethnic and multicultural society. Section 99 
(4) also provides that the composition of cabinet should, as far as possible, fairly 
represent the parties represented in the House of representatives.
Background
ever since the first national election in post-independence Fiji, that of 1972, 
different political parties or coalitions of parties have been elected to form the 
government: the Alliance party in 1972, in the second election of 1977, and 
in 1982; the national Federation party (nFp) in the first election of 1977; the 
Flp/nFp coalition in 1987; the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt) in 
1992, and again in 1994; the Flp-led people’s coalition in 1999; the Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl)/conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua 
(cAmV) coalition in 2001; and the SDl on its own in 2006.
in all these elections, the most prominent and consistent feature is the ethnic 
base of the political parties, and racial voting behaviour. 
the Alliance party was proud that it was multiracial, having three 
components (the Fijian Association, the indian Alliance and the General 
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electors Association). However, in the main, it was essentially a Fijian party, and 
it was the indigenous vote that determined its success or failure at elections.
most of the other parties have also claimed to be multiracial. indeed, in 
their respective constitutions, they have opened membership to all citizens, 
irrespective of race and cultural background. But in their membership and 
in voter support at elections, the Flp and nFp have always overwhelmingly 
drawn support from the indian community. the SDl, the cAmV, the SVt, 
and others like the Fijian Association party, the Veitokani ni lewenivanua party 
(VlV), and pAnu, have been supported, in the main, by Fijians.
in addition, one important development in elections under the 1997 
constitution is the emergence of what is essentially a dual-dominant political 
party polity: the SDl largely supported by Fijians, and the Flp by members 
of the indian community. this trend toward two dominant parties has been 
reinforced by a better understanding by the voters of the above-the-line and 
below-the-line methods for choice of preferences. the overall result in the 2006 
election was that the SDl received approximately 81 per cent of all votes in 
the Fijian communal constituencies, and the Flp 81 per cent of all votes in 
the indian communal constituencies.1
in terms of voting behaviour, Fijians essentially vote for the ‘Fijian’ party they 
consider would best secure the interests of their community. indians, for their 
part, support the ‘indian’ party which, in their view, would best safeguard their 
interests as a community. the two communities see their security ultimately 
in winning control of parliament and government in elections. Voters shift or 
move their votes within their community. there is little movement of votes 
across communities. Fijian votes for the Flp in the 2006 election in the Fijian 
communal seats were only 6 per cent. indian votes for the SDl in the indian 
communal constituencies were even less, at 2 per cent.2
indians switched largely to the Flp from the nFp in the 1999 election. the 
nFp’s share of the indian vote fell from 32 per cent in 1999 to 22 per cent at 
the 2001 election. the new labour unity party, led by Dr tupeni Baba, broke 
away from the main Fiji labour party. But its low indian vote (3 per cent in 
2001) showed that indian voters still preferred nFp, when judged against this 
newer multiracial party. more importantly, they favoured a single political party 
to articulate communal interests. the consolidation of indian support around 
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the Flp continued at the 2006 election, when the Flp received 82 per cent of 
indian votes and the nFp share dropped to 14 per cent.3
on the Fijian side, Fijian votes crossed over from the SVt to the VlV and 
the Fijian Association parties in the 1999 election. in the 2001 election, Fijian 
votes shifted from these two political parties to the SDl and the cAmV. in the 
2006 election, Fijian votes moved overwhelmingly to the SDl from all other 
parties within the Fijian community. As a direct result, there was a 60 per cent 
increase in overall voter support for the SDl.4 
Where to from here?
Given our experience and the trends from past elections, the question that 
arises is, where do we go from here? A combination of continuing ethnic-based 
support for particular political parties; the racial vote by individual voters 
preferring the party and candidates closely identified with, and supported by, 
their ethnic community; and the continuation of the above-the-line choice of 
preferences under the current alternative vote system, will tend to consolidate 
the dominance of the two political parties – the SDl and the Flp. this, in 
my view, will be further reinforced if the current SDl/Flp multiparty cabinet 
continues successfully to run government until the next general election in 2011, 
and to resolve the country’s main national issues. these include the renewal 
of agricultural leases on native land, promoting sustained high growth in the 
economy, and devoting more resources to alleviating and eradicating poverty 
amongst Fiji’s poor and the low-income sections of our society.
the known advantage of the proportional representation system over first-
past-the-post and alternative voting is that it reduces the discrepancy between 
votes cast for a party and seats won by that party. this ensures that a party’s 
representation in parliament directly reflects the level of support it received. 
But this advantage is undermined if it leads to a proliferation of small political 
parties. this makes it harder for any single party to win a clear or outright 
majority in general elections. the new Zealand example is relevant.
From past trends, the introduction of a system of proportional representation 
is unlikely to draw, to any significant extent, indian voter support away from 
the Flp and the nFp, or lead to the formation of a third ‘indian’ party. there 
is, however, a real probability that it would exacerbate the problem of political 
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fragmentation within the Fijian community, and take Fiji back to the kind 
of political situation that led to the defeat of the Alliance government in 
1977, and of the SVt government in 1999. it would make it harder in future 
elections for a single ‘Fijian’ political party to win with a clear majority in the 
House of representatives. Without a ‘Fijian’ party winning with an outright 
majority, Fiji could see a repeat of what followed the 1999 general election. that 
election produced a coalition government led by a ‘non-Fijian’ party, despite 
the Fijian numerical majority. the reason for this was the fragmentation of 
Fijian votes caused by numerous parties competing for Fijian support. And this 
could happen again, even though the Fijians have an increasing Fijian political 
advantage, stemming from the growing Fijian population. 
Voting results in the open seats in the 2006 election confirm the mobility of 
Fijian votes among several ‘Fijian’ parties, and the stability of indian votes with 
the two ‘indian’ parties, the Flp and the nFp. Amongst Fijian voters, 65 per 
cent voted for the SDl; 35 per cent voted for other parties, with the majority 
of these votes going to other ‘Fijian’ parties. Amongst indian voters, 80 per 
cent voted for labour. With only a 2 per cent vote for the SDl in the indian 
communal constituencies, it was clear that the majority of the remaining 20 
per cent of indian votes in open constituencies went to the nFp and minor 
‘Fijian’ parties.5
in assessing the suitability for Fiji of the proportional voting system, 
the following comments by researchers who have thoroughly studied it are 
relevant:
Various Western european countries use proportional electoral systems. more often than 
not, they bring about coalition or minority governments because no party wins an overall 
majority.6
proportional representation, where it has been tried, has not noticeably improved the 
standards of public life. in Belgium, it has tended to eliminate independence. in Switzerland, 
it has so multiplied the tiny groups that no coherent opinion has been able to emerge. that 
always implies weak government, and weak government ultimately means an irresponsible 
government.7
Whilst variations can be made to the proportional representation system 
to lessen its tendency to encourage a proliferation of political parties, its 
application in new Zealand is illustrative of the unclear electoral outcomes it 
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can produce. there, it has led to a succession of coalition governments, with 
weakened authority for the prime minister. 
When no party wins an outright majority, a coalition of convenience becomes 
necessary for the formation of a government. in Fiji, this kind of result would 
make it almost impossible for a prime minister to create the kind of multiparty 
cabinet envisaged in section 99 of the constitution.
An illogical consequence could be a cabinet in which the prime minister’s own 
party was in a minority. i doubt whether this was envisaged by the architects 
of the constitution, because section 98 appears to assume that the person to 
be appointed prime minister will have a parliamentary majority.
clearly, what Fiji needs is an electoral system that delivers: 
•	 the democratic right of the voters to elect their members of parliament 
and their government
•	 a government with a clear majority in the House and strong constitutional 
authority for the prime minister to lead decisively
•	 an effective opposition in parliament
•	 constitutional support for the prime minister to form a multi-ethnic cabinet 
to promote intercommunity accommodation and cooperation.
the electoral commission has proposed an amendment to the electoral Act 
to simplify the ballot paper in relation to the above-the-line and below-the-line 
option for voters. Specifically, the amendment is to restore the discretionary 
powers of returning officers during the counting process, to assess and declare 
the voting intention of a voter.
the commonwealth observer mission has also recommended improvements 
to the counting and reporting system. it has called for a review to refine, 
streamline and simplify the process for future elections. the mission believes 
that this could be done without any loss of transparency or damage to the 
overall integrity of elections.
the process of developing an electronic voter roll, constantly updated 
and improved, will be ongoing, as will be the strengthening of the elections 
office to take on full responsibility for municipal elections as well as national 
elections.
However, other than the above, there are several aspects of the electoral 
system that  could usefully be considered in public discussions.
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the first is whether or not, in the long run, the present system of mixed 
communal and open constituencies should be changed to make all 71 seats 
in the House of representatives open and non-racial. there have been many 
suggestions that communal representation perpetuates racial polarization 
and should, therefore, be abolished. the 1996 reeves report8 commented 
on this and recommended that the majority of seats should be through open 
constituencies. this issue is something the indian and minority communities, 
in particular, will have to think carefully about, because of the continuing 
decrease in their population numbers. recent reports on population trends 
have indicated that the annual birth rate of the indian community has fallen 
to such an extent that, even without emigration, the number of indians in 
Fiji will continue to decline. Fijians, on the other hand, have continued to 
increase to the extent that they now comprise more than 54 per cent of Fiji’s 
total population. Assuming that the indian community regards its assured 
communal representation as vitally important to its political future and security, 
the question that arises is whether or not that community will, in the light of 
population changes, now opt to reverse its earlier historical preference for the 
‘common roll’, or one-person-one-vote in open and non-racial constituencies, 
and insist instead on retaining its communal seats. 
it should be noted that our constitution actually allows our three main 
communities – the Fijians, the indians and the General electors – to retain 
their communal seats. there are 23 for Fijians, 19 for indians and three for 
the General electors. this right of communal representation is entrenched. 
the numbers cannot be changed without the express consent of the respective 
community representatives in the House. ironically, Fijians, who have always 
been averse to the earlier demands of indian political leaders for a ‘common 
roll’, will, as their numbers continue to increase, see political advantage in 
moving toward an all open and non-racial constituency system.
if communal seats are to be retained, an aspect that is worth considering 
is whether or not we should reintroduce the cross-voting system established 
under the 1970 constitution. this would be one way of opening up and further 
democratizing voting for communal representatives. it would also confer a 
political advantage to those candidates who could muster support from all 
communities. 
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An issue for the constituency Boundaries commission to consider following 
the population census scheduled for 2007 is the desirability of closely aligning, 
as far as possible, the constituency boundaries of communal seats to the 
geographical boundaries of the 14 Fijian provinces and rotuma. Already, the 
government’s development administration and the geographical boundaries 
of all rural District Advisory councils are being harmonized with the Fijian 
provincial boundaries. Such a move would encourage all members of parliament 
from the same ‘province’ to support each other, across the parties to which they 
individually belong, in serving the people.
those who have shown a keen interest in the continuing development and 
improvement in Fiji’s electoral system would greatly assist our ongoing efforts 
to promote unity if they would also closely examine the persistence of ethnic 
voting. Why, precisely, do Fijians vote mainly for Fijian candidates, or for 
parties they consider to be predominantly ‘Fijian’ in their membership and 
policies? And, vice versa, why, precisely, do indians vote largely for candidates 
who are from their community, or for a party they consider to be ‘indian’ in its 
membership and policies?  if this continues in the long term to be an entrenched 
feature of voting in Fiji, what can be done to ameliorate its negative impact on 
race relations and intercommunal cooperation in Fiji?
on the promotion of intercommunity cooperation through the formation 
of a multiparty cabinet, i acknowledge that the provisions under section 99 of 
Fiji’s constitution reflect a sincere attempt to promote political power-sharing 
and mutual accommodation between the country’s major political parties 
and the ethnic communities they represent. the intention was to move our 
country away from the identification of government and opposition with 
particular ethnic groups. With decision-making by majority in the House of 
representatives and the convention of the opposition vigorously projecting 
itself as the alternative government, the adversarial nature of the government/
opposition relationship in parliament only served to widen and embitter 
intercommunal relations in Fiji. 
However, the question that arises now, and on which i would encourage 
research and welcome ideas, is whether or not there is a better alternative to the 
current approach of an enforced multiparty cabinet under Fiji’s constitution. 
Whilst the SDl/Flp multiparty cabinet is working well and is a credit to the 
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commitment of all ministers from both political parties, there have also been 
attendant difficulties and uncertainties. For example, are the backbencher 
members of the entitled party in the multiparty cabinet strictly bound to support 
the government’s legislative and other proposals in the House in exactly the 
same way as are those from the prime minister’s party? then there is the role 
of the opposition. A government can only be fully responsible and accountable 
to the people if there is also an effective opposition. in the current House of 
representatives, how can the opposition play this role effectively when it is 
made up of only two out of the 71 members!
the compact chapter of the constitution, in section 6 (g), lays down the 
guiding principle for the formation of a government following a general election. 
A government has to have majority support among the members of the House 
of representatives. this majority support can come from the winning political 
party, or a pre-election coalition of parties. But the constitution goes further. 
it says, ‘… if it is necessary or desirable to form a coalition government from 
competing parties, [that] depends on their willingness to come together to 
form or support a Government’.
i believe that constitutionally encouraging the prime minister to form a 
multi-ethnic government, through a voluntary coalition of willing political 
parties, is a far better approach to political power-sharing and intercommunal 
accommodation in Fiji than that currently provided under the provisions of 
section 99.
Conclusion
in a multi-ethnic and multicultural country like Fiji, where communities have 
been kept apart by communal concerns and interests, it is imperative to have 
an electoral system that produces clear and unequivocal results. the experience 
of other countries indicates that proportional representation does not do this. 
it is crucially important to have a prime minister appointed under section 98 
of the constitution whose party, or pre-election coalition of parties, has an 
outright majority in the House of representatives. A clear popular mandate 
and strong constitutional authority would enable the prime minister to form 
what would essentially be a voluntary coalition of parties represented in the 
House, and willing to join in a multi-ethnic government. Such a government 
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should represent, as widely as possible, our different communities, and govern 
Fiji in the best interests of all. 
Such a government would also be strong because it would be led by a prime 
minister with a clear mandate. What will bring it together, and sustain it, is an 
abiding conviction from all of Fiji’s communities that this voluntary form of 
inclusive government offers the best way forward for our country.
Although communal representation may not be ‘politically correct’, and 
may also not be in keeping with the universal principles of democracy, in 
Fiji’s situation the indians and other minority communities may prefer its 
continuation and retention. their support for the multiparty cabinet of the SDl 
and the Flp has clearly indicated that they regard their equitable representation 
in parliament and participation in cabinet as being important in assuring them 
of their place in our multi-ethnic and multicultural society. the retention of 
their communal representation would be a matter for consideration by the 
members of these communities themselves. For the Fijians, it would be an 
act of altruism and goodwill, and a demonstration of our caring concern, to 
respect their wishes – and, in any case, Fiji’s constitution entrenches communal 
representation.
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Parliamentary Leader, Fiji Labour Party
it’s a bald question, but one that’s surely unavoidable after the combined 
experiences of 2001 and 2006: is it possible ever to hold free and fair elections 
in Fiji anymore? 
Since 2001, a culture of vote-buying, poll-rigging and manipulation has 
seeped into our electoral process and threatens to destroy the very foundations 
of our democratic traditions and undermine the integrity of our elections. 
the exact nature and extent of the behind-the-scenes manipulation to 
engineer the results of the 2006 polls are not fully known, but enough credible 
evidence is available to cast serious doubts on the integrity of the 2006 election. 
likewise the 2001 general election. certainly, no critical observer could give 
them a clean bill of health, and one notices that even the european union 
(eu) observer mission in its final report has this time fallen short of declaring 
the elections free and fair. indeed, the numerous concerns it has raised and the 
recommendations it has made, on the conduct of the 2006 and future polls 
is tantamount to saying, in diplomatic language, that the 2006 election was 
seriously flawed.  
A local observer, Father David Arms, is not so constrained in his criticism 
of the racial bias and other malpractices he observed during the 2006 poll – to 
the point where he has refused to declare the elections free and fair.    His final 
observations are worth noting for anyone interested in an honest review of the 
2006 poll. He concluded that the ethnic imbalance among those conducting the 
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elections was ‘a serious blotch on the integrity of the whole electoral process’. 
Father Arms further noted:
on the basis particularly of the ethnic bias which was so pervasive in the 2006 elections, 
i cannot possibly give a verdict that they were ‘free and fair’. 
the elections of 2006 were so administratively biased that the overall results 
were undoubtedly influenced thereby.
many of Father Arms’ observations and concerns are similar to those held 
by the Fiji labour party (Flp), and are contained in our fairly comprehensive 
report to the eu observer mission and the electoral commission. i am 
of the opinion that much of the mess and malpractice that characterized 
the 2006 poll, deliberate or otherwise, could have been avoided had the 
electoral commission paid heed to a lengthy report i sent to the chairman 
of the commission as early as 5 may 2005 highlighting the main problems 
that marred the 2001 election and urging him to ensure they were not 
repeated.
The 2001 general election 
As a precursor to the 2006 poll, the 2001 election set the trend for what 
should have been expected. For the first time in Fiji’s electoral history, there 
was massive vote-buying in the lead-up to the 2001 general election by the 
laisenia Qarase-led interim administration – as evidenced by the $30 million 
agricultural scam, currently before the courts. no other government before 
this had ever been tainted by such a blatant vote-buying exercise. 
the Flp has consistently held that the 2001 general election was not free 
and fair – marred by vote-buying/bribery, defective electoral rolls, official bias 
and systematic vote-rigging. As a result, the Flp was deprived of victory in 
at least six marginal open constituencies, which altered the results in favour 
of the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl).     
A detailed report highlighting cases relating to vote-rigging, tampering 
with ballot papers and ballot boxes was submitted to the then Supervisor of 
elections, Walter rigamoto, but he failed to investigate any of these, or to 
treat the matter with the seriousness it deserved. His failure to do so meant 




the conduct of the 2006 poll was deeply flawed right from the beginning 
– starting with the voter registration exercise. i must also comment critically on 
the fact that the Supervisor of elections, Semesa Karavaki, was on study leave 
until january 2006 – just four months before the may election. in his absence, 
tomasi tui was sent from the prime minister’s office as Deputy Supervisor 
– the whole process was controlled from the prime minister’s office. tui was 
subsequently promoted to be commissioner eastern.        
Flawed voter registration
to begin with, house-to-house voter registration was confined to a mere two 
weeks, 12–23 September 2005 – clearly not enough time to compile an entirely 
new electoral roll. requests by political parties to have the house-to-house 
registration period extended were not granted. 
Furthermore, the process was highly politicized and lacked transparency; 
enumerators were hand-picked by staff of the elections office and District 
offices – often friends and family of officials. Voter registration teams were 
headed by persons who were politically affiliated and not impartial. A case 
in point is that of prem Singh, a national Federation party (nFp) candidate 
for the nadi open constituency, who was assigned registration and voter 
education activities by virtue of his being an advisory councillor. Subsequently, 
irregularities in the registration of voters in the nadi open constituency were 
noticed – some 1,400 voters in localities known to be Flp strongholds were 
found registered in the adjacent rural constituency of Yasawa/nawaka open. 
unfortunately for him, the displacement of these voters was picked up by Flp 
branch representatives, and the matter rectified.    
there was also gross ethnic imbalance in the recruitment of enumerators. 
out of a total of 4,284 enumerators, only 407 were indians; 155 were from 
other minority communities, while the rest, 3,722, were indigenous Fijians. 
this would clearly have created communication problems for indians in rural 
areas, and for the elderly, many of whom cannot speak english. And, no doubt, 
such biased recruitment was responsible for much of the mess in the voter 
registration process, as well as for the very high number of invalid votes in the 
2006 election compared with the 2001 election. 
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parliamentary questions from the Flp asking for details on enumerators for 
each constituency were rejected by the prime minister, who made the ludicrous 
claim that such information was of a confidential nature. His refusal to provide 
the information underscored the lack of transparency in the process, and further 
fuelled suspicion that something was afoot. 
in the past, school teachers, civil servants and political parties conducted 
the registration of voters. Why was this convention not followed in the 2006 
election?
the Flp-conducted surveys of the registration process found the following 
major flaws/discrepancies:
•	 many indian households in rural and urban areas were not visited by 
enumerators – leaving large segments of indian voters unregistered. in 
labasa, for instance, just a three-day survey by the Flp in march 2006 
uncovered 805 voters who had not been registered. likewise, significant 
numbers of voters in Korovuto, nawaicoba and meigunya in nadi were 
not registered.
•	 Hundreds of voters were either not given registration slips to show they 
had registered or were given blank slips – they were told slips were not 
necessary.
•	 people living in the same house were registered to vote in different 
constituencies – a subtle way of disenfranchising voters, as they would 
not be aware that their names were actually on the rolls of adjacent 
constituencies. they would simply assume that their names were missing 
from electoral rolls. Such attempts to disenfranchise voters would have 
made a crucial difference in closely fought open constituencies, particularly 
those in the central Division. 
•	 For some reason, registration was not carried out on weekends when 
most people can be found at home. enumerators did not make call-back 
visits.
•	 Faulty registration slips – numerous cases of names incorrectly entered, 
blanks left for constituencies or slips tagged ‘to be decided’ – rendered the 
entire registration invalid.
•	 married women were deliberately asked to register under their maiden 
names – again this would have disenfranchised the voter. 
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•	 Hundreds of bizarre cases were noted of people listed in wrong 
constituencies that were not even borderline cases. the following cases 
recorded in the Ba, lautoka and nadi districts serve as illustration:
- 1,300–1,500 voters in the settlements of nalovo and uciwai, well within the 
boundary of the nadi rural indian communal constituency, were registered 
in the nadroga indian communal constituency
- over 1,000 residents from Sariyawa, Savusavu, Waica and momi were 
registered in the nadroga indian communal constituency instead of nadi 
rural indian constituency
- over 1,000 voters from the nadroga indian communal constituency were 
wrongly listed in the nadi rural indian communal constituency
- 1,321 voters were wrongly listed in the Ba West indian communal 
constituency instead of the Ba east indian communal constituency
- 373 voters from the Ba open constituency were listed in the magodro open 
constituency
- about 600 voters residing in meigunya and Votualevu in the nadi urban 
indian constituency were registered instead in the nadi rural indian 
constituency
- 1,900 residents, mostly Fijians, from the magodro open constituency were 
listed in the Vuda open constituency
- indian and General voters were also found registered in Fijian communal 
constituencies
- Some 2,000 voters from the Vuda indian communal constituency were 
registered elsewhere, particularly the lautoka rural indian constituency. 
Such high numbers of discrepancies, irregularities and anomalies are clear 
evidence of a calculated and orchestrated move to disenfranchise indian voters. 
they were too numerous to be merely accidental omissions or errors. 
these irregularities/anomalies were regularly brought to the attention of 
the Supervisor of elections and the electoral commission as they surfaced. 
in most cases, however, they remained uncorrected by polling day, often 
despite assurances that they would be addressed. in the case of the 1,321 
voters from the Ba east indian communal constituency wrongly listed in 
the Ba West indian communal constituency, although the elections office 
agreed to rectify a significant number of these, during polling week it was 
discovered that no such rectification had indeed been made.  
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observer missions have been unanimous in their criticism of flaws in the 
registration process that saw scores, if not hundreds, of voters turn up at the 
polling stations only to be told their names could not be found on the electoral 
rolls. these people were effectively disenfranchised. And, as i have mentioned 
earlier, in closely fought open seats, such malpractices made a difference to 
the final result. 
the eu observer mission noted that in a fifth of all polling stations visited, 
a number of voters were denied their right to vote. names were misspelled, 
constituencies were wrongly allocated, and eligible voters were not registered. 
Some registered in the communal constituencies, but not in the open 
constituencies, should have been allowed to vote but were not.      
Vote-buying  
Blatant vote-buying/bribery by the SDl continued to be a feature of the 2006 
general election, although not to the same extent perhaps as in the agricultural 
scam prior to the 2001 poll, when fishing boats, brush cutters, cooking utensils 
and money were blatantly handed out. 
Soon after it had announced the dates for the 2006 general election, the 
SDl began giving out money for education, ostensibly earmarked for the 
poor. the point is that in the past five years since its inception, the SDl had 
not once spared a thought for these struggling students from poor families, at 
least to public knowledge. in another unprecedented move, indian religious 
organizations and women’s groups this time received money, pots and pans 
etc. just two days before polling began, tV showed footage of an indian man 
overwhelmed by the generosity of the prime minister who had gifted a brush 
cutter to him after his was stolen. Such altruistic gestures from the pm had 
been unheard of in the previous five years!
SDl’s campaign director jale Baba openly boasted that the party had 
spent $7.5 million for the 2006 election campaign. Where did the money 
go? And, more interestingly, where did such a large amount of cash come 
from? Was it corrupt money? the campaign could not have cost so much. 
it is well known that money was handed out to chiefs in the Ba province, 
even during polling week. Buying votes in any form is a criminal act under 
the electoral Act.  
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Failure to comply with the Electoral Act  
considering all the errors, irregularities, anomalies and omissions that surfaced 
during the registration process, it was important that the final electoral rolls 
be published in time to allow thorough scrutiny. Sections 22 and 23 of the 
electoral Act provide a mandatory period of 42 days for objections to be lodged 
in regard to incorrect entries in the electoral rolls and their settlement by the 
elections office. 
this important requirement was not met. provisional rolls carrying only 
registrations made up until 31 December 2005 were released to political parties 
on 17 February 2006. the public was given a mere two working weeks to 
scrutinize the rolls, from thursday 23 February to 13 march 2006. the main 
roll closed on 24 march. All registration after this was to go in a supplementary 
roll, with registration finally closing on 4 April – a week after the writ of 
election was issued. the so-called main roll, clearly a misnomer, was released 
to political parties in batches from 29 march onwards, and thereafter opened 
for public scrutiny. 
our major concern, however, is that the final main roll, which included the 
provisional and supplementary rolls, was not released until 27 April – and then 
only for 33 (less than half the) constituencies. Another 35 rolls were released 
on 29 April, a week before polling started. And the final three came out on 2 
may. these were for the nasinu/rewa open, the magodro open and the nadi 
open constituencies – giving barely three days for voters to scrutinize the rolls. 
clearly the Supervisor of elections and the electoral commission had failed 
to meet their obligations under the electoral Act as far as publication of the 
electoral rolls was concerned. they had also failed to update the electoral rolls 
each year, as required by the Act. 
Furthermore, the Supervisor of elections failed to comply with the requirement 
of the Act to gazette the names of candidates standing for each constituency, 
following their nominations. He also failed to meet the requirement to gazette 
all polling stations, and dates for the opening and closure of each station, as 
required under the electoral Act. Had this been done, a lot of the confusion, 
and, in at least two instances, unscheduled polling without the knowledge of 
most political parties and candidates (except for the SDl), would have been 
avoided. Dates for polling at various stations kept changing right into polling 
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week. it was not until after polling, when the count was nearing its end at the 
Veiuto centre, that a gazette notice was issued listing schedules for polling 
stations; it was backdated to comply with the Act. the electoral commission 
must be held equally guilty for this omission. indeed, they rendered themselves 
culpable by advising that all preparations for the proper conduct of the election 
would be completed before polling began. 
it is clear that the office of the Supervisor of elections was just not ready for 
the rushed national poll beginning on 6 may 2006. the Supervisor of elections 
failed in his duty to inform the prime minister of this fact when he was asked 
if he would be ready in time for early elections. 
Both the Supervisor of elections and the electoral commission must accept 
full responsibility for the incompetence, the inefficiencies, the delays and the 
shambles that characterized the 2006 poll. Having given the nation, and the 
prime minister, over-confident assurances that the electoral machinery would 
be ready for the rushed poll, they must now accept the blame for seriously 
compromising the integrity of the 2006 general election. 
Indian voters misled by the Elections Office
indian voters were told in advertisements placed by the elections office that they 
could continue to register until 8 july 2006, well after elections were over, when 
advertisements in Fijian and english gave the correct date of 4 April 2006.
How-to-vote tV commercials placed by the elections office informed indian 
voters they could vote by ticking either above or below the line, when to tick 
below the line rendered the vote invalid. in contrast, the Fijian and english 
versions of the advertisements gave the correct information. Despite repeated 
complaints by the Flp, the incorrect Hindi advertisement was not removed 
until i personally called up the chairman of the electoral commission, Graham 
leung, after 8 pm on Friday 5 may, the eve of the polls, to complain. He then 
ordered television officials to remove it. 
Excessive printing of ballot papers
the Flp has reliable information that excessive ballot papers were printed 
for a number of constituencies. We believe that these were used to stuff ballot 
boxes in certain crucial constituencies, as in 2001. candidates, for instance, 
are baffled by the very high number of ballots cast in the nasinu/nausori 
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communal constituencies – numbers which belie the low voter turn-out 
experienced – and by the lack of correlation between communal votes and 
those cast for the open seats. 
Polling 
the first day of polling was an utter shambles, as everyone knows. this is despite 
assurances by the Supervisor of elections through the media that his office 
was ‘ready to roll’ come 7 am Saturday 6 may. the truth is that ballot papers 
were not ready at most of the polling stations scheduled to open at 7 am on 6 
may. A number of polling stations did not open until well into the afternoon 
– the polling station at Kalabo opened at 1.30 pm, that at colo-i-Suva at 12 
noon – but the loss in polling time was never made up. 
the problem with unavailability of ballot papers plagued various stations 
throughout the week. it caused unnecessary frustration to voters who had to 
queue for hours on end, and in some cases walk away without voting because 
the polling station had either not received the ballot papers or had run out of 
them. Here again, there was a noticeable racial and political bias that could not 
be ignored. it was pretty obvious that, while polling for the indigenous Fijian 
streams at almost all polling stations went on unhindered, it was the indian 
constituencies and those for other minorities that were affected. 
Senior labour executive and candidate for the nasinu indian communal 
seat, Krishna Datt, reckoned that much of the ‘mess’ was deliberate. ‘it is 
designed to frustrate the process and disenfranchise indian voters’, he said. 
the leader of the united peoples party, mick Beddoes, expressed similar 
sentiments in his report: 
the scale of the disruptions and level of unpreparedness is far too extensive for it to be 
a simple matter of mass incompetence on the part of the electoral commission and the 
Supervisor of elections and his officials.
the fact that the Fijian voters, ballot boxes and ballot papers were in adequate 
supply and in a state of preparedness and [that] they were voting in many cases 
for up to 4–5 hours before the first General or indian ballot papers and boxes 
arrived, adds greater suspicion about the intent of electoral officials.1    
the large numbers of voters who turned up to vote with registration slips, but 
found their names missing from voter rolls, reflected the earlier deliberate mess-
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up in the voter registration process. Had the electoral commission accepted 
my request made in may 2005 that registration forms be made accountable 
documents, this problem would have been avoided. As the problem began to 
surface with consistent regularity at polling stations, a request was made to the 
electoral commission that voters with registration slips whose names were not 
on electoral rolls be allowed to vote. this is the commission’s response:
if a person’s name does not appear on the electoral rolls, that person is not a registered 
voter and, therefore, not entitled to vote.
this response was both disappointing and unexpected, because the voter was 
being deprived of his or her democratic right to vote, not through any fault of 
his or her own, but because of a mess-up by the elections office, of which the 
commission had been kept fully informed. it also failed to appreciate that voting 
is compulsory in Fiji, and a denial of a person’s right to vote is tantamount to 
disenfranchising the voter. 
the American Ambassador, larry Dinger, clearly concerned at the high 
number of voters being turned away because of missing names, pointed out 
that:
in my country, problems like this of missing names are catered for when a provisional roll 
is created so that the person can vote and his vote counted.2
in some cases where the presiding officer did allow such people to vote, these 
votes were kept separate, but in the end not included in the final count. 
in tightly contested marginal seats, such as the laucala open, which was lost 
by the labour party by a mere 11 votes, missing names become crucial.  
Nasinu polling  
At least 200,000 people live in the Suva/nausori corridor – most of them travel 
to Suva to work. Due to the very heavy traffic congestion during peak hours, 
workers generally leave home well before 7 am to get to the city by reporting time 
at 8 am. likewise, in the evenings, with a 5 pm knock-off on week-days, they 
do not get home until 6 pm or after. Despite these considerations, all polling 
stations in the heavily populated nasinu region were scheduled to close at 5 
pm. this is contrary to past practice. even though the commissioner central 
said presiding officers had the discretion to stay open late, almost all polling 
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stations closed promptly at 5 pm, discouraging voters from queuing to vote. 
in the rare cases where polling stations did stay open, they conveniently found 
that they had run out of ballot papers. the Flp made several written as well 
as verbal requests to election officials to accommodate voters who turned up 
after 5 pm, but to no avail. 
the impression thus created, was that every effort was being made to 
frustrate voting rather than facilitate it. As far as the Flp is concerned, this 
was an orchestrated plan to frustrate labour supporters from voting in these 
crucial seats – it must be noted that constituencies in the nasinu area have large 
numbers of low-paid workers and squatters who traditionally vote labour.   
one must also note that polling stations on a number of occasions did not 
open at 7 am as scheduled, but several hours later. to cite a few examples:
•	 on 6 may, the training and productive Authority of Fiji polling station 
opened at 11.30 am instead of 7 am – hundreds of voters who had turned 
up early to vote went away frustrated
•	 on 6 and 8 may, nepani polling station opened at 9 am instead of 7 am 
–  a number of Flp supporters went away without voting; it closed at 5 
pm sharp
•	 At rishikul primary School, on 10 may, polling started one and a half 
hours late but finished promptly at 5 pm 
•	 At Wailoku, polling finished at 3 pm even though voters were lined up to 
vote
•	 At the Assemblies of God primary School polling station in Suva on 6 
may, polling began late in the morning but ended sharply at 5 pm. it was 
noticed that, while Fijian voters were allowed in to vote after 5 pm, indians 
were refused entry.  
Unscheduled polling 
As mentioned earlier, the elections office kept making last-minute changes to 
polling schedules that were not gazetted as required under the electoral Act.  once 
polling programs had been finalized and publicized, they should not have been 
changed. if changes were absolutely necessary due to unforeseen circumstances, 
then it was the responsibility of the election officials to ensure that all candidates 
and political parties were notified of the change, in writing.  
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the most bizarre case was the incident at the rishikul nadera primary School 
on thursday 11 may. polling at the primary school in reba circle was not 
scheduled to take place until Friday 12 may. For some inexplicable reason, the 
elections office decided to move polling there forward to thursday 11 may 
without notifying all political parties or candidates. mystifyingly, only the SDl 
was aware of the changed polling schedule at this station and were there to kick 
it off. others heard about it closer to noon. Several serious concerns arise:
•	 Why was a last minute switch necessary?
•	 Why were other candidates and political parties not informed of the switch, 
but SDl was?
•	 How could election officials allow ballot boxes to be opened in the morning 
without other candidates or their agents being present? 
clearly, there was mischief afoot. inquiries by the labour candidate, Vijay 
nair, disclosed that the directive to hold polling one day ahead of schedule 
was issued by the District officer’s office in Suva. this incident is a clear case 
of collusion between election officials and the SDl. it becomes even more 
significant considering that nair lost this seat by a mere 11 votes. Surprisingly, 
none of the observer missions made note of this incident. labour’s request that 
voting that took place at this particular station on thursday 11 be disallowed 
was ignored by the electoral commission. 
Such malpractices added to the general air of suspicion regarding the 
impartiality of the electoral office. the fact that a serious incident of this 
nature can be treated so casually by those in authority bodes ill for future 
elections in Fiji. 
Ballot boxes and the count 
there were numerous mishaps with ballot boxes that should never have been 
tolerated. Boxes breaking up, as occurred in 2006, is something unheard of 
in Fiji’s electoral experience. Ballot boxes were not properly sealed – a point 
noted even by observer missions. the eu mission recommended that in future 
plastic boxes be used to ensure greater security. the law requires ballot boxes 
to be properly sealed leaving no room for tampering with ballot papers. By 
failing to ensure this, the elections office breached section 86 (1) (a) of the 
electoral Act. 
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there were concerns about ballot boxes being left unguarded for hours at 
polling stations before they were transported to the count centre. one such 
instance occurred on tuesday 9 may at the naivitavaya church Hall polling 
station for the laucala open constituency. the ballot boxes were left unattended 
for three hours until 9 pm, while the presiding officer went to drink grog at 
the SDl shed. it wasn’t until a complaint was lodged with the elections office 
that the boxes were finally taken to the Flagstaff operations centre. the entire 
incident was repeated the following day. this case is particularly significant 
because ballot papers for Box no. c404l from this polling station could not 
be reconciled at the count. According to the presiding officer, the total number 
of ballot papers issued was 1,200; yet total votes cast were only 463 – what 
happened to the balance of 737 ballot papers?
From this same polling station, five ballot boxes were placed aside following 
queries from Flp agents because papers could not be reconciled. However, a 
little later, the count team-leader said he had spoken to the presiding officer, 
who said he had made a mistake in stating the number of ballot papers issued. 
they then brought back the boxes put aside to include them in the count. 
Surprisingly, however, only four not five boxes were brought back. What 
happened to the fifth box? there was an absolute lack of transparency in 
dealing with this complaint. And how could the presiding officer have made 
such a huge mistake in stating the total number of ballot papers issued? Was 
he grossly incompetent or just plain dishonest?
Another questionable incident concerned Box no. c579 from the Vatuwaqa 
church Hall polling station. Here the total votes cast were 12; total ballot 
papers issued were also 12. Yet, the actual count revealed 21 ballot papers in 
the box. Where did the extra ballot papers come from?
the Flp candidate for the nausori/naitasiri open constituency maintains 
that 15 extra ballot boxes were introduced at the count for her constituency. 
the manner in which the count officials and the returning officer dealt with 
this complaint again lacked transparency and smacked of political bias.  
Count for the Laucala Open constituency
By the morning of Wednesday 17 may, it became obvious that the election, 
so closely fought, now hinged on the marginal open seats in the Suva/nasinu/
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nausori corridor. the nausori/naitasiri open constituency, stuffed with 15 
extra boxes, emerged a winner for the SDl. 
the Samabula/tamavua open seat was wrested by labour after a tough 
count battle, during which the bias of election officials towards the SDl 
became very obvious.
the Suva open went to the SDl in another close battle, but it was confidently 
expected that labour would win the two nasinu open constituencies – the 
laucala open and the nasinu/rewa open – in view of the very high polling 
(90%) for the corresponding indian communal seats in these constituencies. 
labour had good preferences and too high a lead in the nasinu/rewa open 
constituency for games to be played there. the laucala open constituency thus 
became crucial if the SDl were to win the election. Despite the very close run, 
it should be noted that mr Qarase had already hailed victory for the SDl. He 
therefore had to win laucala open by hook or by crook. 
As the first count drew to a close on Wednesday, there was confusion. it 
seemed the SDl had asked for a recount, and polling agents were waiting for 
a decision while count officials left the room to confer. However, as everyone 
waited for the final outcome, suddenly, the count team began sealing up the 
ballot papers even though an official announcement declaring the winner had 
not been made. just then, the labour team at the count centre was informed 
via a phone call that the radios were announcing an SDl victory for the seat 
by 17 votes. 
i was en route to Suva from the west when i received this stunning news. 
i immediately called the chairman of the electoral commission, mr Graham 
leung, and informed him that we wanted an immediate recount and that no 
papers should leave the room in the meanwhile. it was as well that mr leung 
came down because the commissioner central was obviously hell-bent on 
packing up the ballot papers and having them removed from the room. mr 
leung put a halt to this, and the commissioner had no choice but to allow a 
recount. in the recount stage, a serious breach of procedure  took place. the 
count team refused to recheck the validity of votes earlier declared valid. the 
fact that, despite all this, the difference in votes was reduced from 17 to 11 
was significant. Had the team rechecked the validity of the ‘valid’ votes, it is 
possible that the result may have been overturned altogether.
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independent observer Father Arms, who was present at this stage, says in his 
report that he had noted at least two invalid ballot papers put into the valid 
votes box. He makes the following observation:
the last seat won that gave the SDl an absolute majority of seats, was won only on the 
mis-conducted recount ….where the difference between the SDl and the Flp was only 
11 votes. Had the Flp won that seat (which they might have under fairer circumstances 
or if the recount had been conducted properly) it is possible they would have been able 
to form a government…
if there had not been the mistakes that worked against the indo-Fijians and if the electoral 
administration had been properly balanced ethnically, another seat or two might have 
gone the way of the Flp.
Add to this the unacceptably high percentage of invalid votes, and it becomes clear that 
Fiji has a few important, but quite manageable, things to do in order to ensure free and 
fair elections.3 
Transporting and security of ballot boxes 
there were other questionable and untoward happenings. For instance, why 
were private security companies with very close links with the SDl used in the 
central Division to transport boxes to the count centre and to guard boxes? 
trucks belonging to Global risks, owned by Sakiusa raivoce, a known SDl 
supporter and brother-in-law to ratu jone Kubuabola, were used to transport 
ballot boxes. Sunia cama’s (security/bailiff ) men, dubbed the ‘box boys’, 
provided 24-hour security at the Veiuto count centre, sleeping on the premises. 
it was not their job under the electoral Act. Why could not the police provide 
this security? Sunia cama is a former professional boxer with known extremist 
nationalist sympathies and a relative of jale Baba, SDl’s campaign director. 
Win Gate marketing company ltd was also used to transport boxes. the 
company has close association with jale Baba in the carting of mahogany logs 
from tailevu north to the mills. 
the electoral Act requires transportation of ballot boxes to be carried out 
by trustworthy companies. the above are too closely associated with the SDl 
to be classified trustworthy or impartial. 
i have attempted to highlight a few of the more glaring and questionable 
practices and acts, and examples of non-compliance with electoral laws, that 
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compromised the integrity of the 2006 poll. the trend emerged in 2001. Fiji 
has held eight general elections since independence. Apart from minor concerns 
and hiccups, the integrity of the first six elections was beyond suspicion. High 
standards and professionalism were generally the hallmarks of our electoral 
machinery. 
the manipulation, rigging and deliberate disenfranchisement that 
characterized the 2001 and 2006 general elections should be a concern to all 
citizens who believe in the integrity of the democratic process. What went wrong 
occurred with too much regularity to be simply brushed off as incompetence 
or oversight. As Shakespeare’s Hamlet would say, there was clearly ‘a method 
to the madness’. 
the neutrality of the civil service and the police is now a serious issue. in 
2006, there was a palpable, pervasive aura of pro-SDl sentiment among both 
the police and count officials, certainly in the central Division count centre. 
this could stem from the fact that there was gross racial imbalance in the 
recruitment of count officials, and in the police presence on the premises. 
indeed, when the count seemed to go against the SDl, those present could 
sense the palpable hostility through the body language, and even in the actions, 
of officials and police. At times, the situation bordered on being dangerous for 
Flp supporters. A clear demonstration of such bias was the spontaneous manner 
in which Fijian count officials burst out singing as SDl emerged ‘victorious’.
unless timely action is taken to weed out these malpractices, they will become 
a cancer that will completely destroy the integrity of our electoral machinery.
Conclusion
the reports of all observer groups must be thoroughly studied, and their 
recommendations implemented. the final report of the eu observer mission, 
for instance, makes comprehensive recommendations to improve the system 
and ensure greater security. 
major concerns are the registration and preparation of the electoral rolls and 
the conduct of postal ballots. Since 2001, there has been an alarming increase in 
the number of postal ballots despite the considerable increase in polling stations 
to facilitate voting in remote areas. For instance, there were some 20,000 postal 
ballots in 2006 – an unbelievably high number. Furthermore, postal ballots 
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were being allowed even after polling proper started, and late postal ballots 
were included in the count well after the legal deadline of monday 15 may. 
the process clearly lacked transparency. 
postal ballots can be a vehicle for vote-rigging, and must be brought under 
control. the eu observer mission report is highly critical of the manner in 
which postal voting was conducted and reports as follows:
the vulnerability of the postal voting exercise to errors or fraud (impersonation) was 
increased with the provision to allow postal voting in person to continue during the official 
ordinary polling days and the fact that postal ballot boxes were not sealed overnight… 
party agents were not present throughout the postal polling process and in any case would 
not have been allowed to stay at the premises overnight.
it is obvious that Fiji can no longer rely on the neutrality of the civil service 
to conduct future elections. An independent body must be created to conduct 
elections in order to restore the credibility of the process. ethnic parity in the 
appointment of elections officials, both in the elections office and at the polling 
and counting stages, must be paramount. 
All observer group reports have emphasised the need for Fiji to move away 
from the current emphasis on communal voting, and to encourage more cross-
racial voting. this entails a move away from having a majority of communal 
constituencies to having more open constituencies. this is something that the 
Flp fought vigorously for during negotiations on the 1997 constitution. our 
call was not heeded then. it is now obvious to a wider group of observers and 
political pundits that, unless constitutional reforms take place to embrace more 
open constituencies as opposed to communal constituencies, national politics 
will continue to be dominated by ethnic rather than national considerations. 
in this respect, i wish to deny the observation made by the eu in its report 
that the two major political parties, namely the SDl and the Flp, staged 
a highly ethnic political campaign rather than concentrating on issues of 
national concern. the Flp at no stage played racial politics in its 2006 election 
campaign, and this can be clearly gauged from our election manifesto as well as 
from advertisements placed in the newspapers and on television. if anything, 
there was an attempt to woo indigenous Fijian votes. indeed, our entire 2006 
election campaign focused on national issues. i call on observer groups to be 
fair in compiling their reports.  
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the SDl stole the 2001 and 2006 general elections. it used, at a conservative 
guess, over $40 million of taxpayers’ money under the guise of agricultural 
programs, to buy votes. the office of the Supervisor of elections, senior 
electoral officers and divisional commissioners facilitated an SDl victory.  
Notes
1 letter to chairman of electoral commission, 8 may 2006 (unpublished). 
2 Daily Post, 9 may 2006.
3 ‘report of Fr David Arms; observer to the 2006 Fiji General elections, circulated 18 
September 2006, unpublished, p.1.
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A view from the Electoral 
Commission
Graham Leung
Whatever one’s views about the success or otherwise of Fiji’s 2006 general 
election, there seems to be a consensus that there is a need for a wide-ranging, 
thorough and critical examination of Fiji’s voting laws, not least of the country’s 
‘alternative vote system’. 
clearly, the electoral commission has a role to play in spearheading 
discussions aimed at developing bipartisan support for electoral reform. Some 
of the issues that emerged from the 2006 election are by no means new; they 
have been raised in the past by various observers. However, between general 
elections, very little appears to have been done to promote debate on the 
country’s electoral laws and system. it is evident that, unless there is a concerted 
effort to address these issues, they will arise time and again. 
While section 56 of Fiji’s 1997 constitution makes casting a vote in general 
elections compulsory, there has never been any attempt to ascertain whether 
or not every registered voter does indeed cast a ballot. the anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many people did not cast a ballot in any of the 1999, 2001 and 
2006 general elections. Despite this, there is little evidence of people who did not 
do so being prosecuted. While there are competing arguments for the retention 
of section 56 of the constitution, there is much to be said for discarding a law 
that is not being enforced and that is difficult to enforce; laws that cannot be 
enforced bring the legal system into disrepute and may even encourage non-
compliance. on the other hand, a compelling argument can also be mounted 
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that not casting a ballot is as much an expression of the democratic choice of 
a voter, as is casting one. Whatever the arguments, it seems to me that the law 
on ‘compulsory voting’ in Fiji needs revisiting to determine whether or not it 
has succeeded in meeting the objective of its architects.
under the electoral regulations of the 1970s and 1980s, and again under the 
electoral Decree of 1992, the returning officer had the discretion to allow a 
vote which might otherwise have been discarded as invalid, where the voter’s 
intention was clear. in the electoral Act 1998, this provision was removed. 
While the number of invalid votes fell in the 2006 general election – down 
to 8.7 per cent compared with 11.8 per cent in the 2001 election – many 
commentators have observed that this figure is still too high and must be 
reduced even further. Although precise figures are not available, information 
gleaned from election officials at the count centre suggests that the format of 
the ballot paper may create confusion in the minds of the voters. in many 
instances votes were declared ‘invalid’ because the voter had ticked above and 
below the line. Arguably in some cases, the voters’ intention was obvious. But 
the current law is quite clear, a voter cannot tick both above and below the line. 
Given this situation, there appears to be a strong argument for the restoration 
of the discretionary power of the returning officer. 
Fears that giving the returning officer the power to validate votes is giving 
the officer too much power, could be misplaced as there are checks and balances. 
First, there must be a ‘finding’ that the voter’s intention is clear. Furthermore, 
the presence of party agents at the count increases the level of transparency and 
ensures that only valid votes are counted. the restoration of the discretionary 
power would ensure that the highest number of valid votes are counted, and 
reduce the number of voters that are inadvertently disenfranchised. 
Sections 130 and 131 of the electoral Act deal respectively with bribery and 
undue influence of voters. Section 131 makes it an offence for any person to 
hinder or interfere with the free exercise or performance by any other person of 
any political right or duty. Since voting was first introduced in Fiji, party sheds, 
banners and the serving of kava have been accepted and indeed encouraged 
by political parties as part of the overall election process – even though many 
political parties often complain about the expense associated with erecting and 
staffing the sheds. it is difficult to ignore the reality that, despite voters visiting 
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the sheds to obtain assistance, the process often influences the way in which they 
vote. this influence can take various forms – ranging from voters being given 
how-to-vote cards to more subtle means of coercion and influence. electoral 
laws neither expressly permit nor prohibit the sheds. there is only the caveat 
that they be no closer than 50 metres from the polling station. Given the need 
to improve the ethical environment under which polling is conducted so that 
elections are ‘freer and fairer’, parliament should, in consultation with relevant 
stakeholders, give serious consideration to the banning of party sheds. Voters 
should proceed directly to election officials to obtain their registration details 
and ballot papers. While no reliable evidence is available, the possibility of 
some voters being inadvertently misled or improperly advised on how to cast 
accurate votes cannot be ruled out. Banning party sheds, while perhaps making 
the atmosphere of elections less ‘carnival-like’, is likely to increase the ability 
of voters to cast their votes independently.
Section 164 of the electoral Act empowers the electoral commission to make 
regulations  prescribing ‘all matters required or permitted’ by the electoral Act 
or ‘necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect’ 
to the Act to be prescribed. presently, there are regulations on only a limited 
range of issues. in the past, the electoral commission has used its regulation-
making powers sparingly, if at all. i would suggest that it is timely for the 
electoral commission to consider taking a more robust attitude with regard to 
the exercise of its statutory powers in this regard. under section 164(2) of the 
electoral Act, there is clearly enormous potential for the electoral commission 
to introduce wide-ranging measures aimed at improving the transparency and 
conduct of general elections. these regulations would have the force of law and 
bring about greater uniformity and accountability in election administration, 
thus assisting the Supervisor of elections and his/her staff.
many useful, if not altogether new, recommendations have emerged from the 
various missions that were present in Fiji to observe the 2006 general election. 
the electoral commission hopes to complete a comprehensive review of the 
general election before the end of 2006. the expectation is that it should then 
be in a good position to develop a strategy for the conduct of future elections 
in Fiji. this strategy is likely to have, as a high priority, the establishment of a 
State elections office. 
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the ultimate outcome of Fiji’s 2006 election was paradoxical. in some respects, 
it was the most polarized election in Fiji’s history.2 the two major parties, each 
with unanimous support from their respective ethnic communities, were able 
to divide up all the Fijian and indian communal seats, as well as all the open 
seats.3 Yet, in the aftermath of the election, the formation of a multiparty cabinet 
represented a historically unprecedented effort at power-sharing between the 
leaders of Fiji’s two major communities. 
the idea that some kind of coming-together in cabinet of leaders representing 
Fiji’s different ethnic communities might provide some means of getting beyond 
Fiji’s communalist impasse was not new. it had been raised during ratu Sir 
Kamisese mara’s period as prime minister in the late 1970s, but never got off the 
ground. it was entrenched in the 1997 constitution by the then prime minister, 
Sitiveni rabuka, and by then opposition leader jai ram reddy, but they lost 
the 1999 election.4 A multiparty cabinet was formed after the 1999 election, 
but it did not include the party with the largest share of the indigenous vote 
(rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt), which won 38 per cent 
of the Fijian vote in 1999). instead, the Fiji labour party (Flp) obtained an 
absolute majority (with 37 of the 71 seats) and, although it formed a coalition 
with several smaller Fijian parties, the emergence of splits within these Fijian 
allied parties generated difficulties for the multiparty cabinet even before the 
coup of 19 may 2000. 
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Such splitting is always a difficulty with multiparty cabinets; the minority 
party or parties run the risk of being seen as powerless within cabinet and lose 
popular support. none of the indigenous Fijian politicians who participated in 
the 1999 cabinet proved able to secure re-election in majority Fijian electorates 
in either 2001 or 2006. the key challenge for the post-2006 election multiparty 
cabinet was to achieve real influence for the minority party, and enable its leaders 
to sustain popular Fiji indian backing for their participation in cabinet.
Fiji is not alone in looking to power-sharing as the answer to long-standing 
political polarization, but the country does have some uniquely favourable 
circumstances that might make it possible to avoid the type of difficulties 
experienced elsewhere.
many of the world’s experiments in power-sharing – for example, those 
in Africa – have occurred in post-civil war circumstances. the protagonists 
have armies stationed in different parts of the country, and the power-sharing 
arrangements often attempt to bring these together. So great is the bitterness 
between former combatants that these arrangements are often used to gain 
strategic advantage – and regularly fall apart.5 Fiji is fortunate not to have this 
experience of civil warfare and violence; polarization has been largely political, 
while relationships at the grass roots level have remained reasonably amicable. 
As incoming Flp cabinet minister Krishna Datt put it shortly after the 2006 
poll, political leaders have at times behaved like burlesque American wrestlers 
feigning fights with each other, instead of seeking cooperative ways to manage 
the affairs of state.6 
the best-known modern power-sharing experiment was that adopted as 
part of the South African 1994 constitution by nelson mandela and F.W. de 
Klerk, and this influenced the design of Fiji’s own institutions. the ability 
of those leaders to transcend ethnic politics, and establish for that country a 
more accommodative style of politics made a decisive difference, not just for 
that country, but more broadly for the southern part of Africa.7 Yet, in other 
respects, South Africa is a poor model for Fiji. there, arrangements were 
inevitably temporary, and were aimed at reassuring the white minority during 
the transition away from apartheid. F.W. de Klerk’s national party pulled out 
of the cabinet in 1996, and, in the same year, a new permanent constitution 
abandoned the multiparty cabinet provisions. power-sharing, of a sort, 
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continued, but it was no longer mandatory. Fiji’s situation is very different; 
here, the two populations are much closer in size than those of Africans and 
whites in South Africa and, owing to this, the multiparty cabinet provisions 
are potentially longer-term, rather than temporary, arrangements.
northern ireland has also pursued an experiment in power-sharing, as part of 
the 1998 Anglo-irish Good Friday Agreement, but ongoing tensions between 
loyalists and republicans have delayed the implementation of the power-
sharing rules. there, it is pressure from the British and irish governments that 
has provided the critical encouragement to power-sharing, whereas in Fiji the 
incentives are largely domestic. in many ways, this is a great, and insufficiently 
recognized, advantage: for Fiji, the desire to make these arrangements work is not 
driven primarily by overseas links (important though those may be in the future 
if managed sensitively). rather, Fiji’s more astute politicians have recognized the 
advantages that can potentially be secured by having a government that rules 
by consensus and draws on the reservoirs of talent in both communities. 
neighbouring new caledonia also has a multiparty cabinet experiment, 
although one that has not received the international attention it deserves. 
Back in the mid-1980s, that territory was close to a civil war between mainly 
Kanak-backed, pro-independence groups and the mainly settler-backed 
government. the 1988 matignon Accord provided an initial agreement centred 
on devolution of powers to the three provinces (something, incidentally, never 
tried in Fiji for various reasons). A decade later, the 1998 noumea Accord 
provided for a power-sharing territorial executive, coupled with steady transfer 
of powers from paris to noumea. the result has been a transformation of the 
new caledonian political scene, with Kanak leaders participating in cabinet 
and a reconfiguration of political alliances on both sides.8 
there are many other international experiences with power-sharing; 
some more successful, others less successful. Switzerland, for example, has 
nearly a century of experience with a Federal council, which brings together 
representatives of the German-, French- and italian-speaking minorities. Several 
of the other continental european states – including Austria and Belgium – also 
have experience with power-sharing institutions. there are also some notorious 
failures – cyprus in the 1960s or lebanon in the 1970s, for example. in the 
lebanese case, external factors played an important role in the breakdown of 
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the post-war national pact, even if the inflexibility of domestic arrangements 
– and in particular the 6:5 ratio of parliamentarians in favour of christians over 
muslims – also generated difficulties. nevertheless, when former adversaries 
finally sought to end the civil war that had so ravaged the country from the 
mid-1970s to the 1990s, they almost inevitably reverted to a new power-
sharing agreement (the 1989 ta’if Accord), although one that entailed a shift 
to parity between christian and muslim mps, a stronger role for the muslim 
prime minister and a less powerful role for the maronite christian president. 
Similarly, in Bosnia and iraq, the settlement of severe conflict critically depends 
on some commitment to the sharing of power in cabinet. 
Surveying the global power-sharing experience suggests that, while the 
provisions adopted in different parts of the world differ markedly, there are 
some important common features that help to explain the success or failure of 
accords. What lessons can be learned from the international experience? 
An effective voice for minority representatives
power-sharing cabinets need to provide an effective voice for those politicians 
representing the minority community (or smaller party or parties). there is 
always a danger that the majority community’s leaders will view the multiparty 
cabinet as a vehicle for rubber-stamping their own program, and deny minority 
leaders an effective voice, so that the latter come to be seen as unrepresentative 
‘uncle tom’-type figures. this is sometimes dealt with by having a minority 
veto, although such provisions run the risk of generating gridlock and 
immobilism. effective multiparty cabinets enable parties to bring their own 
policies and perspectives into cabinet, and to establish some kind of balance 
between different interests through negotiation. in new caledonia, this has also 
been much debated, with discussion centring on the meaning of the noumea 
Accord’s provisions for ‘collegiality’ in cabinet. the success or failure of Fiji’s 
2006 experiment will depend on the minority party being able to demonstrate 
greater influence in determining policy than was the case for the smaller parties 
in the 1999–2000 cabinet. 
multiparty cabinets, where both parties have strong support from the peoples 
they represent, have the advantage over multi-ethnic cabinets in that they bring 
a more genuinely representative mix into cabinet. under ratu mara’s Alliance 
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party governments in the 1970s and 1980s, there were repeated efforts to 
create multi-ethnic governments, but these never received majority support 
from the indian community. those who crossed over to join ratu mara’s 
cabinets tended, as a result, to lose their seats at the following election, or to 
be seen as unrepresentative leaders. muslim cabinet minister Ahmed Ali, for 
example, was the indian member for the lau constituency, where the electorate 
was overwhelmingly Fijian. He once described trying to forge links with the 
indian community as being like trying to build a house by putting the roof on 
first.9 Where, instead, the undisputed leaders of the indian community join 
the cabinet there is the potential for a more genuine type of accommodation.
The need for real accomplishments 
power-sharing governments need to show genuine accomplishments. one of 
the weaknesses of the rabuka–reddy Accord back in 1996 was that the two 
subsequent years did little to demonstrate to the electorate the advantages of 
the new cooperative arrangements. inertia set in. 1997, for example, was also 
the year when thousands of Agricultural landlord and tenant Act (AltA) 
leases began expiring, resulting in severe hardship for the Fiji indian rural 
communities. Almost ten years later, in 2006, the AltA expiry issue remains 
unresolved. partly as a result of this failure to deliver concrete achievements 
connected with sharing power, both rabuka’s SVt and reddy’s national 
Federation party proved unable to hold the support of their respective 
communities at the 1999 poll, and the consequence was a rocky ride for the 
new constitution.
in the wake of the formation of the 2006 power-sharing executive, some 
suggested that potentially controversial legislation should be shelved or 
abandoned, and that discussion of some of the thorny issues should be deferred. 
Such delay would have the potential to quickly exhaust the new power-sharing 
government’s post-election honeymoon. Without real accomplishments on 
ethnically sensitive issues, two or three years down the line, criticism of ministers 
enjoying perks and pajeros would inevitably feature in the media reports, and/
or government backbenchers would become more restive. ethnic out-bidders 
would find themselves getting a wider hearing, putting pressure on their more 
moderate colleagues in cabinet. 
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timing is also important for other reasons. power-sharing arrangements, 
like coalition governments more generally, frequently break down beyond 
the middle of a parliamentary term, ahead of impending general elections, as 
political parties seek to re-galvanize support among core electorates. At that 
stage, minority parties in cabinet often look for potent issues around which to 
make a break from cabinet, hoping that electorates will punish the governing 
party for any breakdown in coalition arrangements.
An approach more likely to cement power-sharing arrangements is to 
demonstrate to the public real gains to people’s living standards, that arise out 
of the new cooperation in cabinet. Fiji’s economic growth and investment levels 
have been seriously diminished by political instability and civil strife. As a result, 
there exists scope for substantial gains should that epoch in Fiji’s history now 
be closed. even prior to the 2006 election, some politicians were collaborating 
together in the government select committees on land and sugar issues, and 
aiming to arrive at real solutions to these pressing questions. the land-leasing 
question, in particular, is an issue that is susceptible to some accommodative 
resolution (although not, as some propose, by creating an additional tier of 
state bureaucracy to deal with leasing).
the promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity (rtu) Bill is another 
issue that could either break up the multiparty cabinet or, if handled sensibly 
and sensitively, show real gains for cooperation in cabinet. the government’s 
desire to draw a line under the experience of the 2000 coup, and to open a new 
chapter in Fiji’s history was understandable. it has been the amnesty provisions 
of the rtu Bill that generated the most concern, on the grounds that they might 
facilitate the release of those convicted for involvement in the 19 may 2000 
coup or the 2 november 2000 mutiny at the army’s Queen elizabeth Barracks. 
there is a possibility for compromise here too; a thoughtful amendment to the 
Bill could address the concerns of the minority community that the arrests and 
convictions after 2000 should stand out as an emphatic warning against any 
return to Fiji’s cycle of coups, but still put in place machinery that assists the 
country in shifting beyond the fraught experience of the 2000 coup.  
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Visionary leaders and change in political parties
power-sharing arrangements need the engagement of visionary leaders, 
and political parties often need to change substantially to make these work 
effectively. power-sharing arrangements depend on the ability of political 
leaders to transform the parties they represent. mandela’s role in changing the 
African national congress away from the politics of confrontation, and de 
Klerk’s similar role in relation to the national party were crucial in ensuring 
the success of the transition in South Africa. conversely, ian paisley and other 
loyalist leaders’ resistance to the implementation of the 1998 Anglo-irish Good 
Friday Agreement have proved an obstacle to the constructive continuation 
of the peace process in northern ireland. the sudden death of political 
leaders who provide the critical inspiration behind power-sharing accords (as 
in new caledonia or Sudan10), inevitably entails a bumpy ride for the new 
arrangements. if the leader of one of the cooperating parties stands outside the 
multiparty cabinet, its chances of success are, inevitably, slim. the post-2006 
election power struggle in the Flp was an almost inevitable result of party 
leader mahendra chaudhry’s decision to remain outside the cabinet. in South 
Africa or northern ireland, the Flp leader would have been entitled to a vice 
presidency or deputy chief minister position, an arrangement that is probably 
the logical counterpart of effective power-sharing arrangements where these 
involve two large communities. 
As they adjust to sharing power after a period of bitter antagonism, both 
majority and minority party leaders inevitably face difficulties in managing 
internal party affairs. the majority party leader is potentially threatened 
by government backbenchers eager for portfolios should power-sharing 
arrangements fall apart. the minority party leader may face charges of ‘selling 
out’ his or her community. in Fiji’s post-2006 case, the Flp leader stayed 
outside the cabinet and Flp ministers were subjected to disciplinary charges 
for breaching party policy. the alternative of a breakaway faction separating 
from the Flp was, perhaps fortunately in this context, legally discounted by 
constitutional provisions against party-hopping.11 Flp ministers seeking to 
align themselves outside the party would have to face by-elections in their 
constituencies; this would potentially require them to cross the difficult hurdle 
of over-turning the strong support for the Flp shown at the 2006 polls in 
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indian electorates. Differences are inevitable under Fiji’s multiparty cabinet 
arrangements, and are best dealt with by thoughtful and flexible negotiation 
within political parties as much as within cabinet.  
Government and opposition 
power-sharing arrangements entail a reconfiguration of the ‘opposition’ and 
other constitutional arrangements. internationally, power-sharing arrangements 
are normally associated with a shift away from the Westminster-style government 
opposition model. normally, there is no leader of the opposition. instead, 
backbenchers – whichever political party they are associated with – serve as the 
check on government policy, as with the Bereichsopposition during the time of the 
Austrian grand coalition.12 Fiji’s constitution remains ambiguous in this respect 
because the multiparty cabinet provisions were added later, superimposed 
after the assembly of a Westminster-based framework. this has resulted in all 
sorts of anomalies. For example, the constitution provides for a proportional 
distribution of the senate nominees from the leader of the opposition, but 
not those from the prime minister. the precise interpretation of the cabinet 
proportionality provisions in section 99 (5) of the constitution was an issue of 
continual litigation in the court of Appeal and Supreme court after the 2001 
poll, with the decision of September 2004 placing judges in the position of being 
effectively law-makers rather than interpreters of the law.13 not having a limit 
on cabinet size was also unfortunate, because the requirement to retain dual 
majorities inevitably imparts an inflationary impetus to cabinet formation (new 
caledonia, it should be noted, does have an 11-member limit on cabinet size).14 
rules about ‘cabinet confidentiality’ and ‘collective responsibility’ also reflect 
the Westminster tradition, rather than the more flexible type of arrangements 
normally found in power-sharing executives. 
Affirmative action programs 
Affirmative action programs often accompany power-sharing provisions, but 
these work best if they relate to distribution of gains arising from a higher 
rate of economic growth, and if they are oriented towards all disadvantaged 
groups rather than one or the other ethnic group. in many countries that have 
looked to power-sharing rules to find a route away from political polarization, 
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improving the position of disadvantaged communities has been important. even 
where the differences are small, as between the catholics and protestants in 
northern ireland, improvements in living standards for the more disadvantaged 
community can make a big difference (improving prosperity in largely catholic 
Southern ireland had significant knock-on effects for northern ireland’s 
catholics). in new caledonia, the matignon and noumea Accords have 
been accompanied by heavy French expenditures aimed at rééquilibrage (‘re-
balancing’) to improve the position of the Kanaks. As in Fiji, those provisions 
often stimulate criticism that more is being done to foster the emergence of an 
indigenous élite than to improve general living standards. nevertheless, those 
affirmative action policies have proved important in changing the orientation 
of the political leadership on both sides in new caledonia, and are intimately 
connected with the success of the power-sharing accords.
in Fiji, discussions of relative indigenous disadvantage often occur in a time 
warp. it is as if nothing has changed since the time of the Spate (1959) and 
Burns (1960) reports, when around 90 per cent of indigenous Fijians still lived 
in rural villages, when there were few Fijian professionals, and when Fijians 
scarcely participated in the formal sectors of the economy (other than in the civil 
service, on the docks and in the gold mines).15 Yet, this position has changed 
vastly, and not primarily due to affirmative action programs. even before the 
unravelling of the Fijian regulations in the mid-1960s, many ethnic Fijians 
had moved towards the towns. in the 1970s and 1980s, Fijian participation 
in formal sector employment grew strongly. nevertheless, household income 
and expenditure surveys in 1977 and the early 1990s showed Fijians, on 
average, to be worse off than Fiji indians.16 A big part of the reason had to do 
with poverty in Fijian rural villages, although there was also evidence of urban 
poverty. those studies found that, although Fijians were on average worse off 
than Fiji indians, income inequality was more severe amongst Fiji indians. So 
the lowest 20 per cent of indian income-earners were somewhat worse off than 
their Fijian counterparts. 
Fears are often expressed that affirmative action programs, particularly those 
aimed at encouraging indigenous businesses, are disproportionately aimed at 
élites. But there are alternative ways of handling such policies that earn greater 
legitimacy. notably, the once heavily criticised malaysian model of affirmative 
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action is now much more internationally favoured, to a large degree because it 
became increasingly growth-oriented – rather than simply aimed at dividing up a 
diminishing or stagnant pie – and because it became aimed at all disadvantaged 
groups rather than favouring only one of the country’s ethnic groups. politicians 
in Fiji tend to feign a division on principle in relation to affirmative action; the 
labour party, when in power, accepted the need for programs that were aimed at 
tackling indigenous disadvantage. So, the issue is how to establish some degree 
of consensus around policies that have the effect of improving the situation of 
Fijians without being viewed as excessively ethnically slanted.  
this list of important lessons from the international experience is not 
exhaustive; there are many others that merit consideration. But the list 
highlights some of the core issues that will need to be addressed, preferably 
through negotiation and compromise rather than through excessive resort to 
the law courts. if this is accomplished, ten years down the road, it might be 
Fiji that becomes the model to which other countries look, rather than Fiji 
looking to other countries to find examples of how to make power-sharing 
work effectively. 
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Women and minority interests 




candidates from ten different political parties and some 69 independent 
candidates contested the 2006 national election. Amongst the 336 candidates 
were some 32 women, three of whom were standing as independents. the large 
number of parties and independent candidates could be an indication of the 
people’s growing discontent with the policies of the two major parties and of 
their increasing confidence in political participation. 
table 29.1 shows how the different parties performed. the national Alliance 
party (nAp) is of interest as it is a new party contesting elections for the first 
time. it fielded the third largest number of candidates and also the highest 
number of women candidates. Both the nAp and the united peoples party 
(upp) made special efforts to field more women. the upp, a small party, had 
30 per cent women candidates and a gender-balanced winning team. the two 
major parties – the Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) and the Fiji 
labour party (Flp) – had poor representation of women candidates at 6 per 
cent and 12 per cent respectively. 
Women’s performance 
of the eight winning women, five stood on SDl tickets, two stood for the Flp 
and one for upp. By definition, all gained the required majority of at least 50 
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per cent +1 of the valid votes cast. of the other women candidates, 17 gained 
less than 10 per cent of the vote in their various constituencies and seven gained 
over 10 per cent, with the highest of these garnering 47.5 per cent of the votes 
in her constituency.
the communal seats were contested by 17 women and the open seats by 15 
women. the percentage of candidates who emerged victorious in the open 
constituencies was almost double that in the communal constituencies (table 
29.2). 
Did the voters favour women or men? According to at least four women 
candidates, some women supported them simply because they were women 
even though they did not specifically campaign solely on gender issues. one 
of the successful candidates publicly thanked her two main women campaign 
managers who helped her visit voters door-to-door and for their dedication 
during the campaign. Another candidate, though unsuccessful, acknowledged 
Table 29.1 Summary of party performance, 2006 
party total number number of Women as Seats won Seats won proportion 
 of candidates women proportion by party by women of women 
  candidates of total   representatives 
   (per cent)   (per cent)
SDl 79  5 6 36 5 13.9 
Flp 59 7 12 31 2 6.5 
nAp 51  8 16 - -  
nFp 44  4 9 - -  
nVtlp 11 2 18 - -  
upp 10 3 30 2  1 50.0 
pAnu 9 - - - -  
party of truth 2 - - - -  
justice & Freedom 1 - - - -  
Social liberty 1 - - - -  
independents  
(+coin) 69 3 4 2 - - 
total 336 32 9.5 71 8 11.3
notes: SDl = Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua; Flp = Fiji labour party; nApF = national Alliance 
party of Fiji; nFp = mational Federation party; nVtlp = nationalist Vanua tako lavo party; upp = 
united peoples party; pAnu = party of national unity; coin = coalition of independent nationals 
Source: The Fiji Times, 19 may 2006.
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the support of women’s groups in her constituency. this support enabled her 
to develop a network that has been maintained since the election and is still 
used to assist and empower women.
Promoting fairer representation
Despite government rhetoric, women’s representation in parliament has 
remained below the minimum 30 per cent target set. this is due to such 
reasons as:
•	 difficulties in adapting very strong traditional cultures and attitudes that 
see women’s status as subordinate to that of men
•	 continuing male influence over the way women in their families vote
•	 difficulties of those with little education (often women) comprehending 
the alternative vote (AV) system
•	 women being hesitant to nominate for election
•	 political parties making little concerted effort to encourage women as 
candidates
•	 the high cost of election campaigns combined with the relatively poor 
financial status of women
•	 the fact that the AV electoral system works against women and minority 
groups. 
While the first two reasons are difficult, long-term problems, the rest would 
be relatively easy to address given political will. For example, the AV system, 
which tends to favour large parties over small ones, could be replaced by a system 
of proportional representation in which smaller parties were represented in 
parliament in proportion to their popular support; women could be encouraged 
by government and political parties to stand as candidates; public funding 
Table 29.2 Women’s performance in communal and open seats
constituency number of women candidates Women winners percentage winning 
communal 17 3 17.6 
open 15 5 33.3
Source: Analysis of figures extracted from The Fiji Times 19 may 2006.
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could be used to defray the costs of election campaigns; and Fiji could give 
consideration to a quota system for gender representation in parliament. 
Studies of democracies worldwide show the critical role of a country’s electoral 
system in determining the extent of meaningful democracy achieved and in 
shaping the long-term political landscape.2 one of the important features 
of democracy is its capacity to represent the range of interests and concerns 
of the populace in decision-making bodies. this requires that small parties 
representing special interest groups are able to sit in the elected legislative 
bodies alongside major parties that represent majority interest groups; and that 
marginalized groups, such as women and youth, are fairly represented. 
The smaller parties: the National Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF) 
and the National Federation Party (NFP)
the manifesto of the indigenous Fijian-led nApF addresses the SDl’s 
blueprint policies by promising to eliminate racial and discriminatory 
policies and to provide services based on need rather than race. it promises to 
eliminate corruption in government, and to promote good governance and 
multiculturalism. it also promises to encourage political parties to set a 50 
per cent target for women candidates in elections. the manifesto of the indo-
Fijian-led nFp promises to enhance genuine multi-ethnic cooperation and 
power-sharing and to promote respect for the vanua, cultural diversity and 
ethnic differences. Achieving an ethnic balance in the diplomatic and civil 
service that would address the current apparent bias towards indigenous Fijians 
was also an important election promise.
these two parties, with their message of multiculturalism, appealed to 
small groups within the electorate – and yet neither won a seat, despite having 
garnered sufficient votes to warrant representation. As mentioned above, 
meaningful democracy requires such minority parties to be represented in 
national parliament; an outcome that is less likely to be achieved under Fiji’s 
AV system than it would be under proportional representation (pr). 
table 29.3 shows the percentage of national votes that each party won 
and the number of seats gained in the 2006 election. it also shows the 
number of seats each party would have gained had the votes been counted 
under a full pr system rather than an AV system. the calculations are 
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based on the assumption of a pr system that treats the whole country as 
a single constituency, and no minimum vote threshold for representation 
in the parliament. in practice, most countries that use the pr system 
have limited pr systems with sub-national constituencies rather than a 
single national one. the single national constituency of a full pr system, 
however, is the closest to fair representation of the electorate; it is used in 
the netherlands.
As the election was run on an AV system with single member representation, 
the comparison in table 29.3 is only an indication of what would have resulted. 
note that under a pr system, three other parties – the nAp, the nFp and the 
party of national unity (pAnu) – would have gained seats in parliament. the 
upp’s share of seats would have been reduced to one. 
in Fiji we need to ensure small minority groups have a say in parliament, 
and so some communal constituencies may be necessary. At the same time, 
small groups sometimes have to compromise vital interests in order to survive. 
For example, the upp adopted much of its major partner’s policies when it 
joined with the Flp to form the new people’s coalition. it did not have 
an independent policy on land and so missed the opportunity to formally 
address a pressing concern of its migrant pacific islander communities, some 
members of whom have been in Fiji for generations but lack rights to land 
(upp manifesto).3 
A possible way forward
Fiji has been independent for over 30 years; it has had time to get used to 
elections and has had experience with two kinds of plurality majority electoral 
Table 29.3 Party representation in 2006 under AV and PR systems 
 SDl Flp nAp nFp nVtl upp pAnu pt jF Sl inD
Votes won  
  (per cent) 45.0 41.8 3.4 6.9 0.5 0.8 0.9 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.7 
Seats  under AV 36 31 - - - 2 - - - - 2 
Seats under pr  32 30 2 5 - 1 1 - - - -
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systems. Furthermore, it has achieved high literacy rates for both women and 
men and a highly educated female workforce. Yet despite these positive factors 
women continue to lag far behind men in positions of responsibility, including 
participation in national parliament.
Given the experience of other countries and democracies, it is clear that 
Fiji’s plurality majority electoral system will not encourage either rapid increase 
of women’s participation in parliament or the inclusion of minority interests 
in national decision-making bodies. A review of the electoral Act, including 
a review of the electoral system is needed if a more meaningful democracy 
involving greater representation of women and minority groups is to be 
achieved. Such a review should seriously consider changing Fiji’s elections 
system to a pr system with fewer communal and more open constituencies. 
it could also consider the other issues that limit the participation of women 
and minority groups, including campaign financing, and the issue of making 
party lists more gender-balanced.
Notes
1 the author gratefully acknowledges the help of three strong women politicians, Hon. 
Bernadette Ganilau, mrs priscilla Singh and mrs Fane Vosaniveibuli, who willingly agreed to 
be interviewed during the preparation of this paper. Any misinterpretations of their parties’ 
policies are entirely those of the author.
2 reilly, B. & reynolds, A. 1999. Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies, national 
Academies press, Washington, Dc. Available online at http://www.nap.edu.
3	 the issue is, however, being addressed by the women’s wing of the party (personal 
communication, Hon. B. r. Ganilau, 6 july 2006).
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The case for reform of the  
electoral system in Fiji
Rev. David G. Arms
Since the time the alternative vote (AV) was first proposed for Fiji in the 
reeves commission’s report of 1996, there have been those (such as myself ) 
who opposed it, regarding it as unsuitable to Fiji’s political circumstances. ever 
since the first elections using AV were held in 1999, there have been calls for 
reform. A lot of the suggestions being made have to do with improving the AV 
system as currently designed for Fiji. However, there has also been a consistent 
call for complete abandonment of the AV system. Between 1999 and 2001 
there was a strong push by some for a return to the first-past-the-post (Fpp) 
system, which Fiji had used previously.1 use of Fpp would certainly remove 
the complexities of the present AV system, but it would do nothing at all to 
overcome AV’s other deficiencies. What has been consistently advocated for 
this purpose is a form of proportional representation (pr). in this chapter, 
i discuss briefly some of the main arguments for switching to pr,2 dwelling 
at a bit more length on the question of ethnic cross-voting. needless to say, 
in arguing for reform, all three elections held under AV must be put under 
scrutiny, not just that of 2006.
the main argument for pr, in my view, is one of fairness. in 1999, the 
coalition led by the Fiji labour party (Flp) received a total of 336,868 first 
preferences, the coalition led by the Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni taukei (SVt), 
a total of 255,690 first preferences. respectively, they held 46.8 and 35.5 per 
cent of the first preferences of the whole electorate. Yet when it came to seat 
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allocation under AV, the Flp-led coalition received 52 seats, more than five 
times as many as the StV-led coalition, which received only 10! While it is true 
that AV is intended to take into account more than just first preferences, the 
disproportion it provided in this case can in no way be interpreted as reflecting 
the wishes of the people, which is what an electoral system is supposed to do. 
the results were grossly unfair, and were certainly a contributing factor to the 
coup of 2000. A pr system on the other hand would have divided up the seats 
much more fairly (see tables 30.1 and 30.2).
Although the above example of unfairness is perhaps the most striking, 
there are other clear examples of unfairness in all three elections held under 
AV (1999, 2001, and 2006). take, for instance, the national Federation party 
(nFp), which is mainly an indo-Fijian-backed party. in 1999 it received a total 
of 104,676 first preferences, in 2001 a total of 63,915 first preferences, and in 
2006 a total of 49,116. this represents about a third, a quarter, and a seventh 
respectively of the indo-Fijian vote. Yet the nFp received no seats at all in any 
of the three elections. How can this be in any way construed as fair?
Another argument for pr is that AV has failed in the very purpose for which 
it was adopted. the main reason given by the reeves commission for adoption 
of AV was to promote multi-ethnic government.3 AV has done nothing of the 
kind – indeed it has done the very opposite. in 1999, the Flp-led coalition 
was indeed multi-ethnic and became the government; but every indo-Fijian 
in parliament was in the government (except for George Shiu raj), leaving the 
opposition benches to be filled by the other ethnic groups (and George Shiu 
raj). this was hardly what was envisaged. What made things worse in practice, 
was that many of the indigenous Fijian members of the government were not 
happy with developments. their support slipped away, clearly making the lower 
House ethnically divided. in 2001, this division was even more apparent – the 
government was basically one of indigenous Fijians (and George Shiu raj), 
with the other ethnic groups in opposition (with a couple of non-indo-Fijian 
mps, however, opting to join the government).
in 2006, the situation has become worse, with almost everyone alleging 
that the voting has taken place along ethnic lines – indigenous Fijians voting 
mainly for the SDl, and indo-Fijians for the Flp. indeed, instead of promoting 
multi-ethnic government parties, as the reeves commission had intended,4 it 
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Table 30.1 1999 election: parties, first preferences and seats 
party  1st prefs % AV Fpp pr
Fijian communal constituencies:  
 23 seats, total valid votes 179,216 
FAp  32,032 17.87 9 4 4 
Flp  3,352   1.87 - - - 
nVtl  16,352   9.12 1 1 2 
pAnu  17,149   9.57 4 4 2 
SVt  68,114 38.01 5 11 10 
VlV  34,758 19.40 3 2 5 
indep  5,645   3.15 1 1 - 
others  1,814   1.01 - - - 
      
Indian communal constituencies:  
 19 seats, total valid votes 165,841 
FAp         955   0.58 - - - 
Flp  108,735 65.57 19 19 13 
nFp    53,076 32.00 - - 6 
pAnu         153   0.09 - - - 
indep       1,015   0.61 - - - 
other       1,907   1.15 - - - 
General communal constituencies:  
 3 seats, total valid votes 11,013 
FAp       1,057   9.60 - - - 
GVp       3,367 30.57 2 - 1 
uGp       5,412 49.14 1 3 2 
indep           20   0.18 - - - 
other       1,157 10.51 - - - 
      
Rotuman communal constituency:  
 1 seat, total valid votes 3,994 
indep     2,012 50.38 1 1 1 
other     1,982 49.62 - - - 
      
Open constituencies:  
 25 seats, total valid votes 359,491 
FAp    38,863 10.81 2 2 3 
Flp  119,563 33.26 18 15 8 
nFp    51,600 14.35 - - 4 
nVtl    15,234   4.24 - - 1 
pAnu    14,009   3.90 - - 1 
SVt    72,726 20.23 3 7 5 
uGp       4,732   1.32 1 1 - 
VlV    35,314   9.82 - - 3 
indep       5,323   1.48 1 - - 
other       2,127   0.59 - - -
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has provided a situation in which each communal group has its own communal 
party: the SDl for indigenous Fijians, the Flp for indo-Fijians, the upp for 
the Generals, and an independent for the rotumans. only robin irwin, for 
the Generals, forms an exception! Any multi-ethnic government that eventuates 
will be due to the multiparty cabinet provisions of the constitution (which were 
not a part of the reeves report); it will not derive from the AV system. on the 
other hand, a pr system, while not forcing a multi-ethnic government, presents 
good opportunities for voluntary coalition formation – and such coalitions are 
likely to cross ethnic lines.
A further argument for pr is that it promotes the role of women in 
politics. of the 15 nations with the highest percentage of women mps in 
the lower House, 14 use pr electoral systems. this speaks for itself. While 
there are now eight women mps in the lower House (which constitutes an 
improvement over 2001, but is only the same as in 1999), this is far below 
what is desirable. Women comprise 50 per cent of the population. While 
parity may not be a practical option, the nation would profit greatly from 
having women’s direct input in governance. pr, not AV, is a practical way of 
facilitating this. not only does the system itself give women a better chance of 
succeeding, but it is easier in pr systems to legislate increased representation 
for women. For instance, under a list or mixed-member proportional system, 
Table 30.2 1999 election: parties, preferences and seats – overall view
party 1st prefs % AV Fpp com/ 71 -open 
      open pr pr
All constituencies:  
 71 seats, total valid votes 719,555
FAp   71,952 10.00 11 6 7 8
Flp 231,650 32.19 37 34 21 24
GVp      3,367   0.47 2 - 1 -
nFp 104 ,676 14.55 - - 10 11
nVtl   31,586   4.39 1 1 3 3
pAnu   32,266   4.48 4 4 3 3
SVt 140,840 19.57 8 18 15 14
uGp   10,144   1.41 2 4 2 1
VlV   70,072   9.74 3 2 8 7
indep   14,015   1.95 3 2 1 -
other      8,987   1.25 - - - -
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legislation could require that at least one in every four candidates on a party’s 
list be a woman.
Another supporting argument for changing to pr at this time, is that of 
simplicity. pr systems can of course be complex. But there are pr systems 
that are quite simple – just one tick, or at most two, on an easy-to-understand 
ballot paper. the complexity of the AV system is itself a serious issue in Fiji. 
But is seems pointless to tamper with the system in order to make it simpler 
when AV is deficient on other grounds, as indicated above and also below. it 
would surely be more efficient to adopt a suitable and simple pr system that 
simultaneously solves those other deficiencies of AV.
Another aspect of pr is that it would have a moderating effect on 
communalism. this matter is clearly related to the larger topic of multi-
ethnic government. As indicated earlier, the 2006 election is generally looked 
upon as being very much an ethnic tussle: the SDl supported mainly by 
indigenous Fijians versus the Flp supported mainly by indo-Fijians. But AV 
has exaggerated this bipolar division. And it has also deprived of representation 
a more accommodating middle ground.
contrary to public perception, in 2006, more indigenous Fijians voted for 
the so-called indo-Fijian parties (Flp and nFp) in the Fijian communal seats 
than ever before – 7.26 per cent of them in fact (see table 30.5). this compares 
with 2.8 per cent in 2001 (see table 30.3) and a measly 1.87 per cent in 1999 
(see table 30.1). this outcome is in spite of the fact that most of the voters 
would have known that the party they were voting for had no chance of winning 
the seat. Had there been a real chance of such a vote affecting the outcome 
(which there would have been under list pr, for example), it is probable that 
the percentages would have been higher. if list pr had been in operation, the 
Flp would have picked up two seats from indigenous Fijian votes in 2006, 
perhaps one seat in 2001, but none in 1999.
there are similarly indo-Fijian voters in indo-Fijian communal seats voting 
for parties viewed as primarily indigenous Fijian. their numbers were miniscule 
in 1999 and 2001 because such parties figured it was a waste of time and money 
trying to compete against the major indo-Fijian parties. in most indo-Fijian 
constituencies therefore, there was no primarily indigenous Fijian party that 
could be voted for. But the SDl gave it a real try in 2006, and, though their 
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Table 30.3  2001 election: parties, first preferences and seats
party  1st prefs % AV Fpp pr
Fijian communal constituencies:  
 23 seats, total valid votes 166 775
BKV    7,826   4.69 - 1 1 
cAmV 33,776 20.25 5 5 5 
FAp    3,528   2.12 - - - 
Flp    3,857   2.31 - - 1 
nFp      817   0.49 - - - 
nlup    6,666   4.00 - - 1 
nVtl    2,738   1.64 - - - 
pAnu    4,900   2.94 - 1 1 
SDl 83,506 50.07 18 16 12 
SVt 14,331   8.59 - - 2 
indep    4,085   2.45 - - - 
other      745   0.45 - - - 
      
Indian communal constituencies:  
 19 seats, total votes 145,431
FAp            8   0.01 - - - 
Flp 108,459 74.58 19 19 15 
nFp   32,143 22.10 - - 4 
nlup      3,731   2.56 - - - 
SDl        149   0.10 - - - 
indep        565   0.39 - - - 
other        376   0.26 - - - 
      
General communal constituencies:  
 3 seats, total valid votes 10 045
cAmV       325   3.23 - - - 
FAp       314   3.13 - - - 
GVp     1,904 18.95 - - 1 
nlup       993   9.89 1 1 - 
SDl     2,477 24.66 1 1 1 
SVt       252   2.51 - - - 
uGp     3,260 32.45 1 1 1 
indep       520   5.18 - - - 
      
Rotuman communal constituency:  
 1 seat, total valid votes 3,772
indep    1,969 52.20 1 1 1 
other    1,803 47.80 - - - 
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Table 30.4  2001 election: parties, preferences and seats – overall view
party 1st prefs % AV Fpp com/ 71-open 
      open pr pr
All constituencies:  
 71 seats, total valid votes 636,788
BKV   11,576   1.82 - 1 1 1
cAmV   64,414 10.12 6 7 7 7
FAp      8,146   1.28 - - - 1
Flp 218,728 34.35 27 32 25 25
GVp      1,904   0.30 - - 1 -
nFp   63,915 10.04 1 - 7 7
nlup   28,489   4.47 2 1 2 3
nVtl      3,682   0.58 - - - -
pAnu      7,088   1.11 - 1 1 1
SDl 169,227 26.57 32 26 20 20
SVt   35,143   5.52 - - 4 4
uGp      3,260   0.51 1 1 1 -
indep   17,238   2.71 2 2 2 2
other     3978   0.62 - - - -
table 30.3 continued
party  1st prefs % AV Fpp pr
Open constituencies:  
 25 seats, total valid votes 310,765
BKV      3,750   1.21 - - - 
cAmV   30,313   9.76 1 2 2 
FAp      4,296   1.38 - - - 
Flp 106,412 34.24 8 13 9 
nFp   30,955   9.96 1 - 3 
nlup   17,099   5.50 1 - 1 
nVtl        944   0.30 - - - 
pAnu      2,188   0.70 - - - 
SDl   83,095 26.74 13 9 7 
SVt   20,560   6.62 - - 2 
indep   10,099   3.25 1 1 1 
other      1,054   0.34 - - - 
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Table 30.5 2006 elections: parties, first preferences and seats
party  1st prefs % AV Fpp pr
Fijian communal constituencies:  
 23 seats, total valid votes 203,176
Flp    12,865  6.33  -  -  2
pAnu    4,127  2.03  -  -  -
nAp    5,050  2.49  -  -  1
nFp    1,883  0.93  -  -  -
nVtl    2,203  1.08  -  -  -
SDl  163,799 80.62 23 23 20
upp    115  0.06  - -  -
indep    13,106  6.45  - -  -
other    28  0.01  - -  -
     
Indian communal constituencies:  
 19 seats, total valid votes 165,082
Flp  134,002 81.17 19 19 16
pAnu    -  0.00 - - -
nAp    3,170  1.92 - - -
nFp    23,263 14.09 - - 3
nVtl    -  0.00 - - -
SDl    4,260  2.58 - - -
upp    -  0.00 - - -
indep    349  0.21 - - -
other    38  0.03 - - -
     
General communal constituencies:  
 3 seats, total valid votes 10,809
Flp    383  3.54 - - -
pAnu    -  0.00 - - -
nAp    776  7.18 - - -
nFp    60  0.56 - - -
nVtl    -  0.00 - - -
SDl    3,874 35.84 - 1 1
upp    4,220 39.04 2 2 2
indep    1,496 13.84 1 - -
other     
     
Rotuman communal constituency:  
 1 seat, total valid votes 4,435
nAp    245  5.52 - - -
SDl    526 11.86 - - -
upp    532 12.00 - - -
indep    3,132 70.62 1 1 1
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success came nowhere near their pre-election hype, it was impressive enough. At 
their first effort, the SDl were able to pick up 2.58 per cent of the indo-Fijian 
vote. this would not have won them a seat under list pr, but it would have 
come pretty close. What’s more, this percentage was obtained even though the 
SDl would not generally have been considered benign towards indo-Fijians in 
its five-year term of government, only going after their vote late in the day. 
We see then that there is a certain amount of ethnic cross-voting. there 
could, in fact, be quite a lot of such cross-voting in the open seats, but since 
voting is done in secret, any estimate of the percentage of cross-voting in open 
seats would be largely guesswork. in the communal seats, however, even though 
cross-voting may be on a small scale, it has significantly increased in 2006. the 
big problem is that AV is not rewarding these votes in any way, whereas list pr 
would do so. AV is in fact misrepresenting Fiji’s voters, and misleading them 
into believing that Fiji has become more polarized, whereas the truth is the 
opposite. the tragedy is that the continued use of AV is highly likely to bring 
about and intensify this polarization. Why would parties like the SDl and Flp 
continue to spend money and make efforts to draw cross-ethnic votes in the 
communal seats when AV makes such efforts futile? What is said here about 
communal seats will also apply to many open seats. As about 20 of these 25 
seats are ethnically lop-sided, and it is predictable which party will win, there 
may soon be a tendency by the party of the other ethnic group not to contest 
them, for such effort will also be seen as futile. this is why an immediate change 
to pr becomes so important. Fiji needs to build on what willingness there is 
to vote across ethnic boundaries, not discourage it.  
table 30.5 continued
party  1st prefs % AV Fpp pr
Open constituencies:  
 75 seats, total valid votes 387,407
Flp   156,913 40.52 12 11 11
pAnu    2,099  0.55  -  -  -
nAp    13,363  3.46  -  -  1
nFp    23,910  6.18  -  -  2
nVtl    1,454  0.39  -  -  -
SDl    70,952 44.14 13 14 11
upp    1,615  0.43  -  -  -
indep    16,618  4.30  -  -  -
other    483  0.03  -  -  -
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Table 30.6  2006 elections: parties, preferences and seats – overall view
party 1st prefs % AV Fpp com/ 71-open  
      open pr pr
All constituencies:  
 71 seats, total valid votes 770,909
Flp 304,163 39.46 31 30 29 29
pAnu     6,226   0.81 - - - 1
nAp   22,604   2.93 - - 2 2
nFp   49,116   6.37 - - 5 5
nVtl     3,657   0.47 - - - -
SDl 343,411 44.55 36 38 32 33
upp     6,482   0.84 2 2 2 1
indep   34,701   4.50 2 1 1 -
other        549   0.07 - - - -
unfortunately, AV discourages other smaller parties too, some of which 
occupy the middle ground between the two giants. the nFp and nAp 
(national Alliance party) are excellent examples. though they drew 49,116 first 
preferences (as mentioned earlier) and 22,604 first preferences, respectively, in 
2006 (see table 30.6), they received no reward, whereas under pr they would 
have (the reward would have been five seats for the nFp and two seats for the 
nAp). Why keep the AV system, which wipes out such minority viewpoints? 
Such parties, though small, have a valuable contribution to make. Who can 
deny the value of the united Generals party (uGp) – now the united peoples 
party (upp) – in parliament, for example? though the party had a solitary 
representative in the last parliament, it wielded substantial and constructive 
influence. But notice again AV’s abhorrently haphazard nature. While we may 
rue the failure of the nFp and nAp to win any seats, even with their large 
number of first preferences, the upp with only 6,482 first preferences in 2006 
managed to win two! What a ridiculous perversion of justice!
to cut out certain minorities in this way is against Fiji’s own cultural norms. 
Fiji prides itself on its respect for minorities – except, it would appear, when they 
are political parties. rotumans receive a place in the Senate and their own lower 
House seat; the Generals are very well catered for with three seats; provinces 
such as Serua and namosi receive separate Fijian communal seats even though 
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their population is far smaller than many other provinces; proportionality is 
required for deciding seats in the multiparty cabinet; proportionality is also 
required in deciding which opposition members will be appointed to the Senate. 
there seems to be in all these cases a genuine concern for inclusiveness. Such 
an attitude is necessary also toward political parties.
pr would provide this inclusiveness, as well as the fairness spoken of earlier. 
At the same time, it would not exaggerate the importance of such parties. By 
being proportional it gives all groups their due. it may be thought that, while 
AV and Fpp may tend to push politics too much into a two-party struggle, 
pr would multiply parties excessively and thus make governance too difficult. 
experience in other countries, however, does not bear this out. there may 
indeed be a need for more comprehensive dialogue, but surely that is often 
what is best for a country. it is, in fact, precisely what is being called for in Fiji’s 
current multiparty cabinet situation.
However, can we realistically expect the two major parties, the SDl and the 
Flp, to opt for a change to pr when it would clearly weaken their overall power? 
to get them to do so will certainly be a challenge, but it should be attempted 
for the good of the country. Hopefully, the leadership of these two parties, 
especially in a multiparty cabinet context, will have enough statesmanship to 
give this consideration due priority.
Self-interest, however, would also indicate that these parties consider pr.5 As 
Fiji’s demographics change with the emigration of indo-Fijians, the Flp’s main 
power-base is shrinking. pr would ensure that it would retain fair representation 
no matter what happens in regard to population ratios in the future. on the 
other hand, the SDl needs to consider that, as fear of indo-Fijian leadership 
subsides in the indigenous community, more internal differences (especially, 
perhaps, regional ones) are likely to emerge within that community, as has 
happened before (in the first 1977 election with Sakeasi Butadroka, and in 
the 1994 election with josefata Kamikamica). if splits occur in indigenous 
Fijian politics, it is important that the resulting factions be represented fairly, 
otherwise the injustice of the 1999 election towards the SVt-led coalition could 
be repeated for the SDl and/or the dissident factions.
While pr cannot be expected to solve all of Fiji’s political difficulties, it 
would help the country enormously in the various ways suggested here.
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A note on the electoral data
tables 30.1, 30.3 and 30.5 deal respectively with the elections of 1999, 2001 
and 2006. each table provides the abbreviated names of the political parties, the 
number of first preferences each party received, the percentage of the ethnic (or 
joint) group vote that figure represents, the actual number of seats won by each 
party under the AV system, the number of seats each party would have won if 
the votes had been counted under Fiji’s former Fpp system, and the number 
of seats each party would have won if the allocation was proportional to the 
number of first preferences each party received. this latter way of allocating 
seats is one method of what is called proportional representation (pr).6
tables 30.2, 30.4 and 30.6 summarize tables 30.1, 30.3 and 30.5, 
respectively, adding together the first preferences and seats for all the different 
constituency types. these three tables have two pr columns, not just one. the 
first of these (titled communal/open pr) summarizes the pr seats allotted in 
tables 30.1, 30.3 and 30.5. in those tables, pr was applied separately within 
the respective group of constituencies, communal and open. pr could be 
applied in this way, and would indeed work quite well if communal seats were 
retained. in point of fact, however, it becomes unnecessary to retain communal 
seats when pr is used, for pr itself provides fair ethnic representation between 
the various ethnic groups, if this is what the voters themselves want (that is, if 
they vote along ethnic lines).
the second pr column (titled 71-open pr) calculates the proportions as 
if all 71 seats were open seats. it uses the totals of each party’s first preferences, 
communal and open, to determine how the 71 seats might have divided out 
proportionally. there is an inherent weakness in calculating the proportions 
in this way, however, in that independent candidates and some parties (e.g. 
the uGp/upp) will have run in one half of the system (say, the communal) 
but not in the other. Similarly, some voters may have been constrained in their 
voting by the number of parties running in their constituency. nevertheless, it 
gives us a rough idea as to how pr results might look. one could, of course, 
calculate how the 71 seats might have divided up on the basis of the 25 open 
seats alone, but this would have the same weakness as that described above.
table 30.7 provides an overall view of the seat division under AV, Fpp, 
communal/open pr and 71-open pr for all three elections.
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What i would particularly like the reader to consider in these seven tables, is 
the very different seat allocations provided by the three different voting systems. 
election results are supposed to reflect ‘the will of the people’, but clearly that 
will is interpreted by the voting system used. Surely we should look for a system 
that reflects that will most accurately. the tables illustrate how the AV and 
Fpp systems provide us with gross inequities in representation. in contrast, a 
pr system would respect the various opinions in our midst and contribute to 
a greater degree of collaboration (rather than winner-takes-all). Such working 
together is what the multiparty cabinet provisions of the constitution are 
trying to encourage. For large and small groups alike, pr provides genuine 
and fair representation. the lower House, after all, is supposed to be a house 
of representatives.
Notes
1 interest in a return to Fpp waned after 2001, probably for reasons given in footnote 5.
2 there are three main forms of pr: a list system; a mixed-member proportional system; and a 
single transferable vote system. Any of these would be fine for Fiji provided they are suitably 
adapted for Fiji’s circumstances. i have elsewhere made concrete suggestions in this regard (see 
Arms, D.G. 2006. ‘concrete options for proportional representation in Fiji’, in Reviewing 
Fiji’s Electoral System, proceedings of workshop hosted by the citizens’ constitutional 
Forum, 9–10 February, printhouse, Suva, pp.9–119; and Arms, D.G. 2006. ‘the failure of 
the alternative vote system and the case for proportional representation in Fiji’ in Journal of 
Pacific Studies).
3 Fiji constitution review commission. 1996. The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, 
parliament of Fiji parliamentary paper 34, Government printer, Suva, p.310.
4 reeves commission 1996, p.315–17.
5 unfortunately, self-interest is all too often the over-riding factor – a self-interest which is 
frequently misguided. the indigenous Fijian leadership was in favour of changing back to 
Fpp from AV in the period 1999–2001. the SVt would certainly have done much better 
under Fpp in 1999 (see table 30.2). However, if Fpp had been used in 2001, the Flp would 
have won, not the SDl (see table 30.4). there was, thus, little talk of a change back to Fpp 
after 2001. ironically, had the SDl implemented such a change, the party would have won 
by a large absolute majority in 2006 (see table 30.6) rather than by an extremely narrow 
one.





the 2006 election confirmed the polarization in the country that has been 
extant for much of our voting history. the process has tended to ebb and 
flow at critical periods, with little sign of any sustained development towards 
integration. the inability of political parties promoting multiracialism and 
multiculturalism to make inroads was unsurprising. Six years after the events of 
2000, divisions remain. our respective communities continue to find security 
and support among their kind, and their attitudes are, in turn, reinforced by 
an electoral system that is ethnically based.
the campaign itself was remarkable for its relative lack of invective, insult 
and ill will. there were certainly some isolated personal attacks on individual 
politicians that reflected little credit on the critics. However, by and large, it was 
open and freewheeling and ‘negative’ incidents were limited. radio, television 
and ‘the dailies’ provided full coverage and were accessible to the people. the 
barrage of criticisms leveled at the electoral commission and the Supervisor 
of elections had some substance, but the problem was largely systemic: the 
consequence of successive governments since independence leaving those 
offices in hibernation between elections. the lesson learned is not to allow this 
to happen in future. the authorities need to ensure that the offices are fully 
resourced and in a constant state of readiness. there was some defensiveness 
about the election observers. i take the view that the measure of comfort and 
assurance they provided the electorate was a sufficient riposte to any criticism. 
credit is due the prime minister for inviting them.
the election outcome was influenced by several significant factors. i have 
already mentioned the existing ethnic divisions. the fraught relationship 
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between the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) government and the 
military, further compounded by the military’s campaign for truth and justice in 
the villages, only served to strengthen support for the SDl. this strengthening 
was significant in the light of indo-Fijian emigration coupled with higher Fijian 
birthrates, neither of which have been given sufficient attention. next year’s 
census should remedy the situation. What it will reveal, i would respectfully 
suggest, is the increasing difficulty the Fiji labour party (Flp) will face in 
future elections unless it broadens its Fijian base. 
the SDl, and the prime minister in particular, were impressive in being 
able to hold the Fijian electorate together. the calls for unity appear to have 
been largely heeded. However, differences based on provincial, vanua and other 
rivalries remain, and will need to be dealt with sensitively and expeditiously if 
they are to be kept in check. the potential for disunity remains because, as the 
proportion of Fijians in the population increases, real and imagined grievances 
are fueled and respective groups feel emboldened to assert their claims. Fijian 
national leaders have to be more direct in telling their own people about 
restraint and forbearance. the pandora’s box of ever-increasing expectations 
in the context of unrealistic time frames is a threat to all of us.
Yet, i do not despair: there is a paradox in these election results that fuels 
my optimism. the ethnic slant of the voting patterns did not preclude a deep-
seated desire across our communities for more cooperative governance. Having 
cast their ballots, the electorate wanted  the political parties to work together 
more closely. in over a century of multiculturalism, much of it with little or 
any engagement, we have learned to live with each other. We are still learning, 
sometimes painfully. part of that lesson is working with each other and engaging 
in a limited fashion. We prefer our own leaders, but we expect them to build 
the bridges that we are reluctant to construct ourselves.
As for the national Federation party, it has failed in a second general 
election to secure any seats. While i do not predict its demise, it will not make 
any headway as long as mr chaudhry remains leader of the Flp. He is the 
undisputed political leader of the indo-Fijian community. His standing was 
reinforced following the events of may 2000. By his courage while being held 
hostage in parliament, he upheld the izzat, or honour, of his people. they have 
not forgotten and they are grateful. ironically, it is that status as well as his 
articulation of indo-Fijian fears and concerns that make him a bogeyman to 
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many Fijians. He is, of course, not one, but rather, a relentless and articulate 
advocate of the causes in which he believes.
the issues in the election included the promotion of reconciliation, 
tolerance and unity Bill, resolution of the land tenure issue, economic 
management, poverty and the plethora of squatter settlements, as well as the 
relationship between the government and the military. As is the nature of such 
debates, there was an ethnic hue to the positions people took. For example, if 
one was Fijian, one tended to favour the expiring leases being brought under 
the native land trust Act rather than the Agricultural landlord and tenant 
Act. At the same time, since may 2000, indo-Fijians see the military as a 
necessary check on the more nationalist inclinations of the government. the 
promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill created much disquiet in 
the community because of its implications. overall, the support that opposition 
parties might otherwise have gained from Fijian votes was more than offset by 
support for the SDl government on the basis of continuing stability.
A pleasing aspect of the new House of representatives is the eight female 
members. However, these women represent only a little over ten per cent of the 
House. there is ample scope for more women representatives. While the Flp 
adopted a quota system (of sorts) for women candidates at its annual conference 
in lautoka in 2004, no political party has been bold enough to implement 
the initiative. Women have generally had to struggle against heavy odds for 
endorsement. the arguments about a level playing field are spurious because 
there is none. Having said that, one must acknowledge the relative success of 
the SDl government in having five women members of parliament.
in the last few days before the general election commenced on 6 may 2006, 
advertisements appeared that implied support for the SDl government on the 
basis of its christian orientation. Such sentiments had also been expressed from 
the pulpits in many churches across the nation. those initiatives were unfortunate 
and have no place in a multicultural, multireligious society like ours. they 
influence impressionable minds and thereby encourage bigotry and arrogance. 
it is sufficient that christians are enjoined to vote to allow God’s will be done. 
He of course moves in His own unfathomable manner and may use anyone to 
effect His will. As for the response of indo-Fijian religious organizations, while 
more subtle than their christian counterparts, some could not divorce themselves 
from the demands of politics, while others remained apolitical.
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the electoral system still remains too complicated for people to understand. 
However, there is little prospect of change. the major parties appear to 
be comfortable with the status quo, but that should not be an obstacle to 
continuing debate and discussion. i do not apologize for favouring a form of 
proportional representation. it is important that the support for political parties 
in our community be reflected in that proportion in parliament. otherwise, 
certain sections of the electorate are not properly represented. the requirement 
for a partly pre-determined ethnic composition of the House should also be 
reviewed with a view to its gradual removal over time. i believe this may happen 
slowly, as the proportion of Fijians in the population increases significantly, 
and this scenario provides them with a measure of security.
in the context of the minority General Voter population, the realignment of 
the united General party with the Flp generated much soul-searching within 
these communities. While there were those who feared the consequences of 
alienation from traditional allies, others were convinced it was time to seek an 
alternative to the ‘step-daughterly’ treatment received hitherto. the strategy 
appears to have worked. Whether it will improve the position of minorities, 
in terms of the equal opportunities to which they are entitled, is an open 
question. there are those on the Fijian side of politics who take the view that 
as ‘the generals’ have cut loose from their usual moorings, they should be held 
to account. politics is not a forgiving pastime here or elsewhere.
it would be easy to feel some disquiet about the continuing ethnic division 
in our community as revealed in recent voting patterns. i accept such division 
as largely the result of our history. Yet it also camouflages the accommodations 
we have made with each other in the years we have lived together. it does not 
fully reflect the extent of our engagement, although this is still too limited 
for this author’s liking. the strength of this engagement lies in the ordinary 
people of this country. twice, almost a decade and a half apart, we have had two 
significant political upheavals. our resilience is due in large part to the people 
and to their hope of a better future for their children, whatever their ethnicity. 
it is this vision that links all of us. We need to expand the vision to narrow the 
distances between us and draw us more closely together. For all these reasons 




Understanding Fiji’s  
political paradox
Robert Norton
the wide-ranging contributions to this volume on Fiji’s 2006 general election 
and its aftermath reflect some continuities in the country’s political history since 
the late colonial period. the land issue was central in the minds of indo-Fijian 
farmers in the 1960s, when political party competition began, for many leases 
were being lost to the Fijian reserves. indo-Fijians were at that time offered a 
choice between leaders who pushed strongly for radical constitutional changes 
and those who promised security and progress by working with conservative 
Fijian leaders. perhaps in the formation of the post-2006 election multiparty 
cabinet we see a potential for that choice to emerge again as it did in the 1999 
election. But the demographic trend, contrasting so starkly with the indo-Fijian 
majority at the time of independence, is likely to discourage radicalism in indo-
Fijian leadership and strengthen the emphasis on cultivating Fijian allies. 
Another continuity is the importance of chiefly influence and chiefly rivalries. 
Although the leading Fijian chiefs have, since 1987, been displaced at the helm 
of government by commoners or people of modest traditional rank, it is clear 
from the chapters by tuimaleali’ifano, tuitoga, and Saumaki,1 how strong 
chiefly influence and rivalry continue to be – particularly at the local level, 
and even in areas such as rewa that have long been subject to strong urban 
economic and cultural influences. it should be noted, however, that, contrary 
to popular assumption today, commoner representation among members of 
parliament has been strengthening since the late 1960s when, in fact, nearly 
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half the then twelve Fijians elected by popular vote to the colonial legislature 
were commoners. After the extension of adult franchise to Fijians in 1963, the 
Great council of chiefs’ nominated representation was reduced to only two of 
the six Fijian members of the legislative council, and further weakened in 1966 
to just two out of fourteen Fijian members. Since 1970, Fiji’s constitution, in 
contrast to those of tonga and Samoa, has not given chiefs (nobles in tonga) 
any privileged representation in the main legislative assembly. the extent to 
which Fijians of chiefly rank have enjoyed influence in electoral politics has 
been due to traditional loyalties and to the significance acquired by leading 
chiefs as perceived bastions of Fijian identity and strength in the context of 
ethnic conflict – not to legal prerogative. 
Bose and Fraenkel’s inquiry into the fate of ‘western separatism’ addresses a 
dimension of politics that has long interested political analysts2: western Viti 
levu as a regional seed-bed for the growth of radical challenge to the political 
establishment – among both Fijians and indo-Fijians – with the potential to 
nurture political alliances. the ‘national’ in the national Federation party 
(nFp) derives from the national Democratic party in western Viti levu that 
Apisai tora and isikeli nadalo merged with A.D. patel’s Federation party in 
1968. many western Fijians had resented the colonial government’s privileging 
of southeastern Viti levu and the eastern islands by way of support for education 
and development and recruitment to government jobs. tora’s earlier Western 
Democratic party and nadalo’s Fijian national party were born from those 
grievances, while the Federation party simultaneously grew from the indo-Fijian 
farmers’ industrial struggles with the colonial Sugar refining company. 
Western Fijian dissent has waxed and waned, moderated partly by countervailing 
relationships between local chiefs and eastern political leaders, and by the greater 
force of ethnic consciousness. From the early 1970s, ratu mara strengthened his 
support in the west through his influence in the Western tuis (chiefs) Association 
– which he helped establish – by directing development projects to the region, 
and by increasing westerner representation in parliament and cabinet. the 
leading western chief, tui Vuda, was eventually recruited to government, along 
with others – including even Apisai tora himself, once feared by the commercial 
and political establishment. When, in 1987, a new government was formed 
with a west Viti levu Fijian (timoci Bavadra) at last at the helm, tora led street 
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marches in protest against it. Fijian nationalism, originating in southeast Viti 
levu, became a far greater problem for mara than dissent in the west. political 
observers and aspirants alike have long tended to overestimate the potential for 
militant regionalism to weigh heavily in Fijian politics. 
laisenia Qarase’s endeavour to become a national leader has been frustrated 
by the demands of Fijian extremists. the problem of Fijian ethno-nationalism 
has a long history. in his political planning for self-government, ratu mara 
argued patiently with younger Fijian colleagues in the leadership of the Fijian 
Association – soon to be the major body in the Alliance party – to dissuade 
them from their initial vision of a ‘Fiji for the Fijians’. if not for the untimely 
death in 1964 of the staunchest Fijian nationalist of that time, ravuama 
Vunivalu, mara’s task would have been even more difficult. Soon after mara 
and nFp president Siddiq Koya led Fiji to independence, mara faced a far 
more daunting challenge from Sakeasi Butadroka and the Fijian nationalist 
party (Fnp) that dashed his hope to strengthen indo-Fijian representation in 
government. just as mara had his problem with the ‘young turks’ in the Fijian 
Association, and later with the Fnp, rabuka was bedevilled by the ‘taukeists’ 
and reactionary methodists when, in the mid-1990s, he reinvented himself 
politically to embark on the project of constitutional reform. Qarase may have 
succeeded in taming Fijian ethno-nationalism for the moment, but it is likely 
to continue to haunt him. All three leaders have also been constrained by the 
political need to placate provincial or vanua rivalries and grievances. these are 
likely to be intensified by the strengthening nexus between political power and 
access to material benefits of various kinds. 
What is perhaps most remarkable about the 2006 election is the way its 
outcome repeats a pattern of dialogue and conciliation that had followed phases 
of crisis on the eve of Fiji’s independence – and that emerged again several years 
after rabuka’s coups. labour party leader Krishna Datt is surely to laisenia 
Qarase, what jai ram reddy was to Sitiveni rabuka, and Siddiq Koya to ratu 
mara: a partner in projects of political reform aimed at bridging the ethnic 
political divide. the strong accord that quickly grew between mara and Koya 
following the death of A.D. patel late in 1969, was a triumph over an ethnic 
polarization that came close to widespread violence following the nFp victory 
in by-elections forced by that party’s boycott of the colonial parliament.3 the 
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understanding that grew between reddy and rabuka in the late 1990s seemed 
a strong echo of that historic pact, and the conciliatory potential now appears 
yet again in Qarase’s relationship with Datt. 
this brings me to ratu joni madraiwiwi’s observation about ‘the paradox’ 
of the recent elections: such a strong ethnic polarization, yet followed by a 
promising start to collaboration in a multiparty cabinet.4 this outcome directs 
attention to the question of the nature of ethnic difference and conflict in 
Fiji, the paradox that such electoral polarity is not necessarily a measure of the 
intractability of conflict. 
After the many elections and much experimentation with multi-ethnic 
political organization since parties first competed for power in 1966, the ethnic 
divide persists in the political arena as starkly as ever, confounding the visions 
of proponents of grand theoretical narratives about inevitable directions of 
political change driven by forces of modernity. When the question of Fiji’s 
political development first loomed large in academic debate, following rabuka’s 
coups, marxist and liberal democratic analysts agreed that ethnic identities and 
conflicts must surely fade in the political arena under the increasing weight of 
cross-cutting interests evident in the market economy. the major obstacles to 
dispelling the allegedly false consciousness of race or ethnicity, it was confidently 
claimed, were the vested interests and manipulative rhetoric of the powerful 
(especially Fijian chiefs). 
Generalizing paradigms, fashioned from western experience and ideals, 
have tended to impede the understanding of Fiji’s complexities and paradoxes, 
obscuring more than they illuminate. insufficient attention has been given to 
discerning the social and political dynamics of the society in its particularity. 
How might we understand Fiji in terms of its distinctive features and history? in 
these respects it is helpful to inquire into how Fiji differs from other small-scale 
post-colonial societies such as trinidad and Guyana in the caribbean, where 
ethnic identities also continue to dominate political alignments despite the 
strong presence of cross-cutting interests of social class. How might an inductive 
understanding of these national histories offer inspiration for theorizing about 
the nature of ethnic conflicts? to stress the significance of the ethnic divide in 
such societies is not at all to deny the importance of the cross-cutting interests 
and values associated with occupation, social class, consumerism, and shared 
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citizenship. rather, it is to recognize the special problems that ethnic differences 
and conflicts pose for the design of political institutions that might allow 
effective expression of common interests. it is a question of what institutional 
arrangements would best constrain and contain the ethnic concerns and 
tensions, what form of democratic government would best suit a society like 
Fiji? the paradoxical outcome of the 2006 election suggests support for this 
perspective. it dramatized the compatibility of strong expression of ethnic group 
allegiances in the electoral arena with prospects for dialogue and compromise 
in the executive and parliament on issues concerning interests shared across the 
ethnic divide (such as urban poverty, educational and health service needs, and 
rural development), as well as on issues which, while largely placing the major 
ethnic groups in opposition, are nonetheless negotiable (such as land-leasing 
and affirmative action for Fijians). i will return to the question of dialogue 
and negotiation later. 
An important point to make in connection with the paradox ratu joni 
madraiwiwi highlights concerns the extent to which, as Fraenkel observes, 
the generally agreeable mood of everyday inter-ethnic relations tends to be 
insulated from ethnic conflict at the political level.5 there have, of course, been 
times when political tensions flood into these relations to the point of abuse 
and violence, and we cannot ignore the longstanding mutually denigrating 
stereotypes. Yet, what perhaps most distinguishes Fiji from many other countries 
with deep ethnic divisions, is the degree to which cooperation and friendliness 
in everyday relations has resisted corrosion by political conflict. 
i recall illustrative vignettes from my field research: ratu mara’s political 
lieutenant, David toganivalu, campaigning in the villages to strengthen the 
Fijian Association against the Federation party in 1966 – with dire warnings 
about threats to political privilege and land – and then relaxing at clubs in Suva 
to share drinks and play snooker with indo-Fijian friends; isimeli Bose, principal 
author of the controversial Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei submission to the 
constitutional review commission in 1995 – with its unrelenting discourse 
on justifications for Fijian resentments against indo-Fijians – explaining that 
treatise to me as we sat alone in the board room of Vinod patel co (hardware 
suppliers to the Ba provincial council), and then our affable encounter with 
the patel men as we left; my old teacher friend narayan Govind, staunch nFp 
408 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
and later Flp man, recounting friendly street chats with Sakeasi Butadroka, 
who had moved in parliament that indo-Fijians be deported to india (‘Buta is 
not really a bad man you know…’). 
literature on life in trinidad and Guyana, and observations by indo-Fijians 
who have visited these countries, suggest that routine inter-ethnic relations there 
(between people of east indian and African descent) are more often marred 
by antipathy than is the case in Fiji, despite a greater convergence in similar 
occupations and lifestyles, which many intellectuals and politicians long hoped 
would encourage social and political integration. there seems to be a greater 
conjunction of ethnically polarized political relations with the mood of everyday 
social relations, the long-standing competition and antipathy in everyday life 
influencing the tensions of the political arena more than the reverse.6 
Yet, it is also very significant that in Guyana and trinidad political power 
has, in recent years, been transferred from one ethnically based party to another 
without incurring major violence, and certainly not coups d’état.7 this further 
highlights the need to inquire into the distinctive features of Fiji: a place where, 
in everyday life, ethnic relations tend, for the most part, to be harmonious 
despite the marked cultural, social and economic differences, and where political 
polarization does not preclude friendly dialogue and compromise, but where 
transfer of political power has not been tolerated. A place where, as Firth and 
Fraenkel remark, democracy seems to work only so far as it keeps the indigenous 
Fijians in political control.8 
to understand the paradox of the 2006 Fiji election we must consider it in 
relation to some aspects of the bifurcated nature of Fiji society, economy, and 
polity as these were shaped by colonial policy and practice. the term bifurcated 
highlights Fiji’s contrast with trinidad and Guyana which, for all their ethnic 
tensions, are best described as unitary societies in respect to an essentially shared, 
if highly competitive, engagement in common institutions, most importantly 
the economy and political system in which there has been no institutional 
privileging of ethnic groups.9 the old term plural society, applicable in some 
respects to all these countries, glosses over this important difference. 
the most obvious contrast with Fiji is that indigenous Amerindian 
populations are very small (almost non existent in trinidad), and have hardly 
figured at all in national politics, let alone enjoyed special rights. there is no 
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constitutional differentiation of ethnic group rights – as there is in Fiji – and 
no history of a compulsory separation in space, such as was rigidly maintained 
for most Fijians by the colonial administration. there is no ethnic difference 
in prerogatives of land ownership. cultural differences are slighter than in Fiji, 
a fact belied by the apparently stronger ethnic antipathies; the most significant 
cultural differences are in religion and in family and marriage customs. the 
Hindi language has not been as strongly preserved as it has in Fiji, and the vast 
majority of descendants of the African slaves speak only english. over the last 
four decades, however, there have been ‘movements’ of rediscovery and reassertion 
of cultural difference among both the indian and African populations, and these 
movements have been associated with political rivalry. By their oppositional 
energy, the cultural revivalist efforts have more strongly influenced ethnic tensions 
in trinidad and Guyana, than the deeper, but taken-for-granted and routinely 
lived, cultural differences have contributed to ethnic tension in Fiji. 
A major aspect of the bifurcation of Fiji was the structure of the capitalist 
economy in which, for a very long time, the great majority of indigenous Fijians 
were only marginal participants. their predominantly subsistence village-based 
lifestyle, forcibly maintained by colonial laws, produced an enduring sense of 
economic weakness in the wider society, and yet at the same time facilitated the 
supply of much of the best arable land for relatively cheap leasing by indo-Fijian 
farmers. compulsory village living for most indigenous Fijians minimized their 
dependence on rent income and, therefore, indirectly subsidized colonial Sugar 
refining company profits by keeping down the price the company needed to pay 
to the indo-Fijian tenant farmers for their sugar cane. of course, the confinement 
of most Fijians to their villages also supported the cSr co.’s project of developing 
a highly skilled indo-Fijian labour force, wholly committed by financial necessity 
to the industry. By the mid 1930s the cSr co. was firmly opposed to a strong 
Fijian participation in cane farming, viewing that prospect as a threat to the 
efficiency it had developed through the indo-Fijian small farmer system.10 
Associated with this highly unbalanced yet complementary ethnic divide in 
the economy was the privileged status of Fijians – through their leading chiefs 
– in the colonial state, and the strengthening of the Fijian conviction – in the 
transition to independence – of their entitlement to political pre-eminence.11 
ethnic Fijian convictions about who they are in modern Fiji, their sense of worth 
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and strength in the wider society, became inextricably tied in with their leaders’ 
power in the state, just as, for indo-Fijians, strength and social status came 
to be identified especially with individual ability and success in the capitalist 
economy, whether as farmers, businessmen, or independent professionals.
Yet it is a mistake to understand this bifurcation simply as the source of 
conflict. We need to recognize the distinctive modes of inter-ethnic ‘getting 
along’, of accommodation through dialogue, negotiation, and conciliation, 
which the bifurcated structure of Fiji has encouraged over many decades of 
intermittent impasses and crises. Bridging difference has long been a central 
value in public social and political life. At the level of social interaction, there 
has been a remarkable ease of sociability, facilitated by the relative absence of the 
kind of status rivalry and economic competition that have contributed to ethnic 
enmity in trinidad and Guyana. indeed, it might be argued that inter-ethnic 
sociability in Fiji has in a way been facilitated and encouraged by the reality of 
deeper cultural and social differences. the value of ‘the races coming together’ is 
affirmed in a variety of social contexts, from social and sports clubs to community 
service groups, local government councils, and town festivals. regularly bridging 
difference, getting happily together despite persisting divides in much of routine 
social life, became a shared value that began to emerge in the last two decades 
of the colonial era.12 
At the national political level, as at the local social level, there has evolved a 
culture of interaction. there are the long-standing major issues about which 
there has repeatedly been dialogue and conciliation, not just acrimonious 
dispute. indeed, the great issues of land and the constitution have enabled 
and encouraged the objectification of ethnic conflict as a shared problem for 
dialogue and conciliation. the domain of national political relations has been 
regulated over a long period of time, especially by consultative institutions 
such as the Great council of chiefs and by negotiable issues. After successful 
deliberation on highly contentious matters, with phases of tension and mutual 
recrimination, there comes a sense of shared achievement and a celebration of 
what binds the opponents after all. the energizing context for such moments is 
partly the very depth of the divide itself, and its distinctive character of different 
and conflicting domains of interest about which there can be negotiation and 
accommodation. 
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political conflict associated with the ethnic divide in Fiji has tended to have this 
characteristic of negotiability, and in this respect sometimes bears comparison with 
enduring conflicts in industrial relations. the most notable instances include: the 
agreements on reform of the terms of land leasing that led to the passage of the 
Agricultural landlord and tenant ordinance in 1966, at the height of political 
party conflict, and of the Agricultural landlord and tenant Act in 1976 (also 
amidst political tension); the quite remarkable negotiation of agreements for 
constitutional reform in 1969–70 and in 1996–97 after phases of severe ethnic 
tension; and, most recently, the agreement on the multiparty cabinet after several 
years of argument and court cases following the traumas of 2000. 
Biman prasad’s chapter is especially interesting for its focus on the significance 
of issues on which political parties seem to be converging, and on each party’s 
rhetorical efforts to attract support from across the ethnic divide.13 However, 
prasad is perhaps mistaken in drawing a stark contrast between ‘race-based’ 
and ‘issue- and ideology-based’ political competition. the ethnic or race divide 
has itself long been partly determined by issues; ethnic support for political 
parties, as Fraenkel notes, has not been simply a matter of ethnic sentiments 
and prejudices.14 A study of issues in Fiji politics must include the examination 
of issues on which the major parties are strongly opposed but which are open 
to compromising dialogue. these issues, like those of increasing agreement that 
prasad focuses on, have tended to be ‘masked’ by ethnic polarization. 
the question of the special interests of the indigenous Fijians has itself long 
been an issue open to dialogue and agreement, with a lineage going back to the 
famous debate in the colonial parliament in 1946 on ‘safeguarding the Fijian 
race’ (often referred to as the ‘Deed of cession’ debate). this debate, after an 
acrimonious start, concluded in a relaxed mood of accord, with all agreeing on 
the principle of at least a protective paramountcy of Fijian interests.15 in the late 
1960s, the nFp campaigned as the party committed to defending not just the 
rights of indo-Fijians but also the interests of the Taukei (Fijians) against alleged 
oppression and exploitation by an alliance of european capitalists, Fijian chiefs, 
and colonial officials. the nFp was indeed the first political party to declare 
that it wanted to make the needs and concerns of the Taukei a national issue, 
and it was the nFp leaders who, in the dialogue that led to independence, 
proposed giving the Great council of chiefs veto power in the Senate. 
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the importance of negotiable issues is a favourable condition for the new 
multiparty cabinet. provincial and vanua pressures influencing Qarase in the 
allocation of resources and appointments are likely to compromise his will 
to indulge requests and proposals from his Flp cabinet colleagues, and may 
threaten to undermine the collaboration – the fate of ratu mara’s attempt to 
increase indo-Fijian participation in his Alliance party government during the 
1970s and 1980s. But if Qarase wishes to strengthen the new collaboration, 
perhaps with a view to encouraging political re-alignments and building indo-
Fijian electoral support, he must make these concessions and allow the Flp 
cabinet ministers to share in decision-making about the delivery of patronage 
in the constituencies, as well as in the making of policy. 
of course, Fijian disaffection with Qarase’s government might itself favour 
new inter-ethnic alliances. Durutalo suggests that, while the SDl has succeeded 
for the present in unifying Fijians by way of an ideological ‘orthodoxy’ centring 
on the theme of the unity of vanua (Fijian community and its land), lotu 
(church) and matanitu (the state), in the longer term imbalances in SDl policies 
‘may be seen as offering solutions to some groups of indigenous Fijians only’.16 
While such imbalance might provoke destabilizing rivalries among Fijian 
political leaders, it might also offer opportunities for an indo-Fijian-based 
political party to cultivate new Fijian allies, a strategy that the demographic 
trend toward an increasing Fijian majority will surely encourage.
the 2006 election is the first in which the army actively sought to influence 
voters, conducting an ‘educational’ campaign to explain the officers’ opposition 
to the SDl government’s proposed promotion of reconciliation, tolerance 
and unity Bill. in considering the question of the army’s involvement in Fiji’s 
political life, there is an interesting comparison to be made with the Great 
council of chiefs. in the course of crisis and constitutional change over the last 
two decades, both institutions have become powerful actors in the political arena. 
Both are viewed by most indigenous Fijians as bastions of protection for their 
ethnic interests, and both have played a part in the assertion of Fijian demands 
for political paramountcy. Yet both have also supported political stability and a 
multi-ethnic constitution by helping to constrain Fijian ethno-nationalism. 
the contrasting figures of Sitiveni rabuka and Voreqe Bainimarama as 
commanders dramatically illustrate these different possible directions of military 
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action in the political arena: rabuka, once the charismatic champion of indigenous 
hegemony who threw out Fiji’s independence constitution, and Bainimarama, 
resolutely maintaining his stance of professional responsibility not to side with 
Fijian ethno-nationalists but to defend the 1997 constitution against them. 
past Fijian political leaders, including ratu Sukuna, ratu mara, ratu penaia 
Ganilau, ratu edward cakobau, and rabuka himself, were crucially important 
in their capacities to persuade members of the Great council of chiefs, typically 
very conservative and ethnocentric, to agree to various reforms in the national 
interest in respect to land and the constitution. But the uncertainty of such 
influence and guidance was dramatized by the divisions that emerged in this 
forum during the coup crisis of may 2000. like the council of chiefs, the 
military has become an institution with political power, whose contribution 
to the political process, whether in support of an excluding ethno-nationalism 
(or perhaps provincialism) or of building an equitable multi-ethnic society, 
is likely to continue to be contingent on the will and persuasive authority of 
particular leaders.
Postscript 
the armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organisations: a 
marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalised and symbolic status, and a 
monopoly of arms. they form a prestigious corporation or order, enjoying overwhelming 
superiority in the means of applying force. the wonder, therefore, is not why this rebels 
against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.17
rabuka’s coups in 1987, efficiently executed by a powerful army in support 
of Fijian ethno-nationalist demands, created the spectre of recurring military 
interventions. i wrote at the time that ‘it seems most improbable that the army 
might cease to be a crucial factor in Fiji’s political life in the foreseeable future’.18 
the ethno-nationalism that provoked rabuka’s two coups has remained a 
chronic source of crisis or impasse in Fiji’s democratic political system, and was 
the major factor driving Speight’s coup in 2000 and Bainimarama’s interventions 
in 2000 and 2006. 
Yet what is most interesting about the four military interventions in Fiji is 
the shift from actions strongly embedded in ethnic sentiments and objectives, 
to actions claimed by the army leaders to fulfil their responsibility to ensure the 
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good governance of the nation by combating that same ethno-nationalism. the 
military has become a political force in its own right, attempting to manage 
the intractable problems of ethnic conflict that have long marred democratic 
government in Fiji. 
Bainimarama’s imposition of martial law soon after the ‘Speight coup’ in may 
2000, was widely welcomed in Fiji as rescuing the country from a prospect of 
growing violence. A striking feature of the popular responses to Bainimarama’s 
coup in December 2006 has been the frequent supportive remarks by indo-
Fijians – the declaration that ‘we indians are happy about this coup’ is commonly 
heard. the commander had become well known for his stand against Fijian 
ethno-nationalists and support of non-discriminatory government. moreover, 
an immediately felt consequence of this coup, with its ongoing deployment 
of armed soldiers at street checkpoints, was a reduction in violent robberies of 
indo-Fijian and chinese businesses and homes by young Fijian men. in one 
well-publicized incident, a group of indo-Fijian town councillors presented 
soldiers with packed meals to thank them for their presence.
this latest coup is nonetheless an expression of ethnic Fijian power and 
identity, and, for the soldiers, a legitimate form of communal Fijian action. 
Yet, paradoxically, it is an expression of Fijian strength that conceivably might 
have potential to help resolve the longstanding dilemma of how to reconcile 
the Fijian conviction of entitlement to state power with the multi-ethnic reality 
of the society and economy. this dilemma is a legacy of the bifurcation of Fiji 
created by colonial rule, and discussed earlier in this chapter. 
During the three decades before independence, colonial officials had 
encouraged the strengthening of the Fijian position in two arms of the state: 
the Fijian Administration and the royal Fiji military Forces, which were 
linked by several chiefs who had served with authority in both. in the 1960s, 
this strengthened Fijian position in the colonial state led the British officials, 
who were preparing Fiji for self-government, to abandon an initial plan to 
introduce a common franchise to replace ethnic voting and representation. 
the Fijian political leaders’ vehement opposition to the proposal raised fears 
of the possibility of violent upheaval, especially in the event of disaffection in 
the predominantly Fijian army.  
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the Fijian Administration, in close relationship with the Great council of 
chiefs, supported a political élite of high-ranking chiefs who were able to preserve 
their dominance of Fijian leadership after the advent of party politics and the 
Fijian franchise in the 1960s, in the context of ethnic tension. their lieutenants in 
the Fijian Association campaigned in the villages to persuade popular acceptance 
of the multi-ethnic Alliance party as the means by which Fijians could secure 
political power (the Fijian Association was the dominant body in the Alliance). 
However, it was in the electoral arena that the ability of these leaders to 
accommodate the interests of non-Fijian groups, especially the indo-Fijians, 
was eventually weakened by the emergence of the Fijian nationalist party. this 
extremist pressure, together with rapid economic and social changes that were 
transforming Fijian needs and expectations, began to erode the strength of the 
paramount chiefs in political leadership several years after independence.
By contrast, the Fijian-dominated army steadily strengthened during the 
early post-colonial decades, in size and weaponry, and in the sophistication and 
experience of its personnel. major ingredients for this strengthening have been 
service with un peace-keeping forces in the middle east and elsewhere, and 
the interventions in Fiji’s political arena. the military has sometimes been led 
by high-ranking chiefs, and it has strong affinities with traditional Fijian society 
and the colonial Fijian Administration in respect to its hierarchical structure 
and communal values. But the army has also long been a domain in which 
commoner Fijians have been able to achieve status and career advancement, 
or at least economic security, and thus many indigenous Fijian families have 
army ties. in the popular view, soldiering is a mark of Fijian achievement and 
strength. like the administrative bureaucracies concerned with Fijian affairs, the 
army developed as a Fijian institutional domain counter-balancing indo-Fijian 
strength in the world of business and professions. Although the army is open 
to recruits from any ethnic background, it continues to be an overwhelmingly 
indigenous Fijian body.
As mentioned, attempts by Fijians, chiefly and non-chiefly, to become 
national political leaders attending to the interests of indo-Fijians and others, 
have repeatedly been frustrated by the challenges from Fijian extremists. By 
contrast, Fijian extremism has helped to strengthen the army as a political force 
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by providing a springboard for the seizure of political power – initially in support 
of ethno-nationalist demands, but recently in opposition to them.
rabuka deposed a government which most Fijians rejected as illegitimate, but 
that most indo-Fijians supported. twenty years later, Bainimarama threw out 
a government most Fijians supported, and that most indo-Fijians opposed as 
discriminatory and corrupt, an embodiment of Fijian power oppressive to them. 
this contrast between the coups of 1987 and 2006 is a measure of the growth of the 
military as an independent political force, with corporate beliefs in its possession of 
special responsibilities and rights which surpass the authority of elected governments 
that are broken or compromised by Fijian ethno-nationalist groups.
the army now conceives itself to be the most important part of the state, as 
much in the protection of domestic order and governance as in matters of external 
defence. this claim is backed by invoking a now much-debated clause in Fiji’s 
current constitution which, the army insists, implicitly preserves the following 
provision in the previous constitution established by rabuka in 1990: ‘it shall 
be the overall responsibility of the republic of Fiji military Forces to ensure at 
all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its peoples’.19 
the army’s conviction about its political prerogative is vividly conveyed in a 
‘message’ from the commander to his men published in the rFmF newsletter 
just before the 2006 election:
i can assure you, my loyal soldiers, that whatever government comes into power will 
not be a threat to our existence because the military in Fiji is strongly intertwined and 
embedded on the firm belief that without the rFmF there is no spine to our democracy 
or sovereignty. politicians have a somewhat distorted perception of why we exist. We are 
the final guarantor of security in this country. For without a dedicated, loyal and strong 
military there can be no security or stability. And national sustenance and the successful 
generation of economic wealth can only be achieved if you have a military dedicated to 
its call of duty and one that champions truth and justice.20
the crises of 2000 were the crucible for this transformation of the army’s 
corporate mission. in particular, these events largely explain the great weight 
of the personal motivations and iron resolve of the commander in the long 
lead-up to the 2006 coup. 
Bainimarama, scarcely 15 months into his post after appointment from the 
navy over the heads of several eligible military officers, returned to Suva from 
an overseas trip in may 2000 to experience threats on his life and to find his 
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forces in danger of a catastrophic split. After holding his men together and 
taking control of the country under martial law, he faced renewed threats 
to his life and his army from an attempted mutiny. these traumatic events 
compelled an obsessive personal mission to strengthen the rFmF as a force to 
combat the threat of Fijian ethno-nationalism which Bainimarama viewed as 
continuing to dominate and corrupt the government he had put in place and 
that was returned to power in the elections of 2001 and 2006. Bainimarama 
initiated a program of indoctrinating his officers and troops on their duty to 
become guardians of good governance for the nation. officers who were not 
sympathetic to his vision resigned or were expelled.
the project of preparing the military for an on-going political role has 
precedent in a plan drafted by rabuka and his officers in 1989 to institute a 
lengthy period of army rule, in support of objectives of advancing indigenous 
Fijians in the economy. Severe measures were then proposed, including 
suppression of trade unions and ‘neutralization’ of political leaders deposed 
by rabuka’s first coup.21 the plan was abandoned after its rejection by the 
president ratu penaia Ganilau and the prime minister ratu mara. Bainimarama 
is pursuing a very different agenda, initially against the resistance of the Great 
council of chiefs, and after pushing aside the vice-president, ratu joni 
madraiwiwi, one of Fiji’s highest-ranking chiefs and a former High court judge 
and unbending defender of constitutional government. 
this latest coup d’état presents the paradox of the army as the strongest 
embodiment of indigenous Fijian power supporting a project ostensibly aimed 
at transforming governance to serve the needs of the multi-ethnic nation, 
especially by eliminating discriminatory policies and practices. How to counter 
the tendency for ethnic interests and conflicts to dominate political life has been 
Fiji’s major problem since the advent of party politics 40 years ago. perhaps 
an entrenchment of ethnic Fijian power through an enduring overseer role for 
the military in the domains of political competition and government could 
have the potential to encourage more flexibility for inter-ethnic cooperation, 
given that the issue of securing Fijian pre-eminence in the state would then 
have been removed from the arena of political struggle.
However, the major political reality in Fiji now is the fact of military-backed 
rule, whatever its proclaimed agenda. military power, directly or indirectly 
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exercised, contains its own imperatives and tendencies that inevitably encourage 
resort to the organization’s special capacity to dominate the populace by use or 
threat of physical force. At the time of writing, the army is more preoccupied 
with displaying this coercive power than with making credible attempts to 
pursue its proclaimed mission to ‘clean-up’ alleged corruption and malpractice 
of the deposed government. rhetoric about this national-reform purpose of the 
coup is being used to justify intimidation of people who strongly voice their 
opposition to the takeover. they are denigrated as threats to the army’s work 
for the well-being of the nation. Some have been assaulted or bullied after being 
taken from their homes or work places to the barracks. 
Will an army leadership that attempts a guardian role for the nation and 
encourages inter-ethnic cooperation in government remain committed to this 
mission over the long term? Several trends might work against the project. 
military officers might develop vested interests in strengthening their control 
in various domains of government. there is the possibility, perhaps related 
to such a trend, that politically destabilizing rivalries will emerge within the 
army leadership, along old vanua or provincial lines. there remains, too, the 
possibility of a return to an ethnocentric exercise of power under changed 
leadership and in response to popular indigenous Fijian discontents. 
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addendum
The Fiji coup of December 2006: 
who, what, where and why?
Jon Fraenkel
the Fiji military’s ‘clean-up’ coup reached a climax on 5 December 2006. 
Although president ratu josefa iloilo rubber-stamped the takeover that 
morning1, he was swayed by Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi to disassociate 
himself from it in the afternoon. the official statement from Government House 
said that the republic of Fiji military Forces (rFmF) had acted ‘contrary to the 
wishes of their commander in chief ’, but conveyed the president’s intention 
to remain in office only to preserve some semblance of continuity.2 that was 
not to be. Because the prime minister had declined to resign and the president 
equivocated, the illegality of the takeover had become inevitable. At 6 pm on 
tuesday 5 December, military commander Frank Bainimarama declared that: 
‘…the president has been prevented by some, including the Vice president, 
from exercising his constitutional prerogative to dismiss the prime minister 
in exceptional circumstances. As commander of the rFmF, i, under the legal 
doctrine of necessity will step into the shoes of the president given that he has 
been blocked from exercising his constitutional powers’.3 
this was a coup that, unlike that in 2000, was reasonably quickly and 
straightforwardly logistically consolidated, but nevertheless remained highly 
politically precarious. there was none of the mayhem of 2000, no trashing of 
Suva’s business district, no curfews, no more than the usual power and water 
cuts. in the days before the coup, in ‘exercises’ announced beforehand to the 
national media, illumination flares were fired into the night sky above Suva 
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Harbour and close to nukulau island, and soldiers fanned out across Suva. 
this was a show of strength aimed at ratcheting up the tension and convincing 
the somewhat incredulous political classes that the military meant business. 
off the reefs of Kadavu, a Black Hawk helicopter crashed in to the sea while 
attempting to land on one of three Australian warships that were standing by 
if needed to evacuate nationals. Fijians said it had been taken down by the 
shark god, Dakuwaqa. newly arrived Australian security personnel attached 
to the High commission were, Fiji’s military command declared, to be treated 
as ‘mercenaries’4, and the army top brass condemned the anticipated use of the 
Biketawa Declaration as a justification for invading Fiji.5 in the event, both 
Australian warships and security forces departed, and, from canberra, prime 
minister john Howard declined to commit troops, publicly – if ill-advisedly 
– reporting that he had been asked to do so three times by Qarase, but did not 
want to risk Australian lives.6
When the coup itself started, it was not a surgical strike, but rather a slow, 
methodical, and seemingly irresistible takeover of state power. on 4 December, 
weapons were seized from the police armouries at nasinu and nasova in Suva 
and from smaller weapons’ stores in nadi, lautoka and labasa to prevent any 
potential threat to the rFmF’s monopoly on the use of armed force. the next 
morning, prime minister laisenia Qarase was summoned to Government 
House, to be confronted, he anticipated, with the options of capitulation or 
humiliating resignation.7 His vehicle was stopped at the gates, where soldiers 
insisted that he walk the remaining distance. Qarase refused, and returned 
to his richards road residence, declaring that ‘under no circumstances will i 
resign or advise ratu josefa [iloilo] to dissolve parliament’.8 in the glare of the 
international media, soldiers tried to raid Qarase’s home, eventually succeeding 
in whisking away the prime minister’s two official vehicles, thereby stripping 
him of the remaining trappings of statehood. He left, the next day, for his 
home island of Vanuabalavu. parliament was not sitting on the day of the coup, 
depriving the 2006 takeover of those critical focal points of the 2000 and 1987 
coups. But the Senate, which was in session, was shut down, and soldiers raided 
the prime minister’s office, carting away papers and computer hard drives to be 
used as evidence in the intended clean-up campaign. confirming the impression 
of preparedness for a prime ministerial resignation rather than a seizure of power, 
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military personnel that day roamed the offices of the Government printer and 
the parliamentary library seeking copies of rabuka’s 1987 coup decrees to use 
as models for the inauguration of the new order.9   
the 2006 military takeover had been an event so regularly threatened that 
many doubted that it would ever eventuate, not least because the commander 
himself had for several years repeatedly and emphatically publicly denied that 
he was intending a coup. the police commissioner, Australian Andrew Hughes, 
had also regularly reassured the nation that there would not be a coup, based on 
private guarantees from the commander. repeated spats with the government 
had encouraged the perception that the commander’s antics were mere 
brinkmanship, designed to influence rather than control the political agenda. 
there were other good reasons why so many ruled out a military takeover. 
previous coups had had quite different dynamics, or at least so it appeared. in 
both 1987 and 2000, coups had occurred in the wake of election victories by 
predominantly indian-backed political parties. each had overthrown reformist 
governments that were associated with the left of the political spectrum and 
identified with the politics of the sugar cane belts. each time, takeovers had 
been carried out in the name of upholding ‘indigenous paramountcy’, extending 
the reach of a notion formally embedded only as a ‘protective principle’ in the 
1997 constitution. Both previous coups had the backing of the bulk of the 
ethnic Fijian establishment, as indicated by the endorsement of the Bose levu 
Vakaturaga (Great council of chiefs (Gcc)) and the methodist church. 
Both had brought into office governments committed to ‘affirmative action’ 
aimed at uplifting the position of the indigenous community. Both post-coup 
governments had ultimately pulled back from the abyss of ethno-nationalism 
and veered towards a more moderate and internationally acceptable style of 
politics. 
the December events turned Fiji politics upside down. Key coup victims 
of 1987 and 2000 emerged as defenders, enthusiasts and beneficiaries of the 
military takeover, while, overnight, the coup backers of 2000 became democrats 
and supporters of the rule of law. the Director of the Fiji Human rights 
commission, an assortment of catholic social justice advocates, much of the 
business community and probably the majority of left-leaning civil society 
activists supported the coup.10 Vociferous opponents of previous illegal regimes, 
423addendum
such as the widely respected justice Anthony Gates, took positions in the new 
order, as did several well-travelled participants on the pacific’s ‘good governance’ 
workshop circuit. Deposed 1999–2000 prime minister mahendra chaudhry 
became interim Finance minister, as well as acquiring a host of other important 
portfolios, including sugar industry restructuring. the reaction from the bulk 
of the Fiji indian community to the 2006 coup was astonishing; the group 
that had such a strong sense of its own victimhood, due to the 1987 and 2000 
coups and the much earlier experience of girmitya (indentured labour), was 
strongly in favour of the clean-up coup.11 
that remarkable reorientation in Fiji politics had been brewing, behind the 
scenes, for a considerable time. in january 2006, Flp president jokapeci Koroi 
astounded Fiji tV viewers by pronouncing support for a military takeover, 
seeing in this the potential for a fulfilment of the agenda of the deposed 
1999–2000 people’s coalition government. rFmF antagonism to the Qarase 
government – a government that it had originally, in july 2000, put into office 
– became apparent in the wake of justice Gates’ november 2000 decision to 
restore the 1997 constitution. After the government appealed, the higher courts 
upheld that decision (in the chandrika prasad case), but left space for the 
then ‘interim’ administration to transform itself into a caretaker government, 
pending fresh elections in August 2001. in response to those judgments, the 
rFmF had wanted a restoration of the former parliament, and the formation 
of a ‘government of national unity’.12 instead, Qarase’s newly formed Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni lewenivanua (SDl) used the advantages of incumbency and, in 
particular, a generous agricultural assistance scheme, to procure indigenous 
electoral support in rural Fiji. its detractors alleged that this was what won the 
2001 election. in the wake of its victory, the SDl formed a coalition with the 
2000 coup-supporting conservative Alliance–matanitu Vanua party, much 
to the dismay of the rFmF. the new government exerted pressure on the 
president’s office to drop charges against the november 2000 mutineers and 
to ease sentences for prominent coup leaders or allied chiefs (or release them 
under ‘compulsory supervision orders’) and, in mid-2005, threatened to enact 
a controversial promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity (rtu) Bill 
that might have provided an amnesty to those still incarcerated as a result of 
their involvement in the coup of may and the associated mutiny of november 
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2000. the rFmF vigorously opposed other pieces of intended SDl legislation 
as well, such as the Qoliqoli Bill and the indigenous claims tribunal Bill, and 
strongly resisted proposals in a 2005 government-commissioned review to 
downsize the rFmF. 
Alarm bells first started ringing when, in December 2003, rFmF commander 
Frank Bainimarama told soldiers dining at the officers’ mess at the Queen 
elizabeth Barracks (QeB) that he intended to take over the running of the 
government if his contract was not renewed. in the three following years, the 
outspoken commander was to engage in a series of high profile spats with the 
Qarase administration, each commencing with rFmF criticisms of government 
policy or personnel and vague threats of one type or another, and ending with 
various half-hearted reconciliatory statements, coupled with assurances that 
there would not be a coup d’état. each spat served, internally, as a loyalty testing 
instrument for the purging and restructuring of the rFmF. As a result, over 
the five years after the 2000 coup, virtually the entire senior, often Sandhurst-
educated, command had been dismissed, sent on leave or resigned. And still 
that cathartic transition continued. in january 2006, freshly appointed land 
forces commander lt. col. jone Baledrokadroka, a close fellow-marist-educated 
friend and ally of Bainimarama, warned that he had received orders which he 
deemed potentially treasonous, sparking a potentially violent showdown with 
the rFmF commander. Baledrokadroka was sent on leave pending a court 
martial. 
there were robust attempts at peace-making. Vice president ratu joni 
madraiwiwi, who as roko tui Bau was high chief to the tailevu-born 
commander, sought to mediate between Bainimarama and Qarase, and 
wholeheartedly backed the multiparty cabinet formed after the 2006 election. 
When the commander publicly attacked the government yet again in September, 
the Vice president endorsed the government’s long-running efforts to seek a 
Supreme court ruling as regards the military’s constitutional position.13 While 
the commander was out of the country in october, the president sought to 
remove him from office, and appoint instead lt. col. meli Saubulinayau. 
But the takeover was badly mishandled, and other senior officers again rallied 
behind the commander and threatened a coup should the president issue 
such directions. the order was consequently withdrawn. Soon, Saubulinayau 
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too was removed from his position and placed under investigation. After 
each destabilizing crisis, the commander purged disloyal officers, or moved 
them to positions without responsibility at Strategic Headquarters at Berkley 
crescent. By December 2006, the senior rFmF ranks were exclusively staffed 
by rapidly promoted and extremely junior officers who owed their position to 
the commander.        
Before departing to inspect Fiji’s middle east troops in october, Bainimarama 
announced a three week deadline for the Qarase government to comply with 
rFmF demands or resign. While he was away, heavily armed soldiers raided the 
Suva wharf to secure the release of a consignment of imported rFmF weaponry 
and ammunition being held by the customs authorities on instructions from 
police chief Andrew Hughes, who had insisted on clear military assurances that 
they would not be used for a coup. Hughes had also commenced investigations 
aimed at laying charges against the commander for ‘sedition’, entailing a hugely 
controversial raid on the president’s office seeking incriminating evidence. 
many alleged that the sedition charges were the trigger for the December 2006 
coup. According to this view, further appeasement was the preferable course, 
and without that personal threat to the commander there would have been no 
coup. in fact, the point of no return had been reached earlier, at the time of the 
botched attempt to replace Bainimarama by Saubulinayau. After that, insiders 
knew that the so-called ‘impasse’ or ‘stand-off ’ that had so destabilized Fiji 
politics was likely to be resolved by a military coup, and not by the government 
successfully asserting its authority.14 By november, it was widely known in 
local diplomatic circles that there was going to be a military takeover, and that 
nothing short of utter capitulation, resignation by Qarase or installation of a 
puppet government could avert it. 
commodore Bainimarama returned from his trip to the middle east on 4 
november, only to depart again for new Zealand to attend his granddaughter’s 
first Holy communion. While he was there, the new Zealand government 
facilitated crisis talks between the commander and Qarase, who flew down for 
the purpose. At these, Fiji’s prime minister conceded to all the main rFmF 
demands, agreeing to suspend action on controversial legislation, to take into 
account rFmF views when considering whether or not to renew Hughes’ 
contract, and even to accept advice from the Director of public prosecutions 
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or Solicitor General, were it offered, to publicly drop charges against 
Bainimarama.15 Yet, as soon as Bainimarama returned to Fiji, he declared that 
Qarase was ‘lying’ about the Wellington deal, that the bills should be withdrawn 
not stalled, and that nothing could stop the intended clean-up campaign.16 
the deadline had fallen due, but now the commander said there would be no 
action until the school holidays and then, in a farcical climax to the pre-coup 
phoney war, put off the ousting of Qarase to attend the scheduled ratu Sukuna 
Bowl rugby contest between the army and the police. 
this time, the coup that had hovered finally happened: Bainimarama, having 
himself rendered the government incapable of acting, claimed its incapacity 
as justification for the takeover. the illegality of his action was nevertheless 
clear. the 1997 constitution does not permit the president to dismiss a prime 
minister unless he has lost the confidence of the majority in parliament, and a 
dissolution is only possible on the advice of a legally appointed prime minister.17 
With president ratu josefa iloilo in place, it was probable that rFmF lawyers 
would suggest that certain ‘reserve powers’ existed (on the Kerr/Whitlam 
model18) and that ratu josefa was acting under the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to 
speedily restore constitutional rule in Fiji. Without the president in place, the 
‘doctrine of necessity’ was irrelevant; it was an unsuitable line of defence for a 
usurper, as the commander clearly was, and ‘necessity’ could scarcely be invoked 
to tackle an rFmF-provoked crisis.19 the more plausible line of legal defence 
was to suggest that a ‘glorious revolution’ had occurred (using Kelsen’s theory 
of revolutionary legality) and established a new constitutional order. But, for 
that, the commander needed to abrogate Fiji’s 1997 constitution, which he 
steadfastly refused to do through December–February, presumably because of 
the rift this might create with ratu josefa iloilo and other conditional pro-
constitution allies. even with a formal abrogation of the constitution, the 2001 
chandrika prasad case had left many in Fiji very familiar with the required tests 
of ‘the doctrine of effectiveness’, namely ‘acquiescence’. that perhaps helps to 
explain the recurrent post-coup cycles of beatings and intimidation at the QeB 
in nabua directed against outspoken critics, lawyers, women’s rights activists, 
and SDl party officials, if not the considerable number of ordinary civilians 
picked up from the check-points, the police stations or from their homes for 
various allegedly criminal activities. 
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in the weeks before the coup, international opinion and local diplomats 
had rallied behind the Qarase government. At a meeting of the pacific islands 
Forum, held in nadi in october, Qarase was fêted by Helen clarke and john 
Howard, and served as their ally in controversies with other members of the 
melanesian Spearhead Group.20 Australia, new Zealand, the uSA, the european 
union, Britain and the united nations made clear their disapproval of the 
commander’s intended coup, and threatened sanctions. on 28 november, the 
American Ambassador, and the Australian and British High commissioners, 
had visited the QeB during Bainimarama’s absence, urging a stand down of 
forces and change in the command structure. on the eve of his retirement, 
the un’s Kofi Annan threatened to withdraw Fiji peacekeepers serving with 
the un, something potentially far more damaging to the rFmF than the 
Australian and new Zealand severing of bilateral military ties. Australian 
minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer urged people in Fiji to rise up 
against the new military order, prompting those sympathetic to Bainimarama 
to talk of double-standards given the more muted responses to the 1987 and 
2000 coups.21 in fact, once the initial outrage had abated, there was no great 
difference in the overseas reaction as compared with previous Fiji coups. the 
hard-pressed un was never likely to deprive itself of an urgently needed supply 
of peacekeepers for iraq. Although there were targeted travel bans, Australia 
and new Zealand ultimately did not impose trade sanctions, concerned as they 
were of the consequences for antipodean expatriates and businesses in Fiji.     
in his new role as self-proclaimed ‘president’, commodore Bainimarama 
temporarily appointed the army physician, Dr jona Senilagakali, as prime minister, 
and announced the commencement of his clean-up campaign. on the day after 
the coup, a nervous-looking Bainimarama declared a state of emergency and 
promised stern repression against any who dared to incite popular resistance. 
Yet, on the following days, the commander dropped his severe green military 
fatigues for florid bula shirts at his daily press conferences, and announced a series 
of populist measures designed to bolster support for the takeover. the deposed 
government’s previously announced imposition of an increase in VAt was to 
be reversed. the board of the Fiji national provident Fund (FnpF) was to be 
purged, with the suggestion that its excessive take-up of government debt would 
be halted and the associated monopolies in the Fiji telecommunications market 
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abolished. costly prison facilities on the offshore island of nukulau were to 
be dismantled, enabling the island to become, once again, a popular weekend 
picnic resort. 2000 coup leader, George Speight, was transported from there to 
the naboro maximum Security prison, and other still-imprisoned 2000 ‘coup 
convicts’ were spread out amongst prison facilities elsewhere on Viti levu. 
ministers were given a month to vacate their government quarters. Vice 
president ratu joni madraiwiwi was given only hours to leave his official 
residence, in a petulant response to his refusal to support the military 
takeover. A new broom swept through the commanding heights of the state 
apparatus. military officers took over key positions in the civil security 
institutions; colonel ioane naivalurua became commissioner of prisons, 
naval commander Viliame naupoto took over as Director of immigration, 
and col. jim Koroi became commissioner of police. A succession of 
government ceos, including the key advisor in the prime minister’s office, 
jioji Kotobalavu, and the chairman of the public Service commission, 
Stuart Huggett, were sacked, as were the Solicitor General, the Supervisor of 
elections and the parliamentary Secretary. the boards and chief executives of 
state-owned enterprises – including Fiji pine, Fiji post, the FnpF, Airports 
Fiji, Air terminal Services, the civil Aviation Authority of Fiji, ports 
corporation and ports terminal ltd, the Fiji electricity Authority and the 
Sugar cane Growers’ council – were all purged. those targeted were usually 
officials identified with the Qarase government or known opponents of the 
new regime, but dismissals were invariably accompanied by allegations of 
corruption, mismanagement and abuse of office. on radio Fiji one, military 
spokesmen initiated daily attacks in the Fijian language on such opponents, 
making accusations of grave misdemeanours that were not repeated on the 
station’s english language programs.22
the coup had been justified by claims of military knowledge of deep-seated 
corruption under the Qarase government. if such there was, the military was 
well placed to know. in addition to 3,500 or so paid rFmF personnel, some 
20–25,000 Fijians had passed through the military since independence, many 
serving on overseas peace-keeping missions. perhaps 5,000 were no longer alive, 
but the remainder were all, at least in theory, military reservists. As a result, 
the rFmF had former officers positioned throughout Fiji’s key institutions; in 
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the police force, at the airport and customs authorities, in the lands transport 
Authority, on the native lands trust Board, and through all the ministries 
and state-owned enterprises. Such prying eyes, where sympathetic, should 
have been able to discern multiple incidents of small- and large-scale fraud. 
Yet, in the wake of the coup, the military set about primarily seeking evidence, 
rather than exposing already known scandals. often, what proof there was, 
was far from robust. the rFmF dismissed Fijian Affairs Board ceo Adi litia 
Qionibaravi, claiming that she had ‘used money from the Fijian Affairs Board 
to buy herself a vehicle’ and to ‘renovate a private house at ma’afu Street’, based 
on information from the two indian carpenters contracted to do the work.23 
like ousted Airports Fiji ltd chief executive Sakiusa tuisolia, she responded 
by taking out paid advertisements in the Fiji newspapers denying the rFmF 
allegations. the military was publicly soliciting informers to assist the proposed 
‘national audit’, and large volumes of papers and computer hard drives were 
being stored away as evidence for the ‘forensic accountants’ that Bainimarama 
wanted to bring to Fiji. Australia and the uK refused his requests for such 
assistance, not wanting to have anything to do with efforts to discredit the 
ousted Qarase government.
in one sense, corruption under the deposed government was well known; 
especially in the government tendering process, in the immigration department, 
in the native land trust Board, in the affirmative action programs and at the 
interface between foreign investors and government. reports from the Auditor-
General’s office, down the years, had highlighted hundreds of irregularities, not 
only under Qarase’s administration but also under those of his predecessors.24 
the public Accounts committee, when it had functioned, had also documented 
incidents of gross mismanagement of public funds, although it had a poor record 
of initiating prosecutions. the courts had heard evidence of significant abuses of 
public office under the ministry of Agriculture’s Agricultural Assistance Scheme, 
and had convicted former permanent secretary peniasi Kunatuba for his role in 
what became widely known as the ‘agricultural scam’. But the rFmF too had 
been subjected to scrutiny, in particular for busting spending limits and failing 
to obey repeated court judgements requiring an audit of its regimental funds.25 
the democratic process had been far from perfect in encouraging enquiries, 
or securing convictions against public officials for corruption. the Qarase 
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government had failed to pass pressing anti-corruption legislation, but it was 
far from clear that a coup could rectify those weaknesses, and prove midwife to 
the emergence of a cleaner social order. unleashing an accusatory culture, and 
putting judgement into the hands of those who were not experts, also elevated 
the position of those with axes to grind on the mill of the clean-up campaign. 
Detailed scrutiny was always likely to pick up some evidence of government 
corruption, as it always had done in the past, but would this be sufficient to 
justify, retrospectively, the December coup? 
evidently aware of the small pickings in the early days of the anti-corruption 
crusade, the commander promised extraordinary revelations on january 1, so as 
to see in the new Year ‘on a truth and transparency note’. Spokesman neumi 
leweni applauded a junior officer’s initiative in mounting ‘operation Free 
Fiji’ to expose major fraud among senior SDl officials and provide evidence of 
ballot-rigging at the 2006 election and of kickbacks for ministerial favours.26 
the rFmF, it turned out, had recruited notorious Australian conman peter 
Foster to solicit the information. Foster had, before the coup, been hunted down 
and unceremoniously arrested by the Fiji police for using a forged Queensland 
police report to obtain a work permit. more disturbingly, he had published black 
propaganda on the internet seeking to depict the champagne Beach resort in 
the Yasawas as a ‘heavenly haven for homosexuals’ in the hope that this would 
bring down the wrath of conservative landowners upon the promoters.27 the 
motive, apparently, was that he had previously secured a uS$580,000 loan 
from the Bank of the Federated States of micronesia to develop his own resort 
in the Yasawas, and thus urgently needed somehow to secure the termination 
of his rivals’ lease.28 
Foster had been released on bail by the Fiji court, but ordered to stay under 
police guard at the luxury Suva hotel, jj’s on the park. From there, he was taken 
into rFmF custody and wired to gather evidence of corruption and election-
rigging from senior SDl officials – evidence which the rFmF spokesman 
initially described as ‘irrefutable proof ’ of ballot-rigging.29 the resulting heavily 
spliced tapes were aired on Fiji tV on 2 january; navitalai naisoro, a key SDl 
strategist was shown purportedly admitting involvement in ballot-rigging in 
may 2006, but his claims lacked plausibility and, before long, the rFmF had 
abandoned its plans to release any more of the footage obtained by Foster.30 in 
431addendum
early january, having already breached bail apparently with rFmF collusion, 
Foster evaded his military minders and escaped Fiji aboard a vessel bound for 
Vanuatu.31 ‘Democracy is corrupt’, Foster had told the Fiji Daily Post in early 
january at the time when he extolled the virtues of the military’s coup, but now 
he claimed that it was military corruption that was halting the further public 
disclosure of his revelations.32 the junior officer previously acclaimed for his 
initiative in mounting ‘operation Free Fiji’, was subsequently, allegedly, badly 
beaten up by rFmF soldiers for his role in the Foster escape.33
According to the plan initially laid out by ‘president’ Bainimarama, the Great 
council of chiefs was to meet to ‘reappoint’ president ratu josefa iloilo, and 
in so doing demonstrate acquiescence in the military takeover.34 With a similar 
objective, the commander insisted that he would only attend the Gcc meeting 
if invited as ‘president’, rather than as ‘commander’. But the chiefs delayed and 
demurred, with chairman ratu ovini Bokini cancelling the scheduled levuka 
meeting, and taking refuge in tavua, where the traditional bodyguards of the 
tui tavua set up roadblocks, reportedly to halt an expected rFmF assault. 
reports filtered out that the ‘warriors of the 14 provinces’ were preparing an 
uprising and assassination of the commander, and soldiers were sent out into 
the provinces to pre-empt that threat, although the military denied harassing the 
Gcc chairman. When the Gcc eventually met at the FmF Dome in Suva on 
20–22 December, ratu ovini lamented that never before had the Gcc been 
so ‘ridiculed and suppressed’. the chiefs had refused rFmF entreaties to invite 
the commander as ‘president’ but instead requested his presence as military 
commander. Bainimarama consequently refused to attend. Qarase, although 
invited, was also absent, stranded on his home island of Vanuabalavu owing to 
military insistence that no plane or vessel carry him to the capital.  
At the meeting, Fiji’s three confederacies35 were at odds as to how to react 
to the ousting of the Qarase government; Burebasaga and Kubuna were united 
in refusing to endorse Bainimarama’s request, but tovata was divided. one 
member of the lau (tovata) delegation, ratu tevita uluilakeba, who was the 
son of former president, ratu mara and who had recently been promoted 
commander of the all-important third Fiji infantry regiment (3Fir), insisted 
that the council be ‘realistic’ and acknowledge that the military held executive 
authority. that language of ‘realism’ was also embraced by other members 
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of the family of ratu mara, echoing the former president’s post-1987 coup 
epithet about accepting positions in an illegal interim administration; ‘when 
my house is on fire how can i stand and watch?’. the Gcc disagreed, and 
stood instead, temporarily, on principle; it resolved to uphold the 1997 
constitution, suggesting that the president and Vice president remain in office 
and the army return to barracks. the Gcc did, however, recognise that the 
Qarase government had been ‘rendered ineffective and incapable of discharging 
its constitutional responsibilities’, recommending that ‘since there is no other 
alternative in this crisis, the Gcc has regretfully advised the prime minister 
laisenia Qarase to tender his resignation to the president’.36 under the Gcc 
plan, a privy council would have been established to advise the president, 
including representatives from the military, the SDl and the Flp, which would 
choose a prime minister and establish membership of a ‘Government of national 
unity’, paving the way for fresh elections fifteen months later. 
many expected greater Fijian resistance to the military takeover. Australian 
minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and ex-police chief Andrew 
Hughes anticipated civil unrest; so too did the rFmF itself. the rationale for 
constant beatings and harassment up at the QeB and the continuation of the 
emergency decree was, after all, that the security threat remained real. labour 
leader mahendra chaudhry insisted that there were ‘elements out there who 
would not hesitate to create disorder should there be any slackness on the part 
of the law enforcement authorities’.37 these fears were, perhaps, exaggerated. 
Fijians were scared. Back in 2000, there had been enduring resistance to the 
rFmF in some parts of the country, such as Wainibuka (in tailevu) and 
Wailevu as well as other parts of Vanua levu. But Fijians in these areas had 
been brutally repressed, and they feared a repeat of the military onslaught.38 
the 2000 protests had, in most cases, been orchestrated by prominent chiefs, 
many of whom had been beaten up and imprisoned in the aftermath. calls 
from chiefs in namosi and cakaudrove for their soldiers to stand down were 
countered by rival rFmF provincial contingents visiting villages to solicit 
communal support.39 Although 80 per cent of Fijians had backed the Qarase 
government in may, popular enthusiasm was hardly such as to spark an uprising 
in its support. And Qarase’s flight to mavana removed the short-lived focal point 
of post-coup resistance in Suva. Within Fijian society, there exists a tradition 
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of submission to forceful and violent overlords, but silence, culturally, is not 
acquiescence. in time, indigenous Fijian resistance to the interim government 
might grow. the methodist church is by no means reconciled to the new 
order, and nor are the Bau and cakaudrove chiefs. the government – short of 
money – will impose public spending cuts that are likely to stir resentment in 
the indigenous Fijian community, especially as mahendra chaudhry will be 
the minister implementing them. 
the greater immediate potential for resistance, or for some kind of 
counter-coup, came from within the army itself. repeated internal incidents 
of opposition to Bainimarama over 2000–2006 had shown this to be a real 
possibility. the poor turnout of reservists called into the army camps shortly 
before the coup also indicated some lack of enthusiasm for the coup. At the 
may 2006 election, the bulk of rank-and-file soldiers probably backed the SDl, 
as did ethnic Fijians more generally. But, as we have seen, Bainimarama had 
also cemented a dependable command structure, and subjected this to repeated 
loyalty tests. Amongst the rank-and-file, loyalism held its attractions. not least, 
the rFmF offered reasonable salaries to otherwise unemployed Fijians, as well 
as the possibility of lucrative participation in overseas peacekeeping missions. 
internally, the rFmF provided a highly structured life experience for soldiers, 
like a spiritless carbon copy of the long lost village order. the army was the 
vanua for many Fijians, and this coherence provided potential reservoirs of 
support for the senior command. Active mobilization, keeping soldiers on 
their toes, was also used to galvanize the rank-and-file; the threat of foreign 
intervention before the coup, for example, was used to rally soldiers in ‘defence 
of the nation’.
the most vociferous opposition to the coup came from civil society activists, 
but these too were divided. people were urged to wear black on thursdays, 
and citizens were implored to wear blue ribbons and attend silent prayer vigils 
to support ‘peace and democracy, the rule of law and active non-violence’.40 
A ‘democracy shrine’ established by businesswoman laisa Digitaki, consisting 
of a house in the Suva suburb of lami sporting a large banner saying ‘Yes to 
Democracy, no to guns’, was repeatedly raided by the military. outspoken may 
2006 SDl candidate, and former tV presenter, imraz iqbal had his business 
burnt to the ground. Digitaki responded to allegations that their protests were 
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against the law by insisting on the illegality of the emergency regulations, 
and pointing out that ‘their interim prime minister himself has publicly 
admitted that the military takeover is illegal’.41 on christmas eve, Digitaki, 
iqbal and Fiji Women’s rights movement coordinator Virisila Buadromo 
were amongst a group taken up to the QeB, threatened and manhandled, 
and then frog-marched up mead road with soldiers behind them shouting 
‘toso! toso!’ (move! move!). local music celebrity, Vude Queen laisa Vulakoro 
was among the many protestors taken up to the camp after she penned critical 
letters comparing the commander to idi Amin.42 one by one, the critics 
were effectively silenced, usually after a single visit to the camps. Fiji Human 
rights commission Director Shaista Shameem said many of the protestors 
were ‘not genuine pro-democracy activists’, prompting fellow commissioner, 
Shameema Ali, to denounce the Director and suggest that the organization had 
lost credibility.	43 many nGos remained silent, or, as in the case of the local 
branch of transparency international, expressed their support for the military’s 
anti-corruption objectives.44 those that resisted were isolated, largely because 
of the muted grassroots Fijian reaction. 
to convey the Gcc resolutions to the commodore, paul manueli, 1974–79 
rFmF commander and finance minister under rabuka, was sent up to the 
barracks; he was followed by a broader delegation, comprising chiefs from 
the three confederacies. on the tV news, military spokesman neumi leweni 
said, ‘why should we meet them when they don’t recognise us as the executive 
authority?’ By this point, the mara dynasty had publicly identified itself with 
the coup, as ratu tevita uluilakeba made clear at the Gcc meeting. His sister, 
former Senator Adi Koila mara, had also strongly supported the clean-up 
campaign on radio new Zealand.45 So too had a politician widely alleged to be 
mara’s illegitimate son, poseci Bune, and mara’s son-in-law, ratu epeli Ganilau, 
Bainimarama’s predecessor as military commander, was clearly positioning 
himself for a top position in the new government. Ganilau’s national Alliance 
party of Fiji (nApF) had obtained less than three per cent of the national vote 
at the may 2006 election, but his party members emerged at the forefront of 
those insisting that Fiji accept the ‘reality’ of the situation, and acquiesce in 
the new order. nApF spokesman Kini rarubi said of the Gcc plan ‘their 
resolution is nothing more than a wish list and they should take it to the Santa 
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claus’.46 the commander concurred with this disdain for the chiefs’ resolutions; 
‘i am of the view that the Gcc in their last meeting embroiled themselves too 
much into the legality of our actions’.	47 He refused to allow any further chiefs’ 
meetings unless these were instigated by the rFmF.
now cut adrift from all the traditional bastions of state power in Fiji, the 
rFmF turned inwards for its christmas festivities, with internal ceremony 
acquiring added importance now that the commander had transformed 
himself into the pivotal figure in Fiji politics. At the QeB, an increasingly busy 
hive of activity, church services became a means for cementing an inevitably 
fragile coherence. ‘We must clean ourselves’, the army’s reverend major josefa 
tikonatabua told close to 700 soldiers attending the rabuka Hall christmas 
church service at the QeB, ‘although you have been spat upon and sworn at by 
your own people because of the uniform you wear, you must remain strong’.48 
these were sentiments echoed by the commander, whose rhetoric regularly 
featured the objective of a disciplinarian transcendence of Fijian primitivism; 
‘we the Fijians are too selfish’, he told soldiers at the rabuka Hall, emphasizing 
the importance of the family, of sharing and of multi-ethnic harmony, as against 
the ‘teachings of some chiefs, church leaders and politicians who have now 
been sacked’.49 in another rabuka Hall church service several days later, the 
commander – evidently concerned by allegations about rFmF abuses at the 
checkpoints – again emphasized that ‘the clean-up starts from within us’, and 
reverend tikonatabua appealed to soldiers to pray three times a day, at 4 am, 
noon and 4 pm. the assembled throng attending the Sunday service was told 
that senior commanders intended to embark on a month-long spiritual fast 
and that the rank and file should likewise deny themselves something, such as 
tobacco, yaqona or alcohol.50
many of the commander’s statements about the Qarase government 
had, down the years, echoed the Fiji labour party’s attacks on government 
corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency. But there were also not-so-subtle 
differences. George Speight’s coup was seen by the commander as a ‘cry of the 
land’, and the contemporary pleas of nadroga landowners, as well as evidence 
of a spurt in land transactions in the two weeks immediately following the 
coup, led the commander to temporarily ban all land sales, claiming that native 
title was being converted to crown land and then sold as freehold.51 returning 
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crown lands to native owners was used to bolster popular Fijian support for 
the coup, but capital gains tax policies on land sales also threatened to ruin 
the already troubled half-completed momi Bay development in western Viti 
levu.52 the neighbouring natadola development, financed by the displaced old 
guard at the FnpF, also found itself in trouble. many fortunes were endangered 
by the new order, including that of Ballu Khan, whose pacific connex joint 
venture with the native land trust Board was placed under investigation. 
the cancellation of the affirmative action programs threatened to halt the 
post-1987 gravy train, which had catapulted a generation of educated Fijians 
into the propertied élite. 
Authoritarian rule was directed at Fijian and indian alike, and several indians 
reported severe bashings at the hands of the rFmF. But most Fiji indians 
welcomed the checkpoints, and extolled the virtues of a government that had, 
at least temporarily, substantially improved the law and order situation. Fijians 
were mostly opposed, and they felt the brunt of military repression. one 
tailevu villager, nimilote Verebasaga, was taken into custody by the rFmF in 
the wake of a village land dispute. up at the barracks, he was allegedly beaten 
to death in such a gruesome way that his clothes had to be changed before the 
body was returned to his distraught kinsfolk.53 many others were subjected 
to intimidation and harassment at the QeB barracks, including politicians, 
civil society activists and outspoken lawyers. usually, they were forced into 
humiliating ‘exercises’, such as running round the army grounds or crawling 
through muddy ditches, in what were evidently rFmF externalizations of its 
internal disciplinary procedures. 
immediately after the coup, Flp leader mahendra chaudhry remained 
unusually silent; then he suggested a speedy return to democracy but notably 
did not call for the restoration of the elected Qarase government. three weeks 
after the coup, with Fiji well embalmed in the softening rhetoric of ‘accepting 
realities’, ‘coming to terms with what has happened’ and the need to ‘move 
the nation forward’, the labour leader ventured an explicit endorsement of 
the Bainimarama takeover. ‘last year’s coup was warranted’, said chaudhry 
in his new Year message; ‘one cannot forget that the current constitutional 
crisis had its roots in a growing discontent and frustration with six years of 
bad governance, characterised by pervasive corruption, ethno-nationalism 
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and defiance of the rule of law’.54 the may 2006 election, like that of August 
2001, had been rigged, said the Flp leader, dismissing the ‘rhetoric about the 
takeover of a democratically-elected Government’.55 
in these statements, chaudhry was clearly positioning himself for an 
extraordinary transition from steadfast upholder of the rule of law to participant 
in an illegal administration, from rFmF victim to ally of the latest military 
insurrection and from principled democrat to coup apologist. He had not 
been prepared to enter Qarase’s post-may election multiparty cabinet, and 
had successfully undermined, out-manoeuvred and disciplined the ‘gang of 
five’ Flp supporters of power-sharing. of these, Krishna Datt, poseci Bune 
and Atu emberson-Bain were expelled from the party. At the first crucial test, 
the 2007 budget vote, the multiparty cabinet had all but fallen apart. now the 
Flp leader was poised to enter a new form of power-sharing arrangement, no 
longer inspired by sophisticated constitutional engineering theories, but rather 
by a Bonapartist transcendence of ethnic divisions and a blunt and remorseless 
shift onto the path of authoritarian modernization. 
With the Gcc now cut out of the loop, Bainimarama chose to directly 
‘reappoint’ the president, ratu josefa iloilo, as the precursor to setting up 
an interim government. the event was to prove yet another extraordinary 
spectacle – despite the absence of the foreign dignitaries, ambassadors, and 
high commissioners usually in attendance on such occasions. After detailing 21 
reasons why the rFmF takeover had been justified, the commander explained 
that ‘extra-constitutional steps’ had been ‘necessary to preserve the constitution’, 
insisting that legal precedents existed for his use of ‘reserve powers’ and had not 
been over-turned, and thus remained ‘binding and valid law’.56 ostensibly to 
facilitate an inquiry into the activities of the judiciary at the time of the 2000 
coup, chief justice Daniel Fatiaki and chief magistrate naomi matanitobua 
had been sent on leave a day before the presidential handover. justice Anthony 
Gates was soon made acting chief justice.57 the independence of the judiciary, 
which had been damaged but not broken by the events of 29 may 2000, was 
now to be more thoroughly compromised by senior judges’ assumption of 
positions under the auspices of an illegal regime.58   
on 4 january, the re-appointed president addressed the nation for the first 
time since the December coup. 
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Good citizens of our beloved Fiji islands. i know that the events of the past few 
weeks have been trying on all of us. in particular in early December we were at 
cross roads at which hard and decisive decisions needed to be made. i was, as 
has been noted by the commander of the republic of the Fiji military Forces, 
unable to fully perform my duties as i was prevented from doing so. i do not wish 
to elaborate further on this point but i can state that they were predominantly 
cultural. in any case given the circumstances i would have done exactly what 
the commander of the rFmF, commodore josaia Voreqe Bainimarama did 
since it was necessary to do so at that time. these actions were also valid in law. 
therefore, i fully endorse the actions of the commander of the rFmF and the 
rFmF in acting in the interest of the nation and most importantly in upholding 
the constitution.59    
For the president to so blatantly endorse such an illegal act was extraordinary, 
and flatly contradicted the Government House statement of 5 December, when 
he had refused to ‘condone’ or ‘support’ the military takeover. the unelaborated 
‘cultural reasons’ referred to the advice of Vice president ratu joni madraiwiwi, 
who, as roko tui Bau, might in traditional terms be seen as the higher-ranking 
of the two chiefs. But ratu joni had been dismissed from his position, and the 
president’s military speech-writers were no longer constrained in their efforts to 
rubber-stamp the new order. nonetheless, the president’s statement sent shock 
waves through the Fijian community, not least through the methodist church, 
which suggested that the president be ‘medically boarded, and if necessary, 
retired with dignity and respect’.60
the day after he had relinquished the presidency, commodore Bainimarama 
was sworn in as prime minister, replacing the rather ineffective Dr jona 
Senilagakali. esala teleni, who had shot up through the ranks to become deputy 
commander after the coup, became acting commander of the rFmF, although 
Bainimarama retained the substantive position. the interim cabinet was then 
announced, an occasion for those civilian politicians sympathetic to the coup 
to emerge into the public glare. the Fiji newspapers had, prior to christmas, 
published novel adverts soliciting applications from the general public for 
positions in the interim cabinet, with the job description requiring clean 
criminal records and a declaration that applicants would not stand in the next 
election. A slimmed-down cabinet of 16 members was announced, replacing 
Qarase’s bloated 36-member collection of ministers and ‘state ministers’, with 
the commander claiming to thereby save $2m annually. Former parliamentary 
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speaker ratu epeli nailatikau emerged from a behind-the-scenes role liaising 
with the commonwealth and bilateral partners, to become Foreign minister. 
Several politicians associated with the nApF, and some former rFmF officers 
with civil service experience, acquired portfolios. the popular Bernadette 
rounds Ganilau amazed the chattering classes of Suva by taking up the post 
of interim minister for labour, industrial relations, productivity, tourism and 
environment, while the sole other mp in her united peoples party was being 
hauled into barracks in western Viti levu to face military questioning for his 
critical public statements about the coup. the president of Fiji’s chamber of 
commerce, taito Waradi, became minister of commerce, and ratu epeli 
Ganilau belatedly took up the Fijian Affairs portfolio. lawyer Aiyez Sayed-
Khaiyum became interim Attorney General, surrendering a $150,000 per 
annum position at the colonial Bank. Frustrating labour warnings about 
‘opportunists’, poseci Bune, the former ‘hard man’ in the deposed 1999–2000 
government became interim minister for public Service reform. Bune had only 
recently been expelled from the Flp, but had previously established for himself 
a chameleonic reputation for traversing all manner of political divides.  
in what he admitted was ‘a strange twist of destiny’, mahendra chaudhry 
became interim minister of Finance, as well as interim minister for national 
planning, public enterprise and the Sugar industry. lekh ram Vayeshnoi, who 
had formerly been chaudhry’s trojan horse in Qarase’s multiparty cabinet, took 
up the minister of Youth and Sports portfolio and promptly sacked the entire 
board of the Sports council. the only other surviving cabinet member was the 
SDl’s jonetani navakamocea, who explained that he had spent close to $30,000 
on the may election campaign and did not want to lose out – rather oddly, 
given the clean-up mandate that was intended to define the new order.61
realism soon took its toll. With an interim government in place, domestic 
critics were presented with the conundrum of whether to continue to insist on 
the seemingly impossible restoration of the Qarase government or to instead 
call for the interim government to settle on a roadmap for the restoration of 
democracy. that ambivalence between pragmatism and strict legality, which 
always figures in the aftermath of coups, led to a wave of more nuanced 
domestic accommodation with the new order amongst the non-enthusiasts 
– those with no hope of places either in the new order nor, any longer, in the 
resurrection of the old. the formerly stalwartly pro-government Fiji Daily Post, 
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managed by Qarase’s cousin mesake Koroi, now concluded that the SDl had 
‘failed in its duty’ because ‘a coup happened on their watch’ owing to its non-
inclusion of ‘the military leadership in its deliberations on national security’.62 
Also, internationally, key bilateral and multilateral agencies had by january 
abandoned much hope of restoration of the elected government. even ousted 
prime minister Qarase was, by the time the pacific islands Forum eminent 
persons Group visited him in late january on his home island, primarily taking 
issue about the timetable for the next election.63
efforts were made to ‘normalize’ the political situation, to rubber-stamp 
the decrees of the previous month, and earnestly pursue the anti-corruption 
program. Following the president’s statement, a wide-ranging immunity decree 
was passed, although the legality of this (and of all the other decrees) remained 
to be tested. chaudhry was to re-design the 2007 budget, and somehow fill 
the F$70m gap left by the dropping of the previous government’s proposed 
VAt increase, avoid the impending economic collapse anticipated to result in a 
F$190m revenue shortfall (including an undisclosed sum to cover the military’s 
giant blow out of its budget during December) and, he hoped, persuade the 
european union to continue to provide F$350m to assist sugar restructuring 
after the inevitable end of sugar price subsidies. poseci Bune announced the 
sacking of all government ceos, and a reversion to the former system of 
lower paid ‘permanent secretaries’, as well as a reduction in the retirement 
age from 60 to 55, opposition to which earned general secretary of the Fiji 
public Service Association rajeshwar Singh a visit to the QeB. With the new 
government installed, ratu ovini Bokini announced the support of the Gcc 
for the decisions of the president, albeit without the chiefs being allowed to 
meet to ratify this shift in stance. the methodist church, whose leaders had 
formerly been outspoken in their criticism of the new order, and then been 
temporarily silenced, again challenged the new regime in a statement sent to 
the pacific islands Forum’s eminent persons Group.64     
December 5 signalled an extraordinary inversion of Fiji’s earlier political 
trajectory. ethno-nationalist coups had been countered by what catholic social 
justice advocates called a ‘multi-culturalist coup’.65 Some fellow travellers denied 
that it was a coup at all. the rFmF had transformed itself from the guarantor 
of indigenous Fijian paramountcy into its nemesis. the Flp had cartwheeled 
from victim to victor in the illegal overthrow of elected governments, and the 
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despised language of the 2000 coup (‘i agree with the goals, but not the means’) 
had become the favoured retort of those seeking accommodations with the new 
order. it was an event justified, like previous coups, by claims that perhaps Fiji 
was not yet ready for democracy, nor for institutions that had been carefully 
nurtured over hundreds of years in europe and north America.66 precisely 
because the longer-run character of the rFmF program remained so obscure, 
all manner of local reformists, erstwhile optimists and vigorous enemies of 
Qarase sought to impress on this seemingly blank sheet their own pet projects 
and vague aspirations. in the early weeks, the commander evidently cherished 
such valuable reservoirs of legitimacy; even to the point of organising a tea party 
for selected representatives of the civil society organizations. As the economic 
downturn set in, this honeymoon era was inevitably displaced by the harsher 
realities of consolidating the military takeover.  
the December 2006 coup signalled the collapse of the mid-1990s 
‘constitutional engineering’ project. At the core of that effort to address the post-
1987 coup crisis and to put in place institutional supports to promote ‘multi-
ethnic government’ was a hybrid mixture of two political science perspectives; 
the Horowitz approach to electoral system design meshed together with the 
lijphartian recommendation of top-level power-sharing among élites.67 Fiji’s 
constitutional review commission had embraced the alternative vote system 
as a means of promoting moderation, encouraging cross-ethnic alliances 
around the exchange of preferential votes, and fostering stable ‘coalitions of 
conviction’.68 But the 1999, 2001 and 2006 elections had provided negligible 
support for such expectations and, particularly in 2001 and 2006, produced 
highly ethnically polarised results.69 the lijphartian power-sharing provisions, 
which entitled all parties with over 10 per cent of seats in parliament to cabinet 
portfolios, had remained untested, at least until 2006.70  in the wake of the 
2006 election, Qarase formed a government that, for the first time, brought 
together in cabinet parliamentarians from the two largest political parties, one 
representing the ethnic Fijians and the other the Fiji indians. nine Flp members 
had entered cabinet, and had received substantial portfolios, like labour, Health 
and the environment. But, as we saw above, Flp leader mahendra chaudhry 
had refused to enter cabinet, a decision that was always likely to entail a death 
sentence for the new arrangements. even before the swearing in of the new 
cabinet, it had become clear that this would spark a power struggle within the 
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Flp. Given the constitutional penalties for floor-crossing,71 Flp disciplinary 
measures against the moderate supporters of power-sharing had the potential to 
bust apart the multiparty cabinet. the most senior Flp enthusiast for power-
sharing, Krishna Datt, had his effigy burnt at a meeting of the nasinu Flp 
in one event among several that indicated the absence of strong Fiji indian 
support within the Flp for power-sharing. Still deeper divisions were always 
likely when controversial SDl legislation, such as the rtu Bill, the Qoliqoli 
Bill and the indigenous claims tribunal Bill, were put to the parliamentary 
vote. Would Flp cabinet ministers adhere to the Westminster rules of ‘collective 
responsibility’ codified in the 1997 constitution? or would they follow the Flp 
party line, as also required by the 1997 constitution? 
in the event, the multiparty cabinet collapsed at the first hurdle. Flp 
ministers were confronted by ultimatums both from Qarase and chaudhry to, 
respectively, support and oppose the 2007 budget. Four backed the Flp line 
and voted against the budget, while five conveniently absented themselves. in a 
last ditch effort to save his crumbling cabinet, Qarase relented from dismissing 
the four anti-budget ministers, but chaudhry showed little sign of wishing to 
make any peace with his rebel ministers, although he smartly embraced those 
other Flp members who sought reconciliation.72 Would there have been a 
coup in December had the multiparty cabinet been working smoothly and 
constructively? that seems unlikely, and, had there not been a military coup, 
the political ramifications of the collapse of power-sharing might well have 
been more severe for the Flp leader. internationally, the break-up of coalition 
governments is frequently accompanied by efforts by antagonistic parties to 
make each other appear as the ‘spoilers’. in this sense, Bainimarama’s coup 
saved chaudhry from appearing as the destroyer of an arrangement that had 
been so warmly welcomed by Fiji’s citizens in may 2006. 
the fact that the break-up of the power-sharing cabinet, an aspect of the 
December events that received insufficient attention both at home and abroad, 
and the 2006 coup happened simultaneously was not a coincidence. After the 
may 2006 election, Bainimarama had publicly and enthusiastically supported 
the new arrangements.73 outspoken hostility to the Qarase government had, 
albeit temporarily, been silenced. only in September, as politicians battled 
over the issue of ‘ground rules’ for the new cabinet arrangements, did the 
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commander again resume his public challenges to the Qarase regime. Given 
the lack of any groundswell of Flp support for the moderate position, the 
refusal of mahendra chaudhry to enter cabinet and the timidity of Qarase in 
re-orienting his government’s policies and personnel to bolster the new accord, 
the fate of the multiparty cabinet had been sealed by early December 2006. in 
its place, although the majority Fijian-backed party was excluded, a different 
grouping of Fijian and indian leaders was to come together in a new kind of 
embrace, but this time in violation of the constitution, of democracy and of 
fashionable theories of institutional design.
that broader structural explanation for the December 2006 coup needs 
to be combined with more specific accounts of institutional galvanization, 
repulsion and attraction. How significant were the ‘shadowy backers’ of the 
2006 coup, which police commissioner Andrew Hughes claimed to have 
under investigation prior to the coup? Did the 2006 coup primarily reflect 
the revenge of the mara dynasty, long shut out of the corridors of power and 
altogether eclipsed by the death of ratu mara himself? Alternatively, was the 
coup driven, at least ideologically, by mahendra chaudhry in a thinly-veiled 
effort to capture power on the back of a military coup? or was commodore 
Bainimarama correct when, responding to allegations of hidden backers, he 
said ‘it starts from within us’.74 it was, after all, the rFmF that had internally 
re-made and steeled itself through protracted power struggles with the Qarase 
government. others had only seized upon the opportunities presented by the 
showdown, even if they encouraged and took succour from it. in the process, 
the rFmF had acquired the ideological colours of those most bitter opponents 
of Qarase’s government, following the principle of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my 
friend’. But if it was Qarase, as incumbent, who precipitated such an unholy 
alliance among his adversaries, what was to happen once these lost the focus 
of their coming together and featured as fellow ministers in cabinet?  
last but not least, what of the role of personal factors? the threat to the 
commander’s life in november 2000 encouraged a relentless pursuit of those 
responsible, and ensured a breakdown of relations with the very government 
he had once put into power. charges of sedition against the commander and 
the longer-running controversies about the killing of counter revolutionary 
Warfare unit soldiers during the november 2000 mutiny generated some 
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personal incentive to overturn the legal order. the role of the individual in 
Fiji’s modern history should not be lightly dismissed. For military leaders, 
personal loyalty can prove to be everything, particularly when their political 
interventions do not express the broader social uprisings. loyalty pledges and 
psychological tests had – for many years – proved a regular feature at Strategic 
Headquarters at Berkley crescent and at the QeB. Would there have been a 
coup in December 2006 if Bainimarama had accepted a diplomatic posting to 
Wellington in 2003, as he nearly did? Was it possible that a stronger response 
from the office of the president might have dislodged the commander back 
in 2003 or 2004? Would history have taken the same course if Bainimarama’s 
contract as commander had not been renewed in 2004, or if he had become 
commander of the united nations in Kuwait observer mission, a job he 
applied for and for the purposes of which he was promoted, temporarily, to 
rear Admiral?75 As the military leader responsible for appointing the Qarase 
government back in july 2000, the commander always held a unique position, 
and he never accepted the subordination of the rFmF to the government.   
Fiji’s may 2006 election was thoroughly eclipsed by the December coup, 
but the issues it raised may continue to haunt Fiji politics. How can the 
country overcome ethnically based voting patterns and, if it cannot do so, does 
power-sharing among political élites provide the only effective answer?76 if Fiji 
follows the pattern of past post-coup settlements, there will be a reversion to 
constitutional democracy. Several factors are likely to delay that process. in 
particular, a new population census will entail a redrawing of constituency 
boundaries, possibly accompanied by electoral system changes. Anticipation 
of the post-electoral configuration of a future parliament may also prove a 
deterrent to holding elections for some time – especially if concerns remain 
about the weakness of support for the interim government amongst ethnic 
Fijians. Will those Fijian politicians who have rallied to the rFmF cause settle 
easily for a part as bit players if the Fiji indian vote delivers the bulk of support 
for the next government? And, even if alliances change much more dramatically, 
will it prove possible to get the military out of Fiji’s political life when elected	
politicians are returned to the national stage? these are questions Fiji must 
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Appendix 2: 2006 election results
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
       
1. Bua Fijian Provincial       
Selaima Kalounivit  
Veisamasama ind. 684     
etonia Bose ind. 207      
Vula josateki ind. 146      
mitieli Bulanauca SDl 4,321      
informal  887      
total votes  6,245      
total valid  5,358      
turnout (per cent)  92.5      
total registered  6,749         
    
2. Kadavu Fijian Provincial       
Konisi tabu Yabaki SDl 3,766     
Semesa matanawa Flp 45     
rupeni Drodroveivau Koroi ind. 57     
james michael Ah Koy ind. 1,191     
informal  417     
total votes  5,476     
total valid  5,059     
turnout (per cent)  89.9     
total registered  6,089     
       
3. Lau Fijian Provincial       
laisenia Qarase SDl  4,896     
Viliame cavubati nApF 350     
informal  697     
total votes  5,943     
total valid  5,246     
turnout (per cent)  89.9     
total registered  6,612     
       
4. Lomaiviti Fijian Provincial       
Filise Baleinakoro nVtlp 136     
Simione Kaitani SDl 5,109     
jone Kauvesi ind. 920     
iliesa tora ind. 44     
informal  696     
total votes  6,905     
total valid  6,209     
turnout (per cent)  90.3     
total registered  7,650     
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5. Macuata Fijian Provincial       
Wasasala Samuela nFp 215     
Savenaca lario Damudamu ind. 103     
Samuela nakete Flp 459     
isireli lewaniqila SDl 7,075     
erami Biaunisala ind.  295     
informal  809     
total votes  8,956     
total valid  8,147     
turnout (per cent)  91.2     
total registered  9,823     
       
6. Nadroga/Navosa Fijian Provincial       
Sakiusa timoci manumanunivalu nVtlp 172     
Veniana Gonewai Flp 2,527     
ratu isikeli tasere SDl 10,624     
peniasi Kunatuba ind. 1,167     
inoke Kadralevu pAnu 356     
informal  1,857     
total votes  16,704     
total valid  14,847     
turnout (per cent)  87.7     
total registered  19,044     
       
7. Naitasiri Fijian Provincial       
ilaitia Bulidiri tuisese SDl 8,455     
maika moroca Flp 424     
jope Gonevulavula nVtlp 353     
Kavekini navuso nApF 404     
manoa laqere naitala ind. 413     
informal  825     
total votes  10,874     
total valid  10,049     
turnout (per cent)  90.1     
total registered  12,067     
       
8. Namosi Fijian Provincial       
ratu Suliano matanitobua SDl 2,481     
Waisea n Batilekaleka nVtlp 178     
Koleta marama Sivivatu Flp 125     
informal  282     
total votes  3,066     
total valid  2,784     
turnout (per cent)  91.8     
total registered  3,340     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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9. Ra Fijian Provincial        
mosese ramuria nApF 225     
tevita tabalailai ind. 734     
timoci naco Flp 1,048     
tomasi Vuetilavoni SDl 6,456     
informal  1,127     
total votes  9,590     
total valid  8,463     
turnout (per cent)  88.1     
total registered  10,880     
       
10. Rewa Fijian Provincial       
Viliame raile ind. 95     
ro teimumu Kepa tuisawau SDl 3,401     
Filipe Q tuisawau ind. 2,371     
taniela robonu Senikuta Flp 167     
informal  639     
total votes  6,673     
total valid  6,034     
turnout (per cent)  90.9     
total registered  7,341     
       
11. Serua Fijian Provincial       
Ananaiasa Qio Vucago ind. 232     
pio Kameli tabaiwalu SDl 2,792     
Sakeasi lomalagi ind. 431     
levani tonitonivanua nVtlp 147     
informal  510     
total votes  4,112     
total valid  3,602     
turnout (per cent)  91.9     
total registered  4,473     
       
12. Ba East Fijian Provincial       
paulo ralulu SDl 5,528     
Apimeleki nabaro nFp 732     
ponipate lesavua pAnu 2,888     
informal  1,067     
total votes  10,215     
total valid  9,148     
turnout (per cent)  86.3     
total registered  11,836     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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13. Ba West Fijian Provincial       
pauliasi namua nFp 257     
ratu meli Q Saukuru SDl 9,211     
taniela Wai Flp 1,156     
meli Bogileka pAnu 883     
informal  1,143     
total votes  12,650     
total valid  11,507     
turnout (per cent)  82.4     
total registered  15,348     
       
14. Tailevu North Fijian Provincial       
laisiasa cabenalevu Flp 278     
Samisoni tikoinasau SDl 6,281     
iliesa Duvuloco nVtlp 1,171     
informal  923     
total votes  8,653     
total valid  7,730     
turnout (per cent)  89.4     
total registered  9,682     
       
15. Tailevu South Fijian Provincial        
irami ului matairavula SDl 6,722     
Akuila Wailevu raikoti ind. 59     
Saukelea erini nApF 493     
levani V tuinabua ind. 1,046     
informal  1,069     
total votes  9,389     
total valid  8,320     
turnout (per cent)  91.1     
total registered  10,303     
       
16. Cakaudrove East Fijian Provincial       
Vilimone Vosarogo ind. 287     
lutuvakula melania nApF 480     
ratu naiqama lalabalavu SDl 6,120     
informal  752     
total votes  7,639     
total valid  6,887     
turnout (per cent)  100.7 (sic)     
total registered  7,588     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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17. Cakaudrove West Fijian Provincial       
Vaniqi manasa ramasirai ind. 607     
niko nawaikula SDl 7,674     
Vosawale josua nFp 236     
informal  1,103     
total votes  9,620     
total valid  8,517     
turnout (per cent)  82.8     
total registered  11,616     
       
18. North East Fijan Urban Communal       
nanise Vunisere Kasami nagusuca SDl 11,548     
manasa tugia  ind. 353     
Sainiana rokovucago Flp 1,357     
Saimoni raikuna nApF 338     
Bogivitu lotawa ind. 61     
informal  906     
total votes  14,563     
total valid  13,657     
turnout (per cent)  84.9     
total registered  17,156     
       
19. North West Fijian Urban Communal       
lemeki V Vuetaki nApF 283     
joji natadra Banuve SDl 11,620     
ravuama rainima nanovu  ind. 477     
mosese tukikaukamea ind. 31     
Vuli Salusalu mahe upp 115     
ratu maikeli lalabalavu nFp 158     
Akanisi Koroitamana Flp 2,017     
informal  849     
total votes  15,550     
total valid  14,701     
turnout (per cent)  82.4     
total registered  18,864     
       
20. South West Fijian Urban Communal       
Viliame Katia Flp 817     
jone Yavala Kubuabola SDl 10,123     
Silikiwai emosi nApF 470     
Seveci naisilisili ind. 305     
informal  803     
total votes  12,518     
total valid  11,715     
turnout (per cent)  82.9     
total registered  15,093     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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21. Suva City Fijian Urban Communal      
peni Vulaca Secake Volavola SDl 880     
josaia Waqabaca Flp 675     
Apete naitini nApF 760     
mataiasi ragigia SDl 7,205     
Semi uluivuya nVtlp 46     
Akuila Bale ind. 142     
miriama rayawa cama nFp 157     
informal  570     
total votes  10,435     
total valid  9865     
turnout (per cent)  82.1     
total registered  12,707     
       
22. Tamavua/Laucala Fijian Urban Communal       
netani Sukanaivalu nApF 788     
laisiasa corerega nFp 128     
ratu jone Waqairatu SDl 10,880     
jone tubuto Flp 970     
Kaumaitotoya u.K.m.S pot  28     
Basilio D Kalokalodromu ind. 18     
informal  679     
total votes  13,491     
total valid  12,812     
turnout (per cent)  84.0     
total registered  16,068     
       
23. Nasinu Fijian Urban Communal       
joji uluinakauvadra nApF 459     
inoke luveni SDl 10,631     
emasi Qovu ind. 630     
Vilikesa ravia Flp 800     
informal  837     
total votes  13,357     
total valid  12,520     
turnout (per cent)  79.8     
total registered  15,694     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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24. Suva City General Communal       
Aca lord SDl 702     
Daniel robert johns nFp 60     
rounds Ganilau  
lavenia Bernadette upp 1,458     
Kenneth Zinck ind. 510     
informal  166     
total votes  2,896     
total valid  2,730     
turnout (per cent)  82.2     
total registered  3,523     
       
25. North Eastern General Communal       
Harry Arthur robinson upp 528 545 561 941  
nawaia touakin ind. 357 361    
rebo terubea Flp 383 391 423   
David christopher SDl 1,467 1,478 1,511 1,547 1,639 
rocky percival Billings nApF 289     
irwin robin ind. 629 873 1,158 1,165 2,014 
informal  389     
total votes  4,042     
total valid  3,653     
turnout (per cent)  86.0     
total registered  4,702     
       
26. Western/Central General Communal       
millis malcolm Beddoes upp 2,234     
noel iupasi tofinga nApF 453     
Anaseini tuineau Henry nApF 34     
Vula tawake Shaw SDl 54     
pateresio nunu polania SDl 1,651     
informal  231     
total votes  4,657     
total valid  4,426     
turnout (per cent)  83.2     
total registered  5,595     
        
27. Vitilevu East/Maritime Indian Communal       
Sanjeet chand maharaj Flp 4,744      
Bhima Sami nFp 946     
jayant prasad maharaj ind. 200     
Akmal ellyas Ali SDl 162     
informal  569     
total votes  6,621     
total valid  6,052     
turnout (per cent)  91.2     
total registered  7,256     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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28. Tavua Indian Communal       
Anand Babla Flp 5,707     
Suresh chandra nFp 1,329     
mohammed janif Khan SDl 144     
informal  732     
total votes  7,912     
total valid  7180     
turnout (per cent)  92.7     
total registered  8,536     
       
29. Ba East Indian Communal       
jain Kumar Flp 4,956     
praveen Bala nFp 1,874     
nirbhay chand SDl 34     
informal  668     
total votes  7,532     
total valid  6,864     
turnout (per cent)  91.8     
total registered  8,203     
       
30. Ba West Indian Communal       
madan Sen SDl 180     
Farouk janeman nFp 870     
narendra Kumar padarath Flp 7,229     
informal  876     
total votes  9,155     
total valid  8,279     
turnout (per cent)  79.3     
total registered  11,538     
       
31. Lautoka Rural Indian Communal       
mohammed Shameem  SDl 252     
Deo Kumar nApF 125     
udit narayan Flp 6,832     
naren prasad  nFp 1,643     
informal  989     
total votes  9,841     
total valid  8,852     
turnout (per cent)  87.9     
total registered  11,200     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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32. Lautoka City Indian Communal       
jai Gawander Flp 7,629     
rosemary Satanji nApF 172     
rakesh Kumar nFp 1,590     
Azizul Dean SDl 158     
informal  1,085     
total votes  10,634     
total valid  9,549     
turnout (per cent)  86.4     
total registered  12,308     
       
33. Vuda Indian Communal       
Vyas Deo Sharma Flp 7,131     
rajendra Singh nFp 748     
Abdul Afizu rahiman SDl 330     
Arbin prakash narayan ind. 14     
Sanel prasad nApF 155     
informal  861     
total votes  9,239     
total valid  8,378     
turnout (per cent)  87.8     
total registered  10,526     
       
34. Nadi Urban Indian Communal       
Gunasagaran Gounder Flp 8,108     
Sushila rameshwar nFp 2,151     
mohammed Zarib SDl 266     
Kamlesh prasad ind. 120     
Sanmogam naidu Sanu ind. 15     
informal  793     
total votes  11,453     
total valid  10,660     
turnout (per cent)  87.6     
total registered  13,081     
       
35. Nadi Rural Indian Communal       
perumal mupnar Flp 6,825     
Karna Waddi raju nFp 2,528     
Armogam Sami SDl 138     
informal  903     
total votes  10,394     
total valid  9,491     
turnout (per cent)  90.6     
total registered  11,467     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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36. Nadroga Indian Communal       
lekh ram Vayeshnoi Flp 7,219     
parma nand nFp 1,215     
Ashok Kumar SDl 474     
informal  1,452     
total votes  10,360     
total valid  8,908     
turnout (per cent)  92.2     
total registered  11,240     
       
37. Viti Levu South/Kadavu Indian Communal       
pravin narayan nApF 143     
chaitanya lakshman Flp 5,575     
Bimal Singh SDl 205     
Bimal Bimlesh prasad nFp 877     
informal  786     
total votes  7,586     
total valid  6,800     
turnout (per cent)  90.2     
total registered  8,407     
       
38. Suva City Indian Communal       
Gyani nand Flp 7,660     
Shiu ram coin  20     
chandra Kant umaria nFp 1,675     
mohammed Salamat Ali SDl 147     
Dildar Shah nApF 405     
informal  711     
total votes  10,618     
total valid  9,907     
turnout (per cent)  84.5     
total registered  12,568     
       
39. Vanua Levu West Indian Communal      
Suresh chand nApF 33     
Bijay prasad SDl 48     
Suvinay Kumar Basawaiya nFp 708     
Surendra lal Flp 4,886     
charan jeath Singh nApF 950     
informal  568     
total votes  7,193     
total valid  6,625     
turnout (per cent)  92.8     
total registered  7,755     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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40. Luacala Indian Communal       
Dewan chand Flp 13,133     
praveen chand nApF 504     
indar Singh SDl 203     
Sundresan Goundar nFp 828     
roshan Dildar Shah jFp 18     
informal  1,257     
total votes  15,943     
total valid  14,686     
turnout (per cent)  85.7     
total registered  18,610     
       
41. Nasinu Indian Communal       
Hari prasad Sharma SDl 5     
mohammed Khalim nFp 615     
Krishna Datt Flp 10,940     
Fatima Bano Shad nApF 28     
imraz iqbal Ali SDl 226     
liaquat Khan nApF 222     
informal  1,291     
total votes  13,327     
total valid  12,036     
turnout (per cent)  90.1     
total registered  14,789     
       
42. Tailevu/Rewa indian Communal       
ragho nand Flp 8,058     
Anay Sumeshwar Yadav nFp 967     
mohammed tazim nApF 144     
nilesh chand maharaj SDl 126     
informal  1,230     
total votes  10,525     
total valid  9,295     
turnout (per cent)  90.4     
total registered  11,641     
       
43. Labasa Indian Communal       
jaiwant Kris Arulappan nFp 1,137     
Subrail t Goundar SDl 147     
Kamlesh reddy Flp 6,813     
informal  889     
total votes  8,986     
total valid  8,097     
turnout (per cent)  87.7     
total registered  10,248     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
       
468 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
44. Labasa Rural Indian Communal       
mohammed tahir Flp 5,279     
Satya Deo nApF 139     
mohammed rafiq nFp 930     
informal  664     
total votes  7,012     
total valid  6,348     
turnout (per cent)  94.6     
total registered  7,416     
       
45. Macuata East/Cakaudrove Indian Communal       
Vijay chand Flp 5,298     
Kamal Kumar raj nFp 632     
james Venkat Sami nApF 350     
chitra Singh SDl 81     
informal  754     
total votes  7,115     
total valid  6,361     
turnout (per cent)  92.5     
total registered  7,688     
       
46. Rotuma Communal       
Sosefo Kafoa SDl 526 531    
mua ieli taukave upp 532 548 566   
Sosefo Sikuri inoke  nApF 245     
Victor Fatiaki ind. 1,149 1,348 1,361   
jioji Konousi Konrote ind. 1,983 2,008 2,508   
informal  302     
total votes  4,737     
total valid  4,435     
turnout (per cent)  88.2     
total registered  5,373     
       
47. Tailevu North/Ovalau Open        
isoa Gonenicolo tamani ind. 1,585     
tomasi tokalauvere Flp 1,769     
Aisake Bukavesi nVtlp 849     
josefa Dulakiverata ind. 2,800     
josefa Vosanibola SDl 7,342     
informal  1,633     
total votes  15,978      
total valid  14,345      
turnout (per cent)  89.3       
total registered  17,893         
    
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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48. Tailevu South/Lomaiviti Open       
Adi Asenaca caucau SDl 10,400      
Aisea naikawakawa Flp 5,736      
Wailevu jone tovehi ind. 793      
informal  2,597      
total votes  19,526      
total valid  16,929      
turnout (per cent)  90.3      
total registered  21,620         
    
49. Nausori/Naitasiri Open        
Asaeli masilaca SDl 7,723 7,804 7,811 8,298  
peter Anuresh chand nFp 485 485    
josaia Gucake nApF 584 587 1051   
lavenia Wainiqolo padarath Flp 6,935 6,937 6,951 7,515  
lasarusa Sovea Ben Zion ind. 86     
informal  1,473     
total votes  17,286     
total valid  15,813     
turnout (per cent)  86.5     
total registered  19,977     
       
50. Nasinu/Rewa Open       
indar Deo nApF 748 760    
john Ali  SDl 5,188 5,199 5,225 6,764 8,179 
Azim Hussein Flp 8,611 8,625 8,663 8,688 9,436 
priscilla Singh nFp 563     
Seru Serevi ind. 845 1,362 2,035 2,181  
pita c tagicakiverata SDl 1,664 1,672 1,692   
informal  1,572     
total votes  19,191     
total valid  17,619     
turnout (per cent)  90.2     
total registered  21,273     
  8,809     
51. Cunningham Open       
Aminiasi Delana ind. 536     
leoni tuisowaqa nApF 659     
ramesio rogovakalali Flp 7,492     
rajesh Singh SDl 9,831     
joketani Delai Slmp 49     
peni Vatubai nApF 225     
manuel lui Arisais (Snr) nFp 428     
informal  1,344     
total votes  20,564     
total valid  19,220     
turnout (per cent)  85.4     
total registered  24,087     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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52. Laucala Open        
Vijay Krishna nair Flp 6,985 6,985 6,986 7,015 7,845 
Keshwan nadan nFp 638 638 638   
Salabula losena SDl 7,138 7,140 7,161 7,171 7,856 
manunivavalagi Dalituicama  
Korovulavula nApF 874 875 916 1,515  
nimilote jitoko Fifita pot 23     
Viliame civoniceva ind. 43 63    
informal  973     
total votes  16,674     
total valid  15,701     
turnout (per cent)  84.3     
total registered  19,774      
       
53. Samabula/Tamavua Open       
Baba tupeni l SDl 5,939 6,000 6,011 6,021 6,118 
pramod rae nFp 666 668 671   
pita Kewa nacuva SDl 92     
monica raghwan Flp 5,332 5,341 5,599 5,656 7,162 
Filipe Bole nApF 961 979 999 1,603  
monoa Dobui upp 290 292    
informal  947     
total votes  14,227     
total valid  13,280     
turnout (per cent)  83.0     
total registered  17,137     
       
54. Suva City Open       
ofa m.p. Swann ind. 341 345    
misaele Weleilakeba SDl 5,705 5,707 5,746 5,963 6,135 
tom ricketts Flp 3,261 3,475 3,493 3,524 5,903 
Attar Singh nFp 745 746 965   
tikotikoca inoke Seru upp 223     
epeli Gavidi Ganilau nApF 1,763 1,765 1,834 2,551  
informal  813      
total votes  12,851      
total valid  12,038      
turnout (per cent)  84.5      
total registered  15,206      
        
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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55. Lami Open        
eroni ratuwalesi ind. 36      
esaroma ledua ind. 1,474      
Filimoni lacanivalu Flp 2,260      
mere tuisalalo Samisoni SDl 7,664      
Benjamin Wainiqolo padarath nApF 681      
Viliame Savu nVtlp 57     
jasper Singh ind. 1,087      
Vilikesa rauca nApF 168      
lionel Danford upp 303      
informal  1,083      
total votes  14,813      
total valid  13,730      
turnout (per cent)  83.1      
total registered  17,815      
        
56. Lomaivuna/Namosi/Kadavu Open        
ted Young SDl 11,817      
mitieli Baleivanualala Flp 2,972      
peter Asiga lee ind. 1,395      
informal  1,632       
total votes  17,816      
total valid  16,184      
turnout (per cent)  89.9     
total registered  19,819     
       
57. Ra Open       
epineri Vocevuka Flp 4,870     
George Shiu raj SDl 10,172     
Vurewa Aporosa nApF 968     
informal  1,587     
total votes  17,597     
total valid  16,010     
turnout (per cent)  89.5     
total registered  19,670     
       
58. Tavua Open       
Damodar Flp 7,231     
narendra reddy nFp 1,723     
Semi leiene SDl 4,069     
Savenaca tuwai pAnu 303     
Koroinasau ratu Semi nApF 92     
informal  1,145     
total votes  14,563     
total valid  13,418     
turnout (per cent)  91.0     
total registered  15,996     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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59. Ba Open       
ram lajendra nFp 2,981     
john nacamavuto Dunn nApF 139     
jale o Baba SDl 60     
mahendra pal chaudhary Flp 10,709     
ralulu rusila nApF 16     
Savenaca nabeka pAnu 283     
Faiaaz Ali SDl 2,737     
informal  1,422     
total votes  18,347     
total valid  16,925     
turnout (per cent)  88.4     
total registered  20,759     
       
60. Magodro Open       
Vijay lal nApF 731     
josese Drikalu Botitu SDl 3,761     
Davendra naidu nFp 2,023     
Gyan Singh Flp 9,000     
informal  1,973     
total votes  17,488     
total valid  15,515     
turnout (per cent)  87.8     
total registered  19,911     
       
61. Lautoka City Open       
isimeli Savutini Bose ind. 351 351 353   
Daniel urai Flp 7,420 7,424 7,429 7,448 7,839 
josefata niumataiwalu ind. 88 89    
Alexander David o’connor upp 402 402 406 410  
jone Saumaimuri Bouwalu SDl 5,222 5,278 5,356 5,380 5,390 
Sailesh chandar naidu nFp 1,450 1,451 1,451 1,757 1,766 
Bijesh chand ind. 62     
informal  1,244     
total votes  16,239     
total valid  14,995     
turnout (per cent)  85.1     
total registered  19,084     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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62. Vuda Open       
mahammed Yusuf SDl 4,435     
Felix Anthony Flp 9,745     
narend Kumar aka Bissun Datt nFp 1,267     
Viliame rakuli pAnu 177     
Aca tuigaloa Saukuru ind. 54     
informal  1,623     
total votes  17,301     
total valid  15,678     
turnout (per cent)  85.3     
total registered  20,275     
       
63. Nadi Open          
Arvind Deo Singh SVt 237 237 238 238 238   
Amjad Ali Flp 8,630 8,631 8,691 8,691 8,694 8,695 9,060 9,069
prem Singh nFp 2,645 2,645 2,645 2,645 2,652 2,653 2,664 2,669
Williams josephine raikuna upp 389 389 390 390 393 394  
Shyam Sundaram SDl 5,432 5,486 5,487 5,575 5,584 5,818 5,829 6,215
Qoro ratu Vero naovuka ind. 65 65      
rajendra Kumar ind. 56       
Kamenieli nawaqavonovono pAnu 476 476 476 476 622 622 624 633
joseva Samudunatua Vatunitu ind. 168 169 171 178    
ratu jeremaia lewaravu ind. 392 392 392 393 403 404 409 
pravin jamieson ind. 96 96 96    
informal  1,356       
total votes  19,942       
total valid  18,586       
turnout (per cent)  84.3       
total registered  23,658     
       
64. Yasawa/Nawaka Open       
Sivia Qoro Flp 7,858     
Bal Subramani nFp 2,772     
Saimoni naivalu SDl 4,163     
mataiasi n Saukuru pAnu 769     
Dewa nand ind. 60     
informal  1,752     
total votes  17,374     
total valid  15,622     
turnout (per cent)  86.9     
total registered  20,002     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
       
474 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
65. Nadroga Open        
Ali mohammed jamal nApF 260 369    
mesulame rakuro Flp 6,959 6,960 6,973 7,939   
immanuel manu nFp 770 770 1012    
Viliame navoka SDl 6,734 6,739 6,853 6,899   
Vilisite Qera nVtlp  115      
informal  1,856      
total votes  16,694      
total valid  14,838 14,838 14,838 14,838   
turnout (per cent)  89.8      
total registered  18,590         
    
66. Serua/Navosa Open           
Atunaisa lacabuka rasoki nDp 123 196      
Anisi Dau Bati ind. 81       
jona rokowai nVtlp 433 434 621 623    
pio iowane Wong ind. 1,005 1,008 1,009 1,016 1,022   
peniasi lavava Dakua Flp 6,318 6,319 6,319 6,356 6,360 7,311 7,638 
William mcGoon nFp 938 939 940 1,240 1,840 1,860  
jone V navakamocea SDl 8,537 8,538 8,546 8,545 8,553 8,610 10,143 
Viliame Bale nApF 346 347 347     
informal  2,581       
total votes  20,362       
total valid  17,781       
turnout (per cent)  89.9       
total registered  22,642       
67. Bua/Macuata West Open         
josefa cavu nApF 939       
Hazrat Ali nApF 48       
Vitori cavalevu nApF 30       
tuvuki isireli B ind. 235       
lemeki Qalibau Flp 4,618       
josefa Dimuri SDl 8,307       
josefa rusaqoli nFp 565     
Suliasi Saraqia ind. 528     
informal  1,297     
total votes  16,567     
total valid  15,270     
turnout (per cent)  92.4     
total registered  17,925     
       
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
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68. Labasa Open       
mohammed Sharif SDl 80     
Gonelevu Siteri nai nApF 273     
Koresi matatolu nApF 5     
Sailosi Semi lutua SDl 265     
poseci Bune Flp 8,066     
timoci Bulitavu SDl 3,015     
raman pratap Singh nFp 1,266     
informal  925      
total votes  13,895     
total valid  12,970     
turnout (per cent)  88.8     
total registered  15,651     
       
69. Macuata East Open       
Agni Deo Singh Flp 8,357     
parmod chand nFp 1,669     
iliesa Seru SDl 3,343     
informal  1,580     
total votes  14,949     
total valid  13,369     
turnout (per cent)  91.7     
total registered  16,306     
       
70. Cakaudrove West Open       
Gilbert Vakalalabure ind. 511     
tuikoroalau Aporosa ind. 540     
ratu osea Vakalalabure SDl 8,409     
naulu peni ind. 1,544     
inia poate tubui SDl 698     
Saliceni tulevu Gonelevu Flp 2,359     
Solomone catarogo pAnu 91     
informal  1,128     
total votes  15,280     
total valid  14,152     
turnout (per cent)  86.2     
total registered  17,717     
       
71. Lau/Taveuni/Ratuma Open       
Fani tago Vosaniveibuli nApF 2,553     
ilisoni taoba ind. 204     
Savenaca uluibau Draunidalo SDl 10,888     
pio r naiqama  ind. 223     
informal  1,705     
total votes  15,573     
total valid  13,868     
turnout (per cent)  92.1     
total registered  16,906     
 party totals    
  counts
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
       
476 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
affirmative action policies  151–52, 158, 
223, 375–77
Agricultural landlord and tenant 
Act (AltA)  14–15, 18, 75, 90, 97, 
150–51, 157, 158, 372, 401, 411
Ah Koy, jim  69, 128, 278, 313
Ali, john  99, 283
All national congress  229, 248
Alliance party  5, 6, 65, 73, 78, 79, 81, 
82, 93, 147, 205, 220, 229, 243, 244, 
253, 255, 256, 323, 338, 371–72, 
405, 415
AltA (see Agricultural landlord and 
tenant Act)
alternative vote system  169–70, 211, 
272–87, 294, 295, 340–42, 379–84, 
385–98, 441
Arms, Father David  55, 347–48, 361, 
personal perspective 385–98
Assembly of christian churches in Fiji  
123, 133, 300–14, 328
Australian response to events in Fiji  41, 
44, 124, 178, 427, 432
Ba province  xxii, 95, 96, 215, 225–42, 
276
Ba provincial council  95, 229–30
Baba, jale  41, 71, 129–30
Baba, Dr tupeni  67, 91, 92, 99, 283, 
339
Index
Bai Kei Viti  69, 94, 225, 236, 238, 
278, 285
Bain, Atu  101, 437
Bainimarama, commodore Voreqe 
(Frank)  xxi, xxii, xxiii, 8, 13, 14, 29, 
30, 34, 35–42, 71, 75, 76, 94, 115, 
116, 117, 122, 126, 127, 128, 136, 
144, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 
183, 278, 412–13, 414, 416, 417, 
420–49
Baledrokadroka, colonel jone  39, 126, 
128, 424
Bale, Qoriniasi  13, 111, 125, 130, 132, 
139
Banaban community  244, 245, 247, 
248
Bau  27, 45, 69, 84, 204, 208, 210, 
214, 227, 263
Bavadra, Dr timoci  6, 32, 98, 225, 
228, 404
Beddoes, mick  93, 95, 102, 124, 
196–97, 243, 244, 247, 248, 280
Bose levu Vakaturaga (Great council of 
chiefs)  xxi, 5, 21, 46, 65, 66, 68, 82, 
90, 93, 108, 122, 128, 133, 139, 188, 
205, 227, 236, 256, 261–62, 270, 404, 
410, 411, 412, 413, 415, 417, 422, 431, 
432, 434, 435, 437, 440
Bune, poseci  74, 96, 98, 100, 101, 129, 
437, 439
477index
Butadroka, Sakeasi  5, 105, 219, 278, 
408
cakobau, Adi Samanunu talakuli  84, 
163–64, 165
cakobau, ratu edward  17, 262, 413
cakobau, ratu George  6, 17, 262
cAmV (see conservative Alliance-
matanitu Vanua)
catholic church  245–46, 302
caucau, Adi Asenaca  161, 163, 164, 
169
ccF (see citizens’ constitutional 
Forum)
chand, Ganesh  135, 330–31
chand, pratap  67
chaudhry, mahendra  xx, xxi–xxii, 2, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 34, 53, 64, 
66, 67, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 89–103, 
106, 114–16, 124, 136, 174, 177, 
178, 179, 182, 196, 210, 211, 225, 
233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 248, 276, 
280, 315, 322, 325–27, 327, 331, 
374, 400, 423, 432, 433, 436–37, 
439–43 
personal perspective 347–64
chinese  244, 245
christopher, David  243, 247, 248
citizens’ constitutional Forum (ccF)  
114, 125, 131
colonial history  3–5, 27–28, 82, 
227–28, 301–2, 317–22, 322–24
commonwealth  178
commonwealth observer mission  342
communal representation  xix
conservative Alliance-matanitu Vanua 
(cAmV)  41, 69, 70, 72, 73, 78, 
80–81, 83, 90, 121–22, 137, 138, 
139, 140, 179, 204–12, 208–10, 258, 
262, 263, 278, 338, 339, 340, 423
constituency Boundaries commission 
288–99, 344
constitutions: 1970  xxi, 1, 7, 255, 287, 
343, 404
 1990  xxi, 1, 128, 221, 255, 256, 257, 
416
 1997  xix, xxi, xxiv, 1, 2, 6, 7, 20, 68, 
72, 98, 102, 113, 128, 136, 141, 176, 
221, 257, 272, 289–90, 309, 337, 
338, 365, 368, 422, 423, 426, 432, 
442
constitutional crisis 1977  xix, 65, 254
constitution review commission 
(crc)  7, 14, 221, 293, 343, 385, 
386, 407, 441
constitution (Amendment) Act 1997  
233, 288, 293
corruption allegations  xxii, 37, 322, 
382, 418, 428, 429–31, 434–36, 440
coups
 1987  xix, xx, xxi, xxii, 1, 6, 7, 26, 27, 
29, 30, 32, 43, 65, 71, 75, 80, 81, 94, 
98, 121, 130, 132, 133, 175, 177, 
221, 225, 229, 252, 255, 257, 303, 
306, 316, 317, 326, 327, 328, 405, 
406, 413, 416, 417, 421, 422, 423, 
427
 may 2000  xix, xx, xxi, xxii, 1–2, 7, 
8, 12, 26, 27, 30, 32, 41, 43, 65, 67, 
68, 69, 73, 78, 79, 80, 82, 89, 92, 94, 
98, 111–43, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 
181, 205, 219, 222, 225, 233, 236, 
252, 258, 259, 278, 304, 317, 322, 
326, 327, 368, 373, 386, 399, 400, 
413, 414, 416, 420, 421, 422, 423, 
427, 432, 435, 437 
arrest and conviction of participants  
34–37, 118–20, 209, 222, 428
 December 2006  xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 45, 
75–76, 413, 414, 416, 417, 420–49 
478 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
opposition to the coup  433–34 
post-coup beatings and intimidation  
426, 434, 436 
post-coup interim cabinet  xxii, 438–44
cyprus  370
Datt, Krishna  6, 14, 67, 74, 101, 129, 
147, 275, 369, 405, 406, 437, 442
Digitaki, laisa  433–34
Dimuri, ratu josefa  37, 122
Druavesi, ema  138
Duncan, ofa  129
Durutalo, Simione  239
Duvuloco, iliesa  181, 205
economic and social policies  144–59
economy  1, 75, 76, 144–59, 401
education  328–31
electoral Act 1998  xxiv, 52
electoral reform, calls for  285–86, 287, 
340–42, 382–84, 385–98, 402
election campaigns 2006 11–25, 64, 
74–75, 91, 94–95, 111–43, 144–59, 
174–84, 192–97
election observation missions  52–63, 
347–64 
and the media  58–59 
impact of statements  59–61
elections 
pre-2006  250–60
 1963  46
 1972  338
 1977  5, 65, 317, 323, 338
 1982  65, 254, 322, 338
 1987  xx, 6, 255, 317, 327–28, 338
 1992  xx, 97, 338
 1994  xx, 233, 338
 1999  xx, 2, 7, 8, 65, 93, 96, 104, 
106, 160, 161, 171, 176, 177, 185, 
191–92, 225, 228, 233, 234, 235, 236, 
257, 261, 265–67, 272–87, 288–89, 
290–95, 317, 338, 340, 341, 365, 
368, 385, 386, 387, 403, 441
 2001  xx, 2, 9, 17, 53, 64, 65, 71, 72, 
79, 98, 104, 121, 154–55, 160, 161, 
171, 177, 179, 180, 185, 228, 235, 
236, 237, 258, 261, 267–68, 272–87, 
288–89, 324, 338, 340, 347, 348, 
365, 369, 386, 390–91, 441
elections and nation-building  250–60
electoral boundaries  288–99
electoral commission  342 
perspective  365–67, 399
Federation party  5, 250
Fiji Broadcasting corporation limited  
42
Fiji elections office  xxv–xxvii, 41, 
52–57
Fiji Human rights commission  xxii, 
129, 131, 422
Fiji indian community  3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 
105, 124, 139, 162, 167, 232–33, 
302, 315–36, 343
 emigration  6, 9, 259, 327–28, 395, 
400
Fiji labour party (Flp)  2, 6–7, 8, 9, 
12, 13, 15, 16–17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 32, 
39, 41, 44, 58, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 
71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 82, 86, 89–103, 
105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 
115, 122, 129, 131, 135, 136, 139, 
161–63, 165, 177, 196, 205, 210, 
223, 228, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 
238, 244, 246, 248, 249, 255, 258, 
259, 263, 268, 272–87, 310, 315, 
324, 325–27, 330–31, 337, 338, 339, 
340, 348, 368, 369, 374, 379, 383, 
385, 386, 388, 389, 395, 400, 402, 
412, 423, 435–43
479index
 policies and manifesto  2006 144–59
Fiji law Society  72, 125, 129, 131, 142
Fiji muslim league  320–25, 331
Fiji police Force  39, 125
Fijian Association party (FAp) 67, 70, 
79, 80, 82, 98, 109, 222, 243, 250, 
260, 340
Fijian indigenous customs, and elections 
21–22, 46–51 
the electoral shed  46, 48–50 
songs  50
 vanua, lotu and matanitu  78–88, 412
 Fijian traditional chiefs and politics  
84–86, 108, 213–24, 403–5
 title disputes  261–71, 403
‘Fijian paramountcy’  254, 255, 256, 
308, 411, 412, 417, 422
Fijian nationalist party  5, 85, 220, 278, 
415
Flp (see Fiji labour party)
Foster, peter  430–31
Ganilau, ratu epeli  8, 17–20, 73, 76, 
93, 108, 109, 262, 279, 283, 434
Ganilau, ratu penaia  93, 109, 246, 
255, 262, 413, 417
garment industry  1, 75, 253
General electors Association  243, 244
General voters (‘Generals’)  243–49, 
279, 388
General Voters party  244
Great council of chiefs (see Bose levu 
Vakaturaga)
Guyana  286, 406, 408–10, 418–19
Hindu organisations  315–36
homosexuality  309
Hughes, Andrew  113, 182, 422, 425, 
432, 443
iloilo, ratu josefa  35, 66, 67, 97, 126, 
179, 210, 229, 234, 236, 420, 421, 
426, 431, 437–38
indigenous claims tribunal Bill  75, 
424, 442
independence 1970  3, 5, 250, 251
independent candidates  11
inoke, Sosefo Sikuri  192–98
irwin, robin  95, 248, 280
Kamikamica, josevata  97
Karavaki, Semesa  41, 54, 167, 180
Kepa, ro teimumu  163
Khan, Hafizud Dean  324, 331
Kioa islanders  247, 248
Konrote, jioji Konousi  192–99, 248
Koreans  244
Koroi, jokapeci  13, 39, 71, 94, 96, 101, 
162, 164, 423
Kotabalavu, jioji  13
Koya, Siddiq  323, 405
lal, Brij  176
lalabalavu, ratu naiqama  37, 69, 72, 
114, 120, 121, 122, 137, 262, 263, 
278
land issues  14–15, 75, 90, 150–51, 
154–58, 235, 401, 403, 409, 411
lasaro, manasa  303–4
lau  68, 69, 227
lau provincial council  68
lebanon  370–71
madraiwiwi, ratu joni  xx, 14, 38, 39, 
40, 94, 101, 417, 420, 424, 428, 438 
personal perspective 399–402
malaysia  376–77
mara, ratu Sir Kamisese  5, 6, 8, 34, 
66, 68, 69, 89, 91, 93, 97, 102, 109, 
480 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
116, 122, 132, 147, 176, 178, 182, 
213, 220, 227, 233, 237, 243, 246, 
255, 262, 323, 368, 371–72, 404, 
405, 407, 412, 413, 417, 431, 432, 
443
mara, ro lady lala  213, 218, 224
media  12, 13, 17, 24, 174–84, 399
median voter model  145–47
melanesian and other pacific 
communities  244, 245, 246
malapportionment  297
methodist church of Fiji  46–47, 69, 
78, 79, 83–84, 85, 123, 133, 139, 
162, 238, 246, 300–14, 315–16, 401, 
422, 433, 438, 440
‘moderates Forum’ parties  70, 92, 102
mua, metuisela  73
multiracialism  5, 6, 105, 109, 252, 
257, 339
muslim organizations  315–36
nagagavoka, ratu Sairusi  93, 94
nagusuca, nanise  163, 171
nailatikau, Adi Koila  69, 132, 142
nailatikau, ratu epeli  66, 127, 264, 
439
nApF (see national Alliance party of 
Fiji)
narsey, Wadan  15
national Alliance party of Fiji (nApF)  
17, 93, 96, 106, 107, 108, 109, 131, 
149–53,  161, 165, 192, 193, 194, 
196, 248, 262, 279, 283, 379, 382–
83, 394, 434, 439
national Farmers union  16, 21, 101, 
235, 276
national Federation party (nFp)  6, 
11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 58, 65, 69, 70, 89, 
96, 98, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 124, 
131, 136, 147–52, 165, 220, 232, 
233, 234, 248, 254, 255, 257, 258, 
273, 275, 276, 279, 280, 283, 285, 
294, 322, 323, 324–25, 327, 338, 
339, 372, 394, 400, 404
nationalist Vanua tako lavo party 
(nVtlp)  73, 181, 205, 221, 278
native land and Fisheries commission  
270
native land trust Act (nltA)  15, 75, 
90, 150–51, 157, 158, 401, 411
native land trust Board (nltB)  150, 
157, 229, 262, 429, 436
nawaikula, niko  73
new caledonia  370, 371, 374, 376
new labour unity party (nlup)  67, 
69, 70, 92, 243, 245, 339
new nationalist party  41
new Zealand response to events in Fiji  
44, 124, 178, 427 
nFp (see national Federation party)
nltA (see native land trust Act)
nltB (see native land trust Board)
non-government organisations (nGos)  
58, 124–25, 129, 131, 132, 434
northern ireland  370, 374, 376
nVtlp (see nationalist Vanua tako 
lavo party) 
pacific islands Forum  52, 55, 76, 427
 eminent persons Group  440
pAnu (see party of national unity)
party of national unity (pAnu)  69, 
73, 93, 94, 95, 97, 102, 191, 225, 
229, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 
260, 285, 339, 383
patel, A.D.  148, 404, 405
people’s coalition government 1999  
xxi, 2, 7–8, 66, 79, 99, 149, 154, 162, 
225, 236, 258, 322, 338, 368, 383, 
386, 423
481index
poverty issues  152–53, 401
power-sharing, international examples  
368–78 
prasad, chandrika, case 2001  2, 64, 
65–66, 68, 70, 76, 90, 327, 423, 426
prerogative of mercy commission  2, 
72, 113
promotion of reconciliation, tolerance 
and unity Bill (‘the rtu Bill’)  xxviii, 
12–13, 21, 27, 35, 37, 38, 45, 65, 71, 
72, 73, 75, 90, 94, 99, 111–43, 157, 
179, 181, 184, 246, 259, 332, 373, 
401, 412, 423, 442
 impact on 2006 election  135–39
 ministry of multi-ethnic Affairs and 
national reconciliation and unity 
workshops  130
 opposition to Bill  123–30, 133–34, 
142, 246
 joint parliamentary Sector committee 
on justice, law and order  130, 
131–35
proportional representation systems  
285–86, 287, 340–42, 382–84, 
385–98
public Servants’ Association  98
Qarase, laisenia  xxi, xxii, 2, 5, 7, 13, 
14, 20–21, 38, 40, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 
74, 75, 78–88, 90, 94–97, 100, 101, 
111–43, 147, 161, 163, 178, 179, 
182, 183, 184, 197, 205, 222, 231, 
232, 261, 263, 269, 276, 301, 308, 
310, 324, 331, 399, 400, 405, 406, 
412, 420–49
 personal perspective  337–46 (see 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua 
(SDl) party/government)
Qarase’s multiparty cabinet 2006  44, 
73, 74, 96, 100, 101, 110, 158, 268, 
337, 340, 344–46, 368–78, 403, 406, 
412, 424, 437, 439, 441, 442, 443
Qoliqoli Bill  27, 38–39, 45, 75, 129, 
136, 424, 442
Qoro, Adi Sivia  163, 268
rabi island  133
rabuka, Sitiveni  xxi, 6, 7, 8, 18, 41, 
68, 72, 80, 82, 97, 98, 174, 175, 176, 
177, 178, 181–82, 231, 233, 237, 
245, 255–56, 257, 285, 303, 306, 
328, 368, 372, 405, 406, 412–13, 
416, 417
‘reconciliation Week’ october 2004  
114–15
reddy, jai ram  6, 8, 15, 17, 18, 90, 98, 
176, 177, 233, 275, 368, 372, 405, 
406
reeves, Sir paul  176
reeves commission (see constitution 
review commission)
regional politics  xxii
religion  xxii
republic of Fiji military Forces (rFmF)  
xxii, 1, 6, 13–14, 26–45, 65, 66, 71, 
73, 75, 79, 94, 111, 112, 115, 122, 
125, 126–29, 136, 141, 175, 181, 233, 
256, 259, 278, 326, 400, 401, 412, 
413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 420–49
 counter revolutionary Warfare unit 
(crWu)  30, 32, 117, 443
 history  27–29, 414
 mutiny 2000 and court martials  31, 
35, 38, 72, 112, 116, 117, 122, 
126–28, 178, 263, 373, 423–24, 443
 opposition to rtu Bill  122, 125, 
126–29, 136
 public relations team (‘truth and 
justice’ campaign)  31–34, 42–45, 
129, 278 (see also coups)
482 from  election  to  coup  in  fiji
rewa  xxii, 48, 85, 213–24, 276, 403
rFmF (see republic of Fiji military 
Forces)
rotuma/rotumans  xxii, xxiv, xxvii, 56, 
80, 86, 91, 133, 163, 185–203, 244, 
257, 279, 388, 394
rounds Ganilau, Bernadette  95, 131, 
163, 164, 246, 280, 439
rtu Bill (see promotion of 
reconciliation, tolerance and unity 
Bill)
Salabula, losena  163
Samisoni, mere  163
Saubulinayau, meli  424–25
Savua, isikia  115, 116, 178
SDl (see Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
lewenivanua party)
Senilagakali, Dr jona  427, 438
Seniloli, ratu jope  12, 36, 114, 115, 
120, 121, 122
Seruvakula, Viliame  123, 233
Silatolu, ratu timoci  116, 133, 222
Soqosoqo Duavata ni lewenivanua 
(SDl) party/government  xxi, 2, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 38, 
41, 42, 44, 52, 58, 64, 65–76, 78–88, 
90–95, 96, 99, 104–7, 111–43, 161, 
162, 163, 179, 182, 183, 192, 193, 
194, 196, 197, 198, 205–11, 213, 
217–18, 223, 225, 231, 236, 238, 239, 
240, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 258, 
259, 261, 263, 268, 269, 272–87, 308, 
310, 316, 322, 324, 325–26, 329, 
330–31, 338, 339, 340, 348, 379, 382, 
388, 393, 395, 400, 401, 412, 420–49
 policies and manifesto 2006  144–59, 
164–65, 223
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni taukei 
(SVt) party and administration 
1992–99  8, 9, 21, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 
78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 98, 104, 106, 109, 
138, 151, 155, 208, 222, 223, 231, 
233, 234, 235, 239, 256, 257, 258, 
285, 294, 301, 338, 339, 340, 368, 
372, 385, 386, 389
South Africa  369–70, 374
 truth and reconciliation commission  
124, 135
Speed, Adi Kuini  91, 98
Speight, George  xx, 1, 2, 8, 31, 34, 35, 
67, 68, 69, 70, 80, 84, 92, 94, 98, 
105, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 
122, 139, 174, 175, 177, 179, 182–
83, 204–12, 222, 234, 236, 278, 304, 
428 (see also coups, may 2000)
Sugar cane Growers’ Association  276
sugar industry  1, 3, 15–16, 55, 75, 99, 
153, 253, 409, 440
Sukuna, ratu Sir lala  3–4, 17, 93, 109, 
227, 413
Suva  83–84, 245, 246, 247, 279, 280, 
283
Suva-nausori corridor  14–15, 93
SVt (see Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
taukei party)
Switzerland  370
tailevu north electorate  204–12
takiveikata, ratu inoke  68–69, 123, 
128, 137
tavaiqia, ratu Sir josaia  229
tikoinasau, Samisoni  121, 122, 140, 
205–11, 278
tora, Apisai  93, 94, 231, 234, 235, 
236, 238, 248, 404
trade unions  21, 98, 101, 123, 125, 
133, 148, 154
trinidad  406, 408–10, 418–19
tugia, manasa  77, 130, 131, 135, 140
483index
united Generals party  104, 394, 402
united peoples party (upp)  70, 93, 
94, 95, 124, 149, 151, 152, 153, 162, 
163, 165, 192, 193, 196, 243–49, 
280, 379, 383, 388, 394
university of Fiji  330–31
university of the South pacific (uSp)  
52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 130, 328, 330
urbanization  83–84, 253–54, 283
upp (see united peoples party)
uSp (see university of the South 
pacific)
uSA response to events in Fiji  124, 427
Vakatora, tomasi  176, 220, 274
Vakalalabure, ratu rakuita  120, 121, 
122, 137, 140
Vayeshnoi, lekh ram  75, 100, 101, 
439
Veitokani ni lewenivanua Vakarisito 
(VlV) party  80, 82, 84, 98, 109, 260, 
339, 340
Viti levu  11, 68, 69, 73
VlV (see Veitokani ni lewenivanua 
Vakarisito party)
Vosanibola, josefa  37, 38
Voting irregularities, allegations  70, 
347–64, 430, 437
Waqanisau, jeremaia  35
women and women’s organisations  
60, 107, 125, 131, 133, 134, 142, 
160–73, 195
 as voters  165–67
 political representation  160–73, 
379–84, 388–89, 401
Zinck, Kenneth  70, 246, 279
